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ABSTRACT
Steele, Walter R. “A Theological Dialogue with and Evaluation of Erik H. Erikson’s
Theory of Identity Development in Light of Pauline Baptismal Theology in Romans and Some
Implications for Pastoral Care” Ph.D. diss., Concordia Seminary, 2017. 304pp.
The Issue of identity and identity development, or actualization, is both a psychological
and a theological issue. Among psychologists who have been concerned with identity, the name
of Erik H. Erikson is at the forefront. His psychosocial theory has been appropriated by several
people in the field of pastoral care, yet his theory has not been adequately subjected to a robust
and thorough theological critique based on solid exegesis. This dissertation provides such a
critique by using a revised-correlational dialogue between Erikson’s and Eriksonian theory and
Paul’s baptismal theology of identity drawn principally from Romans.
The dissertation first describes Erikson’s theory and a major adaptation of his theory by
James Marcia and his associates. It then explores Romans to determine Paul’s understanding of
identity and the actualization of a Christian identity by means of baptism. A revised correlation
dialogue next reveals that Erikson’s theory must not be applied to the conferral or imputation of
identity, which is given as a gift and received by faith. However, his theory is helpful in two
ways. First, it is useful in describing the deleterious effects of mistrusting God and building
identity on the foundation of rebellious autonomy. In this case, both the syntonic and dystonic
elements can be viewed as antithetical to the Christian life. On the other hand, if identity is first
based upon trust in God and the gospel of the free gift of righteousness in Christ, and autonomy
is understood in terms of self-control and individuation, his theory can be properly used in the
pastoral care work of assisting Christians in actualizing that identity in the various stages of life.
The final chapter provides trajectories for further study and presents an initial proposal for using
the Rite of Holy Baptism in pastoral care.
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PREFACE

Over sixty years ago, in 1950, Erik Homburger Erikson presented his initial Life Cycle
Theory in Childhood and Society. By the next decade he was well known, even winning a
Pulitzer Prize in nonfiction for Gandhi’s Truth in 1970. The term, “Identity Crisis,” comes from
the popularization of his theory in Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968).
His life cycle theory was incorporated into the pastoral care theology of Lutheran practical
theologian Donald Capps in his courses at Princeton Theological Seminary; however, it does not
appear as though it has been given significant attention within The Lutheran Church—Missouri
Synod’s seminaries’ curricula. Any discussion of human lifespan development must take into
account the work of Erikson and that of those who have built upon his theory and modified it
over time. It is the conviction of this dissertation, and will be shown in the proof of its thesis, that
the use of Erikson’s theory of identity actualization in pastoral care is theologically defensible.
His theory with appropriate modifications can enrich and support the work of pastoral care,
especially in reference to the realm of the actualization of a Christian’s baptismal identity.
First, any theological discussion or critique of such a theory must understand the
fundamental presuppositions of his theory. Second, any examination of this theory must consider
how it might need to be revised in light of Christian theology. In this dissertation, “Erikson’s
theory” will refer to his work specifically. “Eriksonian” will be the term for those which have
Erikson’s work as their foundation.
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GLOSSARY

A Sense of Autonomy. A sense of autonomy is an introspective experience of being a person
who is separate, unique, and individuated from another; that is, of being oneself. This
begins at approximately 18 months from birth, during the time when toilet training is also
beginning. A sense of autonomy is externally observable by actions which illustrate
strength of will and willfulness, such as a struggle against the parents.1
Basic Strengths and Basic Weaknesses. Each of the eight stages in Erikson’s theory is resolved
when the person achieves what Erikson calls “a basic sense of” two dialectical qualities,
for example, a sense of basic trust and a sense of basic mistrust. Erikson is often
erroneously understood to present these two as a positive and a negative. On the contrary,
the so-called negative is necessary for living in the world.2 As an example, basic mistrust
is a good quality if mistrust is placed (so to speak) in that which is untrustworthy. When
the resolution of each stage is successfully achieved the product is a “basic strength” of
character. As an example, in Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust) the adaptive strength is “hope.”
Hope results when trust must endure periods in which mistrust in the provider could be
devastating. Hope gives the person a reason to endure.3
Crisis. The idea of a crisis being instrumental at each developmental stage is indispensable for
Erikson. “Each successive stage and crisis has a special relation to one of the basic
elements of society, and this for the simple reason that the human life cycle and man’s
institutions have evolved together.”4 It is essential for understanding Erikson to
understand that the social, historical setting of a person’s life is integral to that person’s
development, just as important as any genetic factors that are in play. A crisis occurs
when the social setting of the person intersects with that person’s learned strengths,
which are no longer adequate to negotiate the new situation. In Erikson, a crisis is not an
evil. It is a necessity for social adaptation and maturation. “Erikson actually regarded
these crises less as battles and more as dialectical tensions.”5

1

See Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1963), 251–54. “Will” and
“willfulness” is “the sense that one will find his or her own identity rather than have to submit to choices imposed by
authority figures.” Alan S. Waterman, “Developmental Perspectives on Identity Formation: From Adolescence to
Adulthood,” in Ego Identity: A Handbook for Psychosocial Research, ed. J.E. Marcia, et al (New York: Springer,
1993), 49.
2

Erikson presents the dialectic in his various charts of epigenetic development in terms of X vs. Y (e.g.:
Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust); however, his intention is not to say that the first quality is the good one and the
second one is an evil. In a description of his chart and the terms he uses, he states: “The vs stands for ‘versus,’ and
yet also, in light of their complementarity, for something like ‘vice versa.’ ” The Life Cycle Completed, ext. ed.
(New York: Norton, 1997), 55. Erikson is dealing with human life as it is, not as it was in Eden or will be in the
eschaton for believers in Christ.
3

See Erikson Childhood and Society, 247–51.

4

Erikson Childhood and Society, 250.

5

Stephen A. Mitchell and Margaret J. Black, Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic
Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 148.
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Epigenetic Principle (of Maturation). Erikson borrowed this term from Freud, who, in turn,
had borrowed it from embryology. In physical development, “each organ has its time of
origin. This time factor is important as the place of origin.”6 In a similar way, the
psychosocial development of a person also follows a set sequence, during which, at each
step, the potential psychosocial characteristic emerges as a fully developed quality. It
may become stunted or regress in some way after emerging, but it will not be missing.
However, if it fails to emerge when it should, it produces a “defective person.”7 Such a
failure to emerge is highly detrimental to psychosocial development, just as the failure of
a physical organ to develop in utero will also prohibit it ever from emerging.8
Identity Crisis. Erikson writes: “‘Identity’ and ‘identity crisis’ have in popular and scientific
usage become terms which alternately circumscribe something so large and so seemingly
self-evident that to demand a definition would almost seem petty, while at other times
they designate something so narrow for purposes of measurement that the over-all
meaning is lost, and it could just as well be called something else.”9 Erikson recollects
first using the term when he was treating war veterans at Mt. Zion Veterans’
Rehabilitation Center during the Second World War. “Most of our patients, so we
concluded at that time, had neither been ‘shell-shocked’ nor become malingerers, but had
through the exigencies of war lost a sense of personal sameness and historical
continuity.”10 Subsequently, he and others noted the same loss in severely conflicted
youth. What the servicemen and these youth had in common was their age bracket.
“Thus, we have learned to ascribe a normative ‘identity crisis’ to the age of adolescence
and young adulthood.”11
Ego Identity. Ego identity is that sense of self which includes both a sense of personal sameness
and of historical continuity, even as one changes and matures over time. Ego identity is
“derived from the psychosocial crises of childhood in light of the ideological climate of
youth.”12 It tests, selects, and integrates the self-images derived from these crises. It is not
wholly a conscious sense of identity. It is a partially unconscious organizing agency,
which is formed by the forces of somatic, psychic, and social influences. Self-identity
emerges from experiences in which changing roles and social relationships are
successfully reintegrated into one’s sense of continuity over time. Identity formation,
thus, can be said to have a self-aspect and an ego aspect.13

6

Erikson, Childhood and Society, 65.

7

Erikson, Childhood and Society, 66.

8

Erikson writes in much greater detail about epigenetic development in “Problems of Infancy and Early
Childhood,” in A Way of Looking at Things: Selected Papers 1930–1980, ed. Stephen Schlein (New York: Norton,
1987), 547–68.
9

Erik Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968), 15.

10

Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 17.

11

Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 17.

12

Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 210.

13

Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 211.

xii

Maladaptation/ Malignancy. Erik and Joan Erikson use these terms to describe an exaggeration
of a virtue, or character strength, “amounting to a pathology”14 For example, the virtue
developed after successful negotiation of Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) is
fidelity. The maladaptive manifestation of fidelity is fanaticism. The maladaptive
response to the crisis is repudiation.
Revised Correlational Approach. A revised correlational approach is a conversational
approach between two distinct disciplines, such as psychology and theology, in which
mutual understanding is sought, so that each discipline might be enriched by the
interaction between the two.

14

Joan Erikson, Wisdom and the Senses: The Way of Creativity (New York: Norton, 1988), 114.
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CHAPTER ONE
SCOPE OF THE DISSERTATION
The Thesis
“Who am I?” This question stands at the center of human inquiry in our time.1 The question
is asked by children, especially those who have been adopted.2 It is asked by adolescents and
emerging adults.3 It is a major factor for military veterans, especially combat veterans suffering
from post-traumatic stress injury.4 It is asked by older adults as they enter retirement and no
longer find identity in their occupation.5 “Identity is an understanding of who you are.”6
The issue of identity and identity formation, however, is not merely a psychological issue;
it has a theological foundation. As will be demonstrated in chapter 3 of this dissertation, for the
Christian the foundational source of identity is his baptism into Christ Jesus, by means of which

1

“Survival, anticipation, and responsibility seem to depend on identity and seem to reveal what makes
questions about identity so morally and practically important, not to mention emotionally uncomfortable.” Maura
Tumulty, “How Philosophers Think about Persons, Personal Identity, and the Self,” in Personal Identity and
Fractured Selves¸ ed. Debra J.H. Mathews, Hilary Bok, and Peter V. Rabins (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins
University Press, 2009), 23.
2

“For many adopted persons, the question of identity is interwoven with specific questions about one’s
lineage, such as ‘Who are my biological parents’ ‘Where was I born?’ ‘What were my earliest days like?’ and ‘What
is my genetic heritage?’ . . . Adoptive identity addresses these questions: ‘Who am I as an adopted person?’ and
‘What does being adopted mean to me, and how does it fit into my understanding of my self, relationships, family,
and culture?’” Harold D. Grotevant and Lynn Von Korff, “Adoptive Identity,” in Handbook of Identity Theory and
Research, ed. Seth j. Schwartz, Koen Luyckx, and Vivian Vignoles, (New York: Springer, 2011), 2:585–86. See
also Betty J. Lifton, Journey of the Adopted Self: A Quest for Wholeness (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
3

“Identity formation takes place in every phase of the life span, but has particular poignancy in emerging
adulthood.” David P. Setran and Chris A. Kiesling, Spiritual Formation in Emerging Adulthood (Grand Rapids:
Baker, 2013), 79.
4

As an example, see the case study, “A Combat Crisis in a Marine,” Erikson, Childhood and Society, 38–47.

5

“Thus we see how the giving up of work has an interfering influence on the human ego.” Heije Faber,
Striking Sails, trans. Kenneth R. Mitchell (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984), 75.
6

Stephen M. Saunders, A Christian Guide to Mental Illness: Recognizing Mental Illness in the Church and
School (Milwaukee: Northwestern, 2016), 1:238.

1

God confers upon the Christian the identity of being one who is righteous before him.7 Baptism
results in a change of status. As Paul writes in Romans 6, it kills and makes alive. It also
transfers the baptized person from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of God. “Through
Baptism God enters deeply into human life; a separation between life before and the life after
takes place.”8 Nonetheless, for all that baptism bestows, it is not often used in the pastoral care
task of Christian identity actualization. Specifically, Christians are often told, “Live out your
baptism.” Yet, what this means and how it is to be applied in the context of their daily lives is not
very clear. Furthermore, how the actualization of Christian baptismal identity is to be expressed
in the various stages on life’s way is also a topic not addressed in any great detail. The task of
outlining the pragmatics of pastoral care in terms of identity actualization is, nonetheless, not
within the scope of this dissertation. A more fundamental task must first be accomplished. That
task is to engage the issues of identity actualization theologically.
It is the thesis of this dissertation that the utilization of Erikson’s developmental theory,
which theory has found its way into many books on pastoral care, is theologically defensible
within certain limits. It will be shown that the theory can be used in pastoral care in two specific
and seemingly contradictory areas when dealing with Christian identity. First, Erikson’s theory,
when viewed through the lens of Paul’s theology of baptism in Romans, and especially in the
preparatory work Paul does in Romans 1–5, can be used in pastoral care to describe and illustrate
the effects, or fruits, of original sin, which has its source in mistrust (lack of trust or faith) in
God, and that this leads to a false identity built on the foundation of narcissistic autonomy and
the resultant work of self-justification.
7

“Being in Baptism is equivalent to being in Christ.” David P. Scaer, Baptism Confessional Lutheran
Dogmatics 11 (St. Louis: The Luther Academy, 1999), 1.
8

Edmund Schlink, The Doctrine of Baptism, trans. Herbert J. A. Bouman (St. Louis: Concordia, 1972), 46.
See also Jonathan D. Trigg, Baptism in the Theology of Martin Luther (Boston, MA: Brill, 2001), 166–73.

2

The second part of the thesis is that Erikson’s theory can be utilized faithfully in assisting
in the pastoral care work of identity actualization, if, and only if, the concept of identity
construction or development is excluded from the basic foundation of Christian identity, which
identity is conferred by means of baptism and based upon the finished work of Christ in his death
and resurrection. In order to establish this final caveat, the dissertation, while noting the apparent
similarity between Paul and Erikson, that is, that trust (faith) is foundational to identity, will
demonstrate that the foundation of Christian identity is conferred by God in baptism. The
Christian’s foundational identity is in the righteousness of faith given in the gospel.
Therefore, this dissertation will demonstrate that, examined through the lens of a biblical
foundation of baptism, drawn principally from Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, supplemented by
First Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians, Erikson’s theory of identity
development can legitimately be utilized in the pastoral care work of Christian identity
actualization with the following caveats. First, it can be used to describe the effects and fruits of
original sin. Second, it can be used to assist a Christian to learn how to express, or actualize, his
or her conferred identity, which is given baptism. Third, any concept of development must be
avoided when speaking about the Christian’s conferred, imputed, alien identity in Christ. This
will be demonstrated in chapter 4, as Erikson’s theory, presented in chapter 2, is correlated with
Paul’s baptismal theology in chapter 3.9 After the above thesis is defended, some implications of
the findings of this dissertation will be presented in chapter 5. While that chapter will only begin
to discover possibilities, its goal is to encourage further work in the future.

9

The scope of this dissertation will be limited to the area of Eriksonian developmental psychology.
Increasingly, brain research is revealing the interconnection between psychological and biological aspects of human
development. A recent publication which gives a general survey of this research is Allen Nauss, Implications of
Brain Research for the Church (Minneapolis: Kirk House, 2013. Such research may well bolster Erikson’s
contention that identity development has not only psychological and social aspects, but is strongly influenced by the
somatic.

3

The Current Status of the Question
To limit Erikson to the discipline of psychology or psychoanalytic thought is really to
misunderstand the monumental change his theory has had on the social sciences and on
psychology of religion. True, he was trained as a psychoanalyst. However, Erikson’s theory
builds upon and yet expands the scope of both Sigmund Freud and Anna Freud, of whom he was
an analysand.10 Partially due to the influence of Anna Freud, who shifted her emphasis from the
study of the “id” (das Es) to that of the “ego” (das Ich),11 Erikson began to question the
“nineteenth century physicalism” of the Freuds, and eventually even Ms. Freud’s mechanistic
description of defense mechanisms.12 He expanded the view of human psychological
development so that it included three key elements: the somatic (physical being), the
psychological; and the social.13 While this thinking is common today, his innovation was
courageous as it brought him into conflict with Anna Freud, who thought of his work as a

10

While Erikson was undergoing psychoanalysis with Anna Freud, she was writing Das Ich und die
Abwehrmechanismen (The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense) which she published in 1936. Lawrence Friedman,
in his authoritative biography of Erikson, writes: “Anna Freud ran several seminars while serving actively as a
training analyst. Erik found her published lectures on the technique of child analysis to be ‘the only safe technical
statement’ on the subject. . . . Erik therefore regarded his contact with Anna Freud at the core of his analytic
training.” Lawrence J. Friedman, Identity’s Architect: A Biography of Erik H. Erikson (New York: Scribner, 1999),
75.
11

See Kit Welchman, Erik Erikson: His Life, Work, and Significance (Philadelphia: Open University, 2000),

12

See Friedman, Identity’s Architect, 88.

49.
13

Erikson is normally labelled a “Neo-Freudian,” since a significant percentage of his work departs from the
intrapsychic emphasis of Sigmund and Anna Freud. See Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr., A Brief History of Modern
Psychology (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), 127–32. Much as did Erikson, Heinz Hartmann also understood
that a sharp divide between the physiological and the psychological cannot be legitimately maintained. “We reject
the customary form of this question: What is biological and what is psychological in the developmental process? We
ask instead: What part is congenital, what maturational, and what environmentally determined? What physiological
and what psychological changes take place in it? Our psychological method encompasses more than just the
processes of mental development. Precisely because the psychological is a part of the biological, under certain
conditions our method shed light on physiological developments, particularly on those pertaining to instinctual
drives. We can trace the course of these developments, using psychological phenomena as their indicator or
symptom.” Heinz Hartmann, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (1937), trans. David Rapaport (New
York: International Universities Press, 1958), 34–35.

4

repudiation of the work of her father.14 One cannot truly accuse her of a false estimation of the
trajectory of Erikson’s work. As an example, for her father the sublimation of the instincts (or
drives of the id) was culturally necessary, but resulted in neuroses in the individual who had to
suppress his id-impulses. The German psychiatrist and psychoanalysis Stavros Mentzos writes:
“Es ist frawürdig, ob alle Formen kulurell wertvoller Tätigkeiten aus einer Sublimierung
entstehen.” Then, referencing Erikson’s Identity: Youth and Crisis, as well as Winnicott and
Matussek, he continues, “Die neuere Kreatitäsforschung auch psychoanalytischer Autoren geht
eine ähnliche Richtung.”15
The heightened concern about personal identity is a modern phenomenon. Erikson, in
Young Man Luther (1958), sought to connect young man Martin’s life crises with the battle
between identity confusion and the acquisition of a sense of self. It is highly unlikely that Luther
would have been conscious of such a struggle.16 His Weltanschauung was quite different.
Nevertheless, Erikson’s work opened the door to the psychoanalytic study of history, even of
biblical characters.
Erikson, of course, did not work in a vacuum. He was an heir of centuries of Western
intellectual thought. Jerrold Seigel remarks:

14

Erikson was sensitive to the way the publicity surrounding Childhood and Society (1950) ignored those he
considered to be his mentors and forerunners. Among these he counted both Freuds, especially Anna Freud, whose
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Since the time of Descartes and Locke (and less explicitly before, as we shall see),
the basis of selfhood in Western culture has been sought primarily along or within
three dimensions, ones that are familiar and should be easily recognizable to anyone.
We call them the bodily or material, the relational, and the reflexive dimensions of
self. The first involves the physical, corporeal existence of individuals, the things
about our nature that make us palpable creatures driven by needs urges, and
inclinations, and that give us particular constitutions or temperaments, making us for
instance more or less energetic, lethargic, passionate, or apathetic. Our selves on this
level, including whatever consciousness we have of them, are housed in our bodies,
and are shaped by the body’s needs. The second, relational, dimension arises from
social and cultural interaction, the common connections and involvements that give
us collective identities and shared orientations and values, making us people able to
use a specific language or idiom and marking us with its particular style of
description, categorization, and expression. In this perspective our selves are what our
relations with society and with others shape or allow us to be. The third dimension,
that of reflexivity . . . derives from the human capacity to make both the world and
our own existence objects of our active regard, to turn a kind of mirror not only on
the phenomena in the world, including our own bodies and our social relations, but on
our consciousness too, putting ourselves at a distance from our own being so as to
examine, judge, and sometimes regulate or revise it.17
These three dimensions are evident in Erikson’s thought. His contribution has been to take
the extended period of adolescence, which has become quite long in modern times, and assign to
it, especially and in particular, the work of identity formation—a formation which, while still
open to some manipulation in later years, is essentially formed during this timeframe. Seigel has
noted that “Erikson argued that the problem of human identity becomes especially acute during
adolescence, when individuals experience powerful bodily and mental transformations, making it
difficult to achieve a stable sense of continuity, both of themselves over time, and between what
any individual is for her or himself and what she or he is for others.”18 This instability is at the
core of the “identity crisis.”19 However, as Seigel notes elsewhere, Erikson teaches that the work
of developing individual identity begins in infancy when the child starts to differentiate himself
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from “the other,” developing first a basic sense of trust and a basic sense of mistrust, and then a
sense of personal autonomy.20
Erikson’s emphasis on the importance of a sense of identity and the dimensions of its
development is supported by the research of Pierre Tapp, Sylie Espardes-Pistre, and Florence
Sordes-Ader. They report seven important dimensions: La continuité; l’unité ou la cohérence; la
diversité et les territoires identitaires; la séparation, l’autonomie et l’affirmation; l’originalité;
l’action et la production d’œuvres; la valorisation ou positivité de soi.21
Erikson has also been credited with broadening the theoretical orientation of
psychoanalysis. Before him little attention was paid to the positive aspects of the cultural or
social milieu. For Freud, the Super-Ego (das Über-Ich), while necessary for social life, was the
chief contributor to neuroses. Erikson understood the social forces as playing a more positive
role in the development of personal identity. His work has also been incorporated into such
diverse fields as cultural anthropology, social work, and psycho-biography. Nonetheless, Stephen
Mitchell and Margaret Black make the following assessment.
Erikson’s legacy offers one of the most interesting ironies of contemporary
psychoanalytic thought. In terms of both the popular culture and related disciplines
like history and anthropology, Erikson has been among the most widely read and
influential of psychoanalytic authors, yet within the psychoanalytic literature itself he
is rarely acknowledged. Erikson always saw his own contributions as simply adding
dimensions to existing Freudian thought. Yet Freudian analytic authors had a hard
time bridging their traditional emphasis on the intrapsychic instinctual conflict with
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Erikson’s rich sense of the complex relationships between the individual and the
surrounding culture. In this sense, Erikson was ahead of his time.22
He contributed to this expansion of Freudian theory by pointing not only to his own clinical work
but also to Freud himself, especially Freud’s Die Traumdeutung.23 Erikson averred that Freud
made a major systematic break with this past when he wrote Die Traumdeutung. Erikson’s
argument has been attacked as false by Harry Guntrip, who argues that Erikson misunderstood
Freud.24 This, along with Anna Freud’s evaluation of Erikson’s writings, may partially account
for Erikson’s lack of status among many psychoanalytic theorists. Edward Shapiro and Gerard
Fromm write:
Erikson made significant contributions to a broad range of disciplines, but the
application of his theories to clinical practice has not received proper recognition.
Although considered among the group of ego psychologists that transformed
psychoanalytic theory in the 1950s and 1960s, Erikson's emphasis on how the
individual is inextricably bound to sociocultural and historical forces has broad and
largely underdeveloped clinical significance. David Rapaport described Erikson's
work as the culmination of ego psychology, the first psychoanalytic theory of the
person's relationship to social reality with which the ego is always engaged. Rapaport
noted, “[Erikson's] concept of mutuality specifies that the crucial coordination is
between the developing individual and his human (social) environment.” This
concept extends clinical work beyond the boundaries of the individual and opens it to
larger scrutiny. From his clinical study of patients, Erikson recognized how the
pathology and recovery of patients are linked to how they engage and are engaged by
their world.25
Nevertheless, Erikson has not been ignored by other writers in the field. In 1978, Daniel J.
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Levinson built upon Erikson’s work in The Seasons of a Man’s Life.26 Gail Sheehy’s book
Passages,27 published two years prior, was actually built upon the research reported in the
former. Sheehy updated her work in 1995 with New Passages: Mapping Your Life across Time.28
Carol Gilligan29 and Joan Borysenko30 have been among the voices that have engaged Erikson
critically, charging that his theory is overly androcentric. Borysenko postulates a significant
difference between adolescent girls and boys in their respective stages of affective development.
Boys, as they enter late adolescence, which is the beginning of Stage V (Identity vs. Identity
Diffusion) for Erikson, begin to negotiate the balance between intimacy and isolation. Girls,
according to Borysenko, have already worked through this stage in earlier years. They have
mastered intimacy. For them the task is not to lose themselves but to develop their own sense of
personal identity apart from others. In other words, Stages V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) and
VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) are switched for each sex.31 This critique, among others, will be
addressed in Chapter 2 because there is merit to the concern.
Erikson’s work continues to be referenced in books on psychotherapy and psychological
theory. Jane Kroger argues that Erikson gives us “the organizing framework” for viewing human
lifespan development over the changing stages of life.32 It is especially at the points of crises in
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life that significant personal changes occur.33 One of the strengths of Erikson’s perspective is
uniting of the psychological with the social environment. “Ego identity requires knowing who
you are and how you fit into society.”34 Henry Maier presents three dimensions for viewing
development: cognitive; affective; behavioral. He presents Jean Piaget’s cognitive theory,
Erikson’s affective theory, and Robert R. Sears’s behavioral theory. In Three Theories of Child
Development, he discusses each theory and then attempts to demonstrate how each theory
coordinates with the other two and can be integrated into an Affect-Behavioral-Cognitive model.
While his endeavor is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note that it is
Erikson’s model that he uses and not someone else’s. In addition, Erikson’s theory of identity
development is cited repeatedly in Handbook of Identity Theory and Research.35 His theory is
also dealt with extensively in both volumes of The Handbook of Life-Span Development.36 These
scholars, among others, consider Erikson from a secular perspective. The foregoing demonstrates
the weight given to his thought, and gives insight into the seriousness with which his work is still
given consideration.
Jack O. Balswick, Pamela Ebstyne King, and Kevin Reimer present a theological
perspective in The Reciprocating Self,37 by utilizing Erikson in their theological study of human
development. Their book considers issues which go beyond the scope of this dissertation, such as
questions of physicalism, dualism and trichotomism in theological anthropology, and how these
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affect the way one considers lifespan development. Using Erikson’s schema, they consider each
stage from the viewpoints of social science research and theology. Of concern to these scholars is
the lack of a guiding teleology in existing developmental theory. In The Reciprocating Self, they
take notice of a philosophical shift in the foundation of theological anthropology. The shift is
from the Aristotelian concept of substance to the concept of relationality in Trinitarian theology.
The self, as they describe it, is a reciprocating entity engaging “fully in relationships with
another in all its particularity.”38 Therefore, for them, the imago dei is a relational term. It is
relationality that determines identity. One is who one is based on one’s relation to others, and to
“the Other,” as well as to one’s own self. Rather than the imago dei being in some sense a
substantial likeness (such as spirit) or an ethical quality (such as holiness39), it is a reflection of
the perichoretic relationship between the divine persons of the Holy Trinity.
Theirs is a theology of relationality drawing from the works of men such as Karl Barth,
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Stanley Grenz, and John Zizoulis. However, they do not attempt to build an
exegetical foundation for the development of human teleology, which they describe as God’s
intention for human identity development as becoming “particular beings in relationship with the
divine and the human other.”40 An exegetical foundation for Christian identity development
based on Paul’s baptismal theology would significantly bolster their argument.41
Donald Capps integrated Erikson’s framework into many of his writings and courses. His
38
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writings, however, have been aimed at appropriating Erikson into pastoral care work rather than
rigorously critiquing the foundations. Thus, while his books have been helpful to many, they also
would have been bolstered by a more robust dialogue between Erikson and exegetical theology.
The same holds true for Gary R. Collin’s guide for Christian counseling.42 Siang-Yang Tan,43
Mark R. McMinn and Clark D. Campbell,44 Robert C. Fuller,45 Matthew Linn, Sheila Fabricant,
and Dennis Linn,46 and Stanton L. Jones and Richard E. Butman47 all reference Erikson’s theory,
use it to describe human development, yet also fail to give it a substantial theological critique.48
While Erikson continues to be referenced in the area of lifespan development, little from a
Christian perspective, and virtually nothing from a Lutheran perspective, has been done to
determine the theological validity of his theory or, having approved some or all of his theory, to
discover how an Eriksonian perspective might enrich a robust pastoral theology of identity.
Pastoral theology that is not based upon a solid theological foundation will likely run counter to
the gospel and hurt people spiritually in the long run. Therefore, this dissertation seeks to provide
a theological critique of Erikson’s theory in light of Pauline baptismal theology. This will be
accomplished by grounding this theological critique in solid exegesis, and demonstrating how
Erikson’s theory of identity development, with some corrections and adjustments, can assist the
work of pastoral care in terms of Christian identity actualization. The “Methodological
42
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Procedures” section below outlines the systematic process to be followed to demonstrate this
thesis.

The Dissertation in the Context of Current Scholarship
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod (LCMS) pastoral theology has tended in recent years to
shy away from integrating findings of secular psychology into the framework of pastoral care.
The discussion for the Missouri Synod begins with C. F. W. Walther’s Pastoraltheologie49 (First
Edition: 1872) which predates the rise of psychotherapy in pastoral theology. It is not possible to
know for certain what Walther’s attitude toward the discipline would have been. Certainly he
would have rejected the reductive physicalism that undergirds Freud’s psychoanalytic theory.
However, he did teach that pastoral care involves more than merely preaching to people.
“Pastoraltheologie ist der von Gott verliehene (θεόδοτος), durch gewisse hilfsmittel erlangte
(acquisitus) prakische habitus der Seele, vermöge dessen ein Kirchendiener befähigt ist, alle
Verrichtungen vie ihm als solchen zukommen”50 These words indicate that Walther appreciated
that other disciplines are to be incorporated into the practice of soul care.
J. H. C. Fritz, perhaps following the suggestion of Walther that auxiliary means are
appropriate in pastoral theology, wrote about the cure of souls in Pastoral Theology (1932). He
states that a general theological anthropology is not sufficient. “A pastor . . . must also know how
to diagnose and treat the peculiar spiritual conditions of an individual soul.”51 While the sinful
heart is the root cause of all problems within people, there are secondary causes which manifest
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sin in particular ways. These include: heredity; psychosomatic influences; fixed habits; various
temperaments; hysteria in women; and the “twenty-two large groups and types of mental
diseases” listed by the American Psychiatric Association in his day. He does add this caveat: “Of
course a modern psychiatrist who denies the fact that sin is the source of all evil in the world, and
especially also of demoniac possession, should not be consulted,”52 thereby acknowledging the
challenge faced by any practical theologian who desires to attempt some integration between
psychology and theology.53 Concern with identity development, at least as it concerns people
today, does not appear to have been a concern at this point in the history of Lutheran pastoral
care.
Concordia Publishing House published What, Then, Is Man? A Symposium of Theology,
Psychology, and Psychiatry54 in 1958. This is a serious attempt at a revised correlational dialogue
between the disciplines. The first edition of Erikson’s Childhood and Society had appeared eight
years before. The second edition would see the light of day three years later. Although What,
Then, is Man? does not reference Erikson, concerns about the philosophical presuppositions of
psychologists are raised. What, Then, Is Man? lists three areas of concern: determinism,
materialistic monism, and intersubjective confirmability. The authors aver that determinism
undergirds the teaching of Sigmund Freud. Since Erikson was trained as a Freudian
psychoanalyst, if their assertion is true, the degree to which his schema exhibits determinism
must be investigated. Materialistic monism, otherwise known as “Reductive Physicalism” avers
that there are no supernatural forces at work. This provides an atheistic framework within
52
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psychology. Erikson, especially under his wife’s influence, was not antagonistic to a form of
Protestant Christianity and was influenced by his mother (a Jew who read and introduced her son
to Kierkegaard).
Part of the appeal of Erikson for pastoral care and counseling is his positive attitude toward
Christianity. Hettie Zock comments on Erikson’s relation to Christian religion.
Having summed up the more formal characteristics of Erikson’s concept of religion,
with regard to content, it can be said to rely heavily on the Christian religion. As we
have regularly seen up to now, Erikson frequently draws his psychological
terminology from the Christian religion. The motto of the immortal identity ‘die and
become’ as well as the golden rule have a Christian character. Furthermore, it is no
coincidence that it is mostly Christian religious figures in whom Erikson has found a
strong sense of I: Jesus, Luther, Kierkegaard, and Thomas Jefferson. Besides there is
the Jew Einstein, who grew up in a Christian milieu, and the Hindu Gandhi, who was
deeply influenced by the sermon on the mount. Moreover, Erikson points—rightly or
wrongly—to the similarities between satyagrapha and Jesus’ teachings. It is true that
Erikson never says that the representation of the meeting with an Ultimate Other is
the exclusive property of the Christian tradition. However, it can be rightfully argued
that Christian tradition is in some way normative for Erikson.55
Zock’s evaluation of Erikson’s positive attitude towards Christianity is corroborated by Walter
Capps.
Erik Erikson contributed toward increased understanding of religion by providing
documentation and illustration of how individuals construct worldviews. Admittedly,
this sounds simplistic, but there is a particular point to be made. Sigmund Freud
himself explored the relationship between psyche and culture in such well-known
studies as Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Moses and Monotheism (1939),
and The Future of an Illusion (1927), and elsewhere, while many writers and
theoreticians, influenced by Freud, pushed the psyche-and-culture tandem even
further in their analyses of the manner in which Western culture is a product of
collective neurosis or psychoses or of failed exchanges within psychological reality.
But, to my knowledge, no one prior to Erik Erikson had undertaken to explain these
matters in specific individual and historical terms.56
The third concern of What, Then, Is Man? is intersubjective confirmability, which restricts
55
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“discourse to propositions that can be confirmed or disconfirmed… by appeal to empirical
evidence which we can all obtain at will.”57 While this is sound science, it does preclude any
influence upon the subject matter by religious texts, thereby prohibiting meaningful dialogue. 58
As texts are examined, these three presuppositions will require serious consideration. Rick Marrs
states that the in-depth scholarship of this work “had a formative influence on many non-LCMS
evangelicals who expanded the Christian counseling and psychology movement in the 1970s.”59
Yet it appears to be been buried in obscurity among many Missouri Synod Lutherans.
The Pastor at Work is a collaborative work, published by Concordia Publishing House in
1960.60 Chapter 13, “Pastoral Care of the Sick,” by Edward J. Mahnke and Chapter 17, “The
Pastor and the Burdened Soul,” by Edwin A. Nerger both reference secular and pastoral
psychology texts in their chapter bibliographies. Thus it appears that from at least the 1930s
through the 1960s, The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod attempted in some manner to
integrate the field of psychotherapy with that of pastoral care. Nevertheless, the concept of
identity development is not a central theme in The Pastor at Work.
The 1990 edition of Pastoral Theology, edited by Norbert H. Mueller and George Kraus,
has a dearth of information related to such integration. The events of the late 1960s and 1970s in
the LCMS, especially concerns about the effects of modernism on theology, might account for
this. Nevertheless, such an investigation is also outside the scope of this dissertation.
In 1994, Concordia Publishing House published Pastoral Care under the Cross by Richard
57
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C. Eyer.61 In chapter 5, “Crossing the Years: The Elderly,” Eyer makes extensive use of
Erikson’s developmental schema and writes about identity development. However, this book, as
is true for many others, does not attempt to critique Erikson from a theological perspective or
explore in depth its connection to baptism. Eyer’s use of Erikson is pragmatic and functional.
In 2007, Concordia Publishing House released Lutheran Service Book Pastoral Care
Companion.62 In the Introduction, the commission members distinguish between “ordinary
pastoral care” and “extraordinary pastoral care.” They state: “While recognizing the place of
extraordinary forms of pastoral care, the agenda attends to the ordinary.”63 However, the agenda,
while acknowledging the existence of “extraordinary pastoral care” appears quickly to dismiss it.
The agenda states: “The wise pastor will know when others must be summoned to care for
physical or psychological maladies. … [The] pastor will devote himself to spiritual care—the
care of the soul.”64 This statement could, and has been, understood to mean that pastoral care in
The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod has a very narrow focus and that pastors ought to
eschew pastoral counseling. The narrowly focused goal of pastoral care, as stated in the Lutheran
Service Book Pastoral Care Companion, is “nothing less than the faith confessed in the
conclusion of the Apostles’ Creed: ‘I believe in the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the
body, and the life everlasting.’ ”65 Not only is it “nothing less than,” some LCMS pastors clearly
understand it to be nothing more than this.66 Such a narrowed description of pastoral care is not
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thick enough for real parish practice. Parishioners more often avail themselves of their pastor for
“extraordinary pastoral care” more than they do for confession and absolution. They look to him
and other church workers for advice and perspective in a multitude of lifecycle crises, including
the question, “Who am I?”
In The Genius of Luther’s Theology, Robert Kolb and Charles Arand write, “Every age
brings with it a predominant set of beliefs about what it means to be human and how to live out
that humanity. Each configuration of the human being also brings with it an analysis of the
ailments that beset human life along with a proposal of a set of cures that are needed.”67 These
two sentences state both the reality and the challenge of this dissertation’s endeavor. The Greeks
used philosophy. Ancient Israel used Torah and wisdom literature. Ever since the Enlightenment,
science has been looked to as the predominant and determinative source of knowledge. The issue
with scientific explanations is not with science proper; it is rather scientism. “Scientism is a
philosophical handmaiden of materialism. While materialism is a metaphysical claim (about
what exists), scientism is an epistemological claim (about what we can know). In its strong form,
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paragraph, in which he attacks the emphasis on “two kinds of righteousness,” as taught now by Charles Arand, Joel
Bierman, and Robert Kolb, among others, makes it clear that his goals of preaching are quite narrow. “The two
kinds of righteousness is the topic of a sermon by Martin Luther in 1518. It was seized upon by a few professors
from the St. Louis seminary a few years ago as a potential new theological motif that could rival and maybe even
supplant the law/gospel motif. As best I can tell, the seed for this this new impetus for the two kinds of righteousness
was planted by Robert Kolb and watered by Chuck Arand . . . . An over emphasis on the two kinds of righteousness
diminishes the prominence of the law/gospel dichotomy. In the law/gospel dichotomy, we hear the law to be
convicted of our sin and we need the gospel to raise us to new life in Christ. It is that freedom from the law that is
the fundamental thing of the Christian faith. Biermann and others are emphasizing the two kinds of righteousness in
order to make the law and living in accordance with it the fundamental thing of the Christian faith.” See:
http://steadfastlutherans.org/2009/09/two-kinds-of-righteousness-theological-fad-or-helpful-paradigm-news-fromthe-nid-south-region-pastors-conference-by-pr-rossow/ accessed August 25, 2015.
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scientism asserts that materialistic science is the only means of knowing what is real.”68
Nonetheless, scientism should not be a reason for Christians to jettison science.69 Nor should this
be a reason not to seek a mutual understanding of the human condition. An honest, productive,
mutually beneficial dialogue with the social sciences can be of immense value to pastoral
theology and possibly also to systematics and exegetical theology as well. A model for the
interaction between theology and science is found in “In Christ All Things Hold Together: The
Intersection of Science and Christian Theology,” a report of the Commission on Theology and
Church Relations of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod.70
The social sciences seek to describe the human condition in language appropriate to the
various sub-disciplines within its purview. Theology also is concerned with the human condition,
prelapsarian, lapsarian, regenerated, and after the Parousia. The theological study of the human
being is known as ‘theological anthropology’.71 An honest dialogue must first allow each
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discipline to speak with its own vocabulary and grammar, within its appropriate sphere. The
terminology and meaning of those words must next be translated in such a way that true
communication can occur. (Of course, the saying “taduttore, traditore” reminds us that a onefor-one exchange of ideas is limited by the semantic domain of each language.) This dissertation
presents Erikson’s theory (chapter two), Paul’s baptismal theology drawn principally from his
Epistle to the Romans (chapter three), and then notes points of convergence and divergence,
before evaluating Eriksonian theory in light of Paul’s teaching, in chapter 4. This work must first
be done before any attempt is made to determine the implications for the task of pastoral care in
identity actualization, some of which will be explored in chapter 5.
Mutual dialogue must take seriously each discipline. This means that Erikson’s theory of
identity development must be given a fair hearing. He must be allowed to speak. Our first task is
to achieve understanding. Without this, no worthwhile critique or evaluation is possible. Points
of convergence and divergence must be discerned. Areas where one discipline supplements the
other are to be explored and mined for what they are worth. Finally, before any conclusion can
be arrived at, a hierarchy of authority must be established and clearly presented. Herein, a
theological anthropology drawn from the Scriptures and the Lutheran Confessions will used as
the control and arbiter between disputes.
Although few LCMS theologians have made significant use of Erikson, and when they
have done so they have not provided a solid theological foundation for such appropriation,
outside of LCMS circles the Lutheran (ELCA) practical theologian Donald Capps made
extensive use of Erikson’s model.72 However, like Eyer of the Lutheran Church—Missouri
Synod, he never critiqued it from either a biblical or theological perspective. Similarly, LeRoy
1–10.
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Aden73 follows Erikson’s model without critique. This dissertation provides such a critique by
means of exegetical work on Paul’s baptismal theology and a dialogue between both disciplines.
In reality, Eyer’s, Capps’s and Aden’s appropriations belong under the heading of the Reception
History of Erikson in practical theology. They are not true dialogues; neither are they critiques.
This dissertation recognizes a void that exists in Lutheran practical theology in engaging
Erikson biblically and theologically. It critiques Erikson’s theory of identity development using a
Lutheran Confessional approach.74 It also examines Erikson’s model, in a faithful and disciplined
manner, in relation to Paul’s theology of baptism, and brings Paul and Erikson into theological
dialogue. The goal is to describe identity development in a manner that does justice to both
theology and Eriksonian theory, so that further work based upon this examination might be done
with confidence in its theological validity. The goal will be met in chapter 4. Finally, three
preliminary implications will be presented in the final chapter, to stimulate future work.

The Methodological Procedure to Be Employed
Two principle approaches characterize all research and interaction between the disciplines.
In the realm of biblical and theological inquiry a Lutheran Confessional approach will be in
operation throughout. James Voelz briefly describes such an approach.
First, Christ must remain at the center of the picture as the touchstone for the
whole. . . . Second, all of the passages of the Scriptures (a) must hang together
exegetically as a whole (the principle of coherence), that is, all the passages must be
able to be accounted for and must relate to one another in a matrix; and (b) must be
exegetically defensible within their own Scriptural contexts (the principle of
integrity), that is, all the texts must be able to be matrixed without compromising the
integrity of any individual passage under discussion. Furthermore, these principles
are related to one another. We might liken their relationship to a constellation that
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consist of a binary star system (= coherence-integrity principles) that orbits around a
third main sequence star (= Christological principle).75
One significant strength of this approach, among others, is that it will serve as a referee as the
attempt to glean psychological identity development data from the exegetical and theological
tasks.
A revised correlational dialogue between theology and Eriksonian theory will characterize
the methodology of this dissertation. An extremely helpful resource for carrying out the task in
the practical theology arena of theology and culture76 is Gordon Lynch’s Understanding
Theology and Popular Culture.77 It is his contention that theologians should study culture for at
least four reasons. Culture can be studied to understand how it shapes religious belief and
activities among a population. It can be studied to investigate how culture serves religious
functions. It can be viewed in such a way so as better to approach the missiological task Christ
has given to the church. Finally, as Lynch explains, cultural texts and practices can serve “as a
medium for theological reflection.”78 This fourth approach is the major emphasis of this
dissertation.
Beyond these four main approaches, or reasons for studying the intersection of theology
and culture, four conversational approaches exist. What Lynch calls an “applicationist approach”
subjects culture “to a critique on the basis of fixed theological beliefs and values. . . A basic
assumption of this approach is that it is possible to identify core theological truths from a
particular source (e.g., the Bible or Church tradition) and then apply these critically to the beliefs
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and values of popular culture.”79 While a Lutheran Confessional approach certainly has fixed
core truths which cannot be compromised, a weakness to this approach, especially if it is
uninformed by other approaches, is a failure truly to investigate the cultural artifact on its own
merits and for its own ability to convey elements of truth, value, and purpose. It generally
prohibits meaningful engagement with the culture, including the sciences. In this conversational
approach, communication is unidirectional—theology to culture.
A second conversational approach is labeled “correlational.” This approach characterizes
the work of Paul Tillich.80 This approach is characterized by “correlating the questions raised by
contemporary culture with answers revealed through religious tradition.”81 This approach
appears to provide a safety net for theology. Culture is studied so as to understand its questions
and failings. Theology comes and provides the solution. However, hidden within this approach is
the assumption that theology has answers to all questions raised within culture and that culture
has no ability to challenge theology to think deeply about both prior assumptions, the impact of
the cultural milieu on theology, or even to ask theology whether such formulations are right or
wrong.
A revised correlational approach “envisions a more complex conversation involving
questions and answers from both culture and tradition.”82 This approach acknowledges the
unique contribution each field of inquiry brings to the table as the human condition is discussed,
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debated, and described. Below, in the description of the focus of the research in chapter 4, five
views of the way theology and psychology do or do not interact is discussed in greater detail.
There is an intimate connection between these various views and the conversational approaches
now being described. The revised correlational approach takes the position that such dialogue is
a two-way street. This does not, however, require the findings to be of equal weight. As already
stated above, a Lutheran Confessional approach will be the arbiter between any irreconcilable
differences. There is plenty of room for mutual edification between the two fields of inquiry as
they interact in dialogue. Nevertheless, when psychology contradicts biblical theology, it is time
for it to defer to the higher authority.
A fourth conversational approach is that of “praxis.” Lynch states that this approach very
much characterizes the modus operandi of liberation theology. It is committed “to critiquing
religious and cultural beliefs and practices on the basis of their ability to promote liberation and
well-being.”83 This approach, while it claims to treat each discipline as equal partners, looks to
the results of religious and cultural beliefs and practices and judges them on humanistic terms.
While practical theology is concerned about the lives of people, this approach will not
characterize the conversational approach of this dissertation, since the primary goal is to
theologically evaluate Erikson’s theory in light of Pauline baptismal theology.
Details of the research methodology for each step along the way are presented in the
subsections below.
Focus of Chapter Two: Erikson’s Developmental Theory
The research methods to be employed are literature review and exegetical study. The
literature review will include several biographies on the life and work of Erikson and journal
83
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articles within which he provides autobiographical material. The main focus will be on his books
and journal articles which explicate his theory. Both sources are necessary in order to ascertain
the influence of his life story on the development of his Life Cycle theory and on the corpus of
his writings.84 Furthermore, in order to understand the ontogenesis of his thought processes,
appropriate writings of Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, and Joan Erikson will be explored.
Following a general overview of Erikson’s developmental theory, which will orient the
dissertation within his overall scheme of development, the dissertation will focus tightly on his
theory of identity development. Three factors will be explored in this chapter, as well as provide
the overall structure for examining both Erikson’s theory and Paul’s baptismal theology. These
three factors are the somatic, the psychological, and the social dimensions of identity
development.
Identity development, according to Erikson, while the chief affective work of adolescence,
begins in infancy and extends even to life’s end. Therefore, the stages that precede adolescence
and those that follow must be considered in this study. François Marty states: “Pour Erikson, il y
aurait continuité de l’enfance à l’âge adulte dans les processus en jeu concernant l’identité et
l‘identification, la société jouant un role capital dans mesure où elle permettrait à l’adolescent
d’intégrer les exigences sociales en franchissant différentes étapes structurantes pour son
evolution.”85 The concept of the development of identity runs throughout his theory, even though
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the stage to which it is principally applied is, in his writings, that of adolescence.86 Therefore,
without consideration of the other stages and their connection to identity development a true
understanding of his theory of identity would not be possible.
Focus of Chapter Three (First Task): Pauline Baptismal Theology
Textual research will first include exegetical study of relevant texts, focusing primarily on
Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. In order to supplement and shed light upon this study of Romans,
pertinent texts within the Pauline corpus, especially statements related to baptism in First
Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians will be included.
Romans 7 includes an extensive autobiographical section. Paul’s use of “I” and the struggle
of the “I” with sin, and the commission of sins that is not understood by the “I,” points to the
importance of clearly understanding one’s true self, one’s true identity as a Christian “in Christ.”
The exegetical work on Romans begins with a survey of the identity-related issues which are
found in Romans 1–5.87 Identity, before and after faith in Christ, will be examined. Next, a close
examination of Romans 6 provides the foundation for baptismal identity before entering Romans
7, in which the struggle for true identity is vividly described. This leads to Romans 8, in which
identity remains an important concern. Romans 9–11 assist in the discussion of the relationship
between ethnic identity and Christian identity. The remaining chapters of Romans provide
examples of how baptismal identity is expressed in the ethical life.88
It is hardly possible to understand the complexity of Paul’s anthropology or his baptismal
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theology without including consideration of Paul’s use of the creation accounts in Genesis89 and
of the wisdom literature of the Old Testament.90 Nevertheless, due to space requirements these
will be appropriately examined only as they are suggested by the Pauline texts under study.
Secondary sources which deal with Paul’s anthropology and his theology of baptism as
necessary will be included in the research and discussion so as to develop a thick description of
biblical anthropology, which can inform the study of the development of identity.
Focus of Chapter Three (Second Task): Christian Identity in Paul’s Baptismal Theology
This area of research, which will narrow the focus to Paul’s teaching concerning Christian
identity, may begin to cause some readers concerns about any psychologizing of Paul’s writings
and of the apostle himself. Yet without the research contained in this section the thesis cannot be
proved. This section explores scholarly research into Paul’s anthropological terms, psychological
aspects of his theology, and his understanding the structure of the human being. A somewhat
dated study by W. David Stacey91 explores the Greek, Hebrew, and Pauline views of man.
Despite its date, his study of the terms soul, spirit, flesh, body, heart, mind, conscience, and “the
inward man” is a good starting point. Robert Jewett’s study of Paul’s anthropology in relation to
conflict settings92 brings to light many terms that otherwise might be passed by without thought.
Gerd Theissen draws our attention to the interface between Pauline anthropology and
89
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psychological theory. Theissen acknowledges that psychological exegesis can be poor exegesis.
He states:
Every exegete has learned that psychological exegesis is poor exegesis. It interpolates
between the lines things that no one can know. It inserts modern categories into
ancient texts. Because of its interest in personal problems behind the text, it does not
let the text come to speech. Above all, however, it relativizes the text’s theological
claim through appeal to factors that are all too human. The lengthy catalogue of the
sins of psychological exegesis is imposing; the rejection of any combination of
psychology and exegesis is often presented with such disarming obviousness that it is
almost an offense against good manners.93
Why then attempt it? This dissertation is not a work of psychological exegesis. The
purpose of researching Pauline baptismal theology is to ascertain what it is that Paul taught. The
purpose of investigating the ways in which this informs the development of a Christian’s identity
is to see what data is available for a dialogue between Erikson’s theory and Christian theology.
Theissen’s limited goal is not to exegete the texts psychologically. Rather it is “to interpret texts
as expression and occurrence of human experience and behavior.”94 Again, this is the importance
of Romans chapter seven.
Focus of Chapter Four: A Revised Correlational Dialogue between Chapter Two and Chapter
Three Findings
Space and the purpose of this dissertation preclude a survey of the history of the
interrelation between theology and psychology. Excellent resources for such study include A
History of the Cure of Souls,95 Pastoral Care in Historical Perspective,96 and A History of
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Pastoral Care in America.97 In addition to these surveys, the classic critique of the
psychologizing of theology is Philip Rieff’s The Triumph of the Therapeutic.98 His critique of the
increased importance of psychology and psychotherapy in Western culture includes the charge
that “psychological man takes on the attitude of a scientist, with himself as the ultimate object of
his science.”99 Rieff traces this back to Freud’s attitude toward religion. According to Rieff,
Freud deconstructed religion and turned it into a neurotic condition.100 The methodology of this
study, while focusing on human identity development, seeks to be theologically informed in such
a way that the Christocentricity of Christian theology remains the foundation of the entire
endeavor.
A description of the revised correlational approach has been provided above. In order to
facilitate the revised correlational dialogue, preliminary work on both Erikson and Paul is
necessary. Erikson’s theory is researched in detail. This is the work of chapter 2. Next, Paul’s
theology of baptism and the development of Christian baptismal identity is studied. This occurs
in chapter 3. Having produced data from these two divergent fields of inquiry, a method of
correlation must be used which finds points of convergence. Without these points of
convergence, no conversation is possible. Tools from qualitative research will be used, especially
qualitative research coding, including “In Vivo,” “Magnitude,” “Process,” and “Axial” coding.
“In Vivo Coding” assigns labels to sections of transcripts, which describe the subject being
discussed. In doing so attempts are made to stick as closely to the actual wording of the source
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material.101 “Magnitude Codes” are assigned to “In Vivo Codes” to determine the frequency of
occurrence and the amplitude of their importance.102 “Process Codes” are assigned in order to
explore conceptual realities generated by the data. Process Coding involves turning previous
coding, especially “In Vivo Codes,” into gerunds in order to highlight actions. Second cycle
coding follows this initial work, correlating codes from the first cycle into larger sets using
“Pattern Coding,”103 for meaningful correlative analysis. Pattern Coding investigates and seeks
to identity emergent themes. As part of Pattern Coding, Axial Coding reassembles data into the
manageable and relevant categories suggested by the data.104 Further details on these coding
methods are presented in chapter 4.
Correlating the two fields of theology and psychology is a matter of debate today among
both theologians and psychologists. Therefore, a review of five divergent views will next be
presented to illustrate the ways in which Christians understand and approach the interaction
between theology and psychology in general. This is essential because the way in which one
views the relationship between theology and psychology affects whether one will accept or reject
the methodology used in this dissertation.
Eric L. Johnson is the editor of Psychology and Christianity: Five Views,105 which is a fully

101

Johnny Saldaña, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (Los Angeles: Sage, 2016), 73.

102

Saldaña, Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 86.

103

Saldaña, Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 236–39.

104

Saldaña, Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers, 244–50. Axial Coding reassembles the data taken
apart in first cycle coding. “The ‘axis’ of Axiel Coding is a category (like the axis of a wooden wheel with extended
spokes) discerned in first cycle coding.” Analytical memos help bring the distinct pieces of data together and assist
in reducing first cycle coding to a manageable level for meaningful analysis.
105

Eric L. Johnson, ed., Psychology and Christianity: Five Views (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2010).
The value of this book is the dialogue between the various contributors. After presenting the view to be considered,
the contributors representing the other views weigh in with their critiques. Thus both strengths and weaknesses of
each position can better be considered by the reader.

30

updated and revised version of an earlier work which featured only four views.106 Two of the
views presented will be dispatched somewhat quickly. These two views are called “A Levels-ofExplanation View” and “A Biblical Counseling View.” The former is presented by David G.
Myers and the latter by David Powlison. These are considered together here because of the
common characteristic of not allowing a dialogue between the two. The Biblical Counseling
View, which was popularized by Jay Adams,107 holds to the position that psychology is
irredeemably secular and antithetical to a Christian understanding of what it is to be a human
being. The “Levels-of-Explanation” view acknowledges the value of both a theological and a
psychological explanation of human health and human malady, yet allows no real dialogue
between these disciplines. Each discipline provides its own vantage point, uses its own
terminology, and has its own theater of operation. Each asks and answers different questions.
While the Biblical Counseling perspective privileges Scripture and the Levels-of-Explanation
takes psychology as well as theology seriously as distinct disciplines, neither by itself will equip
one to conduct the work required in the realm of theology and culture, and thereby be of use in
the endeavor of this dissertation.
Between these two polar opposites are the Integrationist View and the Christian
Psychology View. The integrationist view “is more open to modern psychology than biblical
counseling, yet is generally more sympathetic to its critique than the levels-of-explanation
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approach.”108 The integrationist view is represented by the Journal of Psychology and Theology,
published by the Rosemead School of Psychology at Biola University and by the Journal of
Psychology and Christianity, published by the Christian Association for Psychological Studies.
Two important publications that are in the mainstream of this approach are Psychology and
Christianity Integration: Seminal Works that Shaped the Movement109 and Integrative
Approaches to Psychology and Christianity.110 The view of these publications is characterized by
a revised correlational conversational approach.
Mark McMinn and Clark Campbell state that integrative work in psychology and
psychotherapy “is integrative in two dimensions: theologically and theoretically.”111 By
theological integration, they mean that a biblically and theologically defensible description of
persons is foundational. This description must take into account the biblical teaching that human
beings are God’s creation, that God created man in his image (the imago dei), that man is a fallen
creature who is corrupted in body, mind, and soul, and that Christ has redeemed humanity
providing the only grounds for true and lasting hope. Thus the Christocentric dimension is
primary and gives the proper worldview and orientation for integration of theology and
psychology.112 The theoretical dimension refers to “the general trend in psychotherapy literature
to find value in various theoretical approaches.”113 McMinn and Campbell point to the multitude
of theoretical approaches in psychology, which can be utilized under theology as the control and
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arbiter. Their formula for integration does not center on one school of psychological or
psychotherapeutic theory.114 This dissertation profits from this perspective and from the
following one.
The fourth position is called the “Christian Psychology View.” This is the position taken by
Eric Johnson, as well as by Robert Roberts and P. J. Watson in Psychology and Christianity:
Five Views. In many ways this view is a step away from the integrationist and toward the biblical
counseling position. The aim of those espousing this viewpoint is to create a new discipline of
psychology that is distinctly Christian.115 At the heart of this endeavor is the drive to make
Scripture and the Christian tradition of “soul care” the major source of this new psychology.
Johnson does not want to jettison psychological research. Rather he urges a prioritization of
texts. This prioritization privileges the Scriptures. “The Bible is the Christian’s arch-text.”116
Classic texts on Christian pastoral care are also high on his list. Other texts, especially secular
texts, “need to be read with a hermeneutic of both trust and suspicion”117 because of the
sinfulness of the researchers and authors—a sinful common to all people. Rather than calling the
task “integration,” Johnson prefers to refer to it as “translation.”118
114
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Much of what Johnson recommends characterizes this dissertation. The first task is the
achieving of comprehension. The secular text “must be read in order to understand as best as
possible the meaning of the text according to the author.”119 The second task is to evaluate the
writing on its own merits. Is the research honest and truly scientific? What presuppositions are at
work? To what degree does naturalism and reductive physicalism affect the finding? This is all
part of evaluating the worth of the text. The third task is what Johnson means be “translation.”120
Are there words used in psychology that can be translated into words used in theology? To what
degree are the semantic domains overlapping? Can the secular text be incorporated into “a
Christian disciplinary matrix”?121 The penultimate task, as described by Johnson, is
“transposition.” He also refers to this as “sublimation.” By transposition or sublimation Johnson
has in mind a hierarchy of orders in the makeup of human persons. For this he draws heavily
upon Kierkegaard.122 A human being is comprised of the following four strata, listed in ascending
order: biological; psychological; ethical; spiritual. All four are God’s creation and ought to be
under his lordship. By making this distinction, Johnson wants to combat the inroads
philosophical materialism (reductive physicalism) can have on a Christian psychology.
The final product for which Johnson is striving is a fully Christian psychology, which
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generates its own texts “written in a Christian dialect, using all available discursive/conceptual
resources (particularly the canon and Christian classics) as explicitly as possible, but second, it
will demonstrate some degree of the enrichment of its discourse, as a result of its incorporated
material derived from the second dialect community.”123 Such a goal is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Yet this dissertation is designed to contribute a Christian evaluation of this “second
dialect” from Erikson and to allow Erikson to ask the church how baptismal identity is developed
and expressed through the various stages of the lifespan.
A brief mention of the fifth view, “Transformational Psychology,” is in order.124 It is the
contention of John H. Coe and Todd Hall in Psychology in the Spirit, that a “human person is an
embodied spirit (a ‘soul’) whose nature has numerous bodily, affective, cognitive, volitional, and
gender capacities.”125 A close reading of this text reveals a tendency to downplay the importance
of the biological dimension of human existence. This evaluation is bolstered by the prescriptions
offered in the book which border on mysticism. In some ways this approach is a version of
Christian psychology.126 In other ways, its rejection of nearly all secular psychological research
places it close to the biblical counseling view. This approach will not play any major role in this
dissertation.127
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A strict revised correlational conversation between two disciplines of equal authority
would privilege neither. However, as already stated, this is not the case for a theologically proper
and faithful conversation between theology and culture. Therefore, a more detailed description of
the conversation method to be used herein is appropriate. The methodology of this chapter will
be to bring into dialogue the findings of chapter 2 (Erikson) and chapter 3 (Paul). This will
require some translation of terminology and a search for areas of convergence and divergence.
One might argue that because Erikson self-identified himself as a Freudian, and that Freud
was an avowed atheist, all psychoanalytic thought that comes from a Freudian orientation ought
to be rejected. However, this would be akin to rejecting all scientific discoveries based upon the
metaphysical presuppositions of the researcher. Emma Pierce writes:
The fact that Freud did not believe in any god or any spiritual dimension did not
negate the grains of wheat in his bag of theoretical chaff. Many who did not share his
atheistic belief system are nonetheless unable to deny the possibility of an
unconscious dimension: deep, abiding drives and instincts that may indeed control a
human being, bringing about attitudes and behaviours that are at best inexplicable, at
worst detrimental and destructive. 128
Erikson has much more to offer than a few kernels of wheat in a sack of chaff. His psychology
can, with some adjustments, be compatible with Paul’s baptismal theology as it applies to the
actualization of Christian identity.
Erikson’s theory of identity development will be allowed to ask questions of Paul’s
theology and vice versa. Each will be allowed to speak to the other and to question the findings
of the other with one overarching caveat. When there are truly contradicting conclusions,
theology will be privileged. Ultimately the goal is to translate Erikson in such a way that he can
be a dialogue partner in a discussion of baptismal identity actualization in the context of pastoral
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care. The format chosen for this portion of the revised correlational approach is a fictitious
dialogue between Erikson and “a practical theologian.” James Fowler used this approach in
Stages of Faith.129 Erikson was involved in a series of moderated discussions with Huey P.
Newton, cofounder of the Black Panthers, in February and in April of 1971. This dialogue,
although far afield from the purpose of this dissertation, will provide interesting dialogue
unavailable in Erikson’s books. As much as possible, actual quotes and dialogue from Erikson
will be used in order to remain faithful to his intent, as he queries theology’s findings.
Focus of Chapter Five: Implications for Pastoral Care
Practical theology is multifaceted. John Fritz includes catechetics, liturgics, homiletics, and
pastoral theology under the term “practical theology.”130 This chapter will limit itself to three
broad implications of the thesis of this dissertation for pastoral care, in reference to Christian
identity. The developmental stages and their connection to this aspect of identity development
will be brought into focus. The purpose is to demonstrate that the findings of this dissertation are
not merely of academic importance. They reach beyond the theoretical into the actual work of
pastors in their congregations. It will be demonstrated how a modified version of Erikson’s
theory might assist the pastor as he appropriates this information for the work of pastoral care of
God’s people.
The connection between Erikson and pastoral care work has been frequently noted. In their
critique of therapeutic models such as Erikson’s, Jones and Butman comment that while they
have areas of caution—as one should with any appropriation of secular psychology—models
such as Erikson’s have much to offer the Christian pastor.
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The psychodynamic psychotherapies are among the broadest, most comprehensive
systems in use today. In moving beyond Freud’s narrow commitment to a
biologically rooted, “scientific” theory, contemporary psychodynamic theorists have
developed a system that does not present many of the problems to the committed
Christian psychotherapist that classical analysis does. . . . These models are relational
in nature, balance a cautious optimism with a deep appreciation of our capacity for
self-deception and have a substantial (though secondary in emphasis) understanding
of our rational capacities as humans. The values embedded in the model are broadly
compatible with Christian values, though of course there is not a perfect match. . . .
We think it fitting that this is one of the models that many Christian therapists are
embracing; it holds much promise as a possible foundation for future elaboration of a
thoroughly Christian understanding of human personality.131
Robert Richter, a rostered minister of the LCMS, has relied heavily on Erikson for geriatric
ministry among military veterans.132 Much of Richter’s research supports Joan Erikson’s
contention that “in encounters between the syntonic and dystonic, the dystonic elements win out
as time goes on; despair is ‘in attendance.’”133 The despair that accompanies extreme old age
comes from the realization that time is too short to undo, redo, or otherwise make up for lost
opportunities. You are who you have made yourself to be and there appears to be no reparation.
It is to this point that Richter has addressed his ministry, seeking to help Christians understand
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their true identity in Christ and to find hope in him, that despite their failures they are to be free
from shame and guilt under the umbrella of the gift of righteousness in Christ.
James W. Fowler credits Erikson, among a few others, with providing him with the concept
of stages for his theory of the development and maturing of faith over the lifespan.134 He states
that Erikson’s theory provides him “the background” for his own scheme.135 This is clear in a
case study he presents titled, “Mary’s Pilgrimage.”136 Various crises, at significant points in the
woman’s lifespan were catalysts for the formation of her sense of identity, which ultimately
resulted in her identity as a Christian.
The Roman Catholic scholars Matthew Linn, Sheila Fabricant, and Dennis Linn coauthored
Healing the Eight Stages of Life.137 They unabashedly appropriate Erikson’s model and apply it
to spiritual care. Despite their Roman Catholic seminary training, they make no connection
between the stages of development and identity formation through baptism.
The practical theologian who has made the most of Erikson’s theory is Donald Capps. In
The Depleted Self, he notes a change that has occurred in Western culture. While once people felt
anxiety due to a sense of guilt, today people feel deep anxiety without a sense of guilt. Erikson
addresses this as an existential state, which is connected to a sense of deep shame. This shame
may be unconscious, or preconscious, yet it is the result of being stripped naked.138 This
depletion of self recoils as a defense mechanism into narcissism. Such a view retains the
theological concept of sin, and describes it in a similar way as does Genesis 3.
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Capps also builds on Erikson’s first developmental stage when he avers that what sets
pastoral work apart from the other “helping professions” is hope. Pastors are agents of hope.139
Similarly, in Life Cycle and Pastoral Care, he uses Erikson’s stages as a guide to the pastor’s
work.140 It is Capps’s contention that a prevalent characteristic, specifically among males, in
Western society is melancholia. This is to be distinguished from clinical depression, although the
two are related in many ways. In Men and Their Religion he argues that the melancholy self is
formed in males in early childhood. He avers that “melancholia is primarily a condition that men
experience, due primarily to the boy’s separation from his mother.”141 This melancholia is then
integrated into men’s sense of identity. Capps has developed this in greater detail in Men,
Religion, and Melancholia. In this book he notes the prevailing melancholia that characterized
William James, Rudolf Otto, and Erikson. Of special interest are his comments concerning
Erikson. Capps believes that Erikson’s study of the life of Luther was “ostensibly Erikson’s case
study of Luther [as] mythic.” Erikson was not trying to write a biography.142 In fact, for Capps,
Young Man Luther has more to say about Erikson’s own sense of identity than it does about
Luther’s. He writes: “I suggest that the most important reflection of Erikson’s own self-image in
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Young Man Luther is precisely the mother–son theme that lies, shadowlike, behind the
melodramatic story of father and son.”143
As Capps constantly attested, Erikson clearly speaks to pastoral care. Especially in Toys
and Reasons, Erikson has much to say about the ritualization of human life. He closely ties ritual
to the first five stages of development, showing their relevance for ritual, and I will argue, for
ritual’s relevance for pastoral care and counseling.144 Again, Donald Capps:
Other psychoanalytic theorists developed concepts of repeated behaviors applicable
to religious ritual, while Erikson applied his developmental theory. Moreover, though
Freudian in general orientation, his studies of the rituals of Native Americans (1963),
his theoretical essays on ritual (1966, 1977), and his discussions of ritual and political
leadership (1968, 1969, 1977) add up to a major reformulation of the traditional
psychoanalytic view of religious ritual.145
This aspect of Erikson’s work has not had sufficient attention. The importance of ritual,
especially in regards to the experiential acquisition of a Christian identity, needs greater
scholarly attention. Erikson finds ritualization in the mundane aspects of life as well as in the
obvious places, such as baptisms, bar-mitzvahs, weddings, and funerals. These are tied to the
various developmental stages. He argues that the ritual element of adolescence, which is the
stage most connected to the work of identity formation, centers on “the solidarity of conviction,”
when a basic sense of identity emerges, which remains relatively constant through the remainder
of life.146 Considerable space in the final chapter of this dissertation is devoted to viewing the
baptismal rites of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod in light of Erikson’s theory of
143
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ritualization in order to provide a way of viewing them in light of the task of providing pastoral
care to God’s people in actualizing the identity conferred upon them in baptism. While the ritual
elements are certainly subservient to God’s action by means of his word, this final section of the
dissertation will focus on how the ritual can be used to underline and illustrate what God has
done and is doing by means of his word in baptism.

Outcomes Anticipated
This dissertation will demonstrate the validity of the thesis that the use of Erikson’s theory
of identity development is theologically defensible when the theory is excluded from the concept
of the Christian’s conferred identity. If the conferred (or imputed) identity of being righteous by
faith is thought of as a “foreclosed identity,” Erikson’s language might be acceptable. However,
his theory is too intertwined with the idea of development to justify using his theory in reference
to the Christian’s real or imputed identity. However, and likely contrary to Erikson’s intent, his
theory can be used to describe and outline the effects of original sin, especially in light of
mistrust of God and his word and the resulting autonomy. In view of this, the syntonic as well as
the dystonic elements of this theory describe the result of a lack of trust in God as one places
trust in self. Beyond this, if the Christian’s sense of identity is built upon the conferred, imputed
identity, given in baptism, Erikson’s theory will be demonstrated to be of use in pastoral care.
Specifically, the ways in which identity is actualized at the various stages in life can be useful to
the pastor as he cares for God’s people.
Confessional Lutherans have been largely absent in the meetings of conservative Christian
organizations concerned with pastoral care. For example, the Winter 2014 issue of the Journal of
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Psychology and Christianity147 presents various ways theological traditions are integrating
theology and psychology. Missing in that journal issue is any Lutheran view. Similarly, at both
the 2014, 2015, and 2016 meetings of the Evangelical Theological Society in San Diego,
California; Atlanta, Georgia; and San Antonio, Texas, respectively, only one Lutheran
theologian was present for the “Theology for Pastoral Care” working group. A Lutheran voice
needs to be present Lutherans are to fulfill our responsibilities to the Una Sancta by clearly
articulating the pure doctrine of Scripture. This dissertation seeks to provide a uniquely Lutheran
perspective in evaluating, critiquing and dialoging with an Eriksonian developmental model, so
as to provide a biblically, psychologically, and scientifically informed foundation for the pastoral
care work of identity actualization. It will provide justification for constructive dialogue with
Eriksonian developmental theory and with Erikson’s description of identity development in
practical theology by showing significant points of convergence in Paul’s baptismal theology. It
will also show areas of important disagreement.
From this foundation, the dissertation in chapter 5, will give examples of how an
Eriksonian perspective can enrich pastoral care, by providing important information on the
developmental stage of the counselee. It also has important implications for the use of baptismal
rites as tools for pastoral counseling on the subject of the development of a Christian identity,
building on the practice and significance of baptism within the Christian community.
Effective, faithful pastoral care148 requires knowledge of the developmental stage of the
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counselee. One hardly counsels a preadolescent the same as one would an octogenarian. This is
not solely because of a person’s cognitive development. Equally important is the level of
affective development, including one’s sense of identity. In Identity: Youth and Crisis, Erikson
writes about the epigenesis of identity.149 Although his theory avers that “not until adolescence
does the individual develop the prerequisites in physiological growth, mental maturation, and
social responsibility to experience and pass through the crisis of identity,”150 nevertheless, each of
the previous stages plays an integral role of preparing for successful navigation of this crisis, and
contributes to it.
A person’s basic sense of identity is essentially developed as he negotiates the crises of
Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion). Nevertheless, as he navigates the challenges of Stage
VI (Intimacy vs, Isolation), the pressures of caring for others in Stage VII (Generativity vs.
Stagnation), and then faces the existential reality of impending death in Stage VIII (Integrity vs.

may find it useful to make a distinction between pastoral care, pastoral counseling, and pastoral psychotherapy. Of
the three terms, pastoral care is the broadest in scope. It refers to the church’s overall ministries of healing,
sustaining, guiding, and reconciling people to God and to one another. . . . Pastoral Counseling. This is a more
specialized part of pastoral care that involves helping individuals, families, or groups as they cope with the pressures
and crises of life. . . . Pastoral Psychotherapy. This term appears to be used with less frequency than it was a few
years ago. It refers to a long-term, in-depth helping process that attempts to bring fundamental changes in the
counselee’s personality, spiritual values, and ways of thinking.” Gary R. Collins, Christian Counseling, 36. Carroll
Wise, however, would not make such a distinction. “The work of the pastor with individuals has usually been called
pastoral counseling. There are various reasons for this. However, in this book we shall discard the use of this term.
Both in a broad and also a more narrow sense, the pastor does a form of psychotherapy. By psychotherapy we mean
a process, engaged in by two or more persons in which one is accepted as a healer or helper, who aims at assisting
the other to change feelings, attitudes, and behavior, or, in other words, become in some ways a different person.”
Carroll A. Wise, Pastoral Psychotherapy (New York: Jason Aronson, 1983), 1. Richard Eyer differentiates pastoral
care and pastoral counselling, thinking of pastoral counseling as being initiated by the person in need and pastoral
care as initiated by the pastor. See: Eyer, Pastoral Care, 18. The term “pastoral care” is used in this dissertation to
indicate the wider possibilities of using Erikson’s theory beyond the narrower work of pastoral counseling. See also,
Bruce Hartung, “Pastoral Psychotherapy,” in Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling, Rodney J. Hunter, ed.
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 860–61. Since the purpose of this dissertation is to provide a theological defense or
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Despair and Disgust), this basic sense of identity continues to be modified throughout life.151
Understanding that a preadolescent is not yet at the stage for a full-blown crisis of identity, but
that he or she is, for instance, at Stage III (The Play Stage) and is experimenting with various
roles, can assist the task of pastoral care and counseling by the realization, for example, that the
child is anticipating possible future roles and needs space to play these things out. At the same
time, issues of guilt over play-acting secret fantasies might prove to be a rich opportunity to
teach the child about legitimate and illegitimate guilt.152 This, as Erikson states, “is the
ontological cornerstone of morality.”153 On the other hand, while an octogenarian may feel the
need the pastor to support her sense that she has cared well for others and that she has been a
good and faithful servant, it is of ultimate importance that she hear that God’s word, which
declares her righteous, has made bot her and her works pleasing to God, even though she may
see her own failings.
Stage VIII (Integrity vs. Despair and Disgust) in Erikson’s theory suffers from an
inadequate teleology. The fear of the loss of self and identity due to the disintegrating effects of
death needs more than Erikson’s assurance of growth in wisdom and knowledge one has done
well by others. It is here that the connection between baptism and death and resurrection lifts
Erikson’s theory beyond the earthly. Still, the full realization of the disintegrating power of death
which can lead to despair is outlined by Erikson more fully than many others describe it. Many
of the elderly certainly know they have not done all things well, and, even more importantly, that
they have left many things undone which ought to have been done. Here, linking the imputed
identity given in baptism with the righteousness of faith and distinguishing it from the imperfect
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development of this identity in one’s experiential life (which points to the imperfection, and the
relativity, of civic righteousness) incorporates Erikson’s final stage issues of integrity, wisdom,
despair, and disdain into a coherent approach to pastoral care of the elderly.
This dissertation will not directly argue the sacramental dimensions of baptism.154 Rather,
the goal is to outline ways in which the Rite of Holy Baptism (the ritual) can support the work of
pastoral care as it intersects with the actualization of Christian identity. Identity, understood in an
Eriksonian perspective, includes the somatic, the psychological, and the social. Although his
study is primarily about Luther’s rhetoric, Neil Leroux writes about the important link between
content and rhetorical action.
An author fashions (inventio) a work in which an audience can participate not only
through the information presented, but also through the forms into which the
information is organized. Information can bring satisfaction through its newness, but
form has the capability repeatedly to satisfy because of its power to elicit our
recognition of its rightness or fittingness. Furthermore, this rightness—our
cooperation with and ability to apprehend, appreciate, and participate in form
(whether by agreeing with it, rejoicing at it, mourning over it, being terrified by it,
etc.—is the work’s psychology, the explanation behind its function. What makes
audience identification happen is usually not information, but form, “the creation of
an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite.
Therefore, to dichotomize form and content—making content primary, form merely
something later selected (as shape, container, or format)—is misguided. Rather than
being irrelevant or in opposition to content, form and content are inseparable; form
becomes part of, is the “body” of, the (dis- or pre-embodied) content.155
This has important implications for inclusion of the baptismal liturgy in pastoral care in the
experiential life of the Christian, as the pastoral caregiver seeks to describe, and to assist in
shaping, a true and faithful actualized expression of Christian identity grounded in the person’s
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A priori for this dissertation is that baptism is a sacrament, instituted by Jesus Christ, which confers
forgiveness, life, and salvation. It is not merely an ordinance of the church. The confessional foundation for this
understanding of baptism, as drawn from the New Testament is found in: AC 9; Ap 9; SA 3:5; SC 4; LC 4. Luther’s
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baptism.156 Albrecht Peters, comments on Luther’s teaching on baptism in his catechisms.
Baptism is to give shape to and to provide a framework for our entire Christian life,
as a unique event that takes place but once and that is not to be repeated, meaning that
a Christian life is nothing other than a daily baptism, started at a particular time but
reentered into constantly. Though the term signification is itself open to
misunderstanding, the eschatologically effective power of Baptism was front and
center in the interpretations of Baptism that were crafted in 1519 and 1520. . . .
Everything in the Small Catechism concentrates on the well-known phrase about how
the old man is drowned daily and how the new man rises again each day.157
This dissertation encourages fuller use of the baptismal rite in pastoral care. Thus, the
connection between the drowning of the old man and the casting off of one’s false identity and
the confession of one’s negative identity and the emerging of the new man, the Christian identity
given in baptism, will be demonstrated. That which is given as a gift is appropriated in one’s life
experience, by means of the crises one experiences. This emphasis on the important of crises will
be shown to be very close to the Lutheran concept of the life of the Christian being that of a
theologus crucis (theologian of the cross).
Erikson is helpful because he tightly ties ritualization to the stages of development,
especially in the social aspects of the psychosocial and particularly in the first five stages of
development. This is important when one considers how his insights might inform pastoral care
as the pastoral caregiver points out the social (ecclesial) significance of baptism, a baptism into a
new family.158 This new family is part of one’s new baptismal identity in Christ.
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Norman Nagel writes about the connection between baptism and identity, noting that in baptism both the
name of the person is given to the bartizaned, and the name of the triune God is placed upon the bartizaned. “Name
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Since the dynamics of baptism include a person’s body159 (the somatic), his soul (the
psychic), and his social status (ecclesial relationships) how might orders of baptism be used in
counseling so as to reinforce these dimensions of the sacrament? How has the tendency, only
recently beginning to be overcome, to reduce the liturgical action to a few words and some water
worked against the development of Christian identity? An exhaustive study of baptismal liturgies
throughout church history is a task for another study. This dissertation will focus on the use of
the baptismal rites in use in the LCMS. They will be shown to be extremely useful, albeit
underutilized, resources which can effectively assist in the task of developing a sense of
Christian identity in the setting of pastoral care.
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Concerning the importance of the body in baptism, Albrecht Peters writes: “The sacraments underscore
the physical nature of such a promise of forgiveness. To the inner meditation on the image of Christ comes, in
addition, the application of His sacrificial act in Word and in sign, to afford one confident assurance. . . . Luther
underscores the physical nature of the application of the word of salvation in the sacramental signs in three different
aspects. In the first place the sign strengthens the character of the Word as what binds and comforts. God extracts us
from our swarming around among His creatures, extracts us here below from our high speculations about God that
are part of our own self-transcendence, and shows us signs that he Himself has instituted. . . . In such a way the
‘heard sacrament’ is accommodated to the verbum visibile, in a unifying way that cannot avoid being detected by the
individual.” Peters, Baptism and the Lord’s Supper, 36–37.
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CHAPTER TWO
ERIK H. ERIKSON’S DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY AND THE CENTRALITY OF
EGO IDENTITY
An Overview of Erikson’s Developmental Theory
Erikson’s developmental theory is a theory of psychosocial development, with an emphasis
on affective development. This emphasis is in contrast with the cognitive development theory of
Jean Piaget1 and the behavioral development theory of Robert Sears.2 Nevertheless, Erikson
shares with Piaget and Sears, the assumption that development proceeds according to a set
narrative.
The assumption underlying the three dimensions of development as postulated by
Piaget, Erikson, and Sears is that the action of development progresses as a unity-incontinuity. Development (1) evolves within an orderly and continuous progression
and (2) unfolds through well-established successive phases (or stages). What emerges
in behavior, affect, or thought at one phase becomes transformed into something akin
to, but also different from, what existed earlier. The processes unfold as an oscillating
movement which is both differentiating and integrating. Such a developmental
implies increasingly complex levels of organization.3
Although scholars such as Henry Maier classify Erikson’s theory as affective development,
Erikson does not limit his theory to a simple definition of what is commonly thought of as “being

1

For an overview of his theory see: Jean Piaget, The Origin of Intelligence in the Child, vol. 3, Jean Piaget:
Selected Works, trans. Margaret Cook (New York: Routledge, 1953).
2

In contrast to Piaget, see: Robert R. Sears, Eleanor E. Maccoby, and Harry Levin, Patterns of Child Rearing
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).
3

Henry W. Maier, Three Theories of Child Development, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 4.
Emphasis in the original. This understanding of development as orderly, continuous, and in stages is drawn from the
biological (somatic) aspects of fetal development. This is basis for the epigenetic principle of human development.
In 1940 Erikson wrote: “Embryology has developed from the concept of the homunculus, a minute, but completely
preformed man waiting in utero to be awakened, to expand and jump into life, to the present understanding of what
is called epigenetic development, the step by step growth of the fetal organs. Erik H. Erikson, “Problems of Infancy
and Early Childhood,” in Schlein, Looking at Things, 548–49. This principle is then expanded to include the entirety
of the human lifespan.
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emotional.” Michael F. Mascolo and Kurt W. Fischer state: “Current theory and research
underscore the idea that emotion plays a central role in selecting, amplifying, and organizing
attention, consciousness, thinking, and action.” They also report that “it is helpful to think of
emotional states with reference to three broad classes of components.”4 These include motiverelevant appraisals, a core somatic experience, and motor expressions and motor-active
tendencies. Essentially, cognitive activities and behaviors are heavily influenced by the affective
state of the individual.
Erikson’s theory is also not simply a psychological theory. The clinical and developmental
psychologist James Marcia and Ruthellen Josselson state: “Erikson’s theory covers the entire life
span and details expectable psychosocial crises and outcomes at different periods of life. It
affords a way of locating people in their developmental trajectory and understanding their
‘symptoms’ or life difﬁculties as reﬂecting blockages in their growth.”5 Erikson intertwines the
somatic, the psychological, and the social into a unified theory of development. These three
important factors merge to form, among other developmental characteristics, a person’s sense of
identity. Jane Kroger, of University of Tromsø, Norway, an expert in developmental psychology,
remarks:
Ego identity is shaped by three interacting elements: one’s biological characteristics;
one’s own unique psychological needs, interests, and defenses; and the cultural
milieu in which one resides. Physiological characteristics such as an individual’s
gender, physical appearance, physical capabilities, and limitations provide one with a
sense of “bodily self.” As one ages, physical features and capabilities will change and
healthy identity adaptation requires altering one’s sense of identity in accordance
with differing physical changes. Psychological elements of identity include one’s
unique feelings, interests, needs, and defenses, which give one a sense of I that
remains the same across time and circumstance. One’s social and cultural milieus
4

Michael F. Mascolo and Kurt W. Fischer, “Foundations of an Integrative Theory of Dynamic Development”
in Handbook of Life-Span Development, 1:152–53.
5

James Marcia and Ruthellen Josselson, “Eriksonian Personality Research and Its Implications for
Psychotherapy,” Journal of Personality 81, no. 6 (2013): 617.
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provide opportunities for expression as well as recognition of biological and
psychological needs and interests. For Erikson, optimal identity development
involves finding social roles and niches within the larger community that provide a
good “fit” for one’s biological and psychological capabilities and interest.6
However, the cultural milieu is not simply the place where the person lives out an identity.
It has a very strong impact of the development of identity, and how that identity can or cannot be
expressed. In point of fact, the cultural and historical setting into which a person is born and
within which she lives contributes to her sense of social identity. S. Alexander Haslem, Stephen
D. Reicher, and Michael J. Platrow state:
At a personal level, social identities are immensely important to individual group
members. They give us a sense of place in the world: who we are, what we should do,
and how we relate to others. Identities also give us a sense of connection to those who
share our sense of self (i.e., other in-group members), and the group itself is typically
a source of belongingness and pride.7
Additionally, the society, or cultural milieu, sets the boundaries for organizing group identity,
historical setting, cultural norms, and language, which itself determines ways in which self can
be publicly expressed.8
The first and foundational factor in development is the somatic stages of human
development. In each stage of physical development, the person acquires new physical traits and
abilities which are determined both by genetics and by the epigenetically determined growth of
the human organism.9
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Jane Kroger, Identity Development: Adolescence through Adulthood, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage,
2007), 8.
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S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen D. Reicher, and Michael J. Platrow, The New Psychology of Leadership:
Identity, Influence, and Power (New York: Psychology Press, 2011), 144.
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Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 73–74.
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The term “epigenetics” is used in many different ways, depending on the context. Erikson’s use of the term
refers primarily to the progressive changes that take place for an organism—specifically human beings—from
conception to end of life. “The word ‘epigenetic’ literally means ‘in addition to changes in genetic sequence.’ The
term has evolved to include any process that alters gene activity without changing the DNA sequence, and leads to
modifications that can be transmitted to daughter cells (although experiments show that some epigenetic changes
can be reversed). There likely will continue to be debate over exactly what the term means and what it covers. . . . .
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Erikson’s psychosocial developmental theory is epigenetic, suggesting a synchrony
between individual growth and social expectations. At each of eight chronological
periods in the life span, there are physical changes to which one’s social environment
responds with particular expectations and supports in the form of cultural practices
and institutions. It is assumed that the resolution of psychosocial stages will be
positive given “an average expectable environment.” . . . For example, at school age,
when the child is physically, mentally, and emotionally capable, she is expected to
begin to learn the technology of their culture (e.g., in literate societies, reading,
writing, number skills, etc.), and this learning process is supported by the social
provision of elementary schools. . . . Each of the stages of ego growth furnishes a
necessary contribution to the resolution of the succeeding stage.10
The second factor is the sociocultural milieu in which the person is immersed. As discussed
above, this factor brings into the discussion the specific historical, social, and relational reality
within which the person lives.11 Essential to understanding Erikson is his hypothesis that all
expressions of the ego are governed and restricted by genetic, epigenetic, and societal factors.
The third factor is the unique psychological makeup of the person. While the psychological
component is influenced by somatic and social factors, each person also has unique
psychological ways of processing, integrating, and rejecting the other forces. These three—the
somatic, the social, and the psychological—come together and interact to form a person’s sense
of ego identity. This chapter examines each of these three individually in terms of a general
overview of Erikson’s developmental theory. Following this overview, the manner in which
these three factors influence ego identity development is considered in greater depth. Challenges
Since most epigenetic modification, by whatever mechanism, is believed to be erased with each new generation,
during gameto-genesis and after fertilization, environmental and socioeconomic factors are believed to play a large
role in such manipulations. However, one of the more startling reports published in 2005 challenges this belief and
suggests that epigenetic changes may endure in at least four subsequent generations of organisms. . . . Other studies
have found that epigenetic effects occur not just in the womb, but over the full course of a human life span.” Bob
Weinhold, “Epigenetics: The Science of Change,” Environmental Health in Perspective 114, no. 3 (2006): A163.
This implies that the ecological setting for human development has an even greater influence that has been
previously postulated.
10
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human (social) environment, and that this coordination is mutual." His theory is not one of quanta of energy but of
relationships. Erikson focused on the power of abandonment and dependence. He emphasized and examined
attachment, separation, and mutuality in the multiperson system.” Shapiro and Fromm, Comprehensive Textbook,
2:2203.

52

to and adaptation of Erikson’s theory are then investigated. Finally, a synthesized description is
presented.
Erikson’s Theory in Relation to Somatic Existence
The foundational work which introduced Erikson and his theory to the public is Childhood
and Society (1950). A slightly revised edition appeared in 1963. In the 1985 publication, he
added afterthoughts to the work. The Freudian substrate which underlies his thinking can be
clearly discerned in Childhood and Society. In 1968 Erikson described Freud’s contribution to
Erikson’s own theory.
My psycho-social conception of the life cycle was originally based on Freud’s
clinical breakthrough into the early stages of life, in which he found the origin of
neurotic disturbance. I developed some of what I learned, asking: if we know what
can go wrong in each stage, can we say what should have gone and can go right?12
In Childhood and Society, he utilizes Freud’s developmental stages (oral, anal, phallic,
latency, and genital) as he discusses the development of the child from birth to adolescence. For
Freud, the stages are understood as psychosexual. By this he meant that various areas or zones of
the body became, according to a set epigenetic pattern, sites for the fixation of the libido.13
Erikson continued to work within Freud’s line of thought, even as he expanded the
developmental stages into adulthood and included the social elements as integral to healthy, and
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Erik H. Erikson, “The Human Life Cycle,” in Schlein, Looking at Things, 595. Erikson’s respect for Freud
is clear. “Only those who specialize in the extreme intricacies of mental disturbances and of ordinary mental quirks
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(New York: Norton, 1950), 59.
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sensibilities. Sigmund Freud, “Infantile Sexuality,” in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, trans. James
Strachey (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 40. Throughout this essay he links infantile pleasures, such as thumb
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another.” (Freud, Three Essays, 50).
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not merely unhealthy, development. Concerning one of the pillars of Freudian orthodoxy, he
writes:
Libido, then, is that sexual energy with which zones other than the genital are
endowed in childhood and which enhances with specific pleasures such vital
functions as the intake of food, the regulation of the bowels, and the motion of the
limbs. Only after a certain schedule of such pregenital uses of libido is successfully
resolved does the child’s sexuality graduate to a shortlived infantile genitality, which
must immediately become “latent,” transformed, and deflected. For the genital
machinery is still immature; and the first objects of immature sexual desire are
forever barred by universal incest taboos.14
In Freudian theory, the id (das Es) operates according to the pleasure principle.15 The first
erogenous zone is the mouth, by means of which the infant receives gratification at the mother’s
breast. The second is the anal zone, as the child learns to expel and retain the feces. The third is
the phallic (and for the female the vaginal) area, as the child learns to enjoy the pleasures of
genital stimulation. The fourth stage is the latency period, which allows for negotiation of nonlibidinous activity, before the fifth and final psychosexual stage, when pleasure is once again
centered in the genitals, but is now expressed in a more mature and mutually beneficial manner
with one’s partner.
These erogenous zones are not only sites of pleasure. They are also zones of potential
frustration. The mother’s breast may not appear “on demand.” The child, as he or she teethes,
must learn not to bite the nipple. Toilet training is a period of extreme frustration. The bowels do
not always cooperate. And the phallic stage, with the discovery of the pleasure of genital
14

Erikson, Childhood and Society (1950), 58.
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Even though he was a materialist, Freud thought of the id not as part of the somatic makeup of a person,
but as part of one’s psychic structure. The id “is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality; what little we know of
it we have learnt from our study of the dream-work and of the construction of neurotic symptoms, and most of that
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and as there are taking up into itself instinctual needs which find their psychical expression in it, but we cannot say
in what substratum.” Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis, trans. James Strachey (New
York: Norton, 1964), 91–92. In connection with these words, James Strachey states: “Freud is here regarding
instincts as something physical, of which mental processes are representations.” Because the id is so tightly bound to
the bodily drives, it is discussed here in this section.
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stimulation, is often met with parental displeasure. For Freud, the societal strictures which
restrict the pleasure principle become the source of basic neurosis. This oppressive force from
the outside becomes internalized as the superego (das Über-Ich).16
Freud’s psychosexual theory stops at the genital stage. Erikson’s psychosocial theory
continues throughout the human life span.17 His theory also has a far more positive tone. For
instance, in Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) of his theory, the dystonic pair of shame
and doubt are not seen as wholly negative. He writes: “I, therefore, offer as (for example)
Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt with the assumption that no human being can exist among
others without learning to be ashamed or to doubt, but that the ratio of development should be in
favor of a sense of autonomy.”18 Despite his respect for Freud, Erikson chided him for insisting
that his theory was fully informed by science, and that he was able to be objective and to dismiss
the implications of his own societal strictures upon his thinking. Erikson thought that Freud’s
theory was concerned only with looking backward to the time of infancy and childhood, and did
not look forward to a lifetime of developmental changes.
Freud confessed only to a scientific world view, but he could not avoid the attitudes
(often in contradiction to his personal values) that were part of his times. The original
data of psychoanalysis, for example, were minor reconstructions of “pathogenic”
events in early childhood. They supported an orientation which—in analogy to
teleology—could be called originology, i.e., a systematic attempt to derive complex
meanings from vague beginnings and obscure causes. The result was often an implicit
fatalism, although counteracted by strenuously “positive” orientations. Any theory
embracing both life history and case history, however, must find a balance between
the “backward” view of the genetic reconstruction and the “forward” formulation of
progressive differentiation in growth and development; between the “downward”
view of into the depth of the unconscious and the “upward” awareness of compelling
16

Already the difficulty of keeping the three factors (somatic, social, and psychological) separate in any
discussion become clear.
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The term “lifespan” is used to describe the various stages of life through which a person progresses from
birth to death. The term “lifecycle,” on the other hand, includes, in addition to the span of life, the ways in which the
previous stages interact with the latter stages and the intergenerational reality of human life.
18

Erik H. Erikson, “The Human Life Cycle,” 596.

55

social experience; and between the “inward” exploration of inner reality and the
“outward” attention to historical actuality.
Erikson did not have the advantage of the knowledge of the human genome and other
scientific advancements. Neither was the discipline of neuroscience very developed at that time.
Most of what was known about human brain development was discerned by clinical observation
of living patients. Technology at that time was unable to examine the brains of living human
beings, having advanced only slightly since the early days of Freud’s work in neurology. 19 More
information was available about the development of other human organs. Therefore, Erikson’s
work was founded upon his observations of actual children in the clinical setting as well as
watching his own children mature, rather than on scientific medical research.
Erikson divided Freud’s oral stage into two sub-stages. During the first part of the oral
stage, the infant has little control over her movements. She can suck on the nipple when the
breast is brought to her, but she cannot actively seek it. As she develops, she increasingly can do
more to find the nipple and receive the milk. This first part of Freud’s oral stage Erikson refers to
as being “incorporative.” The second part of this stage is inaugurated by the emergence of the
teeth. The child now attempts to incorporate the nipple by biting. The mother rejects this
behavior. Her rejection and the resulting frustration of the child are illustrative of the interplay
between the physical, the social, and the psychological aspects of human existence.
Freud’s anal stage is that stage during which the child gains physical stage over the bowels.
To this stage are assigned two aspects: the eliminative and the retentive. This physiological
development requires mastery of the anal sphincter. “Muscular maturation sets the stage for
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“Freud began his career attempting to create a brain-based psychology.” Louis Cozolino, The Neurology of
Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2010), 10. Cozolino (pp. 1–11) presents a
description of the “entangled histories of neurology and psychology.”
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experimentation with two simultaneous sets of social modalities: holding on and letting go.”20
Additionally, large muscle coordination allows the child to be “on the make,” crawling and then
walking wherever he desires to go.21 The increasing ability to gain control over the body and its
functions is accompanied by a growing sense of autonomy.
In Erikson’s Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt), which is coterminous with the phallic stage in
Freud, one observes an increase in initiative. The child now can more freely go where she
desires, because of vastly increased locomotor and mental abilities.22 Freud shocked the culture
of his day by reporting on childhood sexual excitation of the genitals during this developmental
period.23 Erikson concurred with Freud on this description.
Psychoanalysis verifies in daily work the simple conclusion that boys attach their first
genital affection to the maternal adults who have otherwise given comfort to their
bodies and that they develop their first sexual rivalry against the persons who are the
genital owners of those maternal persons.24
Erikson, however, while retaining Freud’s concept of the Oedipal Complex, viewed it more
as a helpful mythology. By the time he wrote Gandhi’s Truth, in 1969, his increasing interest in
the latter stages of life resulted in his describing the complex as being more like a part of a larger
“Generational Complex,” Simply to look back to the earlier stages of life was not, for him, a
thick enough mythology.25
Erikson’s Stage III (Industry vs. Inferiority) parallels Freud’s latency stage, covering the
20
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school age in the western world until adolescence. Fine motor skills develop so that “the child
becomes ready to handle the utensils, the tools, and the weapons used by the big people,” so that
he might be able actually to “bring a productive situation to completion.” 26 This permits the
child to do more than simply play and roleplay. She can now begin actually to do some of the
work of adults so that she might begin to think through the things that are possible when
adulthood begins.
Erikson’s Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) is aligned with Freud’s final stage, the
genital stage.27 This is the stage which forms the fulcrum for the discussion of identity
development in this dissertation.
With the establishment of a good initial relationship to the world of skills and tools,
and with the advent of puberty, childhood proper comes to an end. Youth begins. But
in puberty and adolescence all sameness and continuities relied upon earlier are more
or less questioned again, because of the rapidity of body growth which equals that of
early childhood and because of the new addition of genital maturity.28
The psychological and social effects of these monumental changes are discussed below.
What is significant as far as physical development is concerned is that the youth is now endowed
with the ability to father or give birth to another child, is showing the physical traits of adulthood
while still psychologically unprepared for parenthood, and is viewed by society as little more
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other hand, military veterans who do not have sufficient identity diffusion can be at a loss as to who they are upon
discharge from service and reentry into the general population. For a thorough description of this phenomenon, see
Jonathan Shay, Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming (New York: Scribner, 2002).
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than a child.
Stages VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) and VII (Generativity vs. Stagnation) in Erikson’s model
cover the period of adulthood, except for “old age.” Erikson has little to say about the physical
changes. It is more in Stage VIII (Integrity vs. Despair and Disgust), when the body begins
clearly to show signs of deterioration, that the growing physical weakness, the lessening of
mental acuity, and other physical factors once more become significant enough to strongly affect
one’s sense of identity. Ego integrity can disintegrate as bodily integrity declines.29
Physical changes that can be externally observed are perhaps not the most important for
development. Neurologist and professor at the Institute of Child Development, University of
Minnesota, Philip David Zelazo, along with Wendy Lee, write the following concerning the
human brain’s constant metamorphosis.
New technologies have allowed scientists unprecedented opportunities to observe the
developing (including the late adult) brain in vivo, and although more work is needed
to understand the limitations of the views afforded by different techniques, as well as
how these views interrelate, our understanding of brain development has increased
enormously in recent years. As this brief review reveals, brain development is a
lifelong phenomenon characterized by considerable regional specificity, and also by a
series of overlapping, dynamic processes that yield both progressive events, such as
increases in white matter, and regressive events, such as decreases in gray matter.
Regressive events are prominent in childhood and early adolescence, but also in the
late adult years. . . One region of the brain that undergoes especially noteworthy
changes across the lifespan—during childhood, adolescence, and normal late adult
development—is the prefrontal cortex.30
Therefore, the somatic influence of cognitive and affective functioning is tied closely to the
physical condition of the brain as well as the entirety of the physical organism. Much of this was
only available to Erikson intuitively, rather than by documented research. However, such
research is not contradictory to either Erikson’s or Freud’s conjectures.
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Erikson’s Theory in Relation to Social Existence
Since Erikson’s theory is that of psychosocial development, the influence of a person’s
communal or social existence, which includes family, peers, societal restraint and expectation, as
well as the historical setting with its ideologies, is important at each developmental stage in the
life cycle. The intergenerational interactions are also essential elements of the social dimension
of his theory. Henry Maier describes the social aspects of human existence from the Stage V
(Identity vs. Role Diffusion) perspective.
The individual slowly moves into society as a unit and as a member of a unit in his or
her own right. Individuals create and continue to establish their communal
membership. They abandoned a stark dependency on family two phases ago; they
now require full status alongside peers in the society. The youth’s gradual growth and
transformation make sense to others, and others begin to make sense to the youth.31
Communal interaction is part of normal, healthy human life. All stages prior to adolescence
require it for the child to survive and thrive. Communal interaction, even if it is restricted to one
particular other person, is what typifies Stage VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) and is necessary for
generativity (Stage VI: Generativity vs. Stagnation) to occur. The disintegration of communal
life, with the death of others dear to the person, is an aspect of what makes navigating the final
stage of life so difficult.
Erikson identifies social institutions which, at each stage of development, form and support
this development. These are treated under the heading of ritualization. For Erikson, ritualization
is not reserved for formal, public ceremonies and situations. He is concerned with the
ritualization of everyday life, that which happens in the home, in school, and in everyday life.
That ritualization occurs in everyday life points to the importance of the family and the
intergenerational interrelations that underpin Erikson’s theory. This cannot be overstated. Life is
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normally lived intergenerationally.32 Erikson does not look at a person in isolation from the
interpersonal interactions and relationships experienced, many of which are ritualized in the
context of a social group. In any given family, the infant (Stage I: Trust vs. Mistrust) interacts
with the parent (Stage VII: Generativity vs. Stagnation), who may at the same time be
negotiating the intimacy issues of Stage VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) with the spouse, and be
dealing with other children in the other stages. He states: “The cogwheeling of stages of
childhood and adulthood are, as we can see in conclusion, truly a system of generation and
regeneration—for into this system flow, and from this system emerge, those social attitudes to
which institutions and traditions of society attempt to give unity and permanence.”33
The sociality aspects of Erikson’s work are considered important among many of those
who those who study ritual and ritualization formally. Catherine Bell states:
Ethnological and biogenetic approaches to ritual often invoke the psychological
theories of Erik Erikson (1902–1990) and Jean Piaget (1896–1980) concerning
physical and social maturation. Erikson, in particular, addressed the “ontogeny” or
32

Erikson most often speaks of the social setting as that of the family, then the family and the school, and
then, in adolescence, the addition of increasing peer relations. Urie Bronfenbrenner provides helpful language to
distinguish the increasing complexity of the web of relationships which affect ego development. “First, the
developing person is viewed not merely as a tabula rasa on which the environment makes its impact, but as a
growing dynamic entity in which it resides. Second, since the environment also exerts its influence, requiring a
process of mutual accommodation, the interaction between the person and the environment is viewed as twodirectional, that is, characterized by reciprocity. Third, the environment defined as relevant to developmental
processes is not limited to a single, immediate setting but is extended to incorporate interconnections between such
settings, as well as the external influences emanating from the larger surroundings.” According to Bronfenbrenner,
each person resides in a microsystem, which is “a pattern of activities, roles, and interpersonal relations experienced
by the developing person in a given setting with particular physical and material characteristics.” Each person also
lives in a mesosystem, which is comprised of “the interrelations among two or more settings . . . such as home,
school, and neighborhood peer group.” He also states that each person also is influenced by the exosystem, which
are other settings which “do not involve the developing person as an active participant, but in which events occur
that affect, or are affected by, what happened in the setting containing the developing person.” Finally,
Bronfenbrenner posits a macrosystem, which operates at the subcultural or cultural level as a whole, including belief
systems and ideologies. Urie Bronfenbrenner, The Ecology of Human Development: Experiments by Nature and
Design (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 21–26. Erikson’s description of the social setting for ego
development primarily correlates with Bronfenbrenner’s micro- and mesosystems; however, he also writes on the
exosystem level when describing the “historical moment” for example, in Erik H. Erikson, Life History and the
Historical Moment (New York: Norton, 1975), when writing about Martin Luther in Young Man Luther and in
Gandhi’s Truth.
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development of ritualization in stages of maturation within the human life cycle. He
defined ritualization as a type of consensual interplay between two or more persons
that is repeated in recurring contexts and has adaptive value for those involved. His
central example of such behavior is the peculiar greeting ceremony that unfolds
between a mother and her baby in the morning. Their interaction is both highly
individual and stereotypical, he argued; each does things that arouse predictable
responses in the other and that are important for both physical and emotional reasons.
Erikson concluded that human ritualization is grounded in such proverbial infantile
experiences, although it culminates in the elaborate ceremonies of public life.34
While Erikson makes connections to religious rituals, his concern is for the mundane rituals
of life in general. He claims, “Ritualization at its best, that is, in a viable cultural setting,
represents a creative formalization which helps to avoid both impulsive excess and compulsive
self-restriction, both social anomie and moralistic coercion.”35 He then outlines seven
accomplishments of ritualization. First, it “elevates the satisfaction of immediate needs . . . into
the context of a communal actuality.”36 Second, ritual also “sanctions a way of doing simple and
daily things.” It develops habits which are socially permissible or even expected. Third, it
includes and excludes. Those whom it excludes are outsiders. Those who know the ritual are
insiders. This results in a fourth effect, that is, the formation of a distinct community who share a
common vision and sense of reality. The fifth aspect of ritualization is that it is comprised of
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Erikson makes a distinction between the “factual,” the “real,” and the “actual.” That which is factual is that
which is verifiable and measurable. That which is real is demonstrably correct. That which is actual is that which is
effectively true in action. In discussing the implications of Albert Einstein’s theories, and their implications for the
way people look at the world in which they live, he remarks that the question for giving meaning to the world of
human experience requires more than simple bare facts. “The scientific way of finding order in the cosmos is, of
course, a specialization given some proven discipline and simple dignity by the continued search for verifiable facts
and the continuing sharing and comparing of both methods and findings. The psychological root of the equally
necessary search for a cosmological order, however, seems to continue that need for a world view that at a given
moment of history combines obedience to the verifiable new fact with the search for a more inclusive sense of
reality, a truth held evident by a community of persons who feel that they share a living actuality.” After discussing
the distinctions between factuality, reality, and actuality, he writes: “Any lasting sense of truth, then, must combine
the factual, the real, and the actual – and so does true playfulness.” See Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 60–61. This turn
to playfulness is the basis for his discussion of ritual, which is a form of formalized play designed to create for those
involved a sense of truth.
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stages. One is incorporated by stages until one has reached the full goal of the ritualization
process. The sixth is the accomplishment of discriminating between “good behavior and
shameful or guilty acts.” Finally, ritual “provides the psychosocial foundation for the gradual
development of an independent identity to be sealed in adolescence by various rituals of
‘confirmation’— a ‘second birth.’—which will integrate all childhood identifications in a world
view and belief system while marking as ideologically foreign all those wishes and images which
have become undesirable and evil and are remindful of other, ‘lower’ species of men.”37
Erikson assigns a ritualization process to each stage of development from infancy through
adolescence. In the stages thereafter he is less clear. The ritual connected with infancy (Stage I)
is “the numinous,” which is founded upon the mutual recognition of child and mother by face
and by name.38 The mother looks closely at the infant and calls the child by name. The mother
calls herself “mother,” or “mommy,” or some such name. Although such interactions appear to
be playful and familiar, they also become formalized; that is, ritualized. The child after a time
begins to make the association between self as an actor and the mother as a distinct actor. This
forms the foundation for recognizing a distinction between self and other.
The second stage in ritualization is one which Erikson called “the judicious.” The child at
this stage learns to distinguish between right and wrong, clean and unclean.39 An external
standard of acceptable behavior is imposed. Failure to comply results in shaming, aimed at
teaching the child to distinguish between the two. This is Freud’s “anal stage,” where pottytraining teaches that the material defecated is dirty, unclean, and socially unacceptable. This is
also the stage Freud assigns for the beginnings of the development of the super-ego, the part of
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oneself “standing watch over the rest of ourselves and confronting us with detestable selfimages.”40 Thus, law and order and the accompanying judicious element of ritualization come
into play as the parental figures enforce the standards regularly from the outside.
Stage III in ritualization is aligned with the play stage. The dramatic element now comes
into play. Erikson’s research led him to see that in the play stage children use various objects to
construct a plot, much as playwrights do when they build a storyline with conflicts that are then
resolved. Children create narratives at this stage of life which “relive, correct, and recreate past
experiences, and anticipate future roles and events” in life.41
Childhood play, in experimenting with self-images and images of otherness, is most
representative of what psychoanalysis calls the ego-ideal—that part of ourselves
which we can look up to, at least insofar as we can imagine ourselves as ideal actors
in an ideal plot, with appropriate punishment and exclusion of those who do not make
the grade. Thus we experiment with and, in a visionary sense, get ready for a
hierarchy of ideal and evil roles which, of course, go beyond that which daily life
could permit is to engage in.42
Erikson does not understand this stage as replacing the previous two; rather, it joins with
them and relies upon them. Thus, each stage builds upon the previous ones, even as it anticipates
the ones to follow.43
“School age adds another element of ritualization—that of methodical performance.
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It is but a small step from the play of dramatic ritual, with the safe acting out of ideal roles and behaviors,
to the development of a sense of one’s identity. If this stage is essential for the development of the ideal self (the ego
ideal), then it contributes to that which, in Freudian terminology, is the superego, which guides the development of
the ego as it struggles with the impulses of the id. Furthermore, this dramatic ritual element is highly suggestive for
the power of an enriched baptismal liturgy to present the baptizand with an experience of the Christian as dead to sin
and alive to God in Christ Jesus (Rom. 6:11). Commenting of the power of ritual, Catherine Bell writes: “Liturgical
studies can appear at times to be in danger of overestimating the power of ritual. The more enthusiastic have gone
beyond affirming the ability of ritual to renew faith and create community; they declare that ritual is what makes and
keeps us human; it can prevent the inhuman destruction of warfare and orchestrate a transformation of the unjust
social order that rational political methods alone cannot bring about. The attempt to build church life on such an
idealized understanding of ritual appears problematic to some secular scholars of religion, although others have lent
their support to this direction.” Bell, Ritual, 221.
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Without this, the elements mentioned so far would lack a binding discipline.”44 Erikson refers to
this as the formal stage in ritualization. The nature of schooling increases the social influence on
the imagination, excluding certain roles and expecting others. Certain behaviors tolerated earlier
are now censured. The number of possible socially acceptable identities are reduced.
As the child enters adolescence, the work of identity development becomes a major, if not
the major, task.
The work role which we begin to envisage for ourselves at the end of childhood is,
under favorable conditions, the most reassuring role of all, just because it confirms us
in skills and permits us to recognize ourselves in visible works. But the unrest of
puberty and the necessity to leave childhood behind, and the unrest of the times,
combine to produce a variety of conflicting self-images, just at the age when we must
envisage ourselves not only as worker, but also as mate, parent, and citizen and may
feel that we ourselves are being sacrificed to technical perfection and the streamlining
of roles.45
Erikson states that what is needed at this juncture is some solidarity of conviction, some
ideology to which to cling and from out of which to make sense of life. The ritualization of this
period, therefore, can be expressed “by simple distain, by moral repudiation, fanatic rebellion, or
warfare.”46 Other times the ritualization of this period can be expressed in fanatical obeisance to
a radical ideology or supreme leader. Erikson recalls:
This I attempted to outline in my book on young Luther’s personal and universal
crisis. The matter can be traced through the revolutionary periods of more recent
history, until we see in our time totalitarian methods of involving new generations
ideologically in staged state rituals combining the numinous (the Leader’s face) and
the judicial (loud condemnations in unison of “criminals”), the dramatic (parades,
dances, and assemblies) and the precise in performance (military precision, mass
sports) on a large scale. These attempt to provide for a whole generation of young
individuals an ideological commitment encompassing perpetual change, and, in fact,
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making traditional (in the sense of pre-revolutionary) values part of a decidedly
negative identity.47
This assumption of a contrary identity is often ritualized in spontaneous rites of passage
designed by the adolescents themselves.48
Erikson has much less to say about ritualization in the adult stages of life. He states that all
adult rituals have the preceding five elements; that is, the numinous, the judicious, the dramatic,
the formal, and the ideological. The aspect of ritual in the adult stages is “ritual sanction.” 49 The
marriage ritual, normally performed in Stage VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) grants ritual sanction to
enter into a committed relationship. In Stage VII (Generativity vs. Stagnation) ritual action is
characterized by teaching, leading, directing, and sanctioning society’s rituals. Erikson bemoans
the ritualization in Stage VIII (Integrity vs. Despair and Disgust), which is the ritual of
mandatory retirement. He sees it contributing to the prevalence of despair and disgust in one’s
latter years.50 Western society denigrates old age and therefore losses out on the wisdom that can
come from a life lived in integrity.51
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Erikson’s Theory in Relation to Psychological Existence
The physical processes of maturation and the social pressures and influences, both outlined
above, interplay with the psychological structure of the mind. These three come together to
produce the balance or, if pathological, the imbalance of the dialectical traits of each successive
stage of ego development, along with the psychological ego strengths developed by means of the
crises of each stage. It bears repeating that, for Erikson, the ego is not equal to the psychological.
The ego is a construct of the somatic, the social, and the psychological factors of an individual. It
is the self, comprised of the aforementioned three elements. In this way, Erikson’s conception of
the ego builds upon and yet departs from that of Freud. As argued earlier, Freud bound the id
tightly to the bodily urges and understood the superego as the internalization of the societal
pressures which resist the id. The ego is the not-completely-conscious battleground that makes
use of defense mechanisms. Erikson almost makes peace between the belligerents. The three
elements of human existence—the somatic, the social, and the psychological makeup of the
individual—combine to produce one’s ego, which continues to grow and be influenced by these
three factors throughout one’s lifespan.
Erikson made a major move away from Freudian orthodoxy when he shifted the chief focus
of his theory from the id to the ego. Even though Anna Freud argued that psychoanalysis was
indeed concerned with the ego and that it was more than mere depth psychology, Erikson’s move
was far more definitive. In Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen (1962) Anna Freud wrote
Eine Wendung der Arbeitsrichtung in den Schriften Freuds, von Massenpsychologie
und Ic-Analyse und Jenseits des Lustprinzips angefangen, hat dann die Beschäftigung
mit dem Ich von dem Odium des Unanalytiscchen befreit und das Interesse für die
Ich-Instanzen ausdrücklich in den Mittelpunkt der Aufmerksamkeit gerückt. Sether
lässt das Arbeitsprogramm der analytischen Furschung sich sicher nicht mehr mit
dem Namen Tiefenpsychologie decken. Wir definieren gewöhnlich: Aufgabe der
Analyse ist die möglichst weitgenhende Kenntnis aller drei Instanzen, aus denen wir
uns die psychische Persönlichkeit zusammengesetz denken, die Kenntnis ihrer
Beziehungen untereinander und zur Aussenwelt. Das bedeutet auf das Ich bezogen:
67

seine Inhalte, seine Ausdehnung, seine Funktionen und die Geschichte seiner
Abhängigkeiten von Aussenwelt, Es und Über-ich. Auf das Es bezogen, heisst es: die
Beschreibung der Triebe, also der Es-Inhalte und das Verfogen der
Triebumwandlungen. 52
Erikson went even further away from concern about the id. Catarina Kinnvall writes:
“Erikson’s move away from a Freudian preoccupation with the unconscious to the conscious is
useful.”53 However, Erikson was not saying that his development theory ignored the subliminal.
Kroger notes that, for Erikson, “identity is partly conscious but also partly unconscious in
form.”54 This is true not only for identity but for all the characteristics of ego development over
the lifespan.
A major aspect of Erikson’s theory is that it does not restrict itself simply to the
psychological makeup of a person. Erikson acknowledges the importance of the things that are
biologically inherited. He also takes seriously the familial, social, and historical milieu in which
the person matures. Erikson presents us with “new insights into the biological, psychological,
and social properties”55 of human existence. Beyond these, he views psychological development
not being built solely upon a few momentous decisions in life. The existential psychotherapist,
Irvin Yalom concurs, stating:
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An individual’s character structure is not the result of a single momentous decision
that can be traced and erased, but instead is constituted by a lifetime of innumerable
choices made and alternatives relinquished. Although the child has, of course, no
awareness of adult characterological options, nonetheless the child always has a
modicum of ability to affirm or reject what is presented to him or her, to submit or
rebel, to identify positively or, as Erik Erikson has taught us, to form a negative
identification with certain role models.56
Thus, the psychological development of a person is not to be restricted to a few events in
infancy and early childhood, as Freud proposed, but to the interplay and interaction between
innumerable individual decisions influenced by the social setting in which development occurs.

Identity Development in Erikson’s Theory
The focus of this dissertation is on Christian identity and how it is conferred and actualized.
While focusing strictly on identity conferment and identity actualization may appear to be an
artificial narrowing of Erikson’s theory, the development of identity is the central concern in his
work.57 Doubtless, one could study each of the various stages of affective development and make
that the fulcrum for research. Because each of Erikson’s stages of development are interrelated,
the psychosocial aspects of each stage contribute to, interact with, and result from the others. As
is demonstrated in the section which follow, in Erikson’s theory, each of the first four stages
contribute necessary material for the development of identity. Similarly, the three subsequent
stages require the successful negotiation of Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) in order
themselves to be successfully navigated. Nevertheless, identity development is inextricably
bound up with any study of Erikson and his theory. It is not an overstatement to declare that all
writers and researchers who reference him or write about him consider identity development the
centerpiece of his life and work.
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Identity was not merely an academic concern for Erikson. It had significant personal
dimensions. Erik was born to Karla Salomonsen, née Abrahamsen of unknown paternity, June
15, 1902.58 She had previously been married to Valdemar Isidor Salomonsen in 1898, although
Lawrence J. Friedman reports that “it did not last a night and was probably unconsummated. It is
not possible that Salomonsen was Erik’s father, as he had absconded to Mexico or the United
States.59 In 1904, on Erik’s third birthday, Karla married Theodor Homburger. They took Erik on
their honeymoon with them. Erik, who at this time received “Homburger” as his surname,
experienced Homburger as a caring father-figure, but always doubted his identity.60 He finally
became fully aware that he was a stepson, but could never track down his biological father. After
moving to the United States, when applying for naturalization with the U.S. District Court in
1938, he (reportedly at the suggestion of his eldest son Kai) changed his name to Erik
Homburger Erikson. Much conjecture surrounds this decision. Some have thought it involved a
repudiation of Judaism, others of the Old World, and others think it was a rejection of his
stepfather. The latter is not likely as he kept Homburger as his middle name. Others have
interpreted this move as Erik being his own father, in a symbolic sense, “Erik, Erik’s son.”61 This
last explanation finds evidence in his statement, “I made myself Erik’s son. It is better to be your
own originator.”62 Whatever the motive, Erikson’s work revolves around the key concept of
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personal identity. For Erikson, the development of identity includes the same three areas listed
above: somatic; social; psychological. All three come together to form ego identity.63
What is meant by the term “identity”? It is more than that of which one is consciously
aware. “Identity is partly conscious but also partly unconscious in form, as it provides that vital
continuity for human existence.”64 In its subjective aspect, it is “the awareness of the fact that
there is a selfsameness and continuity to the ego’s synthesizing methods and that these methods
are effective in safeguarding the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others.”65 Erikson
first used the term when describing his psychoanalysis of World War II veterans. Along with
other combat veterans, he describes his treatment of a Navy corpsman (whom he calls “a medical
soldier) who served with the Marines. The symptoms he describes would likely be explained as
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder today. Erikson observed that this man, as well as others, was in a
state of constant anxiety. He felt attacked. Loud noises would startle him and cause heart
palpitations, waves of fever heat, and headaches. “What was sick in these men, then, was their
screening system, that ability not to pay attention to a thousand stimuli which we perceive at any
given moment but which we are able to ignore for the sake of whatever we are concentrating
on.”66 Erikson pondered what had happened to them. In some cases one could postulate physical
63

In Erikson’s earlier writings, he proposed the three elements as the sources for the development of ego
identity. In his latter writings, such as Life History, he added the historical context as an important aspect in identity.
One can only be what is available at a given time. This reflects the commonsense nature of Erikson’s thought.
Identity includes one’s family background, one’s birthplace, one’s chosen place of residence, and one’s vocation. It
would be impossible to be a nuclear scientist in the 16th century. Thus, one’s historical setting contributes to the
development of ego identity. Nonetheless, it is possible to understand the historical setting as a subset within the
social and cultural setting. This will be the way in which the historical dimension will be treated in this dissertation.
64

Kroger, “Identity in Formation,” 62.

65

Erik H. Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle (New York: Norton, 1980), 22. Expanding on Erikson, James
Loder defines identity as “a consistent sense of self. That is, identity establishes self-consistency, from one social
and cultural context to the next, and allows for a balance between resistance to adult conformity, on the one hand,
and subjective self-absorption, on the other. Identity means also the inner sameness and continuity sensed in oneself
by one’s meaning to others.” James E. Loder, The Logic of the Spirit: Human Development in Theological
Perspective (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998), 207.
66

Erikson, Childhood and Society, 41.

71

damage to nerves, but not in all. What was the deeper issue? He writes:
What impressed me most was the loss in these men of a sense of identity. They knew
who they were; they had a personal identity. But it was as if, subjectively, their lives
no longer hung together—and never would again. There was a central disturbance of
what I started to call ego identity. At this point it is enough to say that this sense of
identity provides the ability to experience one’s self as something which has
continuity and sameness, and to act accordingly. In many cases there was at the
decisive time in the history of the breakdown a seemingly innocent item such as a
gun in our medical soldier’s unwilling hands: a symbol of evil, which endangered the
principles by which the individual had attempted to safeguard personal integrity and
social status in his life at home. Likewise, the anxiety often broke out with sudden
thought, I should now be at home, painting the roof, or paying that bill, or seeing this
boss or calling on that girl; and the despairing feeling that all of this which should
have been never will be.67
Furthermore, for Erikson, a distinction exists between identity formation and identity
construction. Identity formation is a wider term which includes conferred identity as well as an
identity which is consciously constructed. Marcia remarks:
Identity is, as Erikson says, the result of ‘the silent doings of ego synthesis. . . . The
formation of an identity is different, however, from the construction of an identity. In
experimental terms, one becomes progressively aware of one’s basic characteristics
and one’s position in the world. For example, one becomes gradually to realize that
one is separate from one’s mother, the child of one’s own parents, the possessor of
specific skills and needs, a pupil in a particular school, a member of certain social and
religious groups, the citizen of a specific country. This list describes a given or
conferred identity, of whose elements an individual becomes progressively aware. In
contrast, identity begins to be constructed when the individual begins to make
decisions about who to be, with which group to affiliate, what beliefs to adopt, what
interpersonal values to espouse, and what occupational direction to pursue. Most,
though not all, individuals “have” an identity in the original Eriksonian sense. Only
some, however, have a self-constructed identity that is based upon superimposition of
a decision-making process on the given or conferred identity.68
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For Erikson, developing “a sense of identity” is more than having one conferred. Erikson
writes:
Young people must become whole people in their own right, and this during a
developmental stages characterized by a diversity of changes in physical growth,
genital maturation, and social awareness. The wholeness to be achieved at this stage I
have called a sense of inner identity. The young person, in order to experience
wholeness, must feel a progressive continuity between that which he has come to be
during the long years of childhood and that which he promises to become in the
anticipated future; between that which he conceives himself to be and that which he
perceives others to see in him and to expect of him. Individually speaking, identity
includes, but is more than, the sum of all the successive identifications of those earlier
years when the child wanted to be, and often was forced to become, like the people he
depended on.69
Jane Kroger points out the importance of a sense of continuity with oneself and a sense of
personal sameness in ego integrity. “Despite changes in interpersonal relationships, social roles,
and contexts, an attained sense of identity enables one to experience a continued sense of self
and role commitments across time and place.”70 Identity has not merely a psychological
dimension. It is an amalgamation and product of interaction between somatic, social, and
psychological factors.71 Erikson’s insistence on psychosocial development points to the
intersection and interaction between what can be called personal identity and group identity. All
people live within some sociocultural system. It is “the learning the effective steps toward a
tangible collective future, that is developing into a defined ego within a social reality,” that was
Erikson’s aim.72
The conscious feeling of having a personal identity is based on two simultaneous
observations: the immediate perception of one’s selfsameness and continuity in time;
imputed identity given by God and lives in accordance with it.
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and the simultaneous perception of the fact that others recognize one’s sameness and
continuity. What I propose to call ego identity concerns more than the mere fact of
existence, as conveyed by personal identity; it is the ego quality of this existence. . . .
Ego Identity, then, in its subjective aspect, is the awareness of the fact that there is a
selfsameness and continuity to the ego’s synthesizing methods and that these methods
are effective in safeguarding the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for
others.73
Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) in Erikson’s theory has as its crucial role identity
formation. A careful reading of Erikson, especially in Identity: Youth and Crisis and in
Childhood and Society, shows that the central concern for Erikson, throughout his writings, is the
issue of identity.74 Identity, therefore, has its beginning in the very first stage of life and
continues to be a factor throughout the life cycle.
While the attainment of ego identity provides a person with a sense of continuity and
sameness, this does not mean that it is a static achievement. “A further property of identity to
Erikson is its evolving nature. For Erikson, the identity established at the end of adolescence
provides some foundation for entry into adult life. However, identity continues to evolve
throughout adulthood.”75 In fact, for Erikson, identity development has its embryotic
development in the first four stages of development. The first stages provide the foundation for
ego identity achievement, even as that identity continues to evolve over the course of one’s
lifespan.
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Erikson describes three major steps by which the ego grows as it matures. The first step is
that of introjection, the primitive incorporation of the image of another. This step of introjection
is connected with the first few stages of development. Therefore, the most basic experience
which begins to form the ego is that “between the mothering adult(s) and the mothered child.”76
This relationship forms the foundation for ego and ego identity development. “Only the
experience of such initial mutuality provides a safe pole of self-feeling from which the child can
reach out for the other pole: his first love ‘objects.’”77
The second step of ego development depends on the identifications which the child makes
with those who provide roles to be emulated. This requires positive interactions with these
people, who are trustworthy and provide a safe place for such role playing. The connection to the
social aspects of this time in life point especially to that of the play stage.78 However, Erikson
argues that the school age can provide such opportunities if, and only if, the school is structured
so as to allow for meaningful play, experimentation, and investigation.79
The third step Erikson describes is that of identity formation. At this point the usefulness of
identification fades and the adolescent begins a process of “selective repudiation and mutual
assimilation of childhood identifications” and begins to shape them into his or her unique sense
of self, that is, of one’s own unique ego identity.80
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The final identity, then, as fixed at the end of adolescence, is superordinated to any
single identification with individuals of the past: it includes all significant
identifications, but it also alters them in order to make a unique and reasonably
coherent whole of them.81
Erikson writes of “reasonably coherent whole,” thereby acknowledging that the
development of a sense of ego identity is never complete or perfect. There are factors from all
the preceding stages which hinder the development of a truly integral sense of identity.
In Identity: Youth and Crisis, Erikson presents case histories of the lives of George Bernard
Shaw and of William James.82 He notes that “the autobiographies of extraordinary (and
extraordinarily self-perceptive) individuals are one source of insight into the development of
identity.”83 Both men, according to Erikson, endured a prolonged adolescence. Erikson states that
Freud’s psychosexual libido theory “offers no adequate account” for this phenomenon.84 He
notes that extended adolescence should be viewed as a psychosocial moratorium. Inadequate
negotiation of the earlier stages of ego development forestall the work of ego identity
development. Erikson describes what he means by a moratorium and its purposes:
By psychosocial moratorium, then, we mean a delay of adult commitments, and yet it
is not only a delay. It is a period that is characterized by a selective permissiveness on
the part of society and of provocative playfulness on the part of youth, and yet it also
often leads to deep, if often transitory, commitment on the part of youth, and ends in
a more or less ceremonial confirmation of commitment on the part of society. Such
moratoria show highly individual variations, which are especially pronounced in very
gifted people (gifted for better or for worse), and there are, of course, institutional
variations linked with the ways of life of cultures and subcultures.85
Erikson lists factors which contribute to the delay of identity achievement, or in some
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extreme cases the failure to reach such an achievement at all.86 Failure to achieve an adequate
balance between trust and mistrust, and between autonomy and shame and doubt, can result in
confusion over one’s developmental stage. “The young person may feel simultaneously very
young, and in fact babylike, and old beyond rejuvenation.”87 The diffusion of initiative and of
industry, with the result of an overwhelming sense of worthlessness and inferiority, interferes
with the part of identity development that involves vocation. This loss of a sense of identity,
Erikson contends, can cause the young person to choose a “negative identity,” which is
comprised of scorn and hostility “toward the roles offered as proper and desirable in one’s family
or immediate community.”88 In the most severe cases, the negative identity can be delusional.89
On the whole, however, our patients’ conflicts find expression in a more subtle way
than the abrogation of personal identity. They chose instead a negative identity, i.e.,
an identity perversely based on all those identifications and roles which, at critical
stages of development, had been presented to them as most undesirable or dangerous
and yet also most real.90
As the forgoing research demonstrates, it is nearly impossible to untangle the social and the
psychological elements in Erikson’s theory, nor should one seek to do so. They are inextricably
bound together and tied to the epigenesis of a person’s somatic development. Nevertheless, it is
important to understand the impact of each factor on ego identity development. Therefore, the
subsections which follow view the whole from the perspectives of the somatic, the social and the
psychological dimensions of human life.
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Erikson’s Identity Development Theory in Relation to Somatic Existence
Physical factors are at work at each stage of development which impact and interact with
person’s sense of identity. Erikson’s contention that adolescence is the most important stage for
identity formation can only be evaluated by considering the physical aspects of nascent identity
development in the earlier stages and comparing them with the physical changes of puberty and
adolescence. The changes that come after adolescence are less monumental, at least until the
final stage as the body begins to deteriorate in a noticeable manner.
Erikson begins his stages of development at birth. Since his is a theory of psychosocial
development, this makes sense. He does not venture into the physical aspects of human in-utero
development. Rather, the first aspect of human development with which he is concerned is the
encounter that “occurs when the newborn, now deprived of his symbiosis with the mother’s
body, is put to the breast.”91 This is Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust). The focus of the interaction
between the child and the outside world is that of the child’s sucking mouth and the mother’s
lactating breast. “At this point he lives through and loves with his mouth.”92 By means of the
mouth the child incorporates the outside world into himself. Erikson notes that this incorporative
action is accompanied by other modes which will become more fully developed and dominant in
later stages. In order safely to consume the milk, the child must also develop the ability to spit up
milk that chokes as well as to evacuate the bladder and bowels (the eliminative mode) and to
close the lips so as to keep and swallow the milk (the retentive mode). The child also learns to
stick out the tongue, the early expression of the intrusive mode.93 The effective ability to
incorporate is heightened with the emergence of the teeth and the urge to bite. This event is often
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the first highly negative experience between the child and her mother. Erikson has little to say
about the physical contributions to ego identity development at this stage. Much more will be
said in the sections below which discuss the social and psychological dimensions.
Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) in development begins with the desire of the
parents and the ability of the child to control the bowels.94 Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt) brings
with it locomotion. Erikson implies that the ability to control the bowels in Stage II comes before
locomotion. However, this is not always, and likely not usually, the case. Most children have
developed the ability to crawl and even to walk before they have mastered control of the
bowels.95 Along with this locomotive ability comes the awareness of the genitals as erogenous
zones. This is an integral part of Freudian psychosexual theory, from which Erikson does not
depart. However, the emphasis is, for Erikson, more on the intrusive impulses of this age, which
are facilitated by the ability to move under the child’s own power. “The ambulatory stage and
that of infantile genitality add to the inventory of basic social modalities that of ‘making,’ first in
the sense of ‘being on the make.’ There is no stronger word for it.”96 Because the child can
ambulate on her own, she is able to play with others, this increasing her social circle and that of
the influences of society upon her. Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) and Stage III
(Initiative vs. Guilt) physical development contribute to ego identity development by
strengthening the body for future roles with which the person will experiment.
The next stage in physical development is tied to the school age (Stage IV: Industry vs.
94
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Inferiority). The child’s motor skills as well as brain development now permit him to handle and
use the technology, “the utensils, the tools, and the weapons used by big people.”97 This physical
ability to handle the technology of the culture is increased with practice, preparing the child to
exit childhood and enter adolescence. The contribution to identity made at this stage is the
physical ability to make things, to create actual objects in the real world, whether physical or
intellectual.
Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) arrives with all the convulsive impulses that
accompany the advent of puberty. In puberty, “all the sameness and continuities relied on earlier
are more or less questioned again, because of a rapidity of body growth which equals that of
early childhood and because of the new addition of genital maturity.”98 Since, for Erikson, a
“sense of identity means a sense of being at one with oneself as one grows and develops,”99 such
drastic bodily changes significantly impact and challenge any earlier sense of selfhood.
When does puberty begin? Puberty is not a single process or stage with specific
beginning and end points, but rather a continuum of changes that evolve gradually
over the course of adolescence. This slow process eventually results in mature
reproductive capacity, the development of secondary sex characteristics, and the
assumption of adult height and body proportions.100
Puberty actually begins prior to any external manifestations of its processes. Therefore,
puberty-proper may actually begin in the previous stage. However, it is the outward physical
changes which are recognized by society as signs of entry into adolescence. These changes are
most significant to the youth as adolescence begins. “By mid-adolescence, most, if not all, teens
can begin to take their biology for granted. The average mid-adolescent boy or girl will have
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nearly attained his or her full adult height.”101 By late adolescence, few observable changes can
be discerned. “The body has now grown to its full adult proportions. The youth is now at what
likely will be his or her healthiest and body image, the sense of bodily self,102 is more or less
fixed by what this time in the life cycle has produced.103
The time from entrance into developmental adulthood and death is a slow and then more
accelerated path of physical decline. In its early stages it is hardly noticeable. Women may notice
bodily changes brought on by pregnancy. Both sexes deal with decreasing muscle mass, graying
and loss of hair, and longer recovery times after accidents and illnesses. It is largely due to the
body image, the sense of one’s bodily self, compared to that of adolescence that effects ones’
later sense of bodily ego identity.104
Erikson’s Identity Development Theory in Relation to Social Existence
Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development lays great stress of the social factors in ego
identity development. The social part of psychosocial development is multifaceted. The familial
structure into which the child is born and within which he develops is the first societal setting a
person encounters. The implications of this include the multigenerational aspects of life. The
child enters a family at Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust) to parents somewhere in the range of Stages
V–VII, surrounded, perhaps, by siblings and other family members in Stages II–V, and
grandparents in Stages VII and VIII. All these factors are important. However, according to
Erikson, the single most important relationship in Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust) is the one between
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the mother and the child being mothered. How this relationship develops will determine how the
child develops a sense of trust and mistrust and, optimally, the ego strength of hope. Concerning
this relationship between mother and child, Erikson writes:
The simplest and the earliest modality is to get, not in the sense of “go and get” but in
that of receiving and accepting what is given. This is easy when it works and yet any
disturbance shows how complicated the process really is. The groping and unstable
newborn’s organism learns this modality only as he learns to regulate his readiness to
“get” with the methods of a mother who, in turn, will permit him to co-ordinate his
means of getting as she develops and co-ordinates her means of giving. But in thus
getting what is given, and in learning to get somebody to do for him what he wishes
to have done, the baby also develops the necessary groundwork “to get to be” the
giver—that is, to identity with her and eventually to become a giving person.105
Additionally, the child is born into a specific historical moment. One’s psychosocial
identity is shaped by the cultural affirmations and cultural taboos of one’s time and place.106
While one’s Sitz im Leben continues to shape identity throughout life, it also affects the models
of acceptable parenting utilized by the parents. A third factor is the ritualization of everyday life,
which provides the script for social interaction. This is the main thrust of Erikson’s book Toys
and Reasons, which will be referenced repeatedly. This third factor is of great importance to the
thesis of this dissertation. As this study progresses into the trajectories of the findings presented,
the ritual aspects, which contribute to an experience of a sense of Christian identity development,
will be prominently featured and shown to be quite important.
As has been described above, the first essential social interaction a person has in life is that
of the relationship between the mothering person and the mothered child.107 While the physical

105

Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 99.

106

Erikson, Life History, 20.

107

Donald W. Winnicott also considered the mother-infant relationship to be the foundation for ego
development. He taught that the mother-infant relationship begins, at least for the child, as a unit, which only later
“separates into two recognizable individuals.” For a discussion and critique of the Winnicottian perspective on the
development of the ego see Stephen Parker and Edward David, “The False Self in Christian Contexts: A
Winnicottian Perspective,” Journal of Psychology and Christianity 28, no. 4 (2009): 315–25.

82

interaction is centered on the breast of the mother and the mouth of the child, the social
interaction takes place between the faces of the two. Concerning the physical interaction, Erikson
writes:
The first demonstration of social trust in the baby is the ease of his feeding, the depth
of his sleep, the relaxation of his bowels. The experience of mutual regulation of his
increasingly receptive capacities with the maternal techniques of provision gradually
helps him to balance the discomfort caused by the immaturity of homeostasis with
which he is born. . . . Forms of comfort, and the people associated with them, become
as familiar as the gnawing discomfort of his bowels. The infant’s first social
achievement, then, is his willingness to let the mother out of sight without undue
anxiety or rage, because she has become an inner certainty as well as an outer
predictability. Such consistency, continuity, and sameness of experience provide a
rudimentary sense of ego identity which depends, I think, on the recognition that
there is an inner population of remembered and anticipated sensations and images
which are firmly correlated with the outer population of familiar and predictable
things and people.108
The child, in other words, learns a sense of basic trust, rather than constantly feeling
distrustful, because, as the crisis of maternal absence is negotiated, the child learns that she will
indeed return. This sense of basic trust is crucial, according to Erikson, as the foundation on
which identity is to be built. He continues: “This forms the basis in the child for a sense of
identity which will later combine a sense of being ‘all right,’ of being oneself, and of becoming
what other people trust one will become.”109
Erikson links this emerging trust in the child with the societal institution of organized
religion,110 which is connected to the everyday ritual of the numinous relation between mother
and child, in the mutual recognition of one another as other and yet as one who is near. It is
Erikson’s contention that the “ontological source” of ritual is based on the numinous element.111
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“The numinous assures us of separateness transcended and yet also a distinctiveness confirmed,
and thus of the very basis of a sense of ‘I,’ renewed (as it feels) by the mutual recognition of all
‘I’s joined in a shared faith in one all-embracing ‘I Am.’”112 Erikson’s theory is based on the idea
that the foundation of human existence is trust. This trust in the ones who are trustworthy is also
tempered by mistrust of that which is untrustworthy. A child learns to trust by having “reliable
parental responses to such things as hunger, discomfort, and fright.”113 The challenge of the crisis
of trust versus mistrust is to persevere in trust in order to develop the capacity for hope, which is
the ego strength, or virtue, which overcomes mistrust when satisfaction of desire is delayed.
Erikson links this ego strength of hope to two contributions which this stage makes to
identity formation, namely, “time perspective” and “time diffusion.” These terms refer to the
critical importance of developing a workable sense of identity before one enters adulthood.114 A
prolonged childhood, in the sense of being childish, precludes meaningful identity development
and thereby results in regression rather than growth.115 Erikson creatively links the issue of a
proper sense of time perspective to the ego strength of hope, which grows out of the dialectic
between trust and mistrust. Hope is linked to satisfaction deferred. This deferment contributes to
a sense of time because the one who hopes must wait for time to pass before satisfaction occurs.
The person who does not develop hope lives only in the now and here, without the sense that
with time needs may be met by the one who can be trusted. Erikson states:
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Hope is the inner strength which emerges unbroken from early familiarity and
mutuality and which provides for man a sense (or a promise) of a personal and
universal continuum. It is grounded and fortified in the first stages of life, and
subsequently nourished, as it were, by all those ritualizations and rituals which
combat a sense of abandonment and hopelessness and promise instead a mutuality of
recognition, face to face, all through life—until “we shall know even as we also are
known.”116
The developmental issues of Stage II (Autonomy vs Shame and Doubt) are aimed at
increasing the child’s sense of being a separate self. It is in this sense that Erikson uses the term
“autonomy.”117 The social aspects of this stage include “the guerilla warfare of unequal wills”
between the child and the parents.118 Erikson makes an important observation about the historicocultural milieu in which the child is reared. He notes that in “primitive cultures” parents are less
concerned with curbing the child’s will. In agrarian cultures, children are treated as animals
which must be broken and trained. The more developed cultures, which focus on the technology
of machinery, treat childrearing analogously. “Thus the child becomes a machine which must be
set and tuned even before it was an animal which must be broken.”119 By extension, in a
computer culture, it would follow that children become entities to be programmed and
reprogrammed.
This tug-of-war between the child’s will and that of the parent is ritualized in what Erikson
calls “the judicious,” or “the word and the law.”120 The child’s sense of autonomy, of being a
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separate being, is opposed by the limits set by the parents. Therefore, the child begins to doubt
her autonomy and, when disciplined, begins to experience a sense of shame. In Freudian
terminology, the child’s superego is beginning to form and impact the child’s mental and
emotional life.121 The child is now gaining the ability to discriminate between what is socially
good and what is socially bad,122 gaining a sense of the knowledge of good and of evil.123
This stage of development contributes to the development of ego identity by creating the
superego, which will internally critique and guide future identity roleplays. It will also create a
source for the possible emergence of a negative sense—the rebel self which sets itself counter to
the societal and familial will. Furthermore, the person begins to become a divided self, one who
harbors secret aspects of the self, those that are unacceptable to family and society, which will be
internalized, even if never publicly displayed.124
Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt), the stage when vigorous play begins, is supported by three
developments, which also bring with them the crisis of this stage. First, in play, the child learns
to move around more vigorously and freely, establishing the possibility for nearly infinite goals
of what he might become. Second, the child’s developing language develops to the point where
he can hear, understand, and ask a multitude of questions. Third, the development of locomotion
and language combine to “expand his imagination to so many roles that he cannot avoid
frightening himself with what he himself has dreamed and thought up.”125 Nonetheless, from this
stage the child develops a sense of initiative, which is counterbalanced by a sense of guilt.
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Erikson’s inclusion of guilt at this stage likely is influenced by the Freudian underpinnings of his
training. This is the phallic stage in Freud’s psychosexual scheme. It is the time of the emergence
of the Oedipal Conflict. Erikson writes of the child’s “anticipatory rivalry,” of “futile attempts at
demarcating a sphere of unquestioned privilege… of a favored position with one of the
parents.”126 As a therapist working with children, he noted that children’s play at this stage often
includes “the usurpation and ambitious impersonation of victorious self-images and the killing
off of weak and evil ‘others.’”127 Since such actions in real life are forbidden, the child develops
an inner sense of guilt over these desires. The play in which the child is involves provides a
socially acceptable avenue for the expression of such desires. Nevertheless, the desires are
understood to be unacceptable, if they are carried out in actuality.
This child’s play is, in terms of ritualization, the dramatic. The dramatic allows the child to
“create with available objects a coherent plot with conflicting turns and some form of
resolution.”128 In this manner, the child can relive, correct, and recreate past experiences and
explore possible future roles. Such exploration is necessary for the development of ego identity.
It is helpful at this point to remember that identity is a multifaceted concept. A person’s identity
is not monolithic. Rather, ego identity, in addition to including the physical, the social, and the
psychological, also is found in the various roles one plays in life. Vocation, religious beliefs and
affiliations, political ideologies, gender-role attitudes, and beliefs about how sexual desire is to
be expressed are all part of identity, as well as hobbies, friendships, and other interpersonal
relationships.129 The dramatic element in ritualization allows the child to imaginatively explore a
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plethora of roles in numerous imagined settings.
Much of the freedom of childhood becomes restricted as the child enters Stage IV (Industry
vs. Inferiority), in which comes the experience of formal schooling. With formal schooling
comes the corresponding fourth stage of ritualization, which Erikson names “the formal.” By this
he means “methodological performance,” or the binding discipline which “holds them into a
minute sequence of competent acts and an over-all quality of craftsmanship and perfection.”130
The “formal” takes the earlier elements, namely the numinous, the judicious, and the dramatic,
and gives them definite structure. The “formal” gives socially acceptable shape and permanence
to them, making them more truly ritual in the manner that that term is normally meant.
Alongside this understanding of “the formal,” Erikson also understands this stage to
include the actual “forming” of things. The child now is able to craft things, be they objects or
intellectual concepts.131 In order to do this, at least in American culture, the child is met by two
seemingly opposing forces.
Two poles in American grammar school education may serve to illustrate the
contribution of the school age to the problem of identity. There is the traditional of
extreme of making early school life an extension of grim adulthood by emphasizing
self-restraint and a strict sense of duty in doing what one is told to do as opposed to
the modern extreme of making it an extension of the natural tendency in childhood to
find out by playing, to learn what one must do by doing what one likes to do. The
first trend, if carried to the extreme, exploits a tendency on the part of the preschool
and grammar school child to become entirely dependent on prescribed duties. He this
may learn much that is absolutely necessary and he may develop an unshakeable
sense of duty. But he may never unlearn an unnecessary and costly self-restraint with
which he may later make his own life and other people’s lives miserable, and in fact
spoil, in turn, his own children’s natural desire to learn and to work. The second
trend, when carried to an extreme, leads not only to the well-known popular objection
that children do not learn anything any more (sic) but also to such feelings in children
as those expressed in the by now famous question of the metropolitan child:
“Teacher, must we do today what we want to do?”

130

Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 103.

131

Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 104.

88

By this second extreme, he indicates that without some kind of restraint, the child will
become disenchanted with the constant pursuit of his own pleasures and will seek some kind of
structure for his imaginative, creative mind; he will seek some form, something to put order to
the disorder of the unfettered dramatic, judicious, and numinous. Identity ultimately requires
some structure to it if it is going to be of use in life, in love, and in work,
Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion), which corresponds with adolescence, is the stage
in which the essential parts of a person’s identity are brought together into a cohesive whole,
which will be carried out, for the most part, throughout the rest of one’s life. The social aspect of
this for ego identity is found in the ritualization element of ideology and in the social interaction
with one’s peer group. The peer group has become of greater importance for identity
development, for good and for ill, because of the lengthening of the time between childhood and
adulthood.132 As Erikson considers the development of ego identity in this stage, he looks back at
the factors that coalesce in adolescence. The earliest stage contributes the importance of trust in
oneself and in others as the foundation for building a sense of identity. The second stage
contributes the necessary sense of autonomy and of will which is necessary for a person to be “a
free agent,” able to make the required choices as to one’s future sense of self.133 The earlier play
stage (Stage III: Initiative vs. Guilt) provides the adolescent with the imagination to consider the
possibilities as to what he might become. Finally, the school age (Stage IV: Industry vs.
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Inferiority) gives form to the earlier stages and begins to shape the areas of faith, of vocation and
of technological and economic pursuit which figure in to one’s ultimate adult identity.134
In terms of ritualization, the social institution that contributes to and guards identity is
ideology.135 Ideology is the “solidarity of conviction” which ties together the previous
ritualizations. If one thinks of ritual as story, ideology is the moral or point of the story. It is the
reason for the drama and other story elements. In ritualization, ideology gives a person a
“coherence of idea and ideals.”136 Therefore the rites of adolescence, whether passed on by the
society or crafted by the adolescents within their own peer groups, are aimed at confirming,
inducting, and graduating them toward adulthood.137
Adolescent ritualization does not always reflect the ideology of the adult world. In fact, the
self-generated ones most often do not. In many cases these rituals are designed to be expressions
of negative identities, identities that run counter to values of the adult world and to the values of
the childhood they have just left behind.138 While such rituals and ideologies may be distressing
to their elders, they are a necessary vehicle for the person to work out his or her own unique
identity. This is necessary in order for ego identity to escape the trap of being merely the sum
total of all the childhood identifications which have been internalized to date.139
James Marcia provides a way of putting ego identity statuses into helpful categories. These
categories reflect Erikson’s theory, but organize them in a more systematic manner. Identity can
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be understood to be in four statuses. One status is Identity Diffusion.140 A diffused identity is
uncommitted and often not explored. A second status is that of Identity Foreclosure. A person
whose sense of identity is foreclosed is committed to a given identity, to an identity given to or
forced upon him by others, be they family, religious institution, or society.141 A third type of
identity status is that of a Moratorium. During a moratorium, a person is not committed to a
given identity and yet is exploring possible identities. Moratoria are extremely important. While
a person with a diffused identity and a person in a moratorium are alike in that they have not
achieved a sense of identity, the important difference is that the person in a moratorium is testing
in the midst of a crisis of identity formation. He is in the process of exploring alternatives. The
person who has a diffused identity usually is not in any such explorative experience.
Furthermore, a person in a moratorium may have a degree of commitment of some of the identity
concepts he is exploring. A person whose identity is diffused has no such commitment. The
fourth identity status is Identity Achievement.142 A person who has achieved a sense of identity
both knows what that identity is and is committed to it.
Adolescence is a time of a nearly violent reassessment and reworking of what the person
thought was his identity. Pre-adolescent identity is usually what Marcia labels a foreclosed
identity. Now it must be tested, reexamined, reshaped, resisted, discarded, reformed, or made
one’s own. The movement to diffusion is healthy, but only if the person does not get stuck
there.143 The actual ego identity work of adolescence is in moving to the moratorium status.144
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During the moratorium the adolescent can set aside her bestowed, foreclosed identity and rework
the issues of the previous life stages to achieve what might even prove to be a new creative
expression of self. It is this work that incorporates the ritual element of ideology.
In order not to become cynically or apathetically lost, young people must somehow
be able to convince themselves that those who succeed in their anticipated adult
world thereby shoulder the obligation of being best. For it is through their ideology
that social systems enter into the fiber of the next generation and attempt to absorb
into their lifeblood the rejuvenative power of youth. Adolescence is thus a vital
regenerator in the process of social evolution, for youth can offer its loyalties and
energies both to the conservation of that which continues to feel true and to the
revolutionary correction of that which has lost its regenerative significance.145
This moratorium, if properly utilized to weigh the worthiness of the old ways and to consider the
need for societal upheaval and the rejection of socially acceptable identities is aimed at coming
to a sense of ego identity achievement.
The next stage of ego development is the one which involves the dialectic of intimacy and
isolation. As Erikson describes the following stages, he remarks:
We will take a look beyond the identity crisis. The words “beyond identity,” of
course, could be understood in two ways, both essential for the problem. They could
mean that there is more to man’s core than identity, that there is in each individual an
“I,” an observing center of awareness and of volition, which can transcend and must
survive the psychosocial identity. . . . “Beyond identity” means life after adolescence
and the uses of identity and, indeed, the return of some forms of identity crisis in the
later stages of the life cycle.146
These few words must not be passed by too soon. First, they imply that the concept of “ego
identity” and of “the ego” (the “I”) are distinct, even though they are interrelated. Each person is
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a self, is an “I,” an ego. Erikson’s concern as he describes the identity crisis, and, as he also
states, later identity crises, is with the development of a sense of identity. The ego, which exists
in the now and here, develops a sense of who and what it is. But it, the ego, exists whether it
achieves a sense of identity or not.147
Furthermore, while the work of adolescence includes the development of a sense of ego
identity, such an identity, even if achieved, is subject to further adjustments and changes. This
becomes clear when one considers the implications of intimate relationships in Stage VI
(Intimacy vs. Isolation), in the work of procreation and parenting in Stage VII (Generativity vs.
Stagnation), and in the issues of extreme old age in Stage VIII (Integrity vs. Despair and
Disgust).
According to Erikson, “a state of acute identity confusion usually becomes manifest at a
time when the young individual finds himself exposed to a combination of experiences which
demand his simultaneous commitment to physical intimacy (not by any means always overly
sexual), to decisive occupational choice, to energetic competition, and to psychosocial selfdefinition.”148 Capps, writing about the ego diffusion that occurred in the mathematician John
Nash, states: “The fact that these experiences involve other persons makes the demand for
commitment virtually inevitable.”149 This time in the life cycle normally coincides with entry into
young adulthood which, in addition to being the time of beginning one’s vocation, is the stage
Erikson links with readiness to enter into meaningful intimate relationships, both romantic and
147
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otherwise.150
Erikson has much less to say about the ritualization of these later stages. As mentioned
above, the marriage rite grants social approval to enter into the intimacy of marriage. Passing on
societies rituals and retirements ceremonies are about all he has to say about the ritualization of
the last two stages. Other rituals do exist, which Erikson ignores. Those who enter the military
live a life of ritualization. Enlistment rites, graduation from basic training, the awarding of
insignia and medals, changes-of-command, and other formal ceremonies are designed to
strengthen one’s sense of identity as a warrior, to build unit cohesion, and to pass on the
traditions and the ideology of the service. Police officers and firefighters live in a similar milieu.
Religious clerics are ordained and each change of congregation normally brings with it the ritual
of the Rite of Installation that is designed to reinforce the commitment to the teachings of the
church and to care of the congregation. Despite all these rituals, the lack of meaningful rites of
retirement (or for reintegration into civilian or lay status) is in need of further study.
Erikson’s Identity Development Theory in Relation to Psychological Existence
As discussed above, Erikson’s theory makes a distinction between the ego and the
psychological aspects of life. The ego has physical, social, and psychological components, which
all contribute to the unique ego of each person. Nevertheless, it is not easy to keep these distinct
factors separate, and this is especially so when attempting to discuss the psychological.
The psychoanalytic meaning of ego designates it as an inner psychic regulator which
organizes experience and guards such organization both against the untimely impact
of drives and the undue pressure of an overweening conscience. Actually, ego is an
age-old term which in scholastics stood for the unity of body and soul, and in
philosophy in general of the permanency of conscious experience. Psychoanalysis, of
150
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course, has not concerned itself with matters of the soul and has assigned to
consciousness a limited role in mental life by demonstrating that man’s thoughts and
acts are co-determined by unconscious motives which, upon analysis, prove him to be
worse and better than he thinks he is. But this also means that his motives as well as
his feelings, thoughts, and acts, often “hang together” much better than he could (or
should) be conscious of. The ego in psychoanalysis, then, is analogous to what was in
philosophy in earlier usage: a selective, integrating, coherent and persistent agency to
personal formation.151
If the ego is that agency within a person which selects, integrates, and causes to cohere and
form the person, then separating the ego from the psychological begins to look impossible.
Nevertheless, there are psychological aspects of the ego which can be studied apart from the
physical and social factors presented previously.
The psychological aspects of the ego, or “the human mind,” can only be studied by
engaging the partnership between the observed mind and the mind of another observing it.152 The
observer, by which Erikson means the analyst, in deep discussion with the observed person (the
analyzand) observes the defense mechanisms which are in operation within his patient in order to
bring to the surface the unconscious psychological aspects of the ego.
For the young child, it is the social interaction between the child and the mother, and later
also of that with the father and siblings, which form and cause changes in the child’s
psychological makeup.153 The outside influence of the parents and other adults, especially in
Stages II through IV, create defense mechanisms within the child’s psyche as he deals with the
aggressive drive and the sexual drive. Erikson states his agreement with Freud that civilization
had too long refused to deal with the reality of the sexual drive in human nature. Instead, it had
been hidden, so that people “beat a hasty retreat behind romanticism and religionism, into
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secrecy, ridicule and lechery.”154 But whereas Freud thought “the interpretation of dreams is the
royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious,”155 Erikson found it to be in the observation of a
child’s play. It is in the self-forgetfulness of play, he insists, that a child displays his unconscious
ego desires.156 Trained observers can see from a few play contacts what unconscious issues the
child is trying to work out in her play.157
The ego, according to Erikson, is the regulator of the process that integrates the sense of
one’s physical, bodily self with that of one’s sense of social self,158 and develops, in the process,
assuming all is going well, the adaptive ego strengths necessary for an optimal sense if identity,
which will allow one to love (to experience intimacy) and to work (to be generative).159 The crisis
of Stage I, which finds a balance between trust and mistrust, develops the psychological adaptive
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strength of hope. Hope permits the person to endure deprivation for a time, without losing the
sense of trust that the needs will ultimately be met.160 The Stage II crisis of autonomy versus
shame and doubt, if successfully negotiated, develops the adaptive strength of will, or
willfulness, which is “tamed primarily by self-control,” so that the person learns the limits
beyond which he cannot go.161 The work of Stage III, which brings into tension initiative and
guilt works out the adaptive strength of purpose. “Childhood play, in experimenting with selfimages and images of otherness, is most representative of what psychoanalysis calls the egoideal—that part of ourselves which we can look up to, at least insofar as we can imagine
ourselves as ideal actors in an ideal plot, with appropriate punishment and exclusion of those
who do not make the grade.”162Stage IV (Industry vs. Inferiority) provides the strength of
competence, with the confidence which gives a person certainty that one can find oneself and
one’s way in life.163 Hope, a controlled will, a sense of purpose, and confident competence are
the psychological foundation for entering into Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion), during
which time one will explore a sense of identity, which lead one to an ideology to which one can
cling and upon which one can pledge fidelity.164 This strength of fidelity to an ideology, to a
worldview or belief system, become, in turn the foundation for the virtues of love (in Stage VI),
care (in Stage VII) and wisdom (in Stage VIII). Without the achievement of a sense of identity,
with its attendant ideology to which one pledges faithfulness, one is ill-prepared to enter into
intimacy with another and to care for others as one takes on the responsibilities of generativity.
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Furthermore, without a string sense of identity, and commitment to something firm and
significant, the physical and mental degradation which comes at the end of life will cause one to
be overly despairing and disgusted as life draws to a close.

Identity Development: Ego Identity Status Approach
Erikson’s theory includes the concepts of ego identity achievement, identity diffusion
(especially as he first reported it in 1950), adolescent moratorium, and identity achievement. His
writings also imply that early role identifications, if not challenged and reworked, get in the way
of an achieved identity. These four aspects of identity development have been central to the work
of James Marcia, David R. Matteson, Sally L. Archer, and Jacob L. Orlofsky.
The ego identity status approach was originally developed for work with late adolescents.
However, its application has been broadened in both research and practice to include work with
mid-adolescents and adults.165 The most striking development of Erikson’s theory made by these
researchers has been the expansion from Erikson’s bipolar perspective of syntonic-dystonic to
four-fold model of diffusion-foreclosure-moratorium-achievement. Each of these is consider in
this revised Eriksonian model to be an identity status.166
Marcia presents this revision in such a way that he maintains the Freudian structure of the
id, the ego, and the superego. The id is that part of the unconscious which provides a person with
the imperative, the urge to do what it wants. The superego, on the other hand, provides the
person with the judgmental processes, which restrict and condemn many of the id’s drives. The
ego stands between the two as the executive, deciding between the two what will be done. In
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Marcia’s revision, even more so than in Erikson, as the ego grows in maturity and strength of
identity the “ties to the superego figures of childhood are loosened as they are replaced by new
ego ideals.” Thus the go increases in its ability to control the drives of the id. 167
Marcia also presents phenomenological aspects in the formation of ego identity. He makes
a distinction between a “conferred identity” and a “constructed identity.” “Most, though not all,
individuals ‘have’ an identity in the original Eriksonian sense. Only some, however, have a selfconstructed identity that is based upon superimposition of a decision-making process on the
given or conferred identity.”168 That is, according to Marcia, most people live their lives with a
sense of identity which has not been examines, challenges, and made one’s own. They have
either a foreclosed identity or a diffused identity. Either way they likely have not and will not
examine their identity and work through it.
To summarize, identity is experienced as a core or center that gives meaning and
significance to one’s world. This core may be conferred (given by one’s childhood
caretakers) or constructed (built by oneself out of conferred elements). This with
conferred identities experience their future as the fulfillment of their expectations;
those who have constructed identities experience their futures as the creation of selfrelevant forms.169
Identity Statuses
Four identity statuses have been identified: Foreclosure; Diffusion; Moratorium;
Achievement. A person whose identity is foreclosed is one whose commitment to the conferred
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identity is firm and whose openness to an exploration of alternatives is absent. A person whose
identity is diffused is one who may be, but often is not, open to some exploration of alternatives,
and whose commitment to his identity is absent. A person in an identity moratorium status is in
the process of exploring alternative identities and has not yet committed strongly to one. He may
take on an identity for a while to see if it fits, and then may go on to other options. Any
commitment during this status is vague at best. The fourth status is identity achievement. Such a
person is committed to an identity, which has been self-constructed over a period of moratorium
during which alternatives were explored.170
Marcia also reports that research he and others have done aligns identity statuses with three
general personality characteristics. Foreclosures score high on measures of authoritarianism and
stereotypical thinking. “They show preference for a strong leader over a democratic process,
obedience over social protest, and the ‘pseudo-speciation’ described by Erikson.”171 People in a
moratorium status, and some diffusions, show marked levels of anxiety. This ought not to be
surprising, as they are not in a settled state in regards to their identity. Males in a high identity
achievement status and foreclosure females exhibit high levels of self-esteem. This would seem
to support the challenge to Erikson that male and females mature in identity in the same way. For
the females, the evidence suggests that their desire to affiliate (intimacy) might be a cause for
feeling good about themselves when the group with which they affiliate confers identity upon
them.
Antecedent Conditions
Several conditions must exist before a person can enter into the process of significant
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constructive identity development. “As adolescence begins, a person is likely to be in either the
Foreclosure or the Identity Diffusion status.”172 The person with a foreclosed identity normally
has had a close relationship with her parents. She follows family traditions and accepts family
values with little to no questioning. In this way, the parents’ identity is transferred to the child’s
sense of identity. This parallels the findings discussed above, that children in foreclosure tend
toward stereotypical thinking and are attracted to authoritarian figures. On the opposite end of
the spectrum, those with a diffused identity tend to have parents with permissive, neglecting, or
rejecting parenting techniques.173 The parents, thereby, do not provide the child with a clear
picture of expectations or of roles. Waterman reports that there is no clear evidence for the effect
of “a democratic parenting style,” but he postulates that such a style would tend to help children
transition more easily into the identity moratorium status.174
Movement into the moratorium status does not simply happen. In accordance with
Erikson’s theory, a crisis is necessary to cause such a shift in status. A crisis can be initiated in a
variety of ways. It might come by a severe change in academic performance. It might be a crisis
of religious faith. It might be the death of a parent. It might be exposure to goals and beliefs the
child has never come in contact with before. Any number of crises may be the trigger that causes
the shift in status. “The greater the exposure to new possibilities, the more likely it is that a
person will reevaluate his or her original commitments.”175
The significance of successful negotiation of previous developmental stages contributes
greatly to a person’s ability to move through the moratorium status and achieve a level of ego
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identity that is functional.
A sense of basic trust may be experienced as confidence that answers to identity
questions can be found. A sense of autonomy contributes to a feeling that one can
find his or her own identity rather than have to submit to choices imposed by
authority figures. A sense of initiative leads both to more total activity and more
varied activity in the search for a meaningful identity. Finally, a sense of industry
underlies confidence in one’s ability to follow through on whatever commitments are
established. In contrast, negative outcomes on the components of the earlier stages
are likely to be associated with pessimism about the outcome of an identity search.176
In addition, Waterman notes a factor which correlates well with Erikson’s stress on the social
factors of psychosocial development. “The success of adult models in a person’s family and
community should influence the outcome of an identity crisis.”177 When an adolescent in
moratorium status strives to achieve an identity, that presence in his or her life of adults who
have succeeded in the venture gives hope that a similar outcome will be experience in the life of
the adolescent. On the other hand, if the adults around the youth have not been successful in this
in their own lives, the youth is more likely to become frustrated and enter into a diffused or
foreclosed status.
Consequent Conditions
Identity achievement is not a onetime accomplishment. Entry into a committed
relationship, such as marriage, changes the dynamics in a person’s life as they negotiate what
this new sense of self-as-one-with another means for personal identity. The well-known “midlife
crisis” for men, parenthood for both sexes, menopause for women, and other changes in life also
create crises which call for reworking a sense of identity. The final years of life, in extreme old
ago, which has been discussed above, especially force one to reevaluate one’s identity. Identity
achieved is not static. There is a cycling between achievement and moratorium and back to
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achievement that continues throughout one’s lifespan.
Identity Development Patterns
This cycling between the various statuses has been labeled the MAMA cycle. The acronym
MAMA indicates the cycle or oscillation between an identity in moratorium to identity
achievement, to moratorium and then to achievement.178 It is understood by Marcia and
Waterman to be a positive and useful cycle, since obsolete or harmful identities are laid aside as
new ones are attempted. The concept of the MAMA cycle proposes that “progressive (optimal)
identity development throughout the adult years is likely to be characterized by repeated phases
of commitment and later reassessments.”179 The disequilibrium brought about by crises
throughout life contribute to the need for such reassessment.180 Waterman, however, does not
write merely of the MAMA cycle. He presents a model of subsequent patterns for changes in
identity status.
A person in identity diffusion may, with the advent of a crisis, remain diffused or move
either to a foreclosed or to a moratorium status. Foreclosure would provide a seemingly safe
refuge, but would not be optimal. The goal is to move to the moratorium status, so that
alternatives can be explored.
A person in a foreclosed status might, when faced with a crisis, move to diffusion, stay in
foreclosure in which is seeming safety because it is the identity given by family or society, or
move to moratorium status, in order to explore new possibilities. The movement from
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foreclosure to moratorium would occur, Waterman claims, if the earlier commitments to the
conferred identity no longer work.
A person in moratorium, Waterman reports, moves to one of two statuses. Either he will
fall back to diffusion or he will achieve a new working identity. It appears from Waterman’s
research that having been in a moratorium precludes the possibility of moving back to
foreclosure. The foreclosed conferred identity hold no appeal, since it has previous shone itself to
be insufficient to be practical in life.
An important aspect of his theory is the assertion that a person with an achieved identity,
when faced with a crisis, will either find his identity sufficient to meet the challenge, or he will
reenter a moratorium to reconstruct a new or modified identity, or he will fall back into diffusion.
This falling back into diffusion is not necessarily a bad thing if the achieved identity is so
dysfunctional as to be useless. The move to moratorium occurs when the achieved identity needs
some degree of reconstruction or refinement.181
Waterman avers that this model is not theoretical but descriptive of the data. He states that
there are virtually no exceptions to these shifts in status. “The basic hypothesis of identity
development may now be phrased: Movement from adolescence to adulthood involves a
preponderance of changes in identity status, which can be characterized as progressive
developmental shifts.”182

Challenges to and Adaptations of Erikson’s Theory
Erikson’s theory is focused on affective development over time. Henry Maier’s study in
Three Theories of Child Development maps out the similarities and differences between
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Erikson’s affective theory, Piaget’s cognitive theory, and Sears’s behavior theory. Erikson
references Piaget in some of his later writings. Meier attempts to bring the three into a coherent
whole. This dissertation does not critique the lack of the cognitive and behavioral, except as it
impacts Erikson’s argument or as it influences ego identity development. Meier notes three main
areas of divergence from Freud in Erikson. First, it is the ego rather than the id with which
Erikson is primarily concerned. This is not a repudiation of Freud so much as a change in
emphasis. Second, Erikson breaks new ground by giving the social matrix a greater and more
positive place in his theory. Erikson replaces the classical child-mother-father triad with a more
complex social matrix, including siblings, playmates, schoolmates, and peers. The peers come
into play with Erikson because he makes Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) as important as
Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust). The third divergence is the change from a negative view of the social
influences to a much more optimistic vision of its effects. Rather than thinking of crises as
catastrophic events, Erikson views them as events conducive to growth.183 This shift may be
accounted for by considering that Freud was a physician. As such, he built his theory on his
observations of people in need of therapy. Erikson, on the other hand, especially early in his
career, was involved in educational theory. He observed children at play. His interest was not
primarily in those who were troubled, but in those who were developing normally. While still in
Vienna, working at Dorothy Burlingham’s school under the supervision of Anna Freud, Erikson
investigated the use of psychoanalysis in the future of education. The hope was to provide
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teachers with the necessary theory and tools better to teach youth.184
A foundational critique of Erikson’s theory, as well as any theories which posit a set,
determinative developmental progression, is that his theory does not take into account the
plasticity of epigenetic development. Gary Greenberg and Ty Partridge argue that biology is not
the fundamental and guiding force that drives development.
A relational, holistic position takes a dramatically different perspective on the
relations between biology, evolution, and psychological development. From this
perspective, development is an active system of processes superordinate to biology
and evolution. Thus, it is not that the gene or evolution explains development, but
that the developmental system explains the functioning of both the gene and
evolution. From this perspective, it is the developmental system that integrates
biological functions into coordinated patterns that support behavior. It is the process
of development that shapes biological organization and provides the temporal context
for biology-behavior-ecology interrelations. So the question really becomes, how
does development shape biology and the relation of genes and neurons with
behavioral outcomes in a given environmental context?185
What can be asked of the way in which the developmental system shapes behavior can also
be asked of the way the developmental system shapes affective development as well?
Morris Eagle states that “the relationship between motives and affects is bidirectional.”186
Motives drive behavior; therefore, affects are the primary motivator of behaviors.187 Thus, at
least the behaviors of persons would be coordinated with, if not subordinate to, the affects. While
even Freud did not go so far as to say that affect enslaves cognitive functions, except in the
psychotic person, he did state that the area of cognition least affected by affects is that of
184
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perception. Other areas of cognition, in addition to suffering from human miscalculations, can be
clouded by the drives (id motivations) within a person. In other words, one can often understand
a thing to be what one wishes it to be.188
It is well known that Anna Freud rejected the direction of Erikson’s work because she
understood it to be a repudiation of that of her father.189 Aside from rejection by Anna Freud,
Erikson has had other critics. Some have criticized him for not addressing the artificially
extended period of adolescence in Western society.190 He has also been chided for being overly
optimistic, especially in writing about developmental crises as though they all were, to use J. R.
R. Tolkien’s word, “eucatosphrophes.”191 His theory has also been criticized for being
androcentric, and ignoring the differences between males and females in their affective
development.192
Paul Roazen’s treatment of Erikson’s theory is a well-balanced critique, which
acknowledges both the power of Erikson’s ideas as well as what he considers to be the
limitations. He notes that Erikson, like Freud, thought of the ego as essentially a part of the
unconscious; but, departing from Freud, emphasized the ego’s unifying function.193 Likewise,
Erikson agrees with Anna Freud on the ego’s creation and use of defense mechanisms, but
differs with her in wanting to understand these, not merely as being negative, but as being
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adaptive strengths.194 Roazen does not think these departures from Freudian orthodoxy are
wrong. However, he does fault Erikson for often being ambiguous. He especially thinks that
Erikson’s use of the words “a sense of” is overused. He notes Erikson’s proclivity to use this
word when writing, for example, of “a sense of identity,” “a sense of continuity,” and “a sense of
leeway.”195 Roazen’s chief objection to this term is that it fails to pin down whether or not this
“sense of” is a “false sense of” or whether it corresponds to something real. On the other hand,
Roazen thinks that Erikson’s overall positive attitude may well provide “a fresh perspective on
how we conceive of life.”196 While Roazen appreciates Erikson’s positive view of developmental
crises, he wonders whether Erikson might be idealizing “youth’s disharmonies” and missing
what is pathological in adolescent development.197 He believes that Erikson tried too hard to
escape Freud’s “biologism and in the process missed the dangers inherent in his subjectivistic
approach.”198 He also extends this critique by questioning whether Erikson thought enough about
his own life history and the influence it had on the way he viewed development. He accuses
Erikson of romanticizing his own life story, turning it into a mythology.199
This “remythifying” of Erikson’s life story appears to be the backbone of Sue Erikson
Bloland’s autobiography. In this book Erikson’s daughter essentially repudiates his theory and
explains why she has embraced “interpersonal psychoanalytics,” which is based on the work of
Harry Stack Sullivan, who rejected Freud’s “drive theory” and emphasized the interpersonal,
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social interactions. This emphasis moves away from the psychosocial perspective of her father,
which Bloland accuses of merely being a relabeling of Freud’s psychosexual theory, with the
addition of a slight emphasis on the social as having a positive role to play.200
Joan Borysenko’s adaptation and critique of Erikson appears, at first glance, to take his
androcentrism to task. She places greater emphasis on the sense of a girl’s bodily self, which
while not a direct challenge to Erikson, emphasizes the difference between how males and
females view the importance of the body for identity.201 This contributes to the greater prevalence
of eating disorders among females. Her main challenge to Erikson is the assertion of the
Eriksonian life cycle that identity comes before intimacy. Borysenko understands intimate
relationships to be a “major focus of girl’s development since infancy.”202 This question is also
taken up by David R. Matteson, who agrees that “Erikson’s theory of adolescent identity is
deeply challenged by the data comparing male and female identity development.”203
Matteson, after working with the data, has a more nuanced approach. It appears that
females do achieve relationship intimacy earlier than their male counterparts; intimacy does not
appear to require identity achievement first. However, women who enter into intimacy prior to
achieving at least some sense of identity often become enmeshed with the other person to their
own detriment. Having said that, a refinement of Eriksonian theory is in order. “One must
develop a sense of stable self from which to give and receive intimately and still take care of
oneself.”204 In summary, Matteson’s findings correlate with those of Gilligan and Borysenko in
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this way: the concepts of identity and intimacy are to be understood differently as they are
experienced by each sex. This finding, however, does not seem all that different than Erikson’s
own finding that women experience a life differently than do men. This is one of the main points
in chapter 7 of Identity: Youth and Crisis.205
A major supportive adaptation of Erikson’s model is presented by his wife, Joan Erikson,
in the beginning and concluding sections of The Life Cycle Completed: Extended Edition. Joan
Erikson adds a Ninth Stage, which addresses the issues of extreme old age. The relation between
this new stage and Erikson’s original scheme is one of reversal.
Even the best cared-for bodies begin to weaken and do not function as they once did.
In spite of every effort to maintain strength and control, the body continues to lose its
autonomy. Despair, which haunts the eighth stage, is a close companion in the ninth,
because it is almost impossible to know what emergencies and loses of physical
ability are imminent. As independence and control are challenged, self-esteem and
confidence weaken. Hope and trust, which once provided firm support, are no longer
the sturdy props of former days. To face down despair with faith and appropriate
humility is perhaps the wisest choice.206
She then presented her husband’s theoretical structure of the eight stages, with the dystonic
first in order to emphasize its new importance and potency.

Summary of the Findings
Erikson presents a schema of normal ego development, which includes the key stages of
infancy and adolescence as times of rapid growth and change. Erikson’s unique contribution has
205
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been to place ego development, including the experiential development of a sense of identity
within the human life span and to call it a life cycle.207 By labeling it a cycle, he allows for the
interpenetration of the crises of each stage of development to influence all the others. This
creates a dynamic which can be useful in pastoral care and counseling because certain crises are
not the sole property of a given age. Not only can unfinished business, so to speak, but ongoing
challenges to each stage can be addressed on a continuum of care.
Erikson’s theory, especially as further developed by Marcia and Waterman, provides the
language to discuss statuses of identity and of changes in the status. Additionally, it opens the
door to discuss the multifaceted aspects of identity. Vocational, religious, political, sexual (often
now erroneously labeled “gender”), and sexual expression aspects of life are areas of identity
which may be in differing statuses at the same time. This preserves the richness of human
experience and allows for a thick description of a person’s current experience of identity. A
person may be settled on his religious convictions, and so have achieved ideological identity in it
with the accompanying strength of fidelity, and yet still be in a moratorium as to his vocation.
An area to be explored in the dialogue between Erikson’s theory and that of Paul’s
description of Christian identity in and through baptism is the seeming tension between the
conferred identity (imputed or given, which would appear to be a foreclosed identity) and an
achieved or actualized identity, reached by means of the unconscious work of ego synthesis.
Erikson’s theory leans more toward identity actualization as being socially influenced and yet
without any objective teleology. A person achieves a sense of ego identity which works for that
person in the social context in which she lives.
A further issue remains which no writer appears to address. Erikson calls the dystonic
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element of Stage III “guilt.” He assigns the elements of shame and doubt to Stage II. Yet Stage II
is the stage at which the child’s will comes up against the “law and order” societal element. That
shame and doubt occur at this stage do appear to be reactions to restriction upon the will, why is
guilt for doing that which is “unlawful” not also part of this stage? The likely answer is that
Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt) in Erikson is the phallic stage in Freud, the stage during which the
“Oedipus Complex appears in boys (and the Electra Complex in girls) during which supposedly
the boy, if he had his way would rape his mother and murder his father. The result of this
complex is guilt for desiring the death of the parent. It may well be that a sense of guilt begins in
Stage II and comes to a head in Stage III.
Erikson’s theory on the ritualization of life offers promise for a dialogue about the use of
the ritual elements of the baptismal liturgy, and of baptism in general, in the work of pastoral
care and counseling with Christians whose sense of identity does not reflect the realities given to
them in the sacrament. This will be the work of chapter 4. But first Pauls’ baptismal theology
and the process of Christian identity formation, especially as it is expressed in his Letter to the
Romans, must be explored. That is the work of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
PAULINE BAPTISMAL THEOLOGY AND THE EXPERIENTIAL PROCESS OF
CHRISTIAN IDENTITY FORMATION
A definitive systematic theology of baptism is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather,
the focus of this chapter is primarily an exegetical study of significant passages in Romans, with
supplemental passages from First Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians, in order to
describe the unique contribution of Paul’s teaching to the doctrine of baptism to the topic of
Christian identity. An a priori assumption is that the Lutheran Confessions give a true and
accurate exposition and exhibition of the Bible’s teaching on baptism. The primary aim is to
draw from these Pauline epistles the significance of baptism for Christian identity, both as it is
conferred (imputed) and as it is actualized (experienced).1

1

Throughout this section the terms “real” and “reality” will be used for the identity which is conferred
(imputed). It is the Christian’s identity in terms of that which has been given in baptism. It is the Christian’s identity
coram deo.The terms “actual” and “actualized” refer to the Christian’s identity as it is worked in and worked out in
day-to-day living. It is the Christian’s identity as he experiences it and as it is expressed coram mundo. The
Christian’s real identity is an immediate result of justification by faith. The Christian’s actualized identity, while
grounded in justification and flowing from it, is more closely connected to sanctification. This distinction between
the “real” and the “actual” is the same as Dietrich Bonhoeffer uses in Sanctorum Communio. “Describing the
situation in which sin remains in the daily life of the members of the church-community and yet has already been
eliminated, he states: “Es lebt in der sanctorum communio die peccatorum communio weiter. Die adamitsche
Menschheit ist aktualiter noch da, wenn auch realitär überwunden.” (The existence of the peccatorum communion
[community of sinners] remains in the sanctorum communion [community of saints]. The Adamic humanity is, in
actuality, still there, albeit in reality it has been overcome.) Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio: Eine
dogmatiche Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 2005), 144. As the old Adam
remains a present actuality within the Christian community, even though it has been overcome in reality, so the real
identity of Christians, while true as a gift given by God, is in the process of being actualized on a daily basis. The
actual identity of the Christian is only truly known by God, and yet in experienced to a degree by the Christian. The
real identity is only received and known by faith, so long as the believer remain in the world. This distinction
between the real and the actual will be important in the discussion between Pauline baptismal theology and Erikson
begins later in this dissertation. The distinction between the real and the actual is found in the dialectic between the
ontological and the existential. Kierkegaard makes this point: “There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the
ethical, the religious. The metaphysical is abstraction, the there is no human being who exists metaphysically. The
metaphysical, the ontological, is [er], but it does not exist [er ikke til], for when it exists it does so in the esthetic, in
the ethical, in the religious, and when it is, it is the abstraction from, or, a prius [something prior to] the esthetic, the
ethical, the religious.” Kierkegaard, Stages on Life’s Way, 476. Kierkegaard’s concern is for the actual, existential
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Pauline Baptismal Theology
Paul wrote, “Christ did not send me to baptize” (1 Cor. 1:17). Nonetheless, Paul regularly
extols baptism. Baptism is overtly mentioned in Rom. 6:1–11; 1 Cor. 1:10–31; 10:1–5; 12:12–
20; 15:29; Gal. 3:27–29; Eph. 4:1–6; Col. 2:6–15. It is clearly implied, as well, in Eph. 5:26.
Baptism is not limited, however, to the specific verses in which the word “baptism” is found.
Paul speaks of the Corinthians being “washed” in 1 Cor. 6:11. It is argued in the sections which
follow that baptism shapes the entire structure of Paul’s theology in Romans 6–8.2 It also informs
Romans 12–15.
By means of baptism, the baptized is fused into Christ’s death. He is buried into Christ’s
death so that the Christian might “walk in newness of life” (Rom. 6:4). Since the believer is
united with Christ by means of baptism in the “likeness of his death,” the Christian will also be
united with Christ is the “likeness of his resurrection” (Rom. 6:5). Christ’s resurrection means
that death no longer has dominion over him; therefore, because of the Christian’s union with
Christ, the Christian is also no longer under the dominion of death. For this reason, the baptized
is to account it to be true that he is dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus (Rom. 6:11).
From this flows the ethical implications of daily dying to sin and being raised to newness of life
in Christ Jesus (ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ). The ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ phrase points back to the Adam–Christ
dyad in Romans 5. This dyad is also reflected in 1 Corinthians 15, where Paul specifically
contrasts life ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ with death ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ (15:22).
life people live. This life is lived in the three listed spheres. The imputed identity given in baptism is a theological
truth, which will only be fully experienced in the eschaton by those justified by faith in the present. The
actualization of this identity in the existential present is always partial, is subject to variations and vagrancies, and is
expressed in the esthetic, ethical, and religious “existence-spheres of life. The “religious existence-sphere” should
not be understood to be the same as the theological, or ontological, reality. The religious, rather, when meant in a
positive sense refers to the Christians sense of faith, or sense of basic trust. It is therefore not the same as saving
faith (or trust) which is a gift of God (Eph. 2:9).
2

While the cognates for baptism do not appear in Romans 8, the term ἐν Χριστῷ predominates the discussion
of the new life in Christ.
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A concept Paul develops, which grows out of the death, burial, and resurrection motif in
Romans 6, is that of deliverance from being a slave under sin. This slavery is much more than
mere obedience. In chapters 6 and 7 slavery is a matter of identity. “The master decides the
identity of the slave. This understanding of human beings as serving sin, as if they were
possessed by it, also explains why Paul uses violent language,”3 such as putting to death. Death
frees a slave from a master. And a new identity comes by being given to a new master, who
determines an identity for the slave anew. For Paul, the old master is sin. Sin is killed by
baptism. The new master is Christ. He gives the baptized a new identity. What is amazing is that
this new identity includes being a child of God (Rom. 8:12–17).
In Ephesians, Paul uses a synonym for baptism, namely, λουτρόν, washing or cleansing
(5:26). Similarly, in 1 Cor. 6:11 he speaks of the Christian being washed (ἀπολούω), which is
linked to sanctification (being made holy) and justification (being declared or made righteous).
Thus Paul connects baptism to the central salvific motif of his theology of justification by faith.
The unrighteousness which excludes one from the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 6:9–10), is washed
away by means of baptism and replaced by the gift of righteousness and holiness “in the name of
the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of our God.”4
Returning to Romans 5, Paul states that justification by faith (5:1) gives the recipient hope
which sustains the believer through trials, because, verse 5, ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς
καρδίαις ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν (the love of God has been poured out in our
hearts through the Holy Spirit, the one given to us). It would appear that this “pouring out” ought
3

Valérie Nocolet-Anderson, Constructing the Self (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 79.

4

Note that the phrase “ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεὺματι τοῦ θεοῦ ἠμῶν” reflects the
Trinitarian formula of baptism, which is a washing in the name of the Father (τοῦ θεοῦ) and of the Son (τοῦ κυρίου
Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ) and of the Holy Spirit (ἐν τῷ πνεὺματι), here the ἐν indicating a locative dative in that the baptized is
now united with, placed into and therefore now in, the Triune God who is the one who cleanses, sanctifies, and
makes righteous.
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not be considered apart from the giving of the Spirit through baptism. The ceremonial washing
Paul knew as a Pharisee was accomplished by the pouring of water over the vessels to be
cleansed (Mark 7:1–4). Paul clearly connects baptism and washing in Tit. 3:5–7, in which he
links washing with regeneration, renewal by the Holy Spirit, justification, and becoming heirs,
which is a term he connects to adoption as sons in Romans 8.
This connection Paul makes between baptism and the Holy Spirit is important for
understanding the flow of Romans 6–8. This linking of the Spirit with baptism is also found in 1
Cor. 12:13 (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἑν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν) in that “in one Spirit we all
have been baptized into one body.” Thus Paul indicates the corporate, or social, dynamic of
baptism.
In Rom. 8:12–17, Paul refers to Christians as adopted sons, as those who have “received
the Spirit of adoption as sons” (ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας) so that they are now “children of God”
(τέκνα θεοῦ) who now have God as their Abba, their Father (αββα ὁ πατήρ). Similarly, in Gal.
3:7, Paul links baptism with sonship, which new relationship relativizes and overcomes ethnic
divisions.5 “When Paul states that ‘there is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor
female,’ he strikes at three of the major barrier-forming divisions in human society.”6 While Paul
is not obliterating the distinctions between the groups, and while he recognizes that such social
differences exist, the barriers that prohibit fellowship are broken down. They are broken down
because, by means of God’s action in and through baptism, a higher-level identity now exists.
5

In Col. 3:1–11, Paul also declares that baptism, by means of which the Christian is made to be dead to sin
and alive to God, unites Greeks, Judeans, circumcised, uncircumcised, barbarians, Scythians, slaves, and free people
into the one Christ, who is all in all. Thus Paul understands baptism to overcome the attitude of pseudo-speciation
which seeks to denigrate those who are different and to elevate one’s own group to a superior position. “Paul is
challenging the prevailing, commonly held, racially prejudiced view of the Greco-Roman world, and telling the
Christians that such divisive barriers should not (or do not) exist in the new people of God. Within the ‘new
humanity’ of the Church.” J. Daniel Hays, From Every People and Nation: A Biblical Theology of Race (Downers
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 189.
6

Hays, From Every People and Nation, 185.
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That identity is “being clothed with Christ” and “being Abraham’s seed” (Gal. 3:26–29). This
points back to Romans 4, in which Abraham, the man of faith, is father of all those who are
justified by faith.
Paul’s discussion of the pre-circumcision faith of the righteous-by-faith Abraham (Rom.
4:11) is significant in relation to the one and only reference in the New Testament which links
circumcision and baptism. In Col. 2:11–12, Paul “explicitly identifies Baptism as a divine action
that is the circumcision of Christ.’”7 Just as circumcision was the identifying mark of the Israelite
male in the flesh, so now baptism, which includes water applied to the physical body, is the
identifying mark of all Christians, irrespective of ethnicity or sex. Baptism is the divine action
which confers upon each Christian his or her identity. It is no longer restricted to those who are
males. The bodies of both sexes receive this sign.8
In summary, baptism is an important aspect of Pauline theology. It is a means of grace by
which God “calls, gathers, enlightens, and makes holy”9 the Christian and the entire Christian
church. By means of baptism God kills the old man and raises the new. By it he imparts the Holy
Spirit, who regenerates the believer and makes the baptized to be a child of God and a member
of God’s family. As these terms imply, baptism has immense implications for the reality of
Christian identity as a gift given and for the actualization of Christian identity. This is fleshed out
in greater detail in the sections of this chapter which follow. It will be demonstrated that by
means of baptism a specific identity is conferred and that by living out the implications of
baptism, a sense of Christian identity is actualized in the life of the believer. By means of

7

Michael P. Middendorf, Romans 1–8, Concordia Commentary (St. Louis: Concordia, 2013), 479.

8

The bodily significance of baptism will be described in greater detail in the exploration of Romans 6 and 12.
It is also important for the ethical implications of baptism as Paul exhorts the churches in 1 Corinthians, Galatians,
Ephesians, and Colossians.
9

SC 3:6.
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baptism God creates a new physical, social, and psychological reality. Furthermore, baptism is
the means by which a new physical, social, and psychological actuality comes into being, and is
experienced in the Christian’s daily life.
Pauline Baptismal Theology in Romans
Paul’s baptismal theology in Romans has immense importance for the entire Letter to the
Romans. Arguably, the locus de baptismo in Romans is chapter 6. However, the union of the
Christian with Christ and the Christian’s death to sin and resurrection to a new identity runs
throughout the letter. Nevertheless, certain themes in Romans 6 must be established before one
can work backwards and forwards and demonstrate baptism’s importance. It must be shown that
key aspects of Paul’s baptismal theology in Romans 6 are linked with important theological
concepts presented earlier in the letter.
In Rom. 6:1–11 Paul states:
What then shall we say? Are we to continue in sin in order that undeserved favor may
increase? Never! We, the ones who died to sin, how could we yet live in it? Do you
not know that as many of us as have been baptized into Christ Jesus (ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς
Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν) have been baptized into his death (εἰς τὸν θάνατον)? We were coburied in him through baptism into death in order that just as Christ has been raised
from the dead through the glory of the Father, in this way also you should walk in
newness of life (ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς). For since, we having been united (grown
together) with him in the likeness of his death, rather also we will be in the likeness
of his resurrection, knowing this, that our old man (ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος) has
been co-crucified in order that the body of sin (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας) may be made
ineffective so that we no longer might be enslaved (τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς) to sin,
for the dead person has been declared righteous from (δεδικαίωται ἀπό) sin. And since
we have died with Christ, we believe that we also will co-live with/in him, knowing
that Christ, being raised from the dead, can no longer die, death no longer has
lordship [κυριεύει] over him; for that he died, he died to sin once, but the life which
he lives he lives to God. In this way also you—you are to account yourselves to be
dead to sin, but alive to God in Christ Jesus (ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ).10

10

Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ἐπιμένωμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ; μὴ γένοιτο. οἵτινες ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ,
πῶς ἔτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ; ἢ ἀγνοεῖτε ὅτι, ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν;
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In this passage, several key words are highlighted. Baptism is “into Christ Jesus” (εἰς Χριστὸν
Ἰησοῦν), which “supports the image of baptismal immersion.”11 It also is paralleled by the εἰς τὸν
θάνατον (into death) which follows, indicating a movement from a form of “life” into a new
status of being dead, that is in this instance, being dead to sin. This movement now places the
baptized person into Christ so that he is now in Christ Jesus (ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ). The phrase, ἐν
Χριστῷ, not only refers to the divine action which takes place in baptism by which the baptized is
now united with, and is in, Christ; it also indicates that the baptized person is seen by God as in
Christ.12 Therefore, the baptized is no longer accounted by God as a sinner, but as one who is
righteous in Christ.13
In Rom. 6:1–11, Paul also makes a distinction between the καινότητι ζωῆς in which the
baptized now lives and ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος. Paul stops short, here, of labeling the baptized
person as being ὁ παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος; instead, he indicates that the παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος is something
which, in some way, comprises what the baptized person possesses within himself. The παλαιὸς

συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἠγέρθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ
πατρός, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν. εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου
αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα τοῦτο γινώσκοντες ὅτι ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη, ἵνα
καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς
ἁμαρτίας. εἰ δὲ ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν Χριστῷ, πιστεύομεν ὅτι καὶ συζήσομεν αὐτῷ, εἰδότες ὅτι Χριστὸς ἐγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν
οὐκέτι ἀποθνῄσκει, θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει. ὃ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν, τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ· ὃ δὲ ζῇ, ζῇ τῷ θεῷ.
οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς λογίζεσθε ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ζῶντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. (Rom. 6:1–11)
11

Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 444.

12

“They died to sin in God’s sight when Christ dies on the cross for them. This is a matter of God’s decision.
His decision to take their sins upon Himself in the person of His dear Son may be said to be tantamount to a decision
to see them as having died in Christ’s death.” C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the
Epistle to the Romans, International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), 1:299.
13

“We said that God’s decision to take our sins upon Himself in the person of His dear Son was tantamount
to a decision to see us as having died in Christ’s death. It was also a decision to see Christ’s risen life as our true
life—in other words, to see us as living in Him. Paul’s ἐν Χριστῷ has to do with God’s decision as our gracious
Judge to see us, not as we are in ourselves, but ‘in Him’.” Cranfield, Romans, 1:316. Cranfield rejects a sacramental
realism in Romans 6. Nevertheless, his understanding that the ἐν Χριστῷ phrase points back to Paul’s argument in
the preceding chapters of his letter that Christians are declared righteous before God, are seen by him in Christ,
supports the argument that Paul is not moving on to utterly new territory in chapter 6.
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ἄνθρωπος is ours, but is now “co-crucified in order that the body of sin (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας)
may be made ineffective.” The παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος had a body (τὸ σῶμα) which was ruled by sin
(ἁμαρτία). That body of sin (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας) has been “made ineffective,” so that the
Christian is no longer a slave to sin. Martin Franzmann states:
The life that follows upon our death in Baptism is a life of a new kind. Since our old
criminal self, the self native to us as sons of Adam, has been condemned and
executed, our “sinful body” has been destroyed (v. 6). This manner of speaking about
the body is strange to us. To understand Paul’s language here we must recall that
Paul, and the men of the Bible generally, look upon the body as an essential part of a
man’s self, as the expressive instrument of man’s will. They can therefore speak of
the one part of the body particularly involved in an action as representing the whole
person. Jesus’ command to pluck out the offending eye and to cut off the offending
hand is a familiar example of this mode of thought and speech (Matt. 5:29–30). . . .
The “sinful body” is, then, the body as expressive of our old self and its will—the
throat breathing forth corruption like an open grave, the deceiving tongue, the mouth
full of curses and bitterness, the feet swift to shed blood, the eyes that will not look
upon the fearful majesty of God (3:13–18).14
Franzmann connects Paul’s language of the body as τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας with the catena of
condemnation in Rom. 3:9–18. Although one may speak of the human person in such a way as to
distinguish between the bodily, the social, and the psychological, theologically these are simply
ways of describing the totality of the unified person. All human beings are totaliter peccatores,
in their entirety—in the somatic, social, and psychological aspects of being. The human race, as
a whole, in like manner is a peccatorum communio, in all actualizations of its corporate being.15
14

Martin H. Franzmann, Romans: A Commentary (St. Louis: Concordia, 1968), 111–12. Franzmann’s
statement that our old criminal self has been executed and our sinful body is destroyed reflects the new reality of the
baptized. In actuality sin may, and indeed does, activate within the Christian, a pitiful fact which Paul addresses in
Romans 7. Nevertheless, when addressing the issues of Christian identity, the new reality of being dead to sin must
not be lost in the proclamation that the Christian remains simul iustis et peccator in this world until either death of
the final resurrection.
15

More will be said about this later; however, the unity of the human race in Adam, as one sinful race, is a
unity that is in reality a fragmentation. The unity is a dis-integrated unity. What holds the members of the race
together, outside their common descent from Adam is that all have sinned (Rom. 3:23) and all are sinners. “Es ist die
eigenartige Struktur der adamitischen Menschheit, daß sie ebenso in viele isoliere Einzelne zerfällt, wie sie dennoch
als Meschheit, die als Gnaze gesündigt hat, Eine ist; sie ist, ‘Adam,’ eine Kollektivperson. . . . ‘Die Menschheit der
Sünde’ is Eine, obwohl sie in lauter Einzelne zerfällt, sie is Kollektivperson und doch in sich unendlich oft zerrissen,
sie ist Adam, wie jeder Einzelne er selbst und Adam ist. Diese Doppelheit ist ihr Wesen, und sie wird erst durch die
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Because ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος has been crucified with Christ by means of baptism, τὸ
σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας has been rendered ineffective. Therefore, the baptized is no longer enslaved
(μηκέτι δουλεύειν) to sin. Furthermore, having been united with the resurrected Christ, the
baptized is also no longer under the lordship of death (θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει). All of this
indicates a fundamental and radical change in status, in realität, in ontological reality. Philip
Melanchthon remarks:
The comparison of our conversion with the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ is
most meaningful. . . . [First] sin has been buried in a two-fold way: first, by
imputation, for although the remnants of sin remain, they are forgiven, and second, as
far as the effect is concerned, because our sinful nature ceases to be active, or begins
to be mortified. The rest of life, after mortification has been begun, is burial. The sin
has indeed been wiped away by imputation, but we have not yet been glorified.
Although we are righteous, we lie buried, awaiting glorification. Second, so far as the
effect is concerned, we lie in a tomb, that is, under a cross, in afflictions of all kinds. .
. . Then he adds a third part. Not only is there mortification, but vivification is also
begun.”16
Baptism unites the Christian with the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This
union results in a major transformation in identity status: life into death into new life; old into

Einheit der neuen Menschheit in Christus aufgehoben.” (It is the peculiar structure of the Adamic community that it
breaks up into many isolated individuals while still remaining a humanity as a whole. It is Adam, a collective
person. . . . The humanity of sin is one, though being composed of nothing except individuals; it is a collective
person, however, infinitely disunited. It is Adam, because each individual is himself and Adam. This duality is its
essence, and it shall be lifted only by the unity of the new humanity in Christ.) Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio
(2005), 76. Thus the human race, in Adam, is fragmented. “In the deepest Isolation of sin, we find ourselves in the
utmost solidarity with all humanity.” Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1999), 51. The virtue, or ego strength, in Stage VIII of Erikson’s model is Integrity. Therefore, a way
must be found to overcome the dis-integrating effects of sin so that integrity might be achieved. If Bonhoeffer is
correct, then the solution is to be found, not in any isolated method or manner, but in the social dimensions of
baptism, which unites “Menschheit” together in Christ as a “Kollektivperson.” Such thinking flies in the face of
Western, and most especially American, individualism.
16

Philip Melanchthon, Commentary on Romans, trans. Fred Kramer (St. Louis: Concordia, 1992), 146.
Melanchthon continues to hold the tension between the reality of our new status and the actuality of our struggle
against sin. He does not permit the reality of our new status to blind him to the actual struggle against sin which
Christians face each day. On the other hand, he does not permit the actuality of our sinful impulses to denigrate the
reality of the new creation in Christ. The incompatible theologies are the theology of the cross and the theology of
glory. The theology of the cross, however, does not reject the theology of resurrection. To be resurrected, one first
must die. The theology of glory bypasses both the cross and the resurrection. Melanchthon, in this quote, maintains
the proper perspective.
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new; slavery into freedom from domination by sin and death. It also points to a total status
change in the way God looks at the baptized person. Since baptism results in this radical change
of ontological status, resulting in God seeing the Christian “in Christ” and no longer “in Adam,”
the basis has been established to understand that Paul is connecting baptism to the righteousness
of faith. This “faith” trusts God’s declarative word, agrees with it, and becomes the ground for
acting righteously.
Pauline Baptismal Theology in First Corinthians
The focus of this exegetical study is on Paul’s letter to the Romans. Nevertheless, Paul’s
pastoral use of baptism in 1 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians deserves
consideration before moving on to an in-depth look at the struggle for identity as he presents it in
Romans, especially in chapter 6–8.
Paul specifically refers to baptism in 1 Cor. 1:10–31; 10:1–5; 12:12–20; 15:29. In 1
Corinthians 1, Paul addresses the issue of divisions within the church in Corinth. It has been
reported to Paul that there is quarreling (ἔρις) among them. This quarreling is about allegiance to
various teachers. Some identity themselves with Paul, others with Apollos, or with Cephas. Still
others simply state that their identity with that of “following Christ.” Paul counters this division
in the church by appealing to baptism. He asks them into whose name they were baptized. The
rhetorical question is aimed at refocusing them upon Christ, into whose crucifixion and death
they were baptized. In the verses that follow, specifically 1 Cor. 1:18–25, Paul teaches the unity
of all Christians in the crucified Christ. Regardless of what either Judeans or Greeks seek after,
only in Christ is found righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. Therefore, the only grounds
for boasting in in the Lord (1 Cor. 1:30–31).
Paul returns to baptism in Romans 10. In this instance, he calls Israel’s crossing of the Red
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Sea a baptism into Moses (ἐις τὸν Μωϋσῆν ἐβαπτίσαντο). His imagery also includes allusions to
the Lord’s Supper, in that Israel at the manna and drank from “the rock,” which Paul identities as
Christ. In this instance, Paul is making a point of ethics. Even though the people of Israel all
participated in these “sacraments,” they were destroyed because of their idolatry, sexual
immorality, and mistrust in God. In the context of 1 Corinthians 8–10, the issue is eating meat
sacrificed to idols. Participation in such a meal is participation in the demonic (10:20). Although
Paul makes only passing reference to baptism in this place, it can be deduced, nonetheless, that
Paul understood baptism to have ethical implications. This is the same point he makes in Romans
6.
Paul once again brings in baptism in relation to Christian unity in 1 Corinthians 12. The
disunity in the church in Corinth extended to the attitude the members had toward spiritual gifts.
Rather than understanding the gifts to be for the common good of the church, the gifts were
prioritized. Those with certain gifts were deemed to be of a superior status. Paul once more turns
to the implications of baptism. Baptism makes all Christians members of one body, because “by
one Spirit we were all baptized into one body” (ἐν ἑνὶ πνεῦματι ὑμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἕν σῶμα
ἐβαπτίσθημεν).17 As members of Christ’s body, no one member is more important than any other.
Therefore, baptism unites Christians to Christ and to one another. As Paul teaches in Romans,
lower-level identities must give way to the higher-level identity of being in Christ. Paul is urging
them, by appealing to baptism, to make the baptismal reality a living actuality.
Paul’s appeal to baptism in 1 Cor. 15:29 has resulted in many interpretations. It is well
outside the scope of this dissertation to engage these various views in any depth. What is
important for this study, however, is the context in which Paul makes his comment. That context
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is resurrection. Paul has just made the argument that being in Adam results in death for all. Being
in Christ brings life, resurrection from the dead. It is in fact Christ’s resurrection that is the proof
that the resurrection of the dead is a future reality. Paul argues that baptism “on behalf of the
dead” (ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκπῶν) is senseless if the dead are not raised. If they are not, why would this
practice be in affect among them? Therefore, Paul connects baptism with resurrection, just as he
does in Romans 6.
Pauline Baptismal Theology in Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians
In Gal. 3:27, Eph. 4:5, and Col. 2:12 Paul specifically mentions baptism; yet baptismal
language undergirds and permeates these letters. This is especially evident in the paraenetic
sections of the letters. A. Andrew Das states that many interpreters “have concluded that Paul is
drawing from a baptismal tradition or creed from the earliest Christian assemblies.”18 Das notes
that Gal. 3:27–28, 1 Cor. 12:13, and Col. 2:11–12; 3:10–11 have important features in common.
They all treat baptism. Contrasting pairs are brought into play. These pairs are overcome by the
Christians union with Christ. Close connection to God in Christ is created by baptism, such as
becoming sons of God. Being in Christ and faith are closely tied to each other. Although Das
does not believe the evidence is strong enough to argue for a creedal connection, the baptismal
basis for the foregoing is indisputable. “Baptism brings about a corporate unity. . . . The new
corporate community replaces the old, divided realities.”19 What God creates by means of
baptism is a new reality, a people with a new identity, who are then urged to make this new
reality an actuality in practice, within the Christian community.
Paul turns to Hab. 2:4 in Galatians as he does in Romans. He claims that it is evident that
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no one is rectified by keeping the commandments of Torah because “the righteous one shall live
by faith” (ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται).20 Paul’s opponents have been insisting that circumcision
is necessary. In addition to destroying the foundation of the Christian faith, the insistence on
circumcision will tear apart the unity of the church by creating an irreparable division between
those who are and those who are not circumcised. Paul’s extremely negative view of the
commandments of Torah in this letter is due to the need to impress upon his hearers the
impossibility of attaining a righteous standing by keep the commandments. As he does in
Romans, he points to Abraham as the man of faith, as the faith of those who are righteous.21
Circumcision is the great mark of division between people. It makes of humanity two groups,
those who are circumcised and those who are not. By pointing to Abraham, Paul points to the
man of faith, the man righteous by faith, who was still uncircumcised at the time God
pronounced his such. He appeals to an aspect the Roman legal system in which a minor child
would be placed under a guardian who would administer his affairs until “the day set by his
father” when he would inherit the estate and attain full sonship. Das notes, however, that Paul
quickly moves from the illustration of a minor child to that of a slave. Being under the demands
of the law, and in this case willing submitting to its lordship, is slavery.22
After outlining the purpose of the Torah as a παιδαγωγός (custodian), Paul declares that
Christians are “all sons of God through faith” (πάντες υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστε διά πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ
Ἰησοῦ).23 This new reality is the cause of being baptized into Christ. Therefore, the old divisions
between Judean and Greek, slave and free, and even male and female are erased. The new
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primary, higher-level identity is that of being members of Christ and thereby being Abraham’s
offspring.24
Paul’s direct reference to baptism, in his letter to the Ephesian Christians, likewise deals
with Christian unity.25 Paul addresses his hearers as those were once separated from Christ and
alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, being called “the uncircumcision” by those who
were circumcised. But now they have been brought near by the blood of Christ (2:11–13). Paul
then calls Christ “our peace” (ἡ εἰρήνη ἡμῶν). Christ has broken down “the dividing wall of
hostility” (τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ) in his flesh, in order to create “one new man” (ἕνα καινὸν
ἄνθρωπον)26 in place of the two (2:14–15). Now that this new reality has been created, Paul urges
them to live it out, to actualize it. He does this by turning their attention to the reality. “One body
and one Spirit, just as also you were called in one hope of your calling, one Lord, one faith, one
baptism, one God and Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all” (Eph. 4:4–6).
Winger notes that the phrase “one Lord, one faith, one baptism” (εἱς κύριος, μία πίστις, ἓν
βάπτισα) contains all three noun genders, poetically emphasizing the all-encompassing unity.
He, furthermore states, “Eph. 4:5 is perhaps the central line of the entire epistle.”27 If this is so,
then Christ, faith, and baptism are at the center of Ephesians, as they are at the center of the
Christian life. Just as there is one Lord and one faith, so the one baptism which Christians
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undergo is the means by which God creates the new reality of the καινὸν ἄνθρωπον. This is the
new identity, which supersedes the lower-level identities which separate people from one
another.
The status change in Ephesians from death to life, which is similar to Paul’s teaching
concerning baptism in Romans 6, is coupled with a related identity change in Ephesians 2. Paul
informs the Ephesians that they once were “children of wrath” and “sons of disobedience.” They
followed the prince of the power of the air. In a play of words, he writes that they were dead in
trespasses and sins while yet walking in them. As the walking dead, they lived in the passions of
the flesh (ἐπιθθμίας τῆς σαρκός).28 However, God in his grace “made us co-alive together with/in
Christ” (συνεζωοποίησεν τῷ Χριστῷ).29 Winger states, “The prepositional prefix συν-, “together,
with,” points to the τῷ Χριστῷ: God acts upon us ‘with Christ.’ Yet there remains more than just
a hint of ‘with one another’—if God included all of us in Christ, then he also united us with one
another (1 Cor. 15:22).”30 Thus the change in status is from death to life and from separation to
true unity.
Although the word βάπτισμα (baptism) is not used in Eph. 5:26, Paul refers to the
cleansing of the church by Christ as “the washing of water in the spoken-word” (λουτρῷ τοῦ
ὑδατος ἐν ῥήματι), “a clear and unmistakable reference to Holy Baptism.”31 In his treatment of
this passage, Winger detects the language of ceremonial cleansing and sanctification. He also
points to the corporate nature of the effects of baptism. David Scaer, in his book on baptism
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concurs that baptism has a clear corporate dimension. He writes: “Baptism is not presented here
as the rite of individual initiation, but as the act which makes the entire church acceptable to
God.” 32 The context supports his argument, because Paul is speaking of two overlapping
realities: first, the union of husband and wife as one body in the bonds of marriage; second, the
union of Christ and his bride the church in the one body of Christ. These are words of life as a
corporate reality. Once again, the motif of unity by means of baptism comes to the fore. Paul’s
emphasis here on the washing with water, when read in conjunction with the “one body”
metaphor, means that the somatic aspect of baptism is important in his theology.
Paul’s sole connection between baptism and circumcision is found in Col. 2:12.33 Whereas
Paul’s words to the Corinthians, other than the concern that the resurrection has already
occurred, is primarily in regard to their behavior, the Colossian church was in the grips of a faithdestroying heresy. Paul Deterding notes that this heresy bore a resemblance to what would later
be called Gnosticism, with the denigration of the physical. “In this scheme, redemption involves
the escape of the spiritual (πνεῦμα) from the material (σάρξ), in order that there may be
unification with God, who is pure spirit (πνεῦμα).34 By linking baptism to circumcision, Paul
emphasizes the somatic dimension and significance of baptism. Even as he describes baptism’s
effect as “putting off the body of flesh,” he maintains the body as the essential physical aspect of
being human. He has done this by emphasizing that in Christ the fullness of deity dwells bodily
(κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς), “and you have been filled in him . . . in
whom also you were circumcised” (Col. 2:9–11). This circumcision, accomplished for all
Christians by means of baptism, results not only in being buried but also in resurrection.
32
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Together with Christ, the baptized person is now made alive (2:13). This union with Christ
continues in chapter 3, in which Paul moves to the ethical implications of being put to death and
raised to new life. Deterding comments: “The word ‘therefore’ (οὖν), near the beginning of 3:1,
is significant, for it helps to ground this section of exhortation in the preceding exposition of the
Gospel, particularly dealing with Baptism.”35 Deterding notes the key baptismal vocabulary of
“being raised” and “having died” as consistent with Paul’s baptismal terminology. Thus, Paul’s
teaching about baptism in Colossians emphasizes not only the ethical life but more importantly
the bodily life. Christian identity is not found in some form of disembodied existence. Life in the
body matters because Christ has assumed a true human body, true human nature, and fills it with
his deity. God has taken identity as a human being, in everything that being a created human
being means.36
As in Ephesians, Paul’s baptismal theology pervades the paraenetic section of Colossians.37
Concerning the second half of Colossians, Deterding states:
The concepts of “old man” and “new man,” which are unattested outside of Christian
sources, play an important role in this section. Not only do they occur here in a
baptismal context, but they are themselves a part of Paul’s baptismal terminology.
The old man was crucified with Christ in Baptism in order that the body of sin might
be destroyed (Rom. 6:6). The way in which Paul expresses this in Colossians is that
the body of flesh was put off in Baptism (Col. 2:11–12; cf. 3:9).38
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The language of putting off is coupled with that of “putting to death” (Col. 3:5). This is no mere
undressing. This is violent language, just as violent as in Romans 6. The language of unclothing
is also found in Ephesians 4 and 5. The presence of the old man in the daily life of the baptized
runs counter to the reality of being a new creature. Therefore, the Christian lives day-to-day in an
identity crisis. The Christian’s real identity is as one who is righteous by faith. However, the
reality of sin, and of being a sinner, remains. Thus the Christian lives in crisis. Yet, it is this crisis
that focuses the Christian upon Christ, so that one does not return to any attempt at establishing
one’s one righteousness before God by works of the law.
Secondary Literature on Pauline Baptismal Theology
Besides the three ecumenical creeds, the foundational confessional document of the
Lutheran Church is the Unaltered Augsburg Confession of 1530 (the Augustana/Augsburg
Confession [AC]).39 Several of the articles of this confession are pertinent for this study. Article
2 of the AC states: “Item docent, quod post lapsum Adae omnes homines secundum naturam
propagate, nascentur cum peccato, hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum, et cum
concupiscentia.”40 The signifance for this study is the basic lack of trust (fiducia) within the
unregenerate person. While all people may turn to someone or something as an object of trust,
basic trust in God is absent from conception. Article 2 goes on to say that this is a disease
(morbus) which is truly sin, which condemns all who are not renascentur per baptismum et
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spiritum sanctum.41 Therefore, this article acknowledges both that basic trust in God is absent
and that a rebirth is accomplished by means of the Holy Spirit’s work in and through baptism.
Augsburg Confession 4 likewise deals with trust. Human beings are declared righteous “as
a gift on account of Christ through faith.” The phrase used here is per fidem, yet the context
makes clear that fidem is equivelant to fiducia. The German translation in both places is durch
Glauben. Thus faith and trust are equivalent terms in the AC. This faith, or trust, God imputes
(imputat) as righteousness before him (pro iustitia coram ipso). This is derived from Romans 3
and 4.
Augsburg Confession 5 upholds the corporate nature of Christian life. The ministry of
teaching and gospel and administering the sacraments was instituted to create saving trust in the
promises of the gospel. This teaching ministry (ministerium docendi) is carried out within the
context of the corporate life of the church, of a congregation. The Anabaptists are condemned
precisely because they do not believe in the operative power of the external word (verbum
externo), but look within themselves. In addition to denying the external gospel word as the
means of grace, each looks within himself, thereby destroying the constitutive function of the
santorum communio. Articles 7 and 8 go into greater depth about the importance of the
congregation of saints. The church is the congregatio sanctorum in which the gospel is taught
purely and the sacraments are administered rightly (AC 7). Even though the actual gathering of
people around the gospel is not made up solely of those who truly trust in the gospel, the
sacraments remain “efficacious because of the ordinance and command of Christ” (AC 8).
Augsburg Confession 9 concerns baptism. “Of baptism they teach that it is necessary for
salvation, and that through baptism the grace of God is offered, and that children are to be
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baptized who, being offered to God through baptism, are received into God's grace.”42 The
Ausgburg Confession clearly teaches that baptism is at the very center of the Christian faith. It is
inseparable from the gospel. Combined with the teaching of Art. 2, baptism is understood to be
necessary because it is the means by which a person is reborn. A rebirth indicates a new life, and
thereby, it is here argued, a new identity, which is found in being a new person who is righteous
in Christ.
The connection between baptism, being a new person, and being righteous is found in the
Small Catechism. Luther, using Rom. 6:4 as his biblical evidence, describes the significance
(significat) or meaning (Was bedeut den solch Wassertäufen?) of baptism: “It signifies that the
old Adam in us (alte Adam in uns), through daily contrition and repentance, should be drowned
and die, with all sins and wicked drives, and in turn a new man (neuer Mensch) should daily
emerge and resurrect, who in righteousness and purity lives forever before God.”43 The new
identity forged in the waters of baptism is that of being a “new man,” a righteous person. This
simply draws out the significance of the previous question in the Catechism as to how water can
accomplish forgiveness of sins, rescue from death and the devil, and give eternal life to those
who trust the gospel. Baptism is a “grace-filled (gnadenreich) water of life and a ‘bath of the
new birth in the Holy Spirit.”44 Luther emphasizes the newness of life, not merely as a picture,
but as a new reality. The new reality is, then, by daily contrition and repentance, to begin to be
actualized. However, it is not simply an object lesson. The ‘death of the old man and the
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resurrection to new life is not only typified by Baptism but actually effected.”45 Reading the
Small Catechism simply in terms of ethical behavior misses the point that a new identity, a new
birth and a new beginning, has been accomplished in baptism.46 In baptism, a person is born “a
second time” (zum zweiten Mal).47
Luther comments on the right use of baptism, that is in its daily significance, in the Large
Catechism:
The old creature (alte Mensch) therefore follows unchecked the inclinations of its
nature if not restrained and suppressed by the power of baptism. On the other hand,
when we become Christians, the old creature (alte Mensch) daily decreases until
finally destroyed. That is what it means truly to plunge into baptism and daily to
come forth again. So the external sign has been appointed not only so that it may
work powerfully on us but also so that it may point to something. Where faith is
present with its fruits, there baptism is no empty symbol, but the effect accompanies
it; but where faith is lacking, it remains a mere unfruitful sign. . . . Here you see that
baptism, both by its power and by its signification, comprehends also the third
sacrament, formerly called penance, which is really nothing else than baptism. What
is repentance but an earnest attack on the old creature and an entering into a new life?
If you live in repentance, therefore, you are walking in baptism, which not only
announces this new life but also produces, begins, and exercises it.48
Here we detect the way Luther weaves together several of the threads that are important for
supporting the thesis of this study. Baptism brings the new birth, so that a new person, with a
new identity, is actually caused to be born. Nevertheless, there remains the daily crisis of dealing
with the old creature, who is irascible, spiteful, envious, unchaste, greedy, lazy, proud—yes—
and unbelieving.”49 Therefore, the reality of the Christian is the dialectical struggle between trust
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and mistrust (unbelief).50 The Christian daily faces the situation of identity diffusion, even
identity confusion. The opposing forces of the old and the new force the believer into a new
moratorium. For Luther, however, this is no mere moratorium. The old identity is not in need of
an overhaul. Rather, the old identity must be killed, not simply set aside. Baptism does not profit
ex opere operado, if it is not apprehended by trust in the word of promise. Luther taught that, for
the person who has been baptized, and yet who fails to use it daily in contrition and faith, it has
adverse effects. Jonathan D. Trigg, in his study of Luther’s baptismal theology states:
The right use of baptism is signified by the sign; Luther brings braucht and bedeutet
together. A life-long, daily, putting away or killing of the old man, and all the
hatefulness, wrath and unbelief associated with him, in order that all that belongs to
the new may come—this is the rechte brauch der Tauffe unter den Christen, durch
das wasser teuffen bedeut. Conversely, to leave the old man unchecked is to fail to
use baptism rightly, and represents a resisting (gestrebt) of baptism; and those who
are thus outside Christ (ausser Christo) grow only worse as the old nature rages
unchecked by the power of baptism. It is only when we become Christians (wo
Christen sind worden) that the process of submerging the old man begins. Luther
presents the case of the baptized individual in whom this process is not really a
separation of that which belongs together. The power, meaning, and the use of
baptism all converge in the significatio of this daily dying and resurrection. But
without faith the bare unfruitful sign (blos unfruchtbar zeichen) remains alone. Where
faith is present, the signification of baptism stamps its character upon the whole life
of the Christian, who has to learn, experience, and practice what the slaying of the old
Adam means.51
Although the Christian, in Christ, is a new person, a “new man,” the “old Adam” prevents the
Christian from fully actualizing the new reality in its fullness. He must learn how to actualize the
new identity. This is a life-long battle. As will be described below in the discussion of Romans 7,
this struggle has the advantageous effect of forcing the Christian ever to live in, to use Erikson’s
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terminology, the Stage I crisis (Trust vs. Mistrust). This actually works to maintain the Christian
in faith and develops within the virtue of hope, since the Christian never leaves the foundation of
faith (trust) in Christ.
The Formula of Concord clearly delineates between those who have been baptized and
those who have not.
Therefore, there is a great difference between baptized and unbaptized people. For
since (according to St. Paul’s teaching, Gal. 3[:27]) “all those who have been
baptized have put on Christ,” and are therefore truly reborn, they now have arbitrium
liberatum [a freed will or freed choice], that is, as Christ says, “they have been made
free again” [cf. John 8:36]. For this reason, they not only hear the Word but are also
able to assent to it and accept it—although in great weakness. . . . Because in this life
we only receive the first fruits of the Spirit and our rebirth is not complete but rather
only begun in us, the struggle and battle (Streit und Kampf) of the flesh against the
Spirit continues even in the elect and truly reborn.52
As certainly as there is a “great difference” between the baptized and the unbaptized, so the
reality of the rebirth, which is confessed, is also said to be “not complete.” The baptized have
been “truly reborn” (wahrhaftig wiedergebornen: vere renatis homnibus), yet this reality is not
fully actualized. Nevertheless, a rebirth does occur, since “it is true that in true conversion there
must be a change—new impulses and movements of the mind, will, and heart.”53 The new
impulses and movements are those of the new man (ein neuer Mensch) who is born in the waters
of baptism. The ethical, inchoately actualized righteous identity of the Christian follows and
flows from the establishment of the new imputed identity, which is made a reality by the
Christian’s baptism into Christ.

The Significance of Baptism for Christian Identity
Three theories concerning the makeup of human nature have been defended by Christian
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scholars. Trichotomists teach that humans are comprised of a body, a soul, and a spirit.54
Dichotomists, also known as dualists, refer to the body and the soul, usually equating the soul
and the spirit. The soul is the non-material part of the human being in its relation to the created
order.55 The spirit is the soul in relation to God.56 More recently, scholars such as Ray S.
Anderson57 and Nancey Murphy58 have taught nonreductive physicalism.59 The human being’s
nature is understood to be that of an animated body. For purposes of this dissertation, this debate
will be bypassed. In its place, the human experience of life in the body and of the body, as a
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social being, and as a self-reflective being will be explored.60 Therefore, the relation of baptism
to somatic life, psychological life, and social life is the topic at hand.
There is an issue which may appear to be slightly tangential. Nonetheless, it must be
explored. That issue deals with the question, “Who is a person?” Erikson’s epigenetic model
assumes a continuity of identity from birth until death. The epigenetic model is based upon
embryology. This, in and of itself, does not require the assignment of personhood to the fetus.
However, if one does not assign personhood to the fetus, at what point does the human being
become a person with a personal identity? The British ethics scholar, Oliver O’Donovan writes:
To speak of a “person” is to speak of “identity,” that which constitutes sameness
between one appearance and another, and so makes us beings with histories and
names. It is inevitable that this category should appear more satisfactory to Christian
thinkers than the purely qualitative categories with which ancient classical
philosophy had undertaken to analyse man—such categories as “intellect,” “soul,”
etc., which had no historical dimension. For they found in the Old and New
Testaments the thought that the identity of human beings had to do with their role in
history, a role that was assigned them by divine providence. And this was not only
true of the prophets, of whom it could be said, “Before you were in the womb I knew
you, and appointed you a prophet” (Jer. 1:5).61
So, to speak of a person having a beginning as a person after conception is to have a different
starting point than that which the Bible gives. Yet even outside of specific citations from the
Bible, the one who wishes to begin later, at some point after birth, is faced with the task of
setting some criteria for personhood outside of the historical trajectory of the life of the human
organism.
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O’Donovan is helpful in that he uses philosophical categories, in support of biblical
teaching, to argue for personhood beginning at conception. While it is not the purpose of this
study to argue against abortion, his argument for the personhood of the fetus assists in this study
of identity, especially because identity includes continuity over the lifespan, even though that
sense of one’s identity is, at the same time, something to be developed. O’Donovan makes use of
the Christological categories of “hypostasis” and “nature.” While the Latin-speaking church uses
the term persona, the Greek-speaking church used hypostasis. A hypostasis (hypo-stasis) is that
which is a reality which underlies (has a sub-stance, stands under) “all the characteristics and
qualities, all the variable appearances which one and the same person might present.”62
Therefore, the person, or hypostasis, is the subject to whom certain qualities are predicated. To
the person of Christ, two natures are predicated: divine nature and human nature. It is
meaningless to predicate personhood to a nature. A “type” of nature is, rather, predicated to a
person, or hypostasis—to that reality which exists. To say this another way, “nature” is merely
an abstract concept until it is predicated to a concrete hypostasis, to that which actually subsists.
The significance of this line of reasoning for this study is that the reality of the person, the
hypostasis, continuing with integrity over the lifespan is thereby supported. A person’s body
changes over time, it grows, cells are replaced, and then the person’s body degenerates. Physical
change is part of life in the fallen world. A person’s psychological life, likewise, is in a state of
flux. One grows more psychologically mature, one can become psychologically disabled, and
psychological life can also decline. The same is true for the social reality. Nevertheless, even as
one’s life is in constant change, one remains the same person. Baptism brings a new birth. Yet,
as we will see in the detailed study of Romans 6–8 below, there remains an “I” which is still
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“me,” even as a new “I” (or a new sense of “I”) is created. A person develops physically,
socially, and psychologically, and yet has a personal, hypostatic, continuity over time. The new
man in Christ is a renewed, not a replaced, person.
The Significance of Baptism for Somatic Existence
Two terms, used often in the Bible to describe human somatic life, are body (σῶμα: ) ְּג ִוי ָּה63
and flesh (σάρξ: ) ָּב ָּשר. Pauline usage of σῶμα has three different referents. Paul can speak of the
“body of sin” (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας) as he does in Rom. 6:6. In a related way, he also calls the
body, now permeated by sin, to be τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου, “this body of death,” (Rom.
7:24). He uses the term to describe the human body, which will be resurrected at the Eschaton, as
he does in Rom.8:11. God will raise our mortal bodies (τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν) through the work
of the Holy Spirit, through whom God raised the Lord Jesus Christ. He also uses σῶμα to
describe the church as the body of Christ (1 Cor. 12:27; Eph. 5:30).64
Paul’s use of the term σάρξ is often opposed to his use of the term πνεῦμα, especially when
he is speaking in terms of ethical behavior.65 However, he also uses the term in reference to the
flesh of animals and of man. Stacey writes:
“However, when discussing the eating of meat, in Romans 14 and 1 Corinthians 8, he
does not use σάρξ, but κρέας and βρῶμα. This suggests that, for Paul, σάρξ is not
merely the physical substance. σάρξ without ψυχή is not σάρξ. Σάρξ is living flesh,
flesh animated and alive.” 66
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The term  ְּג ִוי ָּהis used both for a living human body, as in Gen. 47:18, and for a dead human corpse, as in 1
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Such a finding lends support to the unity of the human nature, and is in keeping with Gen. 2:7, in
which it is written that the Lord formed the man from the dust of the ground and then breathed
into his nostrils ( )וַ יִּ ַפח ְּב ַא ָּפיוthe breath of life ()נִּ ְּש ַמת ַחיִּ ים, making the man to be a living being
() ְּלנֶּ ֶּפש ַחיָּ ה.67 Thus, to be a human is to be animated dust from the ground, that is, from physical
substance, made alive by God’s breath of life.68 “The σάρξ is the material of the (earthly) body,
but the body σῶμα is the organized form of the concrete person.”69 So, too sharp of a distinction
between these two terms does not appear to be valid.70
Obviously, in baptism, water is applied to the human body. Beyond this, what is the
significance of this physical action? Does it have any effect beyond serving as an ethical lesson?
The answer to these questions are found in Paul’s connection between baptism and the
resurrection of the body. In Rom. 6:5, Paul links the Christian’s baptism with the certainty of the
future resurrection of the body71: εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα.72 Christ has died; Christ was buried; Christ was raised bodily.
By means of baptism, the Christian has been baptized into Christ’s death, has been buried, and
will be raised.73 Middendorf comments:
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μίαν), he ought, therefore, also to care for her as Christ does his church.
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Passages like Eph. 2:6; Col. 2:12; 3:1 assert that our participation in Christ’s
resurrection is already realized now through Baptism (Col. 2:12). As a result, some
suggest that the future verb “we will be” (ἐσόμεθα) should be understood in a logical
sense, as “we will live” (ζήσομεν) is used in 6:2, denoting what now follows Baptism.
Others propose that it may serve as a moral statement comparable to 6:4. However, in
this context, Paul is putting our full participation in Christ’s resurrection off into the
future (as also in 6:8; cf. 5:9, 10, 17, 21). In 6:5, therefore, “we will be” (ἐσόμεθα)
looks forward to our full eschatological experience of Christ’s resurrection life (as in
Rom. 8:11; 1 Cor. 15:47–49; 2 Cor. 4:14; Phil. 3:21).74
Yet, even though the full experience of the resurrection of the body awaits the eschaton, Paul
links that experience with baptism. If there were no true connection between baptism and the
resurrection, then the argument for ethical behavior, grounded in the Christian’s participation in
the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus would be baseless. In Rom. 8:11, Paul states that it
will be to the “mortal body” (τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν) that the Spirit of God, who raised Jesus
from the dead, will give life, thereby pointing to the significance of bodily life into the eschaton.
The admittedly strange reference to “baptizing the dead” in 1 Cor. 15:29 indicates the
strong connection between baptism and somatic existence. The entire chapter is dedicated to the
discussion of the resurrection of the body. If the dead are not raised, the Corinthian’s baptismal
practice makes no sense at all. The body is baptized because the body will be raised. There is
also an echo of 1 Cor. 15:57 in Rom. 7:25. In 1 Corinthians, Paul announces that the resurrection
of the body is death’s final defeat. The resurrected Christ will reappear. On that day, the mortal
(θνητόν), that is, the body, will put on deathlessness (ἀθανασίαν). “The sting of death is sin and
the power of sin is the law, but thanks to the one who gives to us the victory through our Lord
Jesus Christ” (15:57). In Romans 7, Paul describes the effect of Torah’s commandments on the
sinful self. He describes how it drove him to disobedience. Now, as a Christian, he delights in the
something happens that had not yet happened before Baptism. Formerly the person was under the dominion of sin;
in Baptism this dominion is broken. Yet in its decisive point Baptism in not a saving deed different from the one
accomplished on the cross, for through Baptism the sinner is given into Christ’s death.” Schlink, Baptism, 50–51.
74

Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 461.

141

commandments in the inner man (τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον), yet within his members (ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν
μου). Therefore, he describes his condition as that of wretchedness. He asks, “Who will rescue
me from this body of death?” (ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου) His response: “Thanks to
God through Jesus Christ our Lord” (χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν). The
parallel is unmistakable. In both cases, Paul describes the need for victory of the body which is
corrupted by sin. In both cases the answer is in the bodily transformation effected by the risen
Christ.
Paul’s reference to baptism as a “washing” in Eph. 5:26 is aimed, ethically, at husbands in
their relationship with their wives. While this section may be read simply as an ethical
admonition, Paul makes several connections with bodily existence. He calls on husbands to love
their wives just as Christ loved the church. Christ’s love for the church is found in his sacrificial
self-offering, giving up his body to death on the cross, so that he might wash the church clean.
The goal of this washing is to present the church to himself “without spot or wrinkle.” These are
physical terms. While they have ethical import, they point to the eschatological perfection of the
church. Thomas Winger notes that Hosea, the prophet commanded to marry an unfaithful
woman, wrote of the “eschatological restoration” of the Lord’s wayward wife.75 This eschaton
will bring not merely ethical perfection but physical restoration. Thus, Paul’s reference to
spotlessness and the removal of wrinkles would appear to imply more than ethical purity. Paul
combines this command to love the wife as Christ loved the church with the image of the way
one cares for ones’ own body. His concluding remark is that of reminding his hearers of the oneflesh union God creates in marriage. This is no mere metaphor. Baptism is linked to the
eschatological restoration of the fallen human body.
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The Significance of Baptism for Social Existence
The social life of the Christian includes the ecclesial aspects of life—life in the sanctorum
communio. Baptism’s significance for ecclesial life is prominent in 1 Corinthians. Paul’s first
concern in this letter is the divisions that exist, as members of the church in Corinth coalesce
around the figures of Paul, Apollos, Cephas, and “Christ.” By finding their group identity in
these men, they fracture the unity of the sanctorum communio. Paul appeals directly to baptism.
“Is the Christ divided? Paul was not crucified on your behalf, was he? Or were you baptized into
the name of Paul?”76 Unity is found in the undivided Christ. Only he was crucified for us.
Christians are not baptized in the name of Paul, on in the name of anyone other than the Christ.
The apostle even avers that he is now pleased that he baptized so few of them, so that they might
not boast in him. Since baptism is the means by which one is united with the death and
resurrection of Christ, and since Christians share in one common baptism, baptism signifies and
creates the unity of those in the sanctorum communio. Paul makes the same point in Eph. 4:5.
There is “one Lord, one faith, one baptism” (εἱς κύριος, μία πίστις, ἓν βάπτισα). Baptism is the
grounds for maintaining the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace Eph. 4:3). The reality created
by means of baptism is to be actualized in the communal life shared by all in the congregation.
The unity-creating significance of baptism in not absent in Romans. By means of baptism,
all Christians have been united with Christ. Paul’s emphasis is on union with Christ’s death and
resurrection (Rom. 6:5), yet this is a common reality shared by all the baptized. Paul’s consistent
use of the first person plural pronoun drives home this unifying aspect of baptism. In fact, he has
been painstaking in making clarion the common condition of all people as sinners (Rom. 3:23).
He then makes it equally clear that all people have been rectified (justified) freely by God’s
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grace in the atoning death of Christ (Rom. 3:24). The old ethnic divisions of Judean and gentile,
Hellenist and barbarian, are overcome by the common identity as brothers and saints, which is
created by means of baptism into Christ.
Perhaps the clearest example of Paul connecting baptism to ecclesial life together is in 1
Cor. 12:12–20. It is by means of baptism that all Christians are made to be members of one body,
because “by one Spirit we were all baptized into one body, whether Judean, or Hellenist, or
slaves, or freemen, and all were made to drink of the one Spirit.”77 Again, the prominent
divisions within the congregation appear to fall along ethnic lines, as well as on those of social
status. It is Paul’s claim that all such divisions are overcome in baptism.
Paul appeals to baptism in Gal. 3:26, when addressing disunity among the Christians of
Galatia. All Christians are “sons of God through faith” (πάντες υἱοὶ θεοῦ ἐστε διά πίστεως ἐν
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ). This is so because “as many as have been baptized into Christ Jesus have been
clothed with Christ” (ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε).78 Again, as before,
Paul declares that, because they are baptized, the distinctions between Judean and Hellenist,
slave and freeman, and even male and female, are no more because “you are all one in Christ
Jesus.”79
Baptism incorporates an individual into one body—the body of Christ—without absorbing
him into an impersonal collective. Returning to 1 Corinthians 12, as soon as Paul establishes the
grounds for Christian unity, he emphasizes the importance each individual has for the body as a
whole. He uses the metaphor of bodily organs to illustrate his point. While the overarching tenor
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of this section is on the unity, he skillfully maintains the individuating work of the Holy Spirit in
distributing varied gifts to each individual. All Christians are baptized into the one body, and yet
individually are members of the body (1 Cor. 12:27). Paul similarly balances the contrasting
aspects of unity and diversity in Eph. 4:1–16.
Paul’s teaching of this new social reality, being one in Christ and members of one another,
has both social and psychological significance. Philip Esler, commenting on the significance of
the new social identity, which Paul informed the Roman Christians was theirs in Christ by means
of baptism, remarks:
Since our sense of who we are is intimately tied up with our group memberships, one
of the major consequences of becoming a member is a change in the way we see
ourselves—a redefinition of who we are—which has definite implications for our
self-esteem. . . . Given the seriousness of the potential pros and cons of membership,
there can be no doubt of the magnitude of the change in self-concept involved.80
Part of this change in identity, in a culture which was highly conscious of ethnic and class
distinctions, was putting away these distinctions within congregational life. Paul’s teaching was
radical. The apostle obliterated the ethnic, social, and sex distinctions, declaring that all the
baptized were “sons of God,” with equal access to God the Father. Thus, the social dimensions
of baptism flow directly into, what we today would call, the psychological.
The Significance of Baptism for Psychological Existence
Baptism provides a new identity in Christ. As has been argued above, by means of baptism
a person becomes a new creation. The “new man” is born. Paul insists, in Romans 6, that
baptism has effected the crucifixion and burial of “old man.” The result is freedom from slavery
to sin (Rom. 6:6–8). The Christian is now free to walk in newness of life (Rom. 6:4). Paul then
urges the baptized to live in light of this new reality. If the Christian is now a new creation and
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free from the power of sin, it would seem to be a valid question to ask why Paul exhorts them to
live in this new life. Paul Raabe and James Voelz state that Paul presents his hearers with two
ways of approaching the paradox.
One way that Paul speaks of Christians in these chapters is by depicting their present
condition as radically different from their pre-Christian condition. Thus he makes a
distinction between the past and the present, before the Christ-event and their
Baptism, and now after the Christ-event and their Baptism. Whereas they were
formerly outside of Christ, now they are in Christ. In 6:1–10 Paul uses the language
of life and death. Formerly Christians were “living” in sin—in reality dead in sin—
and were dead to God, but now they have died to sin and have been made alive to
God. Paul develops this point with the concept of being “in Christ.” Through Baptism
the Romans were united with Christ's death and resurrection. “We know that our old
self was crucified with him, in order that the body dominated by sin might be
rendered ineffective so that we are no longer enslaved to sin” (6:6). When Christ died
to sin once for all, they died to sin, and when He was raised to life toward God, they
were raised to newness of life, and furthermore, they will be raised to life on the last
day.81
Thus. Paul first establishes a radical shift in the reality of the life of the baptized. Christians are
now “in Christ.” They are now united to Christ and to the salvific events of the gospel. Paul
emphasizes the vast different between the Christian’s pre-faith condition and the current one. He
extends this by using the metaphor of slavery. Raabe and Voelz continue:
Here he contrasts two kinds of slavery, the first, a slavery that is abject slavery and
the second, a slavery that is true freedom. Formerly they were slaves to sin and free
with a false "freedom" in regard to righteousness, but now they truly have been freed
from the tyrant of sin and have been enslaved to righteousness/God.82
Despite the new, radical reality of the baptized, that reality is not fully actualized. To explain
this, Paul describes the Christian’s life from a second perspective. Raabe and Voelz state:
In addition to emphasizing the contrast between the past and the present, Paul also
speaks of Christians as existing in two opposing conditions at the same time. The
locus classicus for this view of the Christian occurs in 7:14–25. Although a minority
position among exegetes, the interpretation of this section as referring to Paul’s
81
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Christian experience has, in our opinion, strong arguments to support it. Among the
arguments are these: the shift to the present tense from the past tense used in verses
7–13; Paul’s assent to and delight in the Law, which he denies for non-Christians in
8:7; the qualification given in verse 18—“there does not dwell in me, that is, in my
flesh, anything good”—which is a necessary qualification in light of the indwelling
Spirit (cf. 8:9, 11); the reference to the “inner self” (cf. 2 Cor. 4:16; Eph. 3:16); the
similarity between the fervent cry expressed in verse 24 and the statement made in
8:23; and the presence of the doxology in verse 25a.83
Thus Paul recognizes both the radical new reality and the struggle to actualize this reality in the
daily life of the Christian. Paul says that this is his experience as well.
This leads to a new psychological reality. The first perspective gives the eschatological,
and therefore the teleological, effect of baptism. The Christian has died to sin and is raised to
newness of life. Paul makes the reality of the resurrection even more clear in Col. 3:1–4. The
Christian has been raised with Christ. Yet even in that letter, he immediately urges them to make
the reality an actuality. Again, as Raabe and Voelz put it in the title of their article, a good tree is
exhorted to bear good fruit. This exhortation is necessary because a second reality, paradoxically,
is also in effect. The commandments of Torah still drive the “old man” to rebellion against God.
“If we only had the first picture, we might be tempted to think of the Christian life as one
automatic and continual victory. . . . However, the second picture reveals the presence of sin and
the flesh as active enemies.”84 Each perspective corrects the other.
A more detailed study of Romans 7 is presented below; however, in describing the
psychological significance of baptism it should be noted that Paul, in Rom. 7:13–25 never
identities himself with the “sin” that is within him. Paul presents himself as “Paul the new man in
Christ,” the “inner man.” He delights in God’s Torah in the inner man (7:22). This “Paul might
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be labeled the “New I.” Paul is also the man who struggles against sin, and finds himself doing
the sin he hates (7:15–16). This Paul is the “Experiential I.” However, when he finds himself
doing the thing he hates, he says it is neither the New I nor the Experiential I but “sin within”
that does it (7:17). This is psychologically important. Paul presents the Christian as a conflicted
“I,” as one who delights to do God’s will because the “I” is a “new creation,” but also as an “I”
who does not fully experience the new reality as an abiding actuality. Therefore, baptism
inaugurates a life-crisis, or series of crises, which constantly return the baptized to the
foundational level of trust vs. mistrust as the Christian struggles to actualize the reality of a new
identity. Middendorf describes this Christians condition in these words:
Therefore, what Paul means is that the true identity of the Christian, the “inner man”
as seen by faith together with that which determines his will and governs his mind, is
free from the domination of sin. Sin no longer rules over a Christian. As a result, his
existence is no longer determined by the flesh. . . . But this does not mean that
believers cease to exist in the flesh, that sin no longer plays a role in the Christian’s
life, or that the prospect of death is eliminated. On the contrary, Paul acknowledges
that Christians continue to live in “mortal bodies” (ἐν τῷ θνητῷ σώματι) where sin
continues to work.85
The Significance of the Struggle against Sin for Christian Identity
The social and psychological significance of baptism, as described previously, points to the
on-going struggle to actualize one’s Christian identity, which has been conferred in baptism.
There are social distinctions of various kind, including ethnicity and social class, which are a
struggle to overcome in light of the unity-creating effect of baptism. All Christians are saints, all
are brothers and sisters, children of God. Then there is the personal struggle every Christian
endures, as he or she daily puts down the “old man” and seeks to make the “new man” operative
in ethical behavior.
Before entering into Romans 6–8, where the struggle against sin and the struggle for
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actualization of one’s Christian identity is a major theme, it will serve us well first to glean from
Romans 1–5 pertinent themes relating to identity.
Romans 1–5 and Christian Identity
Paul states his overarching thesis in Rom. 1:16–17: Οὐ γὰρ ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον,
δύναμις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστιν εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι.
δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπται ὁ δὲ δίκαιος
ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται. Several key words appear in these two sentences. First, Paul brings up the
issue of shame (ἡ αἰσχύνη). In Rom. 1:27, Paul will speak of the shameful deed (τὴν
ἀσχημοσύνην) of the homosexual sex act. While Paul may not have intended the connection
between the two sentences, he nonetheless enters into a description which takes the human race
from its beginning, as those who have a knowledge of God from the things that have been made
(τοῖς ποιήμασιν), and ends with the human race in the equivalence of Sodom, devoid of a true
knowledge of God. Thus, the human race, which begins with a knowledge of God ends in a state,
first and foremost, of shame.
Paul’s statement of not being ashamed of the gospel is connected to the gospel being the
power of God into (εἰς) salvation. While it is clearly stated that the gospel is preached for the
salvation of all, Philip F. Esler takes note of the tendency among readers of Romans to pass too
quickly over the couplet Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνι. These two words are not exactly
equivalent to the terms “Jew” and “Gentile.” Esler argues that the term Ἰουδαίοι refers to those
whose religious center of consciousness was Ἰουδαία (Judaea) and especially the temple in
Jerusalem. The term ἔλληνες refers not merely to gentiles in general, but to those who have
embraced the Greco-Roman culture. “Hellenic” may indeed be a better translation. Furthermore,
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the term ἔθνη refers, in the mind of the Ἰουδαίοι, to all those who are not Ἰουδαίοι. This means
that ἔθνη, as a term of ethnic identity, is a term used by Judean-focused people to exclude those
not in their socio-religious group. In like manner, the ἔλληνες referred to those who did not
identify with Greco-Roman culture as βάρβαροι (often translated as barbarians).86
Esler argues that there is a tension among house churches in Rome. He believes that
in light of the architectural evidence, the Christ-movement in Rome had already
established a separate community from the “Judeans group” (Ἰουδαῖοι), when Paul
wrote this letter. That is, the evidence shows that while Judeans gathered in specific
public places, προσευχαί (“prayer halls”), Christ-followers used a house as a meeting
place. As a result, it is possible for Christ-followers to have their own identity and
unity against Judeans. Esler also insists that it is probable that there were some
conflicts among the groups of the Christ-movement. Since the community of the
Christ-movement was based on different house churches, the competition or even
conflict within the Christ-movement was possible in the milieu that houses and
households played a central role in the pursuit of honor and the interactions between
families often moved toward a competition or conflict.87
Assigning proper meanings to these terms is extremely important, especially given the
timespan and cultural changes since Paul wrote Romans. Today, the term “Jew” means a person
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who adheres to one of the many branches of Judaism. One need not be ethnically “Jewish” to be
a Jew. One might be a “Yid” from the eastern countries of Europe, being descended from the
Ashkenazi. On the other hand, one might be of Irish descent and have converted as an adult to
Judaism. As for the term “gentile,” it has no use outside of Christian literature. The term
“barbarian” connotes a lack of social etiquette. While this may be close to the way the ἔλληνες
thought of the βάρβαροι, it is not an exact parallel. For the purposes of this study, we see in these
various terms the prevalence of monikers of identity in Paul’s letter. Paul desires to have his
readers (the hearers of this letter) get beyond these identities which create barriers between
Christians. One of the effects of baptism is to create in the Christian the higher-level identity of
being righteous, of being “in Christ.” Once this higher identity is cognitively grasped, the effects
of “pseudospeciation,” which is the artificial division of human beings into species or at least
subspecies, can begin to be overcome.88
If the majority of Paul’s audience are non-Judean-leaning people, including cultural
Hellenists, then his insistence that the gospel is to the Judean (Jew) first and also to the Hellenist
(Greek) makes strategic sense.89 Certainly it can be argued that he is simply stating that salvation
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is first to, and also from, the “Jews”; but that he repeats this refrain seems to point to another
purpose. It has been pointed out by commentators that Paul wrote Romans for the purpose of
securing help for a planned future missionary journey to Spain. In Rom. 1:8–15 and even more
blatantly in Rom. 15:14–33, Paul makes clear his desire to preach the gospel where no one else
had yet labored. He states his plan to go to Spain (15:28) by way of Rome. Because he has not
yet been among the Christians in Rome, this letter, he hopes, will pave the way. It is Paul’s
desire to be “sent on” by the Romans. Being “sent on” implies that they would furnish him with
the various items he would need for this undertaking.90 Esler suggests that Paul needs to address
underlying ethic divisions among the Roman Christians before he can expect a united front of
support for his mission to the far west of the Empire. “Paul is trying in some way to bring
together Judeans and non-Judeans in the Christ-movement.”91 Therefore, Paul addresses this
issue by first showing that no distinction exists between ethnic groups. All share together the
common identity of “sinner” (Rom. 1:18–3:20).92 Then he shows that all Christians are righteous
in Christ (Rom. 3:21–5:21),93 and thereby share the reality of that imputed identity. Next he
moves to the struggle for the actualization of this new identity (chapters 6–8).
Before moving on to indict all people as sinners, Paul states his overarching thesis, that the
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gospel is the δύναμις θεοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι (power of God into/for salvation
to/for all the ones who believe), whether they be Judeans or not. Paul bases this on what he reads
in Habakkuk: ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται (the one who is righteous from out of
faith/faithfulness shall live).94 The ambiguity of the phrase ἐκ πίστεως may be intentional, driving
home the reception of righteousness, which is solely by trust, the faithfulness of God in Christ,
and the faithfulness by which the Christian is called to live before God after baptism.95 It is clear
from Rom. 1:16–17 that only the one who is righteousness by faith shall live and that this
righteousness comes to the one who trusts the gospel. Paul moves next to exclude everyone from
this category. He shows in what follows that the only “righteous one” is God.
Therefore, his task is to drive home to his hearers their identity as those who are sinners.
Paul states that it is the wrath of God which is being revealed toward the outward psycho-social
pathologies of humanity. The gospel reveals the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (righteousness of God). Human
psycho-social pathology, to which Paul gives the titles ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ἀνθρώπων (impiety
and unrighteousness of humanity) is revealed in humanity’s reaction to and within creation
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(Rom. 1:18–20).96 Creation reveals God’s power and divinity (δύναμις καὶ θειότης) clearly
enough to render humanity without excuse for rejecting the true God. This rejection of the
Creator is the move from trust (πίστις) to mistrust (ἀπιστία). This mistrust is demonstrated by the
turning from the Creator to created things and endowing them with divinity. Paul states that the
attitude that lies behind this is the inexcusable refusal to glorify God and to render him thanks
(Rom. 1:21). In place of this proper piety of humility, humanity asserts (φάσκοντες) itself to be
wise. This assertion, this attempt at autonomy, is a confusion between “illusion and reality.”97
Humanity’s supposed wisdom is in fact foolishness. This contrast highlights the
psychopathology of unbelief (lack of trust in God).
The ritualization of this misplacement of trust is exemplified in pagan worship practices
(Rom. 1:23). These practices teach. They also feed the passions (τὰς ἐπιθυμίας = passions;
drives), which lead to the dishonoring of the human body (Rom. 1:24) as the truth of God is
exchanged for the lie. Middendorf states that the “alpha-privative noun ἀτιμή, ‘dishonor’ . . . is
the opposite of τιμή, ‘honor.’”98 Within an honor-shame culture dishonoring and shaming are
qualitatively equivalent. This is precisely the direction of Paul’s argument as he describes the
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dishonorable lusts (πάθη ἀτιμίας) of bisexual confusion and homosexual behavior (Rom. 1:26–
27).99 The term Paul uses for male homosexual behavior is ἀσχημοσύνη. Although the majority of
translations render this term in the plural, Paul uses the singular. It is “the shameful deed.”100
Humanity’s lack of trust in God, and the accompanying willful autonomy, has as its result
shame. From this point on Paul, having effectively placed humanity in Sodom, moves quickly to
the just sentence of death which is the wages of sin. Humanity is “filled up with every
unrighteousness (πεπληρωμένους πάσῃ ἀδικίᾳ), to which Paul appends a catena of nouns to
describe evil, which function as identifiers as well as descriptions of human behavior. For Paul, it
is not merely that individuals do evil things. Humanity and each person is unrighteous to the core
of being. The reality is that humanity is deeply corrupted by sin. It will be made clear in Romans
5 that another way to state this reality is to be “in Adam.”101
Paul makes a strategic move in Rom. 2:1. Having set before his hearers a picture of
perverted humanity, he strikes at those who would pass judgment over others, being unawares
that they are doing the same things. Middendorf comments that, rather than narrowing the scope
of the people that Paul is indicting in chapter 2 to Judeans (Jews), it is better to consider the
target of Paul’s diatribe to be any who condemn others without first acknowledging their own
99
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culpability.102 The core idea in this section is that God judges without partiality. 103 Whether one
has the commandments of Torah or not, one will be judged on the basis of the commandments
one has. Merely having possession of the commandments of Torah is irrelevant; “for not the
hearers of Torah are righteous before God, but the doers of Torah will be rectified/ justified” (οὐ
γὰρ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται).104 Paul brings
in, at this point, the function of conscience. The conscience (ἡ συνείδησις) of each person can
either accuse or excuse one’s behavior. This function of conscience, perhaps paradoxically,
shows the self-centeredness of humanity. Paul describes the conscience acting, not for the
welfare of the neighbor, but for one’s own self-justification. Yes, it may condemn. It often,
however, serves to provide one with excuses for behavior. Self-centeredness characterizes
humanity’s relation even to the law of God. People try to keep the law, but only for their own
self and not for the neighbor’s sake.105 The moralism of the people typified in Romans 2 exposes
humanity’s cor curvatus in se and exemplifies each individual’s isolation from others, in each
person’s hyper-autonomy. Paul utilizes this self-justifying aspect of conscience to show the
proper verdict of guilt which humanity deserves. To defend oneself by comparing one’s behavior
against that of others, without understanding the root cause of sin in unbelief and autonomy,
requires a degree of initiative. Objective guilt may very well be true for all individuals, even for
102
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infants, but the subjective feeling of guilt comes as one becomes cognitively conscious of the
laws which one has violated.
Beginning in Rom 2:17, Paul clearly sharpens his focus on the Judeans (Jews) in the
Roman congregations. He makes overt use of identity language when he writes: “Now if you
name yourself a Judean and rely upon Torah and boast (find your honor in) God and know the
will and discern the difference being catechized out of the Torah.” (Εἰ δὲ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ἐπονομάζῃ
καὶ ἐπαναπαύῃ νόμῳ καὶ καυχᾶσαι ἐν θεῷ καὶ γινώσκεις τὸ θέλημα καὶ δοκιμάζεις τὰ διαφέροντα
κατηχούμενος ἐκ τοῦ νόμου).106 The possession of Torah is integral to Israel’s existence and
identity. It continued as such during and after the Babylonian Captivity. However, possession of
Torah was not the key to righteousness.
The entire Law, the Torah, was certainly a gift to Israel. This is true even of the
commands, the laws within Torah. The problem is that the Law itself apart from faith
in God’s salvation, was never intended to be the determining basis for Israel’s
identity. This is never clearer than in the formative exodus-Sinai experience.
Throughout the plagues and during the actual exodus redemption (Exodus 1–15),
Israel itself was still “without Law” (ἀνόμος, Rom.2:12), which was not given until
Exodus 20.107
Righteousness, as Paul states in Rom. 1:17, which is his appropriation of Hab. 2:4, is based upon
faith in the Lord.108 Therefore, identity is not found merely in possession of Torah. Torah without
faith is dead. The Judeans (Jews) indeed had “the form of knowledge” (τὴν μόρφωσιν τῆς
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9–11, he revisits the issue of the special promises to Israel and warns the non-Judeans that they only stand by faith
as well.
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Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 200.
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As is demonstrated below, this is Paul’s major point in Romans 4. The key figure in Torah for Paul is not
the caricature of Moses the legalist, but of Abraham, the man of faith—who believe the promise of the Lord, who
alone is faithful.
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γνώσεως), yet it was not properly formed because it was not formed by faith.109
Before indicting the whole of humanity under sin, Paul speaks of the advantages the
Judeans (Jews) enjoyed as those who had possession of Torah. Yet, in the end, only God is true.
Every man is a liar.110 Indeed, only God is righteous. Paul further argues that humanity’s
unrighteousness upholds God’s righteousness (Rom. 3:5). He alone is just. He alone is true and
truthful. All humankind bears the identity of, and is judged as, “sinner” (ὡς ἁμαρτωλὸς
κρίνομαι).111 As sinners, humanity is altogether worthless (ἅμα ἠχρεώθησαν) and can in no way
become righteous by works. This means that humanity is judged inferior to its original state of
righteousness and that human industriousness means nothing coram deo. The identity of fallen
humanity falls under the broad identity umbrella of unrighteous (ἄδικος).
Having established the identity of unregenerate humanity as ἄδικος, Paul moves to create a
new identity for those who believe the gospel. In terms of identity study, the fact that Paul both
describes the χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ (apart-from-Torah righteousness of God) as being apart
from Torah and yet, nevertheless, revealed in both Torah and the Prophets, continues Paul’s
concern to include both Judeans (Jews) and non-Judeans (gentiles). These lower-level identities
have no bearing on this gospel-manifested righteousness, which is unto all those who trust (εἰς
πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας). There is no distinction (διαστολή) between these two groups for two
reasons. First, “all have sinned and have fallen short of the glory of/from God” (πάντες γὰρ
ἥμαρτον καὶ ὑστεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ). This he has previously established. Second, all are
“rectified (being justified) as a gift, by his undeserved favor, through the redemption, which is in
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Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 201.
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“Let God be true and every man a liar.” (γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής, πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης) Rom.3:4.
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Rom. 3:7.
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Christ Jesus” (πάντες . . . δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ).112 “Paul’s argument is that God does not discriminate between people in this
respect: all sinners deserve wrath; righteousness is for all through faith.”113 This rectification
(justification) is not “legal fiction.”114 God’s declarative word is creative; it creates the new
reality. That this reality is not fully experienced in actuality does not negate its truth. The full
actuality of the new reality awaits the eschatological kingdom. Nevertheless, this new reality is
the gift of a new identity ἐν Χριστῷ (in Christ).115
Paul continues with his usage of identity language as he writes: λογιζόμεθα γὰρ δικαιοῦσθαι
πίστει ἄνθρωπον χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου. ἢ Ἰουδαίων ὁ θεὸς μόνον; οὐχὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν; ναὶ καὶ ἐθνῶν, εἴπερ
εἷς ὁ θεὸς ὃς δικαιώσει περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως καὶ ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως (for we reckon
humanity to be rectified by faith apart from works of Torah. Is God [the God] of Judeans alone?
Is [he] not of non-Judeans also? Yes, of non-Judeans also, since God is one, who rectifies the
circumcision from out of faith and the foreskins through faith).116 Arguing from the central
confession of the faith of Israel, that God is one (Deut. 6:4 ֹלהינּו יְּ הוָּ ה ֶּא ָּחד
ֵ )יְּ הוָּ ה ֱא, Paul achieves the
breakthrough of bringing all together under the higher ἐν Χριστῷ identity, which is the
righteousness of faith.
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Middendorf states that Paul’s use of ἐν Χριστῷ here is not the same as his baptismal usage of Christians
being ἐν Χριστῷ by means of baptism. Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 285. Why this is the case, he does not explain.
While it is certain that in this immediate context, Paul is describing the redemptive work of Christ’s atoning
(propitiating) death, baptism is the means by which the Christian receives Christ’s benefits by faith. Baptism is
baptism into Christ’s death (Rom. 6:3). Christ died once. Thus baptism into his death would mean baptism into his
death on the cross. The reticence to unite the two instances of ἐν Χριστῷ is likely do to a concern not to confuse
justification and sanctification. Yet sanctification, in terms of death to sin, is accomplished by the Holy Spirit by
means of Christ’s death on the cross. I can see no reason not to imply that the two instances are to be understood as
united in the one death of Christ.
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Romans 4 serves as Paul’s litmus test for the orthodoxy of his theology. In many ways,
Romans 4 is also a recap of all that has been written before. The central figure of Torah, for Paul,
is Abraham. Abraham is the man of faith, the man rectified by faith apart from doing the
commands of Torah. This is so, of course, because Abraham lived prior to the giving of Torah
through Moses. And yet, though Paul does not argue it, it is through Moses that we know of
Abraham. Therefore, if Moses relates to us that Abraham was rectified through faith, then Moses
also preaches faith.117 Paul uses the chronology of Abraham’s life to make his point.118 Ben
Witherington states: “Abraham had faith/trust (in God) and that faith was counted to him as
righteousness. Paul is speaking of basic trust in God here, not of ‘the faith’ in the sense of a
specific set of things believed.”119 While Witherington appears to think of Abraham’s faith as a
general trust in God, Paul, in Rom. 4:18, points out that Abraham’s faith was trust in God’s
promise of offspring. That it was not specifically in the man Jesus of Nazareth does not weaken
the argument that it was faith in God’s word of promise concerning a descendant that was
accounted to Abraham as righteousness. Faith/trust must always have an object.120
Of great importance is the way in which Paul links the crisis of faith with the development
of the virtue of hope. Abraham’s trust in the promise of God continued through decades of
nonfulfillment. The promise that Abraham would become the father of many nations (πατέρα
πολλῶν ἐθνῶν)121 was rendered less and less likely with the passage of time. Sarah’s womb was
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Paul essentially picks up this theme in Rom. 10:5–13. Although Moses “writes about the righteousness
that is based on Torah, that one who does the commandments shall love by them,” by citing Deut. 30:13–14, Paul
makes Moses a preacher of faith in the crucified and risen Christ.
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Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 325.
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Witherington, Romans, 123. “Basic trust,” it should be noted is Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust) in Erikson’s
developmental model.
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Even in Erikson’s developmental theory, the child’s basic sense of trust and basic sense of mistrust is
developed by the faithfulness, or lack thereof, of the mother-figure. Trust is also trust in someone or something.
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Whether Paul’s hearers would have understood the word ἐθνῶν with its full ethnic force or not, the
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dead (τὴν νέκρωσιν τῆς μήτρας Σάρρας = the deadness of Sarah’s womb) and Abraham’s body
was dead (τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα ἤδη νενεκρωμένον = his own body being already dead).122 Yet, “against
hope upon hope he trusted” (παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι ἐπίστευσεν).123 Abraham did not waiver in
mistrust (οὐ διεκρίθη τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ).124 Abraham trusted God as the God of resurrection, as is
evidenced by Paul’s argument that it is this trust in God who raised Jesus our Lord from the dead
(τοῖς πιστεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγείραντα Ἰησοῦν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν ἐκ νεκρῶν), which is rectifying
faith.125 This reference to resurrection points forward to the new reality in baptism of the
believer’s resurrection to newness of life in Rom. 6:4.
Romans 5 is significant for this study for several reasons. First, Paul deals with the issue of
crises (suffering). He also deals with teleology, which is important theologically. Furthermore,
he presents us with two sources of ultimate identity: Adam and Christ. “Therefore, being
rectified out of faith (δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως) we have peace (εἰρήνην) in the presence of
God through our Lord Jesus Christ (Rom. 5:1). The term εἰρήνη denotes “the objective state of
being at peace instead of being enemies.”126 This is not superfluous to our study. Peace (εἰρήνη) is

promise, nonetheless, points to the superseding of the lower-level ethnic identities in the righteousness of faith.
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Cranfield, Romans, 1:258. Cranfield continues: “What did Paul understand to be the relation between
reconciliation and justification? The correct answer would seem to be neither that reconciliation is a consequence of
justification, nor that justification and reconciliation are different metaphors describing the same fact, but that God’s
justification involves reconciliation because God is what He is.” This would square with Paul’s use of ἱλαστήριον
(atoning sacrifice or propitiation) in 3:24. Arguing otherwise, Witherington states: “There is significant debate in
regard to whether Paul is saying in 5:1 that believers have peace with God as a consequence of being right with God,
or whether it happens concurrently with being set right. It is doubtful that we should agree with Cranfield that what
Paul is referring to here is having a righteous status before God, if by this is some idea of imputed righteousness is
implied. What Paul is talking about is neither an inherent nor a given attribute of believers but rather an action of
God which set them right, so that they have a new or renewed relationship with God as a result of the work of
Christ. If God were simply to impute to believers his righteousness, then there would be no basis to require
righteousness after their conversion.” Witherington, Romans, 133. Witherington translates θεοῦ in δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ as
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a relational word. It is not, as Paul uses it, a psychological term. Rather it denotes a quality in the
relationship between persons. It is a social term. A person who has been justified by grace
through faith has his or her relationship with God rectified, set right.127 Therefore, the two are
now at peace. Knowing one is at peace with God, one can better persevere in hope (ἐλπὶς) when
crises (θλίψεσιν = tribulations) come. This hope is further strengthened by the knowledge that
one has access (προσαγωγὴ) to God’s grace as a foundation on which to stand, even in the midst
of crises. Paul extols the arrival of crises as the grist mill by means of which character is
developed. Crises (θλίψεσιν) work patient endurance, and patient endurance works tested (or
proven) character, and tested character works hope.128 Paul’s confidence in the ultimate good of
crises for the Christian is indicated by his assertion that Christians boast (καυχώμεθα) not only in
hope of the glory of God but in the crises themselves, because of the hope which is developed in
the believer. This is true, not because crises in and of themselves are of value, but because of
what they produce, namely, hope. “And hope does not put one to shame because the love of God
has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.”129
Paul points to a specific teleology in these verses, namely in the glory of God (τῆς δόξης
a possessive genitive, meaning that it is God’s inherent righteousness. This righteousness is revealed in the way in
which God is both just and the justifier of the believer. In contrast, and in accordance with the classic Reformation
understanding, Middendorf states that δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is the righteousness which God “imputes to us through faith
in the Good News of his salvation.” Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 92. Nevertheless, Witherington’s emphasis upon the
relational aspects of δικαιωθέντες fits well with the new status of εἰρήνη between God and the believer in Christ. This
state of peace continues even as the Christian experiences the crises which Paul begins to outline in the following
sentences and again in Romans 8.
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A clearly relational use of the term, “righteous” is found in Gen. 38:26. Judah declares concerning Tamar,
“She is more righteous ()צ ְּד ָּקה
ָּ than I, since I did not give her to my son Shelah” (ESV). She was faithful to her
relationship with her first husband, to give him an heir. If Erikson is correct, that the ego strength, or virtue, of Stage
V, which is the stage at which the development of identity is focused, is fidelity, then a relationship between fidelity
and righteousness, even the righteousness of faith, could be argued convincingly.
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Rom. 5:3–4. ἡ θλῖψις ὑπομονὴν κατεργάζεται, ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ δοκιμήν, ἡ δὲ δοκιμὴ ἐλπίδα.
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Rom. 5:5. ἡ δὲ ἐλπὶς οὐ καταισχύνει, ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος
ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν. Paul use of the words οὐ καταισχύνει points back to his theme in Rom. 1:16–17. Paul will
have more to say about the Spirit’s role in the Christian’s life in Romans 8.
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τοῦ θεοῦ). This phrase again presents the exegete with the challenge of determining how to
translate the genitive case of the words τοῦ θεοῦ. The context does not support translating it
merely as if the Christian glorifies God. Rather Paul speaks of the “hope for a fully restored
experience of [God’s] image and presence.”130 Therefore, character and identity development are
not without an ultimate goal toward which to Christian presses on.131
Romans 5:6–11 continues the theme of reconciliation. This section also returns the hearer
to the contrast between humanity as sinner and humanity rectified by faith. In both the blood of
Christ (5:9) and the life of Christ (5:10) are the believer’s salvation. Paul next builds upon the
distinction between being in sin and being under grace, by describing the two grounds of
identity: In Adam; in Christ. Paul is again reaching back to Torah. Earlier he had brought
Abraham into view. Now it is the proto-human, Adam. However, he does not at first name him
Ἀδάμ. He calls him the “one man” (ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου) through whom sin came into the world. That
 ָּא ָּדםserves as both the proper name for the first man and as the designator for humanity, by using

ἄνθρωπος to designate him Paul allows “Adam” to stand as the designator for the entirety of
fallen humanity and not merely as a specific individual. Paul makes double use of Adam in
Romans 5. Adam stands as a τύπος (type) of Christ, in that his actions affect all humanity. He
also stands as contrasting τύπος in that the effects stand in contrast. Adam brings death. Christ
brings life. Witherington argues that Paul’s Adam typology undergirds the entire structure of
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Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 393. “The object of hope is the future δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ in which the blessed shall
share.” H. P. Liddon, Explanatory Analysis of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (London: Longmans & Green, 1899),
97. “Paul could be referring here to seeing the glory of God when Christ comes, but more likely he refers to the hope
of being conformed to Christ’s glorious image at the resurrection (see Romans 8).” Witherington, Romans, 135.
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Similarly, Paul writes in Phil. 3:12–14: “Not that I have already obtained this or am already perfect, but I
press on to make it my own, because Christ Jesus has made me his own. Brothers, I do not consider that I have made
it my own. But one thing I do: forgetting what lies behind and straining forward to what lies ahead, I press on
toward the goal for the prize of the upward call of God in Christ Jesus” (ESV). The Christian life has a telos.
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Romans 5–8.
We will then not be surprised to find Paul present a further historical example in his
next argument, in this case Adam, as a basis for drawing yet further conclusions
about the Christian life in ch. 6. This argument involves a synkrisis or comparison
between Adam and Christ, just as the argument in ch. 4. Involved an implied
comparison between Abraham and Christian believers. What is not generally
recognized is that the story of Adam not only undergirds but underlies the entire
discussion from 5:12 to the end of ch. 7, and it is only at that juncture that Paul feels
free to give a full discussion of the implications of what he has been saying for
Christian life, which he does in ch. 8, which concludes the probation portion of
Paul’s arguments.132
Witherington argues that the “I” of Rom. 7 is not Paul writing autobiographically of himself as a
Christian struggling with indwelling sin, nor of Paul the pre-Christian Jew, but rather that the “I”
of Rom. 7:7–13 is Adam, as in humanity ἐν Ἀδάμ.133 Middendorf, on the other hand, dedicates a
14-page excursus arguing that the “I” is the Christian Paul, and that the experience of the
Christian Paul is the actual experience suffered by all Christians.134 One does not have to accept
Witherington’s argument that the “I” of Rom. 7:14–25 is Adam and all those in Adam in order to
appreciate the argument that Witherington makes. As will be demonstrated in Romans 6, it is ὁ
παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος (our old man/ Adam) who is crucified with Christ and put to death.
Similarly, it is Christ who is raised. In this way Paul keeps the Adam-Christ dyad working in his
argument in chapter 6.135 He argues that through Adam, the “one man” (ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου), sin
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“But who is the ‘I’ then who is speaking here? In my view the ‘I’ is Adam in vv. 7–13 and all those who
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Luther’s explanation of Rom. 6:3–4, in Der Kleine Katechismus, reads: “Es bedeutet, daß der alte Adam in
uns durch tägliche Reue und Buße soll ersäuft werden und sterben mit allen Sünden und bösen Lüsten; und
wiederum täglich herauskommen und auferstehen ein neuer Mensch, der in Gerechtigkeit und Reinheit vor Gott
ewiglich lebe.” Luther contrasts “the old Adam” with “the new man,” while Paul contrasts the “old man” with
“Christ.” Luther interprets the “old man” as Adam. He then unites the risen Christ with the baptized Christian.
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entered the world, and with it, and because of it, death entered and passed to all men (εἰς πάντας
ἀνθρώπους), because (ἐφ᾽ ᾧ) all sinned.136 The universal reign of death proves that sin has reigned
since the fall of Adam, whom Paul then calls a type (τύπος) of “the Coming One” (ὅς ἐστιν τύπος
τοῦ μέλλοντος = Christ). Christ, who is the antitype of Adam, is also, like Adam, ἑνὸς
ἀνθρώπου— the one man, Jesus Christ (τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ).137 But, whereas
through the disobedience of Adam death reigns over all, through the obedience of Christ “the
many” (οἱ πολλοί) are established as righteous (5:19). Thus, in Christ, grace reigns through
righteousness to eternal life (5:21). The significance of this section is the identity that is
established and confirmed by the reign of death. Through the disobedience of the one man, the
many are established as sinners” (διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν
οἱ πολλοί). In the same way, “through the obedience of the one man, the many are established as
righteous” (διὰ τῆς ὑπακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οἱ πολλοί). Thus two sources of
identity, Adam and Christ, result in two different, contrasting identities: “sinners” (ἁμαρτωλοὶ)
and “righteous” (δίκαιοι). In Rom. 12:2, Paul will write about the renewal (ἀνακαινώσει) of the
mind. Paul here presents his hearers with two realities, which are the bases for the actuality of a
lived identity. If one sets one’s mind on the “in Adam” identity, one will live in the realm of sin
and death. If one set’s one’s mind on the “in Christ” identity, then one will begin to be
transformed (μεταμορφοῦσθε) by the renewal of the mind. The baptismal shape of this
transformation of identity is taken up in Romans 6.
In Romans 1–5, Paul presents numerous aspects of identity. He acknowledges the various
136

Rom. 5:12. It lies outside the purpose of this dissertation to argue the meaning of ἐφ᾽ ᾧ. Middendorf
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Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 409.
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ethnic identities of Christians, but works to overcome the negative consequences of
pseudospeciation by presenting the higher-level identities of being saints and brothers. He first
indicts all people as sinners, members of a communio peccatorum. This community of sinners
has misplaced the trust it ought to have in the Creator and instead places its trust in created
things. This misplaced trust is ritualized in pagan worship practices, which actually are
destructive both to the individual and to human society as a whole. Human conscience also is
ruined by sin, in that it is turned inward. The struggle of a guilty conscience is not for the
neighbor’s good but for self-justification. Paul concludes with the identity label of “sinner,”
posted over the entirety of humanity.
Beginning in Rom. 3:21, Paul teaches a new identity, found not in the keeping of the law.
Rather it is found in the atoning death and in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. This new identity,
as one who is righteous by faith, is exemplified by Abraham. The patriarch is important, not only
because of his faith, but because of the struggle of faith which he suffered. In Abraham one sees
the connection between trust, identity, crisis, and hope. Abraham’s righteousness was a gift from
God, yet its actualization was hard-won in the daily struggle of trust versus the temptation to
mistrust. This righteousness is in Christ, not in Adam. Adam stands in for the entirety of
unfaithful, mistrusting humanity. Christ is the faithful one. The only truly faithful one. Christ is
the promised descendant, toward whose coming Abraham’s hope was focused. Abraham trusted
God and it was accounted to him as righteousness. His faith was in God who gives life to the
dead. Life from death is the theme of Paul’s baptismal theology in Romans.
Romans 6 and the Struggle for Identity
Paul’s theology of baptism was outlined earlier in this chapter. The primary task of this
section is to investigate the struggle for identity in Romans 6, that is, for the actualization of the
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identity given by means of baptism. That identity is that of being a person who is righteous by
faith, since the righteous shall live by faith (ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται; Rom. 1:17). Paul has
established that this righteousness is in Christ, in him who is the faithful one. The Christian’s
entire life is sourced from the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and is lived trusting in the
efficacy of Christ’s vicarious representative action (Stellvertretung).138 Martin Franzmann
remarks:
The reality of Christ’s death and resurrection determines our whole existence; the
controlling reality of our life now is the fact that we shall live. Our present life gets
its character, direction, and purpose from the fact that we shall live with Him who
lives a life beyond death, a life lived wholly to God, now that he has died an atoning
death, once for all to sin.139
Yet, the experience of every Christian is that of Paul in Rom. 7:14–25, that is, of not perfectly
living out (or actualizing) this reality of being righteous.140 Indeed, if it were the case that one
could, with ease, actualize this identity, then Paul’s entire exhortation to become what one is
would be purposeless.
Paul’s use of the subjunctive mood of the verb περιπατέω (to walk) in Rom. 6:4 indicates
how the baptized ought to live, not how they inevitably live. The proclamation of God’s gracious
favor in Christ, which Paul has been emphasizing since Rom. 3:21, is met by the question as to
whether the conclusion of his previous argument means that one such “continue in sin.” Paul
meets this false conclusion head-on by appealing to the nature of baptism, which buries the
baptized into the death of Christ (6:3). This burial into death, this uniting of the baptized with
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The actualization of one’s being righteous is connected with the Christian’s proper, or active,
righteousness, which is coram mundo.
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Christ in his death, has the ethical purpose of energizing the baptized by Christ’s resurrection.141
Paul is using the violent language of death. Baptism kills the “old man,” because in baptism the
Christian is co-crucified (συνεσταυρώθη) with Christ, in order that the “body of sin” might be
“destroyed” (καταργηθῇ; 6:6).142 Paul understands the struggle to involve the totality of the
person. For Paul σῶμα includes the physical, although it is not reducible to it alone. Human
beings are embodied creatures.143 It is impossible today to speak meaningfully of human nature,
at least in this world, without including the physical body, including the neurological system.144
Therefore, Paul’s use of the phrase τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας remains valid and important, since the
physical aspect of human nature is, at a minimum, involved in the cognitive, affective, and
behavioral aspects of human life, all of which are corrupted by sin. It is while in the body, “in the
flesh,” that the struggle for the experience of one’s identity as righteous occurs.
Although, as we shall see in Romans 7, Paul acknowledges that the Christian struggles with
the urge to sin and that he often finds himself sinning, he, nonetheless, gives the Christian no
excuse for doing so. The Christian, having been baptized into the death and resurrection of
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thought of as belonging to the soul at a minimum involve brain functions, thereby strengthening the argument that
the σῶμα and the ψηχή cannot be separated in this life.
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Christ, is now to account (λογίζεσθε) himself to be “on the one hand dead to sin and on the other
hand alive to God in Christ Jesus” (νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ζῶντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ;
6:11). Looking forward to Romans 7, the one who is “dead to sin and alive to God in Christ
Jesus” is the “New I” referred to earlier in this chapter. The reason the “Experiential I” can
reckon or account this to be true is that the “New I” is a recreated reality in Christ. The “New I”
is dead to “sin” which still dwells within the actualized existence of the “Experiential I.” Paul,
here, is hammering home the point that this “sin” within the “Experiential I” is a thing to which
the “New I” has died. The “New I” has been raised from death. The “New I” co-lives
(συζήσομεν) with Christ in his resurrected life. Therefore, the “Experiential I” is no longer a slave
to sin (μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ). By means of the killing and regenerating effect of
baptism, the Christian lives a new reality, even if in great weakness145 because of the indwelling
sin that remains in the “body of death,” the body of sin.”
Based upon this reality effected by means of baptism, Paul exhorts his hearers: “Therefore,
do not go on letting sin reign in your mortal bodies resulting in you obeying its drives.”146 The
words that follow are highly significant. “Sin shall not exercise lordship over you because you
are not under law (Torah commandments) but under gracious favor” (6:14). In Romans 7, Paul
will bring out the effect that commandments have; they excite the indwelling sin to commit sin.
145

“As soon as the Holy Spirit has begun his work of rebirth and renewal in us through the Word and holy
sacraments, it is certain that on the basis on his power we can and should be cooperating with him, though still in
great weakness. This occurs not on the basis of our fleshly, natural powers but on the basis of the new powers and
gifts which the Holy Spirit initiated in us in conversion.” (FC SD 2:65) Paul. Likewise, speaks of the weakness of
Christians in Rom. 6:19, although he is speaking more about their inability fully to understand the point he is
making.
146

Μὴ οὖν βασιλευέτω ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ. (Rom.
6:12). I am purposely translating ἐπιθυμίαις as “drives,” rather than “lusts” or “desires” in order to tease out the
psychological dimensions of this word. Since “sin” resides in the “body of sin” (τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας), the drives of
the body are corrupted by sin. In Rom. 7:24, Paul calls the body τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θανάτου. Paul appears to center the
drive to sin in the body. Yet, the body as physical creation of God is not essentially evil, for he also exhorts the
baptized to present the bodily members (τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν) to God as instruments of righteousness to God (ὅπλα
δικαιοσύνης τῷ θεῷ; Rom. 6:13).
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Two major effects of becoming aware of sin are shame and guilt. Adam and Eve hid themselves
among the trees of the garden (Gen. 3:8).147 The first reaction to sin’s effects was knowledge of
nakedness, which led to shame. Once the Lord God confronted them, his sentence upon them
declared them guilty of violating his command. The act of hiding among the trees was an
exhibition, an outward sign, of their mistrust in God. They had, instead, trusting the word of the
serpent. Paul’s refusal to return his hearers to a position under the law, but rather to God’s
gracious promise that Christians are free from sin in Christ removes both the shaming power and
the condemning power of the law and frees the baptized to be who they are in Christ, namely,
“the righteous by faith” who shall live.
As Paul continues his argument about freedom from slavery, he begins to use the language
of ritual, specifically the ritual language of Torah. While the baptized are not under Torah
commandments, they, nevertheless, conduct themselves is a way analogous to the sacrificial
system within Torah. The key ritual terms used in Rom. 6:19–23 are uncleanness (ἀκαθαρσίᾳ)
and holiness (ἁγιασμόν).148 The “Experiential I,” prior to regeneration, once presented its
members in slavery to uncleanness (ἀκαθαρσίᾳ). Now the regenerated person, who has within the
“New I” is urged to present its members in slavery to righteousness (δοῦλα τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ)
leading to holiness (εἰς ἁγιασμόν).149 Paul is building his ethical exhortation, which is grounded in
147

Adam falls by eating of the one tree denied him by God. Adam and Eve hide among the trees of the
garden, thinking that these trees will deliver them from the Lord who gave them as gracious gifts. It will happen,
centuries later, that those who are baptized into (are hidden in) the One who was nailed to a tree, that the shame and
guilt of sin will be removed.
148

Rom. 6:19.

149

Middendorf, following James Dunn, prefers to translate ἁγιασμόν as “sanctification, rather than “holiness”
in concern that “holiness” implies a state while “sanctification” connotes a process. The concern, while perhaps
valid, is overcome by the present progressive of the word παραστήσατε (be presenting). Middendorf also argues that
just as Paul writes in verse 19 that presenting the members to righteousness leads to “sanctification” (which he
understands as a process) so in 6:16 Paul states the “obedience” leads to “righteousness.” His argument appears
flawed, since “righteousness” is an imputed status. The parallel between the two would imply that both ought to be
treated as “states.” However, just as things that are holy can be desecrated and defiled, so the Christian, by
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the Christian’s baptism into Christ, upon the Levitical ritual of cleansing and sanctifying and the
corresponding process of desecration and defilement. Paul uses this same concept in Eph. 5:25–
27. Paul presents Christ as cleansing the church, which previously was unclean, “with the
washing of water with the word” (Eph. 5:26). That this language is the language of the sacrificial
ritual system is betrayed by Paul’s use of the phrase “give himself up for her,” since Christ did
this as the sacrifice for sin on the cross. Similar to Rom. 6:19–23, in Eph. 5:25–27 Paul uses the
words “having cleansed” (καθαρίσας), sanctify/ make holy (ἁγιάσῃ), and holy (ἅγια). Thomas
Winger comments of Eph. 5:26:
The sacrificial language of the previous verse now intensifies with the explicit
vocabulary of temple ritual (cf. Rom. 15:16). The verbs ἁγιάζω, “sanctify,” and
καθαρίσας, “cleanse,” reflect the movement from unclean and common to clean and
holy (Lev. 10:10) that was necessary before any person or thing could stand in the
presence of the holy God without being destroyed.150
Consistent with this line of reasoning, Paul, in Rom. 6:21, 23, states that uncleanness leads to
death. In the Levitical system, the priests were to distinguish between, and to teach the people to
distinguish between the holy and the holy and the common, and the clean and the unclean.151
Winger notes: “The NT does not erase these distinctions, but relocates them from the Jerusalem
temple to the person of Christ (Jn. 2:21). His priestly work is to cleanse and sanctify . . . by the
power of his blood . . . and through his word.”152 By means of baptism, the Christian is “in
Christ,” who is the source of holiness. Thus, the liturgical work of the baptized, is to present as a
sacrifice one’s members “in slavery to righteousness resulting in holiness.” Paul will echo this
same language in Rom 12:1–2.

presenting his members to sin desecrates defiles himself. According to Rom. 6:21, persistence in defilement leads to
death.
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Winger, Ephesians, 609–10.
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Lev. 10:10; Ezek. 22:26.
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Winger, Ephesians, 610.
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This section presents the multifaceted telos of Paul’s ethical exhortation. The goal of
baptism is full participation in the life of the resurrected Christ. This is a life free from shame
and death (6:21), having one’s fruit in holiness (6:22), and enjoying the “free gift of eternal life
in Christ Jesus the Lord” (6:23). The daily presentation of one’s members to God is the
ritualization which effects the actualization of the new identity of being righteous, and as Paul
now declares, being holy.153 More on this daily presentation is given later in Romans 12–15.
Romans 7 and the Struggle for Identity
This is a key section, especially in that Paul argues that the “I” wants to do what pleases
God, but the “sin within” does not, so that the “I” that is Paul is wretchedly wrestling. A major
challenge is attempting to deal with Paul’s use of the pronoun “I” in a psychological manner is
determining just who, or what, the “I” is in any given instant.154 There is the “I” who struggles
against sin. There is the “I” who delights in the Torah commandments of God. There is the “I”
who does what it does not want to do. Yet there is an “I” who is not the one doing the evil thing;
rather it is indwelling “sin” which does it. Thus Paul appears to present us with three dramatis
personae: “Experiential I”: “New I”; “indwelling “sin.”
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Throughout Romans, Paul skillfully escapes the accusation that being rectified (justified) by grace through
faith leads to lawlessness. In Rom. 6:19, he states that it is the presenting of the members to uncleanness (ἀκαθαρσίᾳ)
and lawlessness (ἀνομίᾳ) that leads to further lawlessness and ultimately to death. Peter Tomson comments: “Neither
in Rabbinic tradition nor in Qumran, [did] ‘salvation’ or ‘justification by faith’ exclude obeying commandments.
The same appears to hold true for Paul. Especially remarkable is his mention of ‘those who not only are circumcised
but also follow the footsteps of Abraham’s faith’ (Rom. 4:12), i.e. Jews who have both the Law and faith, the
emphasis being that faith and not the commandments are decisive. Tomson, Paul and the Jewish Law, 67. Yet,
although Paul will show, by means of a marriage metaphor, that the baptized have died to the law, this does not lead
to lawlessness. As will be shown, coercive law breeds rebellion in the “body of sin.” On the other hand, the “New I”
delights in the “Law” in the” inner man” and desires, without coercion to follow Torah from out of faith. This is
consistent with Paul’s declaration that “the righteous shall live by faith.” One who lives by faith, faithfully lives in a
righteous manner, although still in great weakness and struggle because of indwelling sin within the “body of
death.”
154

“Chapters 7 and 8 of the Epistle to the Romans are the most intense presentation in Paul of a
transformation in human life. If any Pauline texts can be interpreted psychologically, it is these chapters.” Theissen,
Psychological Aspects, 222.
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In Rom. 7:13–25, Paul is speaking only of the Christian, the one made new and given the
new identity of being righteous in Christ. For purposes of this dissertation, “New I” is the
Christian as he views himself and as he is viewed coram deo, a new person, righteous before
God. This is the Christian’s “real” identity,” as δίκαιος. It is the identity conferred by God in
Christ. As “New I,” therefore, he desires to live righteously. “Indwelling sin” is the “old man/
Adam,” the Christian as “sinner,” as ἄδικος. This is not his real, nor the identity the Christian
desires to actualize. “Experiential I” is the Christian as he experiences himself in the world. He
experiences the daily existential crisis of the pull of “indwelling sin” to commit sin and of the
“New I,” the “I” who has died to sin and is now alive to God. Describing the situation using
these three terms helps to clarify the crisis Paul describes. The drama in Romans 7 is intense.
The outcome of the crises experienced by the “Experiential I” is a matter of life and death.
However, before dealing with the conflicts that rage within the baptized, Paul describes the
Christian’s relationship to the commands of Torah and the effect of the law upon the “flesh.”
While the effect of “law” upon a person may appear to have little to do with the
actualization of one’s identity, it is pertinent for several reasons. First, the Christian’s
relationship to the commands of Torah is a factor in how one sees oneself. It indicates a change
in one’s identity. Second, the effect of these commands, which is sin’s rebellion against the
commands, uncovers the results of unfettered autonomy. Paul has previously given a nuanced
view of autonomy. The Christian is free from the law. Yet the Christian is a slave to
righteousness. This paradox needs to be addressed. To what degree is the baptized free? And
from what is the Christian free? Freedom to sin leads to bondage in death. Slavery to
righteousness leads to holiness and eternal life.
Paul begins this section by stating that “Torah exercises lordship over a man only while he
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lives” (Rom. 7:1). He then uses the metaphor of marriage to illustrate his point. A woman is
bound to her husband as long as he lives. If ever the husband should die, the woman is always
free to remarry. Paul then twists the metaphor slightly. It is not that Torah (the “husband” to
whom she was once bound) who has died. Rather, it is the baptized person who has died. “You
died to Torah through the body of Christ, so that you belong to another, to the one who was
raised from the dead” (Rom. 7:4). Being baptized into the crucified and risen Christ, the
Christian is now no longer bound to Torah as a lord, rather, the Christian is set free from this
bondage so as to be married to Christ.155 This contrast between slavery and freedom has appeared
earlier in Romans 6. Slavery is much more than a state of being. To be enslaved is be a slave, to
have that as an essential part of one’s identity. Valérie Nicolet-Anderson, in her narrative reading
of Romans, describes the plot in these words:
In term of intrigue, it is centered on the end of the rule of sin over human beings; but
it also establishes the identity of human beings as slaves. In terms of ēthos, human
beings are marked by a lack of autonomy.156 Being a slave to one’s master involves
giving obedience to the master (6:16), but Paul also indicates that the master one is
serving decides the identity of the one who is serving the master. As 7:14–23 will
make clear, when a person serves sin it is no longer the individual who is responsible
for what she does or even who she is, because her master seems to inhabit her (7:17).
In this case it is as if the individual is being possessed by an outside power. Both
chapter 6 and chapter 7 indicate that slavery is more than obedience; it is a matter of
identity. The master decides the identity of the slave.157
Therefore, the plot involves the violent language of death, burial, and even crucifixion. The old
husband, who is like a cruel master, can only be overcome by death. In Romans 7, it is the
155

Paul’s interplay between the words “husband” and “lord” reflects Hosea’s contrast between being under a
lord and having a husband: (Hos. 2:18 Heb. / 2:16 Eng.): , ִּלי עֹוד- ִּת ְּק ְּר ִּאי-ישי; וְּ ל ֹא
ִּ  ִּת ְּק ְּר ִּאי ִּא,יְּ הוָּ ה- ַההּוא נְּ ֻאם-וְּ ָּהיָּ ה ַביֹום
ב ְּע ִּלי:
ַ “And it shall be in that day, declares Yahweh, you will call me ‘my husband’ and no longer call me ‘my lord.’”
In Romans 7, Paul is placing Torah in the position of the husband as lord, much as Peter does in 1 Pet. 3:6. Paul uses
the term “bound” (δέδεται) in relation to Torah, yet “is set free” (ἐλευθέρα ἐστὶν) in relation to the marriage to Christ.
156

In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, the issues of “autonomy” will be discussed. Nicolet-Anderson uses the
term to describe the lack of freedom, indeed the lack of freedom of the will, not to sin. Yet there is also a sinful
aspect to autonomy, when it is freedom to be the source of one’s own laws.
157

Nicolet-Anderson, Constructing the Self, 79.
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“wife,” the slave to Torah, who dies so that she might be set free to be remarried to the risen
Christ.
Paul is faced with a theological problem. He could easily be accused of calling Torah evil.
Therefore, he first must make his argument clear. Although, prior to baptism, a person is bound
to Torah, it is not Torah which causes the person to rebel, but the passions of sin (τὰ παθήματα
τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν: the drives, infected by indwelling sin; 7:5). These drives are energized when they
are met by the “law and order demands” of Torah.158 It is only after being baptized, after being
set free from slavery to the law and order demands of Torah, that the Christian serves her new
husband in newness of the Spirit (ἐν καινότητι πνεύματος) and not in the oldness of the letter
(παλαιότητι γράμματος).159
In Rom. 7:7–13, Paul describes the Christian’s past identity, prior to baptism. Paul writes
that he did not know (οὐκ ἔγνων) sin, nor did he perceive or understand (οὐκ ᾔδειν) desire, that is,
the drives within him, until Torah taught him, “You shall not desire (οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις: you shall
not covet).”160 Furthermore, when sin “came alive again” (ἀνέζησεν) in Paul through the
commandments, Paul “died” (ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον: and I died). Therefore, Paul states that his
identity prior to baptism was that of being a dead man. Only unfettered desire raged within. This
means that any sense of autonomy was in fact an illusion. Paul was a slave to the desires of his
158

This wording is chosen to show a point of convergence between Paul’s teaching and Erikson’s description
of the issues of Stage II in his theory. Stage II (autonomy vs. shame and doubt) includes the ritualization of law and
order. The will, desiring autonomy. Rebels. Yet, it appears that this unfettered autonomy is no autonomy at all,
because the child rebels reflexively.
159

Rom. 7:6. In this verse Paul describes the unregenerate as being “held fast” (κατειχόμεθα) under Torah.
After baptism, the Christian, set free from Torah, is paradoxically still “in slavery,” in the newness of the Spirit.
While this might seem counterintuitive, it maintains the thought that the master, who now is the one who is also the
loving Savior, still determines the identity of the slave. The identity of the baptized is given by and in Christ.
160

Rom. 7:7. This is Paul, describing his own experience prior to baptism. “In 7:7 Paul reveals how the Law’s
commandments led the “I” to identify and acknowledge his own impulse toward evil.” Middendorf, Romans 1–8,
533. “Anyone who denies to Paul the ego in Romans 7 has to bear the burden of proof for this claim.” Theissen,
Psychological Aspects, 201.
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flesh.
The Adam-Christ dyad from Romans 5 is not absent in Romans 6–8. Although it was not
the Mosaic Torah that Adam violated in the garden, it was, nonetheless, “the commandment”
which was used to awaken desire within him. When faced with the question of trusting or
mistrusting the word of God, the temptation’s force included the physical (good for food), the
aesthetic or emotional (delight to the eyes), and the psychological (desirable to make one wise).
The word, desirable ( )נֶחְ מָ דis translated with ὡραῖον in the Septuagint, and not by ἐπιθυμέω.161
Nevertheless, the words have similar meanings. The desire for wisdom which had been
forbidden awaken, or perhaps better said, was formed by the command.162 Paul interprets his
experience in terms of the story of Adam’s fall into sin.163 The commandment came, desire raged,
and Paul, just like Adam, died just as God had promised. Thus, autonomous desire leads to
death, which is the ultimate source of shame, because it strips away all pretentions. In the end,
death is the greatest existential question. “The question is whether life can be affirmed despite
death, or whether death erodes all meaning.”164 Torah was intended for life; instead, it, because of
sin, brings death, which was the threat assigned to the tree in the midst of the garden.
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ὡραῖος appears only in Matt. 23:27, where it has the connotation of being attractive. Yet even in this
reference, “desirable” could be a translation. That it is the woman and not that man to which Gen. 3:6 refers is
irrelevant to the present discussion. “Eve coveted God’s divinity in Genesis and so was led into unbelief.” John T.
Pless, Praying Luther’s Small Catechism (St. Louis: Concordia, 2016), 31. The autonomous desire for that which is
not given as gift leads to mistrust in the giver. Thus, the “law and order” aspect of Torah excites the autonomous
will to disobedience. Yet this ultimately leads to shame, when the thing desired fails to live up to its promise. The
tree of the knowledge of good and of evil, in contrast to the tree of life, became the tree of death.
162

How evil desire and mistrust can be created in one who is righteous is a mystery not to be explored in this
dissertation. However, the close connection between mistrust of God’s commands and devil desire is unmistakable
in the biblical narrative of Genesis 3 and in Romans 7.
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“Paul interprets the conflict with the law with the aid of two traditions: first, according to the model of the
story of the Fall; second, by adducing a widespread ancient opinion. Theissen, Psychological Aspects, 202. Theissen
quotes extensively from ancient nonbiblical sources to show the universality of the knowledge that human beings
are excited to lawlessness by the demands of law.
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Michael Oppenheim, Jewish Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Narrating the Interhuman (New York:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 69.
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Yet, Torah is a “Spirit-filled, holy entity that God intended for life”165 (Rom. 7:14). The
problem lies not with Torah but with fallen humanity. Paul writes, “But I—I am fleshly, having
been sold under sin” (Rom. 7:14b). Middendorf notes that this is the language of the “slave
market”166 Significantly, Paul now shifts to the present tense. “I am fleshly” (σάρκινός εἰμι).167
The challenge in these verses is to discern what Paul means by the pronoun “I.” It is Paul, but in
what way is the “I” Paul? Is it a legitimate move to understand the “I” as if one were discussing
two subjects, as has been hypothesized above?
Paul is not accusing indwelling sin for his actions so as to relieve himself of responsibility.
Rather, he is describing as best he can the struggle within the baptized to actualize the new
identity and the strong force of indwelling sin which hinders at every turn. Paul, however, takes
the reality of the new man just as seriously as he does the power of sin. So he presents this drama
to his hearers of a man who has within him, as it were, two strong opponents. On the one hand
there is the new man. On the other hand, there is indwelling sin. And in the middle, tattered and
torn, is Paul the Christian, actualizing his new identity against a mighty foe. He will call himself
the “I” that delights in the Torah. He will call himself the “I” which finds itself doing what it
does not want to do. But he will not call himself “sin.” Nevertheless, in contrast to Torah, which
is spiritual, Paul states that he is fleshly. By this he does not simply mean that he lives a bodily
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Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 559.
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Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 559.
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“The first person singular is again used, but now for the first time in this chapter with a present tense. The
only natural way to understand this ἐγὼ . . . εἰμι is surely the way indicated by Calvin’s comment on the following
verse: ‘Paul . . . is depicting in his own person the character and extent of the weakness of believers.’ The faithful
often refuse this natural interpretation on the ground that it involves—so they argue—a gross belittling of the victory
vouchsafed to the believer, and hanker after an interpretation which regards 7.14–25 and chapter 8 as describing two
successive stages, before and after conversion.” Cranfield, Romans, 1:356. Douglas Moo is among those who think
that Rom. 7:14–25 refers to the unregenerate. Moo acknowledges that Christian’s struggle with sin. “I only deny that
this passage describes that struggle.” Moo, Romans, 449. To deny to the struggling Christian this description of
Paul’s own struggle not only goes against the plain sense of the passage; it also removes the clearest description of
the struggle of Christian identity that the baptized endure.
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life. Rather, he is “sold under sin.” In some way, he is so under the lordship of sin that he cannot
but sin.168 It is not that Paul does not desire to actualize the new life in Christ. He does not think
of a divided will or a discord in the soul. He has in mind the tension which exists, in the
Christian life, between will and action, between intention and performance.”169 Yet he describes
it in such a way that three actors appear on the stage: “New I,” “indwelling sin,” and in tension in
the middle, struggling, “Experiential I.” It might be helpful to think about it in this manner:
“New I” is Paul as fully “new man.” This is the reality into which the baptized is placed.
“Experiential I” is the way the baptized experiences the baptismal life as daily putting off the old
man and putting on the new man, of killing the old Adam” so that the new man may daily
arise.170
“New I” wills to do what pleases God, agrees with Torah that it is excellent (καλός), and
delights in it. “New I” is the “inner man” (τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον) of 7:22. Concerning this “inner
man,” D. G. Stöckhardt comments:
Doch nach dem Zusammenhang, da hier dem inner Menschen Freude an Gottes
Gesetz beigelegt wird und als Gegensatz das Fleisch, die Sünde gedacht ist erscheint
an unserer Stelle der Begriff “ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος” als identitsch mit dem Begriff ὁ καινὸς
ἄνθρωπος. In der Wiedergeburt wird ja vor Allem das Innere des Menschen, Herz,
Verstand, Wille erneuert.171
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Stacey, Pauline View of Man, 163.
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Nygren, Romans, 293.
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The question of the referent of the “I” in Romans 7, and whether one should distinguish between a “New
I,” which does not commit sin, and an “Experiential I,” which succumbs to sin’s power even as it struggles against
it, is significant for any dialogue with Freudian or Neo-Freudian theory, including Erikson. This section provides
material for discussing the ego (das Ich), the id (das Es), and the superego (das Über-Ich) and their relation to an
extrapolated Pauline psychology.
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D. G. Stöckhardt, Commentar über den Brief Pauli an Die Römer (St. Louis: Concordia, 1907), 342.
“However, according to the context, since the inner man delights in the law of God, and sin is conceived as being
opposed to the flesh, the term “ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος” appears in our place as identical to the term ὁ καινὸς ἄνθρωπος. In
the rebirth the interior of man—heart, intellect, will—is renewed.”
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Thus the two are to be equated, and in the terms used here, should be considered as the “New I,”
the reality that is Paul, baptized into Christ, and, by extension, all Christians.
“Indwelling sin” (ἡ οἰκοῦσα . . . ἁμαρτία; 7:17) is that under which Paul, in 7:14, is sold as a
slave. It is the “not indwelling any good thing” (οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν . . . ἀγαθόν) that dwells within Paul,
that is in his “flesh” (ἐν τῇ σαρκί; 7:18). Nevertheless, Paul, as one of the baptized, who
experiences this tension, does not desire to be under sin’s lordship. He calls the crises of his
experience using terms of a battle. “I (“Experiential I”) delight in God’s Torah according to the
inner man (“New I”), but I (“Experiential I”) see another Torah in my members waging war
(ἀντιστρατευόμενον) with the Torah of my mind (“New I”) and taking me (“Experiential I”)
captive in the Torah of sin, which is in my members” (Rom. 7:22–23). In Rom. 12:2, Paul will
urge his hearers to be transformed by the renewal of the mind (ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοὸς). This would
be in accord with the daily actualization of the new identity. The mind, in 12:2, is that of
“Experiential I,” since it in in need of constant renewing. In Rom. 7:23, however, the mind (νοός)
is more likely that mind of the “New I,” against which indwelling sin wages its war, since it is
according to the inner man that Paul delights in God’s Torah.172
The terms “New I” and “Experiential I” are simply hypothetical constructs to describe the
drama of the struggle against sin and for Christian identity which occurs within the mind and will
of the baptized. There is only one “I” who is enduring this struggle.173 However, from the level of
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The meaning of the Torah of God is straight forward. But what is meant by “another Torah,” a “Torah of
sin”? Middendorf describes the double effect of the Torah on the Christian. It is, according to Middendorf, the same
Torah. The “inner man” (“New I”) delights in it and finds it pleasing. However, “indwelling sin” acts toward it just
as unregenerate man does. It rebels. It disobeys, commits sins, and incurs shame and guilt. See Middendorf, Romans
1–8, 567–71.
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Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 567. Middendorf appears unwilling to say what Paul says about himself, that he
actually does the evil he does not will to do. Certainly, there is only one man Paul, but Paul’s psychology—if one
can call it that—is richer than Middendorf appears willing to describe. He is willing, however, on page 581, to refer
to the “distraught I.” So the same reality is described using slightly different terminology.
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experience, there is the deep desire to please God, which is born from the reality of the “new
man” (ὁ καινὸς ἄνθρωπος), the inner man (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος), and yet Paul still finds himself
unwillingly committing sins. Paul will not identify himself with indwelling sin; nevertheless, he
will say that he (Paul, in some sense being “I”) does not do the good thing he wills to do, but
rather does the evil he does not desire to be doing. Paul’s true, foundational identity is not to be
found in either indwelling sin nor in the struggling “Experiential I.” Rather, Paul’s identity in in
the “new man” (ὁ καινὸς ἄνθρωπος), the inner man (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος), who has been united with
the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, so that he might nor walk in newness of life, as Paul
describes in Romans 6.
Still, Paul will not ignore the actual struggle to make this reality his own in practice. He is
in a war that is a great interior struggle, eine große innere Anfechtung, which he describes as
being between his mind and his flesh (his members). The severity of this struggle causes him to
refer to his condition as pure misery. He is a distressed person, ever in the cycle of contrition,
repentance, faith, and further struggle. Therefore, he cries out: “I, a distressed man (Ταλαίπωρος
ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος)! Who will rescue (ῥύσεται) me from out of (ἐκ) this body of death (τοῦ σώματος
τοῦ θανάτου τούτου)?” The struggling “I” (the “Experiential I”) desires to actualize the reality
which is the “New I.” Therefore, the baptized does not desire to remain either under sin’s
lordship or perpetually in this struggle. Always, while in this body, infected with indwelling sin,
the baptized craves the inner reality to become a fully realized actuality. Therefore, the baptized
always looks to the Redeemer for rescue. Thus Paul’s answer to the question of “Who?” “Thank
be to God—through Jesus Christ our Lord (7:25). That this struggle will go on until the body of
death is buried in the grave, or Christ returns, is acknowledged by the final words of this chapter.
Until that day, the “I” lives on both sides of the struggle. The “I” that is Paul the new man
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serves God’s Torah with, or in, his mind, even though sin causes his “flesh” to cave in to the
temptation of its evil impulses. Paul is not, however, giving an excuse for bad behavior. The
baptized person himself served God’s Torah in his mind (αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῒ δουλεύω νόμῳ
θεοῦ: I myself serve in my mind God’s Torah). The addition of the word “myself” (αὐτός) points
to Paul’s sense of identity.174 Yes, frustratingly, Paul finds himself doing what he does not desire
to do, but he will not claim that “person” as the real Paul. Paul has died to sin and has been
raised to newness of life. In this baptismal reality, Paul finds who he really is. This “New I”
causes the “Experiential I” to desire rescue from this struggle, and so to cry out to his Lord Jesus
Christ.175 And because “Experiential I” finds its identity in being the “New I” in Christ, even
when caught unwillingly sinning, it knows that it will not be under the sentence of condemnation
spoken in the first three chapters of Romans. The true identity of the Christian is the “inner
man,” free from the domination of sin and from the condemnation of Torah.176 This is the
Christian, declared to be righteous in Christ, and thereby made righteous coram deo.
Romans 8 and the Struggle for Identity
“There is, therefore, now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus (ἐν Χριστῷ
Ἰησοῦ), for the Torah of the Spirit of Life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the Torah of sin
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Philip Esler, pursuing his topic of the social identities in Romans, concludes that Paul states that he
delights in Torah in his mind in order to draw the Judean-leaning Roman Christians into the new, higher-level
identity as brothers of their non-Judean (gentile) Christians. “He does this above all by creating an ‘I’ voice that
exemplifies Israel in its experience of the law and that incorporates himself and his fellow Judeans.” Esler, Conflict
and Identity, 242. This does not, however, exclude understanding a Christian “I,” as stated above.
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“The general result of the foregoing is that in the phase of struggle which terminates at verse 25, the inner
self of the regenerate serves with the νοῦς the law of God, but with his σάρξ is in the service of the law of sin. This,
however, shows the intrinsic holiness of the Law (ver. 12), ver. 25.” Liddon, Romans, 126.
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“Therefore, the true identity of the Christian, the ‘inner person’ (7:22) as seen by faith, together with that
which determines his will and governs his mind, is free from the domination of sin. Baptized believers have been set
free from slavery to sin (6:17, 18, 20, 22), and Paul assures them that the outcome of the Christian life is eternal life
(6:22). As a result, their existence is no longer determined by the flesh (6:19; 7:5), and just as death no longer
exercises lordship over Christ (6:9), so it is for all in Christ.” Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 590.
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and of death” (Rom. 8:1–2). Paul’s continued use of the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ supports the
view that he is continuing to discuss the Christian life in baptismal terms. By bringing the Spirit
into the discussion, Paul is reaching back to Rom. 7:6, where it is written: “But now, we have
been set free from the Torah, by dying to that by which we were held fast, so that we might be
slaves in the newness of the Spirit and not the oldness of the letter.” In both instances, Paul
describes the newness and the freedom of the baptized. The paradox, of course, is that slavery to
God in the Spirit (in Christ), is true freedom. He continues to describe the inability of keeping
Torah to bring about victory over sin and life. Therefore, only because Christ came in the
“likeness of sinful flesh and for sin” (8:3) is “the righteous requirement of Torah (τὸ δικαίωμα
τοῦ νόμου) fulfilled (πληρωθῇ) in us (8:4). This is not an expected ending to the sentence.
However, Paul does not say that the “righteous requirement” is fulfilled by us. He says it is
fulfilled in us (ἐν ἡμῖν), who walk according to the Spirit (τοῖς . . . περιπατοῦσιν . . . κατὰ
πνεῦμα). It, therefore, must be determined what Paul means by “walking according to the Spirit.”
Paul has previously used the metaphor of walking in Rom. 6:4, stating that the baptized
Christian has been united with the death of Christ so that, just as Christ has been raised anew, so
the Christian might walk in newness of life.177 Therefore, the life lived according to the Spirit is
intimately connected to the death and resurrection of Christ. Still, Paul does not appear here
merely to imply some kind of imputed, fictitious fulfilling of Torah. Otherwise, his statement
would rightly be met with derision by his detractors. It is the Torah of the Spirit of Life, which is
in Christ Jesus, which sets the baptized free and causes this Torah to be fulfilled. By immediately

177

In the opening of this letter, Paul has already linked the resurrection of Christ to the work of the Spirit. The
gospel is “concerning God’s Son (περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ) who was came out from the seed of David (τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ
σπέρματος Δαυὶδ) according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα), who was declared the Son of God in power (τοῦ ὁρισθέντος
υἱοῦ θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει) according to the Spirit of holiness (κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης) by the resurrection from the dead
(ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν; Rom. 1:3–4).
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pointing his hearers to the work of Christ, and by stating that the Torah of the Spirit of Life in in
Christ, Paul emphasizes, as he has throughout this letter, that the righteous are righteous by faith
and that they are to live by faith. This faith, which results in the identity of being righteous and a
saint (Rom. 1:7) calls the baptized to “walk the walk of the Spirit and not that of the flesh.”178
After discussing the vast difference and fate of those who walk according to the flesh and
those who walk according to the Spirit (8:5–8), he definitively states that his hearers are not
among those who “are in the flesh” (ἐν σαρκὶ ὄντες).179 Paul then links the indwelling of the Spirit
to the death of the body. “The body is dead through sin but the Spirit is life because of
righteousness” (8:10). Here he clearly links the Spirit and the status of being righteous together.
He then ties this to the resurrection of Christ: “And if the Spirit of the one who raised Jesus from
the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will also raise your mortal body
through the indwelling Spirit in you” (8:11). This links back to Rom. 6:5, where Paul writes of
the further resurrection of the body in terms of baptism’s effect. Paul views the totality of human
existence in light of the killing and resurrecting power of baptism. Furthermore, he intimately
connects the work of the Spirit with baptism as well. Next, having established this link, he moves
to the practical application of baptism, and the Spirit’s work in baptism, as he exhorts his hearers
to live it out in the daily crises of faith they endure.
Paul describes the struggle of the flesh against the Spirit as a matter of life and death. He
tells his hearers that Christians are debtors (ὀφειλέται), but not to the flesh. However, no sooner
has he called them “debtors” than he changes his semantic domain to that of family. Christians
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Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 615.
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ἀρέσαι is the aorist active infinitive of the verb ἀρέσκω, strive to please, accommodate. According to

BAGD, it can also have the meaning of “having pleasure in” something. Paul uses the dative case, θεῷ, in the phrase
θεῷ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύνανται. If the phrase is translated as “is not able to be pleasing to God,” it could imply the state of
not being pleasing God, because being pleasing to God comes by faith and results in rectification (justification).
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are “sons of God” (υἱοὶ θεοῦ; 8:14) and “children of God” (τέκνα θεοῦ; 8:16). Having received the
Spirit of adoption (πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας; 8:15), the baptized now, by the Spirit, called God “Abba,
Father” (αββα ὁ πατήρ; 8:15).180 These words are of the utmost importance for Christian identity.
Rather than staying with the theme of slavery and of obligation, Paul shifts the grounds of
Christian identity to that of membership in God’s family. He has laid the groundwork for this
much earlier, in Rom. 1:13, by calling his hearers “my brothers,” and in Rom. 4:1, with Israel’s
forefather Abraham as the father of all those who believe (4:11), and all Christians as Abraham’s
offspring (4:16), but now this is intensified. The baptized are God’s sons. They are God’s
children. And because the baptized are God’s children, they are “coheirs with Christ” (8:17).
Being a child of God is the Christian’s hidden, true identity. Middendorf writes: “Paul then
makes an astounding statement about identity. As a result of the Spirit’s presence (8:9, 11) and
direction (8:13), these people are actually ‘sons of God’ (8:14).”181 And because each Christian is
a member of God’s family, each are, with all others, brothers (and sisters) in Christ. This identity
is the one identity that overcomes all lower-level, social identities.
Being heirs with Christ, however, does not mean life without struggle. Rather, the baptized
are coheirs with Christ, “if indeed we suffer with him in order to be glorified with him” (8:17).
Paul realistically knows that the baptized will suffer in this world. However, Paul lives with the
teleology of the final resurrection of the body to glory. Those who suffer with Christ will be
glorified with him. Therefore, he can say, “I count that the sufferings of the now-time are not
equivalent to the glory which is about to be revealed in us (εἰς ἡμᾶς)” (8:18). Given the context,
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Paul intends his hearers to understand “εἰς ἡμᾶς” to mean “in our bodies.”182 However, the
present time (τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ: the now-time) will be a time of suffering. This suffering is “the
dominant topic under discussion from here through 8:30.”183 In Rom. 5:1–5, Paul extolled the
benefits of sufferings for growth in character and hope. Here, the apostle links the suffering of
the baptized with the sufferings of an anthropomorphized creation, and lists a number of kinds of
suffering—tribulation, distress, persecution, hunger, nakedness, danger, death—which might
raise the question as to the value of suffering or even the goodness of God.
It is to the hope of bodily resurrection that Paul points his hearers. “We ourselves groan
within ourselves expectantly awaiting the redemption of our body; for in this hope we will be
saved” (8:23). Therefore, Paul urges them to endure until hope is realized. The significance of
hope cannot be overemphasized, nor can its linkage with trust versus mistrust. Intense suffering
can lead the sufferer to doubt, to distrust the message of the gospel. Christ has been raised. The
Christian has been united with the risen Christ. Nevertheless, the baptized Christian can suffer
horribly. The promise of bodily deliverance is delayed. Not only must the Christian struggle
against indwelling sin (Rom. 7:13–25), he must also endure external attacks, up to and including
threat of death (8:18–25, 35–36). Hope is the virtue that sustains the believer until the promised
reality is revealed, just as it sustained Abraham (Rom. 4:16–22). The faith that justifies,
produced hope in the one who endures. In Rom. 4:22, Paul states that enduring in hope is why
Abraham’s faith was accounted to him as righteousness. But how is this hope sustained?
Paul points his hearers to the gift of the Holy Spirit, whom they have received in baptism.
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“Here the point at issue is what will happen to our human bodies. Paul has in mind the future resurrection,
at which point believers will be well and truly conformed to Christ’s image, and then truly be revealed as sons of
God, like the Son of God.” Witherington, Romans, 222. What Witherington fails to say is that the baptized are truly
conformed to Christ’s image in the world, even now. Christians suffer now specifically because, as sons of God,
their lives are patterned after the Son of God.
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Even when the believer does not know what to say, the Spirit helps in the Christian’s weakness
(8:26) by interceding on his behalf. Paul then moves quickly to Christ. The baptized are being
shaped toward a predetermined future.
Now we know that to those who love God, all things work together into good, to
those called (κλητοῖς) according to his purpose (πρόθεσιν); because those whom he
foreknew (προέγνω) he also predestined (προώρισεν) to be conformed (συμμόρφους) to
the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those
whom he predestined he also called (ἐκάλεσεν). And those he called, these he also
rectified (ἐδικαίωσεν; justified; pronounced righteous), and those whom he rectified,
these he also glorified (ἐδόξασεν).184
All of the verbs indicated above in the Greek are past tense, even though, temporally, not all
have come to completion. It appears that Paul intends the Aktionsart of the aorist tense, as herein
used, to be taken in a punctiliar sense. The action is so certain that it can be spoken of as already
completed. Paul is working from the perspective of the certainty of the eschatological reality of
the telos of the baptized. As it is actualized, however, the foreknowing and predestining action is
before time. The calling and rectifying (justifying; declaring righteous) is in time. The glorifying
is in the future, as he has already stated.
Conformation to the image of God’s Son, while a before-time action of God, is
conformation to the suffering and crucified Jesus in time. Concurrent with being called and
rectified, the baptized will suffer. Yet, because it is all according to a predetermined plot, the
believer can live in hope of future glory. The implications of this for Christian identity is that the
Christian’s identity is determined by God. It is something given. The identity of each Christian is
found in conformation to Jesus, the first-born brother. Paul will later, in Rom. 12:3–8 and he
does in 1 Corinthians 12, describe how this conformation is worked out differently in each
184
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Christian. However, there is a sense in which autonomy is removed. The Christian is not the
creator of his or her own identity. That identity is given as a gift.
Paul assures his hearers that, despite the suffering they will endure, God loved them. God is
the only one able to bring a charge against his people. Yet God is the justifier! Christ is the one
who can condemn. Yet it is Christ who died and was raised. Therefore, no one and nothing can
separate the baptized Christian from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus. Therefore,
knowing this great love, the Christian’s trust in God can endure in hope, despite the temptation to
mistrust the promise of future redemption and deliverance.
The struggle for identity continues through the Christian’s experiential life, even though it
is a thing given by the Lord in baptism. At the same time, the baptismal life is the means by
which this identity is bestowed and the means by which, though struggle, it is obtained in one’s
experience. Throughout Romans 6–8. Paul has indicated that Christians have the source of their
identity in Christ, into whose death and resurrection they have been baptized. The identity as one
righteous in Christ is a reality which is, through suffering and the cross, actualized throughout
life by contrition, repentance, and relying of the work of the Holy Spirit who has been given.
Romans 9–11 and Christian Identity
Romans 9–11, is often read as a polemic aimed at defending God’s faithfulness in respect
to his promises to Israel. Moo suggests that Paul is wrestling with the implications of the gospel
for Israel.185 Witherington describes how Paul refutes the charge that God has not kept his word
to Israel.186 Nocolet-Anderson detects the “problem of the particular,” especially in the
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widespread rejection of the gospel by Israel.187 Franzmann, however, understands Paul’s intent
from a slightly different perspective. The gospel “creates a new Israel out of Jew and Gentile.”188
By bringing these divergent views together, these chapters can also be read with an eye
toward the national identity of Israel and the need for the church in Rome to overcome the ethnic
and national boundaries that divide Christians from one another. The Judeans in Rome, upon
hearing that the non-Judeans are their equals, would want to know about God’s promises and
how they hold up under Paul’s gospel. The non-Judeans, on the other hand, would need to have
any proclivity to put down unbelieving Judeans negated by being reminded that God would
pluck them off the olive tree if they moved from the ground of faith (Rom. 11:11–24).
Middendorf detects three foci in these chapters: God; God’s word; God’s people.189 It is to this
third focus that this study will attend.
Paul has been calling all the Christians in Rome his brothers. Now, however, he
particularizes his relationship with his fellow Judeans. His grief is great concerning his brothers
(ἀδελφῶν), his relatives (συγγενῶν) according to the flesh (κατὰ σάρκα) who are Israelites
(Ἰσραηλῖται; Rom. 9:3). Even though they do not share his faith in Jesus as the Messiah, he
claims them as his kinsman.190 He then lists all the benefits and promises given to the people of
this national group (9:4–5), thereby demonstrating that becoming righteous is not a matter of
human knowledge or powers.191 Thus Paul, while earlier extolling the higher-level identity that
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“How paradoxical it is that Paul quite honestly, without condescension and without any esoteric
reservation, calls the Pharisees his brethren! Quite seriously he treats them as his kinsmen according to the flesh.
Fully aware of their lack of knowledge, and because he too shares the same deprivation, he bows himself under the
pressure of the divine incognito, which is the characteristic mark of the Church.” Karl Barth, The Epistle to the
Romans, 6th ed. trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 335.
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all Christians share because of their baptism into Christ, does not thereby denigrate other levels
of identity. Nevertheless, he wants his hearers to understand that the higher-level identity, which
binds Christians together and that ultimately matters before God, is grounded in God’s promise
to Abraham and is actualized in the hearer’s lives by faith, just as it was for Abraham (9:7–9).
Paul appears to be challenging the identity foreclosure of the Judean Christians in Rome who
thought that their national or ethnic identity resulted in a higher status within the church. Paul
uses Abraham once again, but this time to differentiate between the two sons of Abraham. Isaac
was the child whose birth was based on promise and not on the flesh. Similarly, Isaac’s children
did not both inherit. It was through Jacob, and not by Esau, that God’s promise to Abraham was
made good. Paul’s argument serves to reduce the importance of ethnic lineage to its proper level.
“It is not the case that all of the offspring of Abraham are Abraham’s children” (9:7), but only
those who trust as did Abraham.
The illustration of God loving Jacob and hating Esau has been used for extreme arguments
about predestination and election. That is not a topic for this study. Nevertheless, that God’s
choice of Jacob shows the freedom of God to choose whom God wills to choose is used by Paul
to argue that God has every right to choose non-Judeans (gentiles) and to make them into vessels
of mercy (σκεύη ελέοθς; 9:23). Paul’s argument, regardless of any discussion concerning eternal
election, is aimed at clinching his argument that “the righteous shall live by faith.” Israel—that
vast number of Paul’s countrymen—did not pursue righteousness by faith, by trust in the
promises made to Israel (9:31–32). The non-Judeans (gentiles) who did trust in Christ Jesus
attained (κατέλαβεν: acquired) righteousness only because they did trust the gospel (9:30).192
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192

“What the Gentiles ‘got’ is ‘righteousness, that is the righteousness which is from faith [ἐκ πίστεως].”
Middendorf, Romans 9–16, 946.
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Ultimately, Christian identity, which is found in being declared righteous in Christ, is determined
by faith (trust) in Christ, and not stumbling over him as a rock of offense.193 Paul continues this
argument about the righteousness of faith throughout chapter ten.
In Romans 11, Paul makes a slight shift which is significant for this study of identity. He
asks whether God has shoved away (ἀπώσατο) his ancient people (Rom. 11:1). Paul then selfidentifies as an Israelite, a descendent of Abraham, and a Benjaminite (11:1). These are
ethnocentric terms, pinpointing Paul’s pedigree. Paul appeals to the Hebrew Bible’s teaching of a
faithful remnant (λεῖμμα; 11:5) in order to argue that God always reserves a small number of
faithful for himself. “I have reserved for myself 700 men who have not bent the knee to Baal”
(11:4; 1 Kings 19:18). Yet even this remnant is by an election of grace (ἐκλογὴν χάπιτος; 11:5).
As far as identity is concerned, this unites believing Judeans with the faithful remnant that has
existed throughout Israel’s history. It was never the many; it was always the few. But because it
is “by grace,” there is no ground for prideful boasting. This trust (faith) is no human
achievement. It is God’s gift, God’s work.194
On the other hand, if the number of non-Judean Christians in Rome substantially
outnumbered the believing Judeans, Paul then would need to make sure that the non-Judeans do
not develop a sense of being better than the Judeans. To drive this home, Paul makes use of the
metaphor of the olive tree and the practice of grafting. Although grafting wild branches into
cultivated trees might sound counterintuitive, Esler states:
By far the most plausible view is that Paul and his Greek-speaking audience were
well aware of the widespread practice in the eastern Mediterranean of grafting wild
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olive branches into cultivated olive trees and of the reason for the practice—to
produce more fruit.195
Ethnic Israel are the “natural branches” of tree. Because of unbelief (mistrust) they have been cut
off. Non-Judeans are “wild olive shoots” who, solely by faith (trust) have been grafted into the
tree. Paul warns the non-Judean believers not to become conceited. If they fall from faith, then
they will also be cut off. Furthermore, even those cut off now can be grafted back in if and when
they trust the gospel. Such an action would be an act of resurrection from the dead. The point to
which Paul is driving the entire argument is centered in Rom. 11:18. It is the root that supports
the branches. Being connected to the root unites all the branches, both natural and wild, in one
olive tree. Since all were once dead in sin, all, by means of God’s action in baptism, are raised to
life, being grafted into the root, Jesus Christ, whom God raised from the dead.196
Paul’s final identity-related teaching in Romans 11 is found in verses 28–32. Unbelieving
Judeans are “enemies” (ἐχθροὶ δι’ ὑμᾶς) of the Christians “as to the gospel” (κατὰ . . . τὸ
εὐαγγέλιον), but “as to election” (κατὰ . . . τὴν ἐκλογὴν) they are “beloved” (ἀγαπητοὶ) for the
sake of the fathers. It follows that if the descendants of Jacob are beloved because of God’s
promise to the fathers, their status as enemies is mitigated for the church. It is not that the church
is to look at them as enemies to be hated. Rather, it is their refusal to believe the gospel that
makes them enemies of the church. Paul is not advocating a quid pro quo response to them.
Therefore, even the identity of Israel is to be found in the gospel promises made to Abraham.
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Romans 12–16 and Some Trajectories of Christian Identity
Paul has woven some ethical implications of being righteous by faith into previous sections
of his letter. Beginning in Romans 12, this become the major feature.197 A brief overview of ways
in which a Christian’s baptismal identity is expressed is first presented. The overarching concept
Paul draws upon reaches back to the ritual sacrificial language he used in Rom. 6:19–23. He will
again draw on this language in Rom. 15:16, as he describes himself as a cultic minister
(λειτουργόν) and his ministry as “priestly service” (ἱερουργοῦωτα) to the gospel, offering the nonJudeans (gentiles) as an offering (ἡ προσφορά), sanctified (ἡγιασμένη) by the Holy Spirit.” In
Rom. 12:1–2, Paul urges his hearers to present (παραστῆσαι) their bodies (τα σῶμα) as a living
sacrifice (θυσίαν ζῶσαν), holy (ἁγίου), acceptable (εὐάρεστον) to God, which is their reasonable
(λογικὴν) divine service (λατρείαν). These words echo his call, in Rom. 6:12–14, to present their
members as instruments of righteousness to God. Furthermore, the call to offer one’s body as a
living sacrifice hearkens back to his exhortation, in Rom. 6:11, from them to consider themselves
dead to sin and alive to God. Now Paul pushes forward, speaking of the transformation made
possible and effective in baptism. Rather than conformation to the world, the baptized are to be
transformed by the renewing of the mind. A new way of thinking, generated by the implications
and effects of the gospel in the baptized, will lead them to put off the old identity, with its
practices, and to put on the new identity, which will lead to God-pleasing actions. These actions
are outlined in the closing chapters of Romans.
Before exploring these trajectories, a look back at the way in which Paul has already
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instructed his hearers in renewing their minds is in order. In Rom. 6:1–10, Paul answered the
objection that being righteous by grace through faith, apart from works, would lead to a life of
sin. Rather than turning to legalism, by invoking the commandments of Torah, Paul points them
to the effects and implications of baptism. Christ has died and has been raised never to die again
(6:9), “for in that he died to sin, he died once, but in that he lives, he lives to God” (6:10). This is
the Christological center of Paul’s argument. Christians are those who have been united with
Christ in his death to sin, so that they have died to sin in Christ. They also have been united with
Christ’s resurrection to newness of life. This is the sacramental means by which they have
experienced, in reality, a transformation to a new life. Paul then exhorts them: “In this way, you
yourselves, account yourselves to be dead to sin, but alive to God in Christ Jesus. Therefore, do
not go on letting sin reign in your body to obey its drives” (6:11–12). This is the Christopraxis
element, which is grounded in the Christological center and made effective by the sacramental
union with Christ in his death and resurrection. Thus, by keeping the focus of the mind on Christ,
and his death and resurrection, and accounting his death and resurrection to be theirs, Christians
actualize this new reality which decreases conformation to the world and increases
transformation in holiness. The goal is transformation into a godly conformity to that which is
good (ἀγαθόν), acceptable (εὐάρεστον), and complete (τέλειον). Yet, that this transformation of
the mind is an ongoing process is described, not only by Paul’s struggle in Romans 7, but in the
words “so that you may keep testing (εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν: or, keep on proofing) what is the will of
God” (Rom. 12:2). Paul is calling them to a life of repentance and faith, as they continue the
struggle to actualize the reality of their new identity in Christ. This repentance is a multifaceted
turning from their old identity (and a turning from boasting in lesser ethnic identities) to a rich
experience of the new identity in Christ, grounded ever on, and planted deeply in, the foundation
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of trusting God in Christ. Paul calls this a “transformation,” or “metamorphosis.”198
The first instance of transformative thinking is in reference to self-aggrandizement. Paul
tells them each to think with a right mind rather than thinking more highly of oneself than is right
(12:3). That Paul uses the preposition γὰρ indicates that this exhortation flows from the previous
words about mental transformation. The apparent divisions in the Roman church, especially
between Judeans, who have Torah and the fathers, and non-Judeans, who have obeyed the gospel
in greater numbers than unbelieving Israel, could create the situation of each group boasting over
the other. The same could be true for the “cultured” Hellenists versus the “barbarians.” Paul
urges them to think rightly, “as God has apportioned (ἐμέρισεν) to each a measure (μέτρον) of
faith” (12:3). He then makes use of the metaphor of the body having multiple members. Each
member has its unique task, and yet is one with the rest of the body. For the identity of each
member and the social life of each Christian and well as of the sanctorum communio this has
significant implications.
“The body has many members, yet all the members do not have the same task (πρᾶξιν;
12:4). Πράξις can be understood to mean a task, an activity, or a function.199 As such, it implies
an office, something given rather than self-generated or self-appointed. It is God who has
assigned each member a function, or office, within the sanctorum communio for the good of the
whole body. Paul’s emphasis here seems to be directed more to the concrete congregation than to
the church catholic, and yet each congregation of saints is the church catholic in that place.200
This also speaks volumes to the concept of corporate identity. As individuals baptized and now
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found to be “in one body” (ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι) the church exists as a distinct corporate being, eine
Kollekivperson, as Bonhoeffer attempts to describe. “Person wird nur im Eingebettetsein in der
Sozialität, und mit dem Werden der Einzelperson wird zugleich die Kollekivperson.201 Thus the
individual is not dissolved into the collective. Yet, at the same time, each person is a member of
all the others and members also of something greater than the sum of the parts. That all
Christians are members of one another recalls the intimacy that the baptized have with one
another, and with the three Person of the Holy Trinity. That each member has a task or office in
the body, recalls the generativity to which all are called by virtue of the gifts bestowed upon
them. Paul’s constant refrain, “ἐν Χριστῷ,” situates his entire discussion in a baptismal
framework. He then outlines several offices in the church and how they are to be utilized for the
good of the body.
Much as he does in 1 Corinthians, having discussed gifts, Paul emphasizes the love the
members are to demonstrate toward one another. This love is an active doing of what is best for
the body. Middendorf translates the opening words of 12:9 as a heading: “Love [is] without
hypocrisy:” The colon catches the abruptness of Paul’s statement: “The love—genuine:” (Ἠ
ἀγάπη ἀωυπόκριτος). This love abhors evil and clings to what is good. In brotherly love it
demonstrates brotherly affection. In honor, it strives to honor others first, before itself. The list of
these virtues is quite long. To the central purpose of this study, this love rejoices in hope as it
endured tribulation, being steadfast in prayer (12:12). This echoes Paul’s exhortation in Rom.
8:18–30, where Paul encourages his hearers to patiently endure suffering in hope, and to know
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that the Holy Spirit within them prays with and for them, even when they don’t know what to
pray. Second, he urges them to be busily engaged in meeting the needs of the saints, by
pursuing202 hospitality. The virtue of love and caring are to characterize the baptized, not only in
their dealings with one another, but also with their relationships with their enemies.
In Rom. 13:8–14, Paul returns to the commandments of Torah. In the verse immediately
preceding this he has written of the relationship the baptized are to have with civil authority. This
section has little to say in specificity to the topic of identity, other than to indicate that civic
obligations are not abrogated. The only obligation the baptized actually have is to love one
another (13:8). This might appear to be an easy road, until Paul describes it as a willing keeping
of Torah. It should be remembered that he has already said, in Rom. 7:22, that he delights in
Torah in the inner man. Now he shows that love is the fulfillment of Torah. Paul weaves this
now into the fabric of the baptismal life, by saying, “Let us take off from ourselves the works of
darkness and let us clothe ourselves with the instruments of light” (13:12). The “Put off–Put on”
terminology is used by Paul in his other letters in light of baptism. Furthermore, Paul has the
resurrection of the body specifically in mind, for he writes, “It is the hour for you to be raised
from sleep” (13:11). The teleology of the future resurrected body creates the pattern after which
life ought to be lived now and here. “He who through faith is righteous is to live a life in keeping
with the new aeon.”203 Esler comments:
Paul’s point in the passage is that the Roman Christ-followers should be as they will
one day become. The imagery of future salvation serves to tell who they are or should

202

The word here is διώκοωτες, which can also be translated “persecuting”! Paul may well be utilizing a play
on word, as he uses this same root word in the next verse, where he tells them to bless those who persecute (τοῦς
διώκοντας) them.
203

Nygren, Romans, 435.

196

be in the present, not to warn them that the future is near. Paul contrasts the day that
is beckoning with the night that they are currently experiencing.204
Thus, the eschatological reality is their current reality, who they are now, and calls them to live
consistently with that reality, to be as they should be, as they actualize it now and here. The
ultimate goal is that of love. Christians, therefore, “live outside themselves in God, freed from
having to find their own identity or achieve self-fulfillment. For this reason, they can afford to be
servants not merely of all people but of all things, this caring for them ‘as if there were no
God.’”205 Having his identity secure in Christ, by means of baptism, the Christian can hazard
truly loving and caring for others, without fear of losing himself or of being punished for failing
to be perfect in this age as he attempts to show compassion to others and to work in his vocation
for the sake of others.206
In Rom. 14:1–15:7, Paul exhorts his hearers to “welcome each other because of the identity
God gave” them.207 They are to welcome weaker brothers and to avoid quarreling over superficial
issues which no longer divide. Paul is clearly showing his concern over the need for unity in the
Roman church. On the other hand, as he instructs the Corinthian Christians (1 Corinthians 8–10),
they also should be careful not to cause another to stumble by exercising the “rights” of Christian
liberty to the detriment of the brothers. Once again, the prime expression of Christian identity in
one’s relationship with others is the exercise of love. Causing another to stumble is to destroy the
faith by which the brother lives. The righteous lives by faith. Therefore, since “whatever is not
from out of faith is sin” (14:23), causing another to stumble attacks the very grounds of
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salvation. It is destructive to the person one causes to stumble and destructive to the welfare of
the sanctorum communio.
In Rom. 15:8–13, Paul returns to his need for support for his missionary work. It is this
need that caused him to write the Roman Christians. He transitions to his request for help in his
mission by appealing to Christ as the διάκονον περιτομῆς (bond-slave of the circumcised), on
behalf of ἀληθείας θεοῦ (the truth of God), for the confirmation of the promises given to the
patriarchs and that the ἔθνη (gentiles = non-Judeans) might glorify God for his mercy, just as it
stands written” in the scripture passages Paul then quotes. Again, in terms of the purpose of this
study, while Paul clearly desires a united church, a sanctorum communio exercising love toward
one another and at peace with each other, he recognizes the social distinctions that exist in the
world. These too are real. They have their proper place. They, however, are secondary to the
unity all the baptized have in Christ Jesus the Lord. Ethnic and social identities as lower-level
identities which must not be used to fracture the unity of the sanctorum communio, and so
exclude of denigrate other Christians. All Christians share in this one common identity, that of
being righteous (ἀδελφοί) by faith, and therefore, brothers and sisters in Christ, who share in one
common baptism.

Summary of the Findings
Paul’s theology of baptism and baptismal identity encompasses the somatic, the social, and
the psychological dimensions of life. Additionally, his teaching about Christian identity leads to
a diminishing, albeit not an erasure, of ethnic identity.
The physical significance and effect of baptism is not merely illustrative. Water is poured
on the body, or in the case of Romans 6, likely the baptizand is immersed. However, the real
effect of baptism is uniting the body of the Christian to the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
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The resurrection of the body is the teleological element for the exhortation to live a life of
holiness. The Christian is called to actualize in the now and here what will be clearly true in the
reality of eternity. It is not that the reality is not also now true. In Col. 3:1–4, Paul states that
Christians have been raised with Christ. This reality is now hidden from view, “hidden with
Christ in God.” It is this hidden reality that energizes the struggle to actualize this reality in daily
life, even if in great weakness. Furthermore, Paul calls his hearers to live lives of love toward
one another, toward the stranger, and even toward their enemies. The only way this can be done
in this world is in and through the body. Therefore, the life to which Christians are called does
not relegate the body to a place of insignificance. It is in the body that the Christian experiences
the urges to sin and the promptings of the Holy Spirit to love the neighbor and to this fulfill
Torah’s intent.
The social dimensions of life are a large part of Paul’s teaching about baptism. There is one
Lord, one faith, one baptism. This one baptism is the grounds of Christian unity. It also
incorporates all Christians together into one family. God is the one Father. Christians are all sons
of God, children of God. All Christians are “brothers,” joint heirs with Christ. Having once been
“in Adam, a solidarity in sin which paradoxically divided people from each other in existential
loneliness, the baptized are now “in Christ, becoming a sanctorum communio. The virtue which
permeates this sanctorum communion is love, loving service to one another, including caring for
the weak and being concerned for the faith of one another. This new identity as members of
God’s family causes ethnic and societal identities to be reduced in importance. The identity
which unites Christians with each other is being brothers (and sisters) of one another and saints
in the eyes of God.
The overarching identity of the Christian is being righteous by faith. This is the Christian’s
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given (imputed) identity. The mental life of the Christian, as Paul describes it, especially in Rom.
12:1–2, is to allow this imputed, real identity to become mentally internalized so that it begins to
be actualized, transforming the mind to think anew, to think in accordance with reality. This is a
constant struggle, as the “Experiential I” battles against “indwelling sin.” The transformative
action of God in the believer is to conform the Christian into the reality of the “New I,” which is
the new man, the inner man. This new man daily rises to life in the Christian as he contritely
acknowledges his sin and trusts in the atoning work of Christ’s death, which alone is the ground
of righteousness.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A THEOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF ERIKSON’S THEORY OF IDENTITY
DEVELOPMENT
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis that the utilization of
Erikson’s developmental theory for pastoral care, in terms of Christian identity, is theologically
defensible within certain limits. It will be demonstrated that the theory can be used in pastoral
care in two specific, and seemingly contradictory, areas when dealing with Christian identity.
First, Erikson’s theory, when viewed through the lens of Paul’s theology of baptism in Romans,
and especially in the preparatory work Paul does in Romans 1–5, can be used in pastoral care to
describe and illustrate the effects or fruits of original sin, which have their source in mistrust
(lack of trust or faith) in God, This mistrust leads to a false identity, built on the foundation of
narcissistic, rebellious autonomy and the work of self-justification which often follows because
of shame and guilt. Second, Erikson’s theory can be utilized faithfully in assisting in the pastoral
care work of identity actualization, if, and only if, the concept of identity construction or
development is excluded from the foundation of Christian identity. That foundation is the
conferred identity given in baptism, that is, being righteous (δίκαιος) in Christ. Finally, in order
to establish this final caveat, while noting the apparent similarity between Paul and Erikson, that
is, that trust (faith) is foundational to identity, it will be demonstrated that the foundation of
Christian identity is conferred by God in baptism. The Christian’s foundational identity is in the
righteousness of faith given in the gospel. In order that these three points might flow in a more
logical order, Erikson’s theory will be evaluated first in terms of its relation to original sin,
second in relation to conferred (imputed, alien) righteousness, and only then in relation to the
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actualization of that identity in the Christian’s life.
A revised correlational dialogue, controlled under the Lutheran Confessional approach, will
be utilized.1 For this dialogue to be legitimate, points of convergence between Erikson’s theory
of psychosocial identity development and Paul’s theology of both conferred and actualized
identity must be determined. To find these points of convergence, first and second cycle coding
methods were used to draw correlations between the seemingly divergent writings of the Apostle
Paul and Erik Erikson. First cycle coding included “In Vivo Coding,” in order to highlight
related phraseology, so as to determine whether the terms are used the same way by both authors.
“In Vivo Coding” looks for common terms. It then assigns labels to sections of transcripts, which
describe the subject being discussed. In doing so, attempts are made to remain as close as
possible to the actual wording of the source material.2 “Magnitude Codes” were assigned to the
“In Vivo Codes” to determine the frequency of occurrence and the amplitude of the importance
of the terms discovered in “In Vivo Coding.” This process was found to be less helpful than
other coding methods, as the volume of material from Erikson and Paul were unequal.3 “Process
Codes” were assigned in order to explore conceptual realities generated by the data. Process
Coding involves turning previous coding, especially “In Vivo Codes,” into gerunds, to highlight
1

The correlational approach is delineated in the writings of Paul Tillich. In Systematic Theology, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951), 1:12, 14, Tillich proposes two criteria for theology. The first criterion is that
theology must deal with that which is of ultimate concern for humanity. The second criterion is that theology must
be about those things which are a matter of our being or not-being, in the strictest existential sense of those words.
Theology must set the agenda, because only theology has the “ultimate” as its object of study. In Theology and
Culture, 49, 51, Tillich insists that the church must use the various cultural artifacts, in this case psychology, as
subject matter for speaking to culture. “The Church has the function of answering the question implied in man’s
very existence, the question of the meaning of this existence.” By listening to the culture, the church can thwart the
“demonic distortions” in culture. This is part of the task. What Tillich implies, but never says, is that in listening to
culture, and to aspects of culture such as psychology, culture also challenges systematic theology, and, therefore
also, practical theology. When theology engages culture in a revised correlational dialogue, theology answers
culture’s questions and culture keeps theology from becoming a calcified history of theology. For this reason, the
final section of this chapter will consist of questions and challenges from Eriksonian theory for theology to ponder
and hopefully answer.
2
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actions. This was especially helpful in exploring possible connections between Erikson’s stages
of ritualization and Paul’s ritual language in Romans.4
Next, second cycle coding correlated codes from the first cycle into larger sets using
“Pattern Coding,”5 for meaningful correlative analysis. Pattern Coding investigates and seeks to
identify emergent themes. As part of Pattern Coding, Axial Coding6 reassembled the data into the
categories of “Reality” and “Actuality.” This allowed for the distinction between the three kinds
of righteousness,7 so that confusion between apparent righteousness, the alien righteousness8
imputed to the Christian, and the Christian’s proper righteousness9 might be avoided. Erikson’s
model addresses neither of these latter two. Since he was a secular psychologist, Erikson’s work
is treated herein as a cultural artifact and any reference to righteousness in his work is understood
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Paul. Imputed identity, foreclosed identity, and alien righteousness were placed under “Reality.” Actualized identity,
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In 1518, Martin Luther delivered a sermon in which he delineated three kinds of sin and three kinds of
righteousness. See: “Sermo de triplici iustitia,” in D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar:
Böhlau, 1883–1929), 2:41–47. Luther distinguished between criminal sin, original sin, and actual sin. The first sin is
blatant sin, punishable by civic authority. The second kind of sin is the root sin, inherited from Adam. It is the
source of the third kind of sin, namely, actual sin. While criminal sin is also actual sin, the third kind of sin is not
necessarily outwardly obvious, not is it punished by civil government. The corresponding three kinds of
righteousness are apparent righteousness, alien righteousness, and actual righteousness. Apparent righteousness
includes the civically good works of unbelievers. Alien righteousness is the imputed righteousness which is by
grace, through faith, in the merits of Christ. From this righteousness flows the works of actual righteousness. In this
way, Luther’s use of “actual” correlates to the use of that word in this dissertation. They are actual because they are
actualized acts. The alien righteousness corresponds to the use of to the words “real” and “reality.” That which is
real, that which is imputed and given, becomes the source for that which is actualized. For a discussion of Luther’s
three kinds of righteousness and its application to the development of Christian character, see Joel Biermann, Case
for Character, 122–33.
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in terms of civic, or apparent, righteousness.10 The Christian, however, has an identity as one
who is righteous coram deo, which is the conferred alien righteousness of faith. The Christian
also, because of this conferral, seeks to actualize this identity coram mundo in ways consistent
with his real, conferred identity. The challenge in this correlational study is to determine whether
Erikson’s theory of identity development can be meaningfully and appropriately utilized for
pastoral care in terms of Christian identity.
The sections that follow demonstrate that it was determined that sufficient correlation
exists between Erikson’s model and Paul’s teaching about the actualization of a Christian’s
identity to conduct a legitimate revised-correlational dialogue in order to demonstrate the validity
of this dissertation’s thesis. Furthermore, while the Eriksonian schema must not be applied to the
conferred new identity, which is the Christian’s new reality of being righteous in Christ, it has
been determined that Erikson’s model can be used to show the progression, or, if not the
progression, then the result of mistrust of God, of his word, and of the gospel.
A major aspect of the actualization of identity for both Erikson and Paul is crisis or
struggle. For Erikson, it is the struggle the ego (das Ich) undergoes between the forces of the
inner drives, that is, the id (das Es), and the socio-historical expectations internalized as the
superego (das Über-Ich). For Paul, on the other hand, it is the struggle between “Experiential I”
and “indwelling sin” in the members, which seeks to thwart the desires of the “New I” (the inner
man, the new man), who is prompted to good works by the indwelling Holy Spirit.11
10

Civic righteousness (iustitiae civilis) is also a coram mundo kind of righteousness, but, because it does not
flow from faith, it is not of the same kind as is the Christian’s proper righteousness, which flows from being
righteous by faith. For a discussion of the Three Kinds of Righteousness, see Biermann, Case for Character, 122–
25. For a discussion of righteousness under two kinds, see Kolb and Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology, 25–
31.
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An important caveat must be stated at this point. Erikson’s theory is one of affective development over
time, as one passes through various stages. The syntonic and dystonic elements of each stage must be brought to a
kind of synthesis. For Paul, it is not a matter of stages; it is not a matter of synthesis. Rather, it is an ongoing
struggle between two totalities – a struggle to the death of one or the other.

204

Erikson’s theory is concerned with a person’s achievement of an identity. However,
without a guiding teleology, that identity is only constrained by the physical and sociohistorical
factors which converge upon that person and his psychological makeup to form his sense of
identity. For Erikson, a foreclosed identity is merely an identity imposed from without. It is an
identity that has not been tested, tried, and personally accepted and modified.12 For Paul, identity
is a more complex issue. Every person comes into this world with the foreclosed identity as a
sinner, is a slave to sin, and is unrighteous because of mistrust in God. By God’s grace, through
the atoning work of Christ, and by the calling of the Holy Spirit in the gospel and baptism, every
Christian is given a new identity. This new conferred identity is that of being one who is
righteous by faith. From this reality, of being righteous in Christ, flow elements of identity such
as “son of God,” “heir with Christ,” “child of God,” “saint,” and “brother” (and sister) to all
other Christians. However, the actualization of this identity involves lifelong struggle against
indwelling sin (against the identity as sinner and slave to sin). Therefore, as will be discussed
below, Paul speaks of the practical achievement, or as it is being worded herein, “actualization,”
of the identity as one who is righteous as a process which is actuated by the struggle against sin.
This struggle causes the Christian to ever fall back on his conferred identity as the real
foundation for his sense of identity.
This constant struggle can be correlated to the MAMA cycle,13 discussed in detail on page
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Erikson, Childhood and Society, 155–61. Erikson also refers to a foreclosed identity as a conferred identity.
It is when the conferred identity goes unchallenged and unmodified that Erikson considers it to be unhealthy. The
conferred baptismal identity as “righteous by faith,” and therefore also as children of God and saints, is a conferred
identity. As the attempt is made to integrate Erikson’s theory into a Christian theory of identity development, a
distinction between a conferred identity as “alien righteousness” and the actualization of that identity in the
sociohistorical setting in which the Christian lives will need to be delineated.
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The MAMA cycle is a term used by Alan Waterman to indicate the lifelong process of moving toward
identity achievement. A person achieves a sense of identity; however, as events in life challenge that identity, a
person moves back into a moratorium as the new factors become integrated into a new sense of identity. This can be
correlated to the Christian life as a life of continual repentance, as the old is “put off” and the new is “put on.”
Therefore, the Christian is always striving to become what he or she is already “in Christ.” For a discussion of the
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103 of this dissertation. The concept of the MAMA cycle provides an alternative way of
describing the constant need the Christian has to move away from the sense of having achieved
the goal14 and to daily put off the false identity (especially of being righteous by means of one’s
good works or of being fundamentally a slave to sin) and put on the new, which never looks to
self as the source of righteousness. One can only “put on the new” if there is a reality to put on
each day. This is why the conferred identity is essential. It is the concept of an objective, outsideof-oneself identity, that is missing in Erikson. While Erikson does point to the historical and
social matrix of a person’s life as a major contributor to identity development, this is not the
same as the solid foundation for identity found in God the Creator and Redeemer.
Paul’s Letter to the Romans is an excellent source for investigating Christian baptismal
identity, In very broad terms, the flow of Romans, after presenting the theme of the righteousness
of faith (1:16–17), can be read, in terms of identity, according to the following broad outline: the
identity of being unrighteous because of mistrust or unbelief (1:18–3:20), the reality of one’s
identity of being righteous by faith (3:21–6:10), and the actualizing of one’s identity as righteous
by faith (6:11–15:33).

Points of Convergence and Divergence in the Conversation between Paul’s Baptismal
Theology of Identity and Erikson’s Theory of Identity Development
“In Vivo Coding” revealed related terminology in the writings of Erikson and Paul.
However, whether the terms used hold the same meaning for each author is doubtful. This is a
constant issue when correlating theology and cultural artifacts. Therefore, while some
convergence may appear to occur, a hermeneutic of suspicion must be maintained when reading
the cultural text, which in this case is the work of Erikson. The Magnitude Coding, which
MAMA cycle from an Eriksonian perspective, see Waterman, “Developmental Perspectives,” 50.
14

Phil. 3:7–16.
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examined the frequency of the words and their intended significance, was admittedly quite
subjective. The number of pages of Erikson’s work far exceeds that of the apostle. However, the
frequency of language in the semantic domain of faith and trust is significant in both authors.
The concept of identity had to be distilled from Paul’s writings, while it abounds in Erikson.15 It
was necessary to develop Process and Pattern Codes in order to correlate the two authors and
their writings. From this work, it was possible to discern points of convergence, if not
equivalence. Unsurprisingly, points of divergence were easier to uncover. The results of Axial
Coding are discussed in the section below concerned specifically with the theological evaluation
of Erikson’s theory for use in practical theology. The two axes used in this study, as distilled
from the data, are “reality” and “actuality.”
Points of Convergence
Identity development is the major emphasis in the vast majority of Erikson’s writings. As
demonstrated in chapter 2 above, Erikson taught that the achievement of a sense of identity is
necessary before a person can develop true intimacy, be relatively competent at generativity, and
ultimately develop a sense of personal integrity. The earlier steps in affective development are
foundational to the development of a sense of identity. One must have some sense of industry,
since identity comes in part from competence in some form of work. One must also have a sense
of initiative in order to have a strong enough will to express oneself. This comes, in part, from a
sense of autonomy, that one is a distinct and separate person and agent.16 Ultimately, the entire
15

Paul’s use of terms in the semantic domain of δικαιοσύνη (righteousness) serves as his identity term,
because it is the new identity given in the gospel. It creates a new relationship with God
16

Erikson also taught that an appropriate degree of a sense of inferiority, guilt, and shame, respectively, are
necessary for living in the world with others. No one is perfect at every endeavor. Everyone needs to have a sense of
guilt and shame so that each might function appropriately in society. A person who is shameless or incapable of
feeling guilt is a sociopath. “Emotions are influential in the growth of the moral self . . . especially the emergence of
the self-referential emotions like pride, guilt, shame, and embarrassment.” Ross A. Thompson, “Early Foundations:
Conscience and the Development of Moral Character,” Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K. Lapsley, eds. Personality,
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edifice is built on the foundation of a sense of trust and mistrust and the virtue of hope.
Erikson understood basic trust and mistrust to be developed within a person from the social
interaction of the infant with the mother as she cares for her child, feeding, comforting, and
nurturing it.17 Basic trust is linked to the trustworthiness of the mother, and later also that of the
father, as they respond to the child’s needs.18 When needs are not met quickly, a degree of
mistrust forms. However, ultimate fulfillment of true needs, by having that fulfillment delayed,
produces the virtue, or ego strength, of hope. Erikson’s concepts of trust and of hope are to be
understood in psychological terminology. This trust, or faith, is not a theological virtue, although
Erikson does see trust in terms of the ritualization of the numinous, which he says is socially
expressed in organized religion.19 Therefore, although Erikson and Paul both use the concept of
trust, Erikson’s concept of trust belongs to the realm of the righteousness “encountered in the
civil world that operates without concern or regard for the Triune God,”20 and his numinous
presence is that of the human parent, rather than God the Creator. Paul’s concept of trust, on the
other hand, is a gift of God.21 The one before whom a person stands is God, the Creator (Rom.
1:18–25), the Judge (Rom. 2:1–3:20), and the Justifier (Rom. 3:21–26). Therefore, although we
may detect a degree of convergence, we do not have equivalence.
Trust (πίστις = faith) and hope (ἐλπὶς) are prominent and foundational words in Romans.

Identity, and Character: Explorations in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 171.
Sociopathology also is linked to neurological abnormalities. See Louis Cozolino, The Neuroscience of Human
Relationships: Attachment and the Developing Brain, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2014), 339–41.
17

Erikson, Childhood and Society, 249. “This forms the basis in the child for a sense of identity which will
later combine a sense of being ‘all right,’ of being oneself, and of becoming what other people will trust one will
become.”
18

Erikson, Childhood and Society, 250.

19

Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 89.

20

Biermann, Case for Character, 123.

21

AC 5; SC 2:6. Faith is a gift worked within by the Holy Spirit through the external word of the gospel.

208

Paul, however, does not speak of the development of faith. Faith is gifted by means of the gospel
word, by means of the identity-changing declaration of righteousness. Faith trusts God, that his
word is true. Paul also contrasts πίστις with mistrust (ἀπιστία = unbelief). Paul’s great example
of these is in Abraham, who “against hope upon hope trusted” (παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι
ἐπίστευσεν).22 It may be in the concept of hope that Paul and Erikson correlate more closely. For
Paul, as well as for Erikson, hope is developed when the end result looked for is not fulfilled in
the immediate future. This is the first crisis met by a child and continues to be the foundation of
all crises throughout life. The crisis this: the thing for which one hopes is not quickly
forthcoming. Mistrust and trust tussle. If trust prevails, the crisis (or suffering) produces
endurance. Endurance produces proven character. Proven character results in the virtue of hope.23
Trust and hope rest upon the trustworthiness of the one in whom one trusts. The trustworthy
mother ultimately appears. Hers is the numinous face which smiles at the child and assures it of
its existence. Erikson states that the numinous “is the hallowed presence. The numinous assures
us, ever again, of separateness transcended and yet also of distinctiveness confirmed, and thus of
the very basis of a sense of ‘I.’”24 The child’s faith is assured. For Paul, hope must be built not
upon what appears visibly, but upon the record of God’s faithfulness to his people, and most
especially upon God’s word about the reality of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, into whom the
Christian has been baptized and with whom he is united.
Both Erikson and Paul speak about shame.25 Erikson presents shame as the dystonic
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Rom. 4:18.
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Rom. 5:3–5.

24

Erik H. Erikson and Joan Erikson. The Life Cycle Completed, ext. ed. (New York: Norton, 1998), 45.
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Erikson makes the astute observation that shame is insufficiently studied in Western society. Guilt is the
predominant issue tackled. But shame is a deeper and more destructive emotion in a person. Erikson, Childhood and
Society, 252.
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element in relation to the syntonic sense of autonomy. He closely ties shame to self-doubt.26 This
doubt comes from the knowledge that, although we wish to be autonomous, we are not selfsufficient individuals.27 For Erikson, a sense of autonomy is an introspective experience of being
a person who is separate, unique, and individuated from another. However, in that shame results
from the knowledge that one is not the center of the universe, his concept of autonomy can be
viewed as the sense that one is one’s one law-maker. At this stage of the child’s development,
from about 18 months through the first few years of life, the child attempts to exercise her will
against that of the parents. Erikson admitted that at this stage the child’s self-will must be tamed
by the laws and rules set down by the parents.28 The first reaction to the restrictions placed on the
will is not guilt but shame, that sense that one is being watched and is found wanting. At the
same time, the laws imposed from the outside provide the child with the structure needed to be a
separate person, a moral agent, within the matrix of the social order.29
Although guilt and atonement for guilt have been the primary concern of pastoral care in
the Western church for centuries, Paul, in Romans, has more to say about shame than he does
about guilt. Passing by Paul’s statement that he is not ashamed of the gospel (Rom. 1:16), the
accusation that humankind has exchanged the glory of God for the images of created things
(Rom. 1:23) implies a form of shaming. The result of this exchange is dishonoring (ἀτιμάζεσθαι)
of the body (Rom. 1:24). A sense of shame is intimately connected with a sense of the bodily
self. Immediately after the fall, the primordial parents made loincloths of fig leaves and
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Erikson, Childhood and Society, 253. “Doubt is the brother of shame.”
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Eyer, Pastoral Care, 81. Eyer is following Erikson’s stages as he writes about the developmental stages in
reference to the elderly.
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“The very autonomy gained in the second stage, namely a sense of being a separate person with a will born
of self-will and tamed primarily by self-control—that autonomy soon finds its limits in our sensitive awareness of
being watched by superior persons and of being called names, even bestial ones.” Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 93
29

Erikson, Childhood and Society, 252.
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attempted to hide themselves from God amid the trees of the garden. Paul also speaks of the
“shameful deed” (τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην) of homosexual intercourse (Rom. 1:27). It is not until he has
listed a plethora of shameful deeds that Paul declares the judgment, or decree, of God that
humankind is worthy of death (Rom. 1:32).
Paul’s treatment of guilt actually comes to the fore more clearly in Romans 2 than in the
preceding chapter. Those who pass judgment on others fall under the same judgment because
they are guilty of doing similar things (τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντας; Rom. 2:1–2). The righteousness
of God is revealed in the righteousness, the uprightnessness, of his judgment. The Judeans, who
are in possession of Torah will be judged by the Torah to which they cling. The non-Judeans
(gentiles) will be judged by the aspects of Torah written in their hearts. God as judge is just, and
he justly condemns the entirety of humanity.
Erikson also writes about guilt. For him, a sense of guilt is set in apposition to a sense of
initiative. These two are held in tension and produce the ego strength of competency. As
discussed earlier in chapter 2, the influence of Freud on Erikson is evident in his thoughts about
this stage. The guilt appears linked, in Erikson’s mind, to infantile sexuality and the incest
taboo.30 The superego rules ruthlessly and creates intense feelings of guilt as id-impulses are
condemned by the social matrix.31 So as with Paul in Romans, the sense of guilt, or for Paul the
sentence of guilt pronounced objectively, comes from the outside, condemning the urges and
drives that reign within.
It might also be possible to correlate Erikson’s concept of initiative, especially if combined
with Stage IV industry, with the attempt people make to appease God the judge by works of the
30

“Infantile sexuality and incest taboo, castration complex and superego unite here to bring about that
specifically human crisis during which the child must turn from the exclusive, pregenital attachment to his parents to
the slow process of becoming a parent, a carrier of tradition.” Erikson, Childhood and Society, 256.
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211

law. The knowledge that one does not meet the standards of divine righteousness drives those
who have Torah to double down on Torah and attempt to lean on it for justification, to do what
Paul calls, “works of Torah” (ἔργων νόμου; Rom. 3:20). But this is an impossible task. Not only
can no one fulfill all the requirements of Torah, any attempt at self-justification by works flies in
the face of Torah. “The righteous shall live by faith” (Rom. 1:17 citing Hab. 2:4). Therefore, the
issue is driven back down, as it were, to the Stage I issue of trust versus mistrust. Torah can only
be fulfilled by faith in God; but to trust in works is to trust in self. It is the kind of mistrust that
leads to the narcissistic autonomy that thinks it can initiate its own works (industry) in order to
achieve a righteous identity.
The main concept that must be correlated if the thesis of this study is to be upheld is that of
identity. And it is at this point that the thesis appears to be to be falsified. For Paul, the identity
of being righteous, and thereby a saint, and a son, and child of God, is not a human achievement.
This will be highlighted below as the divergences between the two authors are considered.
However, if the matrix for correlating the two authors includes the concept of three kinds of
righteousness, then it is possible to correlate Paul and Erikson in the area of the actualization of
identity, since a move is made in theology from what is an imputed reality to that which is
actualized as “proper righteousness” during the life cycle.32 In fact, Paul is of great help to a
Christian use of Eriksonian theory in that he provides the teleology that is missing in Erikson.
Paul exhorts the Roman Christians to be transformed by the renewing of their minds (12:2). It
follows then that they are to experience a growing sense of identity, albeit an identity bestowed.
However, the bestowed identity is individuated by the various roles in each person’s life and the
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This move was facilitated by the Axial Coding, which made a distinction between “reality” and “actuality.”
That is, it distinguished between identity conferred and identity as it is lived out and experienced in the Christian’s
daily life.
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gifts given for building up the Christian community.
The preceding admittedly is quite negative. In the section below concerning Erikson’s
theory in regards to active righteousness, a discussion of how his theory can be used in a positive
manner to guide pastoral care work is presented. Erikson considers the ego strength (or virtue) of
Stage VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) to be love. In Stage VII (Generativity vs. Stagnation) the virtue
is care.33 Paul in Rom. 12:1–15:13 describes practical ways in which love and care flow from the
renewed mind, which has its identity in the conferred righteousness of Christ. As active
righteousness is discussed below, ways in which autonomy, initiative, and industry can be proper
appropriated by pastoral care will be presented. These find a proper place within the love and
caring that flow from the gift of righteousness.
Points of Divergence
Major differences remain. Of significance is the lack of an objective teleology in Erik
Erikson’s theory. Erikson’s stages move toward the goal of “integrity,” but the end is simply
death. For this reason, in Stage VIII, despair and disgust predominate over a sense of integrity.
The body disintegrates, independence is compromised, and assistance is required for daily
existence.34 No hope of resurrection and restoration appears in his writings. Rather, the sense of
integrity is to be found in looking back over one’s life and deriving some sense that one’s life
mattered, that one helped others along the way, cared for and loved others, and left behind some
kind of worthy legacy.35 In other words, one looks to one’s own works for a sense of self33

Erikson and Erikson, Life Cycle Completed, 33.
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Erikson and Erikson, Life Cycle Completed, 105–6.
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Erikson, Erikson, and Kivnick, Vital Involvement, 54–73. Erikson finds a degree of despair to be
appropriate in light of the degenerative effects of aging. In Vital Involvement, the writers report on interviews with
informants ranging in age from70 into the 90s. The books is also written with the stages inverted, showing the
regression through the stages that occur toward the end of life. None of his informants which are reported in the
book refer to life after death.
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justification and self-worth.
Erik and Joan Erikson, along with Helen Kivnick reported on elderly people who had
strong religious convictions in Vital Involvement in Old Age. Their informants report, not hope in
resurrection and eternal life, but “concern for existential identity.”36 They indicate a desire to
look back and find meaningful continuity in their life history. The extended version of The Life
Cycle Completed includes a chapter penned by Joan Erikson. In it she refers to a ninth stage. The
genesis of this ninth stage is the extension of life beyond the late 80s and 90s into the 100s. She
reports:
Even the best cared-for bodies begin to weaken and do not function as they once did.
In spite of every effort to maintain strength and control, the body continues to lose its
autonomy. Despair, which haunts the eighth stage, is a close companion in the ninth
because it is almost impossible to know what emergencies and losses of physical
abilities are imminent. As independence and control are challenged, self-esteem and
confidence weaken. Hope and trust, which once provided firm support, are no longer
the sturdy props of former days. To face down despair with faith and appropriate
humility is perhaps the wisest choice.37
She, therefore, places the dystonic elements of the stages in first position, describing the ninth
stage essentially as an inversion of the developmental stages. While she, in the citation above,
refers to “faith and humility” as appropriate orientations for what remains of life, it should be
noted that this “faith” is nebulous in nature. In what is one to trust? Upon what does one lean? If
“hope and trust” no longer provide the “firm support” necessary, it would appear that, for the
Eriksons, trust is a basic life orientation. It does not necessarily have a specific object. It is
emotional, or affective, not a clinging to a specific something or someone, such as God, who is
trustworthy.
Erikson looks death in the face without understanding its existential source. Because he
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does not understand original sin, he knows only apparent righteousness, which is based on the
illusion of human possibility. Thus, the actualization of an identity is the actualization of the fruit
of original sin, namely, mistrust and narcissistic autonomy, which only lead to shame and guilt.
Erikson is correct in seeing the various stages of human affective development. What he does not
comprehend, however, is the root source of the elements and how they cause the dystonic part of
the pairs. This is the heart of the divergence between Erikson and Paul. It is also the chief reason
that Erikson’s theory appears fatally flawed. Yet, paradoxically, this may be quite useful in
pastoral care work, as it provides a unique way of looking at the fruit of original sin and how it
plays out in people’s sense of identity.
Paul looks death in the face and understands its existential source.38 Paul understands
original sin. He therefore can distinguish between apparent righteousness, imputed
righteousness, and the Christian’s proper righteousness, which is the fruit of imputed
righteousness. The imputed, alien righteousness is the integrating element of the Christian’s life.
The Christian’s identity is grounded in this gifted righteousness given in baptism and received by
faith. However, this faith is not a vague trust. It is not even a human affective response. For Paul,
and for Christian theology, trust is so utterly trusting that it grows, not out of what can be seen or
perceived, but out of the ex nihilo reality of human inability. The clearest demonstration of
human inability is the denuding of life by death. Hope can only be hope when all is utterly
hopeless. Trust is only trust when the one trusting is nothing and all depends on the
trustworthiness of the one trusted. Andrew Root, professor of practical theology at Luther
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Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota uses prelapsarian Adam and Eve to illustrate the nature of this
kind of trust by reorienting faith toward the concept of creatio ex nihilo:
Even in the perfection of the garden, before the fall, the ex nihilo remains: the
nothingness out of which humans were created continues in their being, for they are
creatures given the possibility of life from the very Word (Christopraxis) that creates
in and through nothingness. They have come from nothingness and to nothingness
they shall return if they should dare unlatch themselves from God who comes to them
“out of nothingness,” if they should dare deny that God is their minister and that they
received God’s ministering act of possibility out of nothingness.39
This is the nature of trust as described by Paul in Romans 4. Abraham, “against hope, upon hope,
trusted” God’s word of promise (Rom. 4:19). Abraham’s trust was truly trust because the
situation was hopeless. No human possibility existed. All human potential was impotent. Sarah’s
womb was dead. Abraham’s body was as good as dead. Then, and only then, from the ex nihilo
reality did God bring forth life (ex nihilo creata) and prove Abraham’s faith to be valid and his
hope sure. Abraham “did not waver in unbelief but was empowered in trust, giving glory to God,
and being convinced that the thing promised God is powerful to do” (4:21).
Therefore, the fundamental divergence, which permeates the entire theory, is the
discrepancy concerning the nature of trust, or faith. In order for Erikson to be salvaged for
Christian practical theology and for pastoral care, either his definition of trust must be modified
or it must be better understood. However, to modify Erikson’s concept of trust would be to
misrepresent him. It must be assumed that Erikson meant what he wrote. Therefore, the second
option, that of understanding his meaning and seeing if there is any correlation with Paul’s
meaning is the only honest way forward toward utilizing Erikson as a dialogue partner in
practical theology and pastoral care.
Paul and Erikson are not speaking about the same thing when they write about trust. The
39
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following section focuses on a theological evaluation of Erikson’s theory in light of Paul’s
baptismal theology. In it, by using Luther’s concept of the three kinds of righteousness, a
rapprochement will be demonstrated, which respects and maintains the distinctions while rending
Erikson’s theory useful for faithful Christian practical theology.
As indicated above, teleology is another area of difference. Paul, unlike Erikson, has a
teleology that is based, not on internal affective sensibilities within a person, but in the will of
God. Paul’s teleology is based on the foreknowledge and foreordination of God, who, by the
Holy Spirit, calls people through the means of grace to be conformed to the image of God’s Son,
Jesus Christ. Of importance for practical theology and pastoral care, Paul links this eternal
perspective with the sufferings, or crises, Christians suffer. These sufferings are never apart from
baptismal union with the suffering Jesus.40 Life crises are folded into, and are integral to,
actualizing the teleological reality of conformity to Christ. One is conformed to the suffering of
Christ here and now so that one might be conformed to his glory in eternity.41 This ligature unites
trust, hope, and the realization of that for which once hopes in faith.
There are significant differences. Erikson’s overly optimistic view of human nature must
be brought into line with Paul’s understanding of original sin. Erikson is also not dealing with
the righteousness of faith; he knows only the apparent righteousness, or what can be called “civic
righteousness.” Paul’s theology in Romans is in line with Luther’s concept of “three kinds of
righteousness.” Although Paul does not use the terminology, it is demonstrated in what follows
that the works attempted to earn God’s favor fit into the area of apparent righteousness, along
40
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ἐν Χριστῷ (Eph. 1:4) and ‘through sanctification of the Spirit and belief in the truth [ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος καὶ πίστει
ἀληθείας],’ 2 Thess. 2:13, that is, motivated by the merit of Christ and providing for the use and effect of the means
of grace.” Pieper thus connects eternal election, the means of grace, trust in the gospel word, and the telos toward
which the actualization of one’s identity in Christ is oriented.
41

Rom. 8:26–30.

217

with the corresponding evils of criminal sin. The righteousness of faith, which is the alien
righteousness imputed to the baptized, is the real righteousness of the Christian. The object of
this faith (trust) is not in the faltering faithfulness of a human mother, as it is in Erikson’ theory,
but in the sure and certain promise of God who is utterly trustworthy. This righteousness, gifted
by God in Christ and received by faith, is the answer to the problem of original sin. It is
grounded in the death to sin and resurrection to life that is ἐν Χριστῷ. The third kind of
righteousness is the active, or actualized, righteousness that the Christian practices, which has its
source in the imputed, alien righteousness of Christ.42 Erikson’s virtues can be understood only
as apparent righteousness. The question that must be asked and answered is whether and how his
developmental theory might be useful is the actualization of active righteousness in the lived life
of the baptized.43

A Theological Evaluation of Erikson’s Theory of Identity Formation in Light of Pauline
Baptismal Theology
Areas of convergence and divergence have been discussed above. From the discussion, it
can be discerned that while both Erikson and Paul are concerned with issues of trust, mistrust,
and hope, the agreement appears to be superficial. A framework of revised correlational dialogue
42

Oswald Bayer writes of growth in active righteousness as “ethical progress without metaphysical pressure.”
Oswald Bayer, Living by Faith, 66. “If the distinction between ethical and metaphysical progress is forgotten, then
the significance of Baptism is forgotten as well. Baptism marks the intersection of the old world and the new.
Ethical progress is only possible by returning to Baptism.
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This is not a simple task. Joel Biermann has written about the fear many Lutherans have in developing a
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Character, 148–57. On the other hand, Andrew Root, following Jüngel, believes that leaning on Aristotle is
antithetical to Christian living. “This is because Aristotle’s perspective takes no account of the depth of sin and
death that hangs so heavily on human action, keeping it from ever meeting a telos that could save it, making human
actualities ever tragic, for no matter how excellent they may be, they cannot turn death into life.” Root,
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the Christian practices actual righteousness, even grounded in the reality of the imputed new identity? The answer
given herein is in the affirmative.
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must be developed before the evaluation can proceed. That framework is based upon the
presupposition of a distinction between the two axes of “reality” and “actuality.” Within the
matrix of this schema the Christian categories of original sin and alien righteousness belong to
“reality.” The concept of “actual,” or “active righteousness” falls under the heading of
“actuality,” meaning that which is actualized in life and during development.44 “Criminal sin,”
“actual sin,” and “apparent righteousness” also belong under the heading of “actuality,” since
they are actions committed.
Erikson’s Theory in Regard to Original Sin
Erikson’s theory would appear to belong only under “actuality.” However, there is a sense
in which his theory can be placed under the heading of what is “real,” albeit only in regards to
original sin, or perhaps, better said, the fruits of original sin. From this reality of original sin, the
root of which is mistrust of God, flow the fruits of criminal sin, those punishable by civil
authority, and actual sin, many of which are hidden from the gaze of others. From this root also
flow the deeds of “apparent righteousness,” those which appear good but do not flow from faith,
or trust in God.45 Again, the main question that must be answered is whether Erikson’s theory,
which deals mostly with “apparent righteousness” can be useful in the discussion of the “active
righteousness” of the baptized. But first, a discussion of his theory in terms of original sin and its
fruits is presented in what follows.
44

Admittedly, the terms “real” and “actual” are easily confused. Hereafter, “actualized” righteousness, or
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Original sin is defined in the Augsburg Confession as being “without trust in God,” Kolb-Wengert, 37, 39.
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that identity.

219

The theme of Paul’s letter to the Romans is “the righteous person will live from faith,”46
that is by trust.47 Middendorf points out that verb “to trust,” or “to believe,” in the phrase παντὶ
τῷ πιστεύοντι (to everyone who believes), while in the active voice, is used by Paul with a
passive sense. For Paul, “the opposite of ‘faith’ is not so much ‘unbelief,’ as it is ‘works’ and,
specifically, ‘works of the Law.’” 48 Thus, faith, or trust, in Paul is a receptivity. It is passively
receiving, rather than getting in some active sense. Middendorf also points out that this trust
always has an object. It is not merely “faith” or “trust” in some vague emotional sense. Rather, it
is specifically trust in the gospel of Christ Jesus.49
Despite the statement above about trust, or faith, being somewhat vague in Joan Erikson’s
description of the Ninth Stage of life, in Childhood and Society, Erik Erikson understood trust in
the child to be trust in the mother who comes to care for the infant. He called it “social trust”50
because it was trust born of an interpersonal relationship. The foundation for this trust, however,
is not in the child; it is in the “parental faith,” or trustworthiness, which supports the child’s
trust.51 According to Erikson, this basic sense of trust in the earliest stage of life is the picture of
the “childlike surrender to a Provider,”52 which is the foundation of religion. It is the mother’s
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face which communicates with the infant. With her face, she smiles at the child, indicating that
she acknowledges his existence and loves and will care for him. She assures the child that he is
her own. With her face, she also speaks, calling the child by name, granting the child a unique
identity. Therefore, the numinous (to use Erikson’s language of ritualization) does two things:
the face provides the child with a sense of belonging to a social entity, the family, and it provides
a sense of individuation, being a unique person. This is the same action that Paul, in 1
Corinthians 12, says is the work of the Spirit in baptism. By means of baptism, the Holy Spirit
unites the Christian with the body of Christ, the church. Also by means of baptism, the Holy
Spirit grants individuated gifts to each one as a unique member of the body. As this sense of
being a unique person increases, the child begins to develop a sense of autonomy.
Erikson understands autonomy to be the development of a sense of being oneself.
However, Erikson also means that the child’s will is in a constant struggle against the will of the
parents and that the child “must come to feel that basic faith in himself.”53 This drive for trust in
oneself is met by the principle of “law and order” that restricts the will and causes the will to
rebel.54 His description echoes Paul’s in Romans 7, where Paul remarks how indwelling sin
rebels against the demands of Torah and drives him to do what he does not want to do. This also
appears to parallel his description of humanity in Rom. 1:18–32. Even though people know that
certain acts are forbidden, the human will rebels. God gives them over to the consequences of
their acts but they continue in rebellion.
It is here that Erikson’s model can be helpful in describing the stages or aspects of rebellion
against God, which has its genesis in trusting in oneself rather than in God. Autonomy is the
condition of being a law unto oneself. This autonomy is linked to trust, in that, while the
53
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numinous “assures us of separateness transcended and yet also a distinction confirmed,” the
sense of “I” which is developed produces “one all-embracing ‘I Am.’”55 Thus the “I” is set up as
an idol, the object of one’s trust, which generates the sense of autonomy.56 Thereby the seeds of
narcissism are planted.57 The outgrowth of narcissism, according to Capps, is not guilt but shame.
“Narcissists are painfully aware that something is wrong with them.”58 However, shame becomes
its own undoing. It drives the person to estrangement from self, from others, and from God.59
Therefore, autonomy, driven by trust in self, becomes the root of a false and diffused identity, as
one becomes a “divided self.”60 The divided self is a dishonest self. Rather than honesty, the
autonomous person attempts to cover up, rather than to overcome, the faults. “Saving face” is
one way this is described.61 The shame and doubt that come from knowing one is not what one
portrays the “I” to be soon meets the judgment of “the other.”
Paul presents the emergence of shame, which grows from mistrust (lack of trust) in God, in
Rom. 1:18–32.62 The righteous person lives by faith. The corollary to this statement is that the
one who does not live by faith in God is not a righteous person. The person who does not live in
a receptive relationship, trusting the one by whose free will alone one exists, is attempting to be
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the source of his or her own existence. All things have been brought into being from nothingness
by God. God and God alone exists in uncaused reality. This is why the cross of Jesus Christ, or
rather the dead Jesus on the cross, is the ultimate picture of God. He is the only God there is
because only God can bring God back from the dead. By attempting to be the source of its own
existence, that is, foolishly attempting to be autonomous, humanity, while never being
ontologically autonomous, attempts deification. Andrew Root states, “Adam and Eve never try to
deny God as much as to become ‘like God.’ They seek to be God by being outside of
nothingness”63 just as God is. Therefore, original sin is not in the act of disobedience but in the
autonomous orientation of trust in self and mistrust (lack of trust) in the creator.64 Paul describes
the results with words such as “dishonorable,” “shameful,” and “shameless.” However, human
beings remain creatures. They remain dependent, and depleted. Therefore, they turn to trust
created things rather than trusting the Creator (Rom. 1:25). This depletion of self causes them to
turn on one another. They become foolish, faithless, heartless, ruthless” (Rom. 1:31) as they
attempt to draw life from others who are dying along with them.
Autonomy, as an autonomous trust in self, results in shame. This shame drives humanity
onward toward judging others. If one is a law unto oneself, then one becomes the judge of others.
However, as Paul states, “In that you judge another, you condemn yourself” (Rom. 2:1). This
corresponds to Erikson’s Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt). Once faced with the voice of God the
judge, in Genesis 3, Adam immediately began to defend his act by shifting the blame to his wife,
and to God as well, who gave her to him.65 Much of Rom. 2:1–3:8 has its purpose in convincing
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the Judean-leaning Christians that their proclivity for judging others is merely an attempt to
cover up their own guilt. This sense of guilt has driven them to initiate an attempt at selfjustification by works. This self-justification is akin to Erikson’s initiative stage. However,
humankind is incompetent in the things of God. In actuality, that which is in the deep structure of
works-righteousness is the attempt to maintain sinful autonomy. To lose autonomy is to lose
oneself as the ground of existence. Autonomy is always traceable back to trust in self and
mistrust, of lack of trust, in God. The acknowledgement of the identity as sinner is a result of
trust in God’s word about humanity. Erikson believed he had found evidence for this in the life
of Martin Luther, who finally gave up striving to achieve righteousness by works and instead
submitted to God’s word about himself. However, Luther, Erikson believed, came to the
realization of his sinful identity and of his guilt by honest self-examination rather than by selfjustification.
Luther . . . made a virtue out of what his superiors had considered a vice in him (and
we, a symptom), namely, the determined search for the rock bottom of his sinfulness:
only thus, he says, can man judge himself as God would: Conformis deo est et verax
et Justus. One could consider such conformity utter passivity in the face of God’s
judgment, but note that it really is an active self-observation, which scans the frontier
of conscience for the genuine sense of guilt. Instead of accepting some impersonal
and mechanical absolution, it insists on dealing with sincere guilt, perceiving as
“God’s judgment” what in fact is the individual’s own truly meant self-judgment.66
There is a creedal structure to this lack of trust. In Rom. 1:18–23, Paul connects
unrighteousness with the denial of God as creator. In Rom. 2:6–8, Paul connects unrighteousness
with self-seeking. This self-seeking is an attempt at self-justification. Any attempt to be one’s
own redeemer or savior is a denial of the Second Article of the Creed. Only Christ Jesus is the
Redeemer. Similarly, the attempt at self-justification is a denial of the Third Article of the Creed,
in that it is a denial of life lived by faith. The “not-as-a-result-of-works” salvation of which Paul
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writes in Eph. 2:8–10, although it results in good works, is grounded in the ex nihilo character of
creation, redemption, and calling to faith. God has created existence ex nihilo. Christ is brought
back from the deadness of ex nihilo. The Spirit creates faith within the Christian where there was
only unbelief—likewise, ex nihilo.67
The result of a lack of trust in God, in autonomous trust in self, and in attempting selfjustification combines to develop in the person a false identity. Paul points to this false identity
when he speaks of humanity asserting its wisdom yet in reality being fools. 68 Additionally,
human beings seek identity by excluding others. Erikson refers to this as pseudospeciation. The
Judean-leaning Christians, even though they are Christians, appear to consider themselves to be
superior to the others. The cultural Hellenists likewise looked down on the others. The partyspirit Paul attacks in 1 Corinthians 1 is of a similar kind. Rather than finding identity in Christ,
human beings, sadly Christians are included herein, find identity in the lower-level aspects of
social life which divide rather than unite.
Paul is driving his argument toward the goal of achieving the realization that, outside of
Christ, all human beings have one chief identity. All have sinned, so all are sinners. None are
righteous, no not one.69 Paul is likely referring to Eccl. 7:20. Similar themes exists in Romans 1–
3 and in Ecclesiastes. Both Paul and Qoheleth are concerned with righteousness, faith, and
wisdom. Both writers accuse humanity of unrighteousness and foolishness. Furthermore, for both
Paul and Qoheleth wisdom is built upon trust in God. “The form of righteousness for Qoheleth is
67
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the same as for Paul the apostle; the form is faith.”70 Therefore, while not truly a developmental
pattern, the logical flow of Erikson’s theory is congruent with Paul’s description of human
unrighteousness.
Yet, having said that it is not a developmental pattern, there is, nonetheless, a narrative
sketched out by Paul in Rom. 1:18–32. He describes the descent of humanity into utter
foolishness as a dramatic narrative. Refusing the image of God, humanity looks into the face of
creatures to find a reflection to strengthen the depleted, pseudo-autonomous self. What humanity
finds is the reality of law and order God has built into his creation. This shames and then
condemns even those who do not have Torah in written form. The dramatic element, which
Erikson links to the attempt at competence and the alleviation of guilt is in the initiative and
industry of works-righteous self-justification. The result is the unacceptable identity as a sinner,
as one unworthy and unacceptable. Therefore, humanity becomes more bestial than the creation
it worships. Thinking themselves to be wise, they are fools. “There is no fear of God before their
eyes” (Rom. 3:18). Humanity then attempts to build its own self-chosen identity, which is built
on a lie.
Erikson’s model can serve as a lens, “a way of looking at things,”71 to describe the
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unfolding of the results of a lack of fear and trust in God. Physical death is the ultimate result of
sin, of not fearing and trusting God. Sin also wreaks havoc on the social structure of society,
including the church. All the sinful acts Paul lists in Romans 1–3 tear at the fabric of the social
order. Therefore, sin is not simply a personal matter. It is not a mere psychological illness. Sin
has a psychosocial, and indeed a biopsychosocial, dimension. Erikson can help us see this
especially as sin works its fruit in the areas of interpersonal intimacy (Stage VI: Intimacy vs.
Isolation) and generativity (Stage VII: Generativity vs. Stagnation). If each person is selforiented, if autonomy is unchecked by selfless, sacrificial love for others, as Paul describes
marital love in Eph. 5:22–33, then true intimacy is impossible. Rather, each person lives in
psychosocial isolation, even if living with another. Generativity also becomes aimed at selffulfillment and not at passing on life and life-enhancing things to the next generation. The entire
structure of Erikson’s developmental model, if read through the lens of mistrust of God,
enhances the strength of the dystonic elements and perverts the syntonic so that it becomes
curvatus in se, self-seeking and self-justifying. This only strengthens mistrust until the person
ends life in despair, when death proves the foolishness of autonomy.
Erikson’s model proves itself to be useful, when correlated with the theological concept of
original sin, is describing the effects of mistrust, as one considers Erikson’s dystonic elements
and the ways in which original sin results in the attempt to build one’s identity on an autonomous
foundation, which results in a false sense of self. If a person builds his fundamental identity on
his initiative and industry, the result is the false sense of being righteous coram deo by works.
Erikson’s Theory in Regard to Alien Righteousness
“The righteous person shall live by faith.” The person who is righteous by faith shall live.
When it comes to the reality of being righteous by faith, even though for Erikson one’s sense of
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identity is bestowed from the outside, his model has little value because it is a model of
development over time and not of declarative conferral. Therefore, the discussion, which follows
this section, is built upon the distinction between the three kinds of righteousness. Erikson’s
model has been helpful in pointing out the reality of human sinfulness. Actually, what has been
demonstrated is a diagnosis of the disease by its symptoms, the diagnosis of original sin (lack of
fear and trust in God) by its fruit, the sinful acts of people. This was described less from the
perspective of the sins committed and more from the angle of the inner motivations, or affects.
In this section the discussion moves to the reality of alien righteousness. Here again,
Erikson is of slight use.72 This does not mean that there is nothing of value to be gained from the
interaction. His theory has already been shown to be helpful in understanding the root and the
psychosocial dimensions of original sin. Erikson consistently states that trust is the foundation of
identity. In the realm of human interaction, the infantile trust in the mother becomes the soil in
which, and from which, identity grows and matures. According to Erikson, basic trust is “the
cornerstone of a vital personality.”73 This infantile trust is not the same as the conscious decision
an adult might make to trust someone after thinking through whether or not the person is
trustworthy. This trust is not conscious confidence in another; it far more subliminal.74 His
concept of infant faith is closer to that of Jesus’ description in Luke 18:15–17. The pure
receptivity of the infant argues against this kind of trust being other than passive. It is the
trustworthiness of the mother that generates trust in the child. It is the trustworthiness of God in
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Christ that generates trust in the Christian. This is passive, not active faith; thus this kind of
righteousness is passive rather than active. It is a given reality. It becomes the source of active, or
actualized, righteousness. It is foundational to the identity of being righteous. The imputed, alien
righteousness, which creates and forms the Christian’s baptismal identity is liberating. Oswald
Bayer says of the Christian:
In faith they live outside themselves in God, freed from having to find their own
identity or achieve self-fulfillment. For this reason they can afford to be the servants
not merely of all people but of all things, thus caring for them “as if there were no
God.”75
In this way, there is an immediate jump, if it can be said this way, from Stage I (Trust vs.
Mistrust) to Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion). Human autonomy, initiative, and industry,
if added to the doctrine of justification (rectification), destroy faith and thereby destroy the
righteousness of faith. How autonomy, initiative, and industry might still have a place in pastoral
care and counseling will be discussed next. But it must be clearly understood that they belong
only to active, or actualized, righteousness if they have any place at all. They have no place when
discussing the gift of alien righteousness, which is received passively by faith (trust) alone.
Erikson’s Theory in Regard to Active Righteousness
Since one purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the validity of the thesis, that Erik H.
Erikson’s theory provides a helpful schematic for studying the actualization of a person’s sense
of identity, and that it should be considered in relation to baptismal identity, the way in which his
theory assists the task of pastoral care in the actualization of active righteousness (the Christian’s
proper righteousness) and growth in ethical coram mundo living must now be demonstrated.
First, the nature of righteousness must be described.
Righteousness is a relational concept. One who is righteous is righteous in relation to
75
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another or to others.76 The demonstration of this assertion is first in the scriptural teaching that
one becomes righteous before God by faith. In fact, that righteousness is spoken of as before God
(coram deo) or, in terms of civic righteousness and the Christian’s proper righteousness, before
men (coram hominibus/ coram mundo) demonstrates the relational dimension of righteousness.
From the reality of being righteous by faith flow the identity of being a child of God, the state of
being at peace with God, and the new relation of being a brother (or sister) to all other Christians.
All of these concepts are relational. From this the social dimension of righteousness is clear. The
foundation for the entire new reality is the new, reconciled relationship with God in Christ.
Being rectified (justified) by faith, Paul writes, results in peace with God (Rom. 5:1). This
peace is not initiated by humanity but by God, who sent his Son Jesus Christ. Christ died for us.
Being now declared by God to be righteous by Jesus’ blood, we are reconciled to God and will
be saved by his life (Rom. 5:9–11). Therefore, Paul continues, an identity shift has been caused
by the reconciling work of God in Christ. Once “in Adam,” the baptized are now “in Christ”
(Rom. 5:12–17). This has been discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this dissertation. The
Christian’s new identity is multifaceted. It is “in Christ,” it is being declared righteous, it is being
a child of God, and being a sibling to all other believers. The ground of this new identity of being
righteous is receiving the gift of the righteousness of Christ, which is the Christian’s by faith in
Christ. In the area of the reality of the righteousness of faith, it is divine monergism and not any
kind of developmental theory that must hold sway. In fact, it must be excluded, since it includes
76

Δικαιοσύη (righteousness) is a relational word both coram deo and coram mundo. “The standard of
righteousness is . . . to be seen against the wider background of the covenantal relationship with Yahweh.” Moisés
Silva, ed. New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology and Exegesis, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2014), 1:727. The foundational aspect of “being righteous” is to be in a right relationship with another
(or others). Before God, that relationship is trust (faith). Before others, it is to act with love. Middendorf highlights
the relational connection between baptism, trust (faith), and being righteous by means of being baptized into Christ.
Through baptism, “we have been joined to our Lord Jesus Christ, an intimate relationship, which Paul says calls
forth ‘righteousness’ (δικαιοσύνη) in 6:13, 16, 18, 19, 20) in sanctified living.” Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 456. The
sanctified living points not only to the trust relationship of the Christian with God but also the coram mundo acts of
righteousness, often referred to as “civic righteousness.”

230

a degree of human action. Any human act attached to rectification (justification) would be
grounds for human boasting before God. This must be excluded.77
The reality of being righteous by faith in Christ, by being baptized into Christ, is the fount,
from which flow the deeds of active, or actualized, righteousness. The next question to answer is
whether Erikson’s developmental theory has any place in pastoral care and in helping a Christian
actualize that kind of righteousness in his or her life. Having shown how a misuse of the theory
can lead to works righteousness and the death of faith, a certain degree of caution is in order. A
correlative question to the first is, how are we to read Paul’s baptismal theology, as presented in
Romans and the other three letters, and draw from it a sound theology of the development, or
actualization, of a Christian identity? And how are we, with discernment, to interact with
Erikson’s developmental theory, remain faithful to Scripture, and form an intelligible Christian
psychology of identity actualization?78
The move to the realm of the actualization of Christian identity is the move to the final
argument of the tripartite thesis of this dissertation. What has preceded has helped to clear the
table for the following discussion. What follows is not trust, autonomy, initiative, industry,
identity, intimacy, generativity, and integrity in relation to rectification (justification) by grace
through faith in Christ, that is, being righteous coram deo. Rather, being righteous by faith is the
presupposed situation of the baptized person with whom we will be concerned. What a person
needs more than anything is a new core identity.79 This new core of identity is the imputed,
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conferred identity of being righteous in Christ. In daily living, what a Christian needs is a solid
sense of this new identity. Actualization of one’s core Christian identity flows from this reality in
the practice and habituation of active righteousness. Erikson’s theory can help the field of
pastoral care think through, not only the developmental stages of human beings and thereby what
may be legitimately expected of them in this habituation, but also the framework upon which this
identity is built. According to Erikson, the first four stages, and into the fifth, provided the
epigenesis80 of identity.
The first stage to consider is Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust). Erikson thought that trust
“becomes the capacity for faith—a vital need for which man must find some institutional
conformation.”81 This, he said, is found in religion. Paul also shows humanity to be incurably
homo religionis. Forsaking the Creator, humanity turns to and worships the creature (Rom. 1:25).
The first issue involves the impossibility within man for total mistrust. Humanity either places
trust in God or in something or someone other than God, even if that other be self. However, as
was shown above in the discussion of autonomy and shame, trust in self is self-depleting. It
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cannot be sustained.82
The turn from trust in God to trust in “not-God” is the Grundpunkt of sin. William
Weinrich states: “Sin redefines man. After the fall, man is Sinner, that is, sin places man in
opposition to his creator and leads to death as judgment.”83 The characteristics of being a sinner
are lack of fear of God and of trust in God.84 This is ground zero for the struggle against sin.
Everything hinges on trust in the trustworthiness of God and, therefore, that everything that God
says is true. In Rom. 6:1, Paul asks a rhetorical question. Ought a Christian continue to sin so
that God’s grace might increase? His answer is a resounding “No!” The reason for his answer is
found in the reality of what has happened to the Christian by means of baptism. The Christian
has been buried with Christ in baptism so that he might walk in newness of life (Rom. 6:3–4).
Paul proceeds to outline the new reality of the baptized. Then, in 6:11, he says, “In this way also
you—account yourselves to be dead to sin, but alive to God in Christ Jesus.” While not using the
word “faith” or “trust,” Paul is calling them to trust the truth of the new reality. He is calling
them to trust in Christ, and in the benefits given to them in baptism. Erikson wrote about trust as
“childlike surrender to the Power that creates and re-creates, dispensing earthly fortune as well as
spiritual well-being.”85 Conversely, childlike trust can be “outgrown” so that the adult no longer
trusts with the totality of an infant’s faith. When this happens, the person does not become so
much a person without faith as one who finds other objects in which to trust. Each person needs
regular and mutual affirmation of his existence.86 When this is not received from the voice of
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God in his word (which is the smiling countenance, the numinous face of love), then man looks
to other things for validation, for “other forms of validation.”87
The crisis of trust versus mistrust comes when that for which one hopes is delayed. In such
situations, it appears as though the trustworthy one is no longer trustworthy. For the child, the
crisis is in the possibility that the mother has abandoned the child.88 For the Christian, the
temptation is that God is not to be trusted. At its core, mistrust is a failure to persevere in faith, a
failure to hope.89 Paul’s example of persevering faith, of enduring hope, is in the example of
Abraham in Rom. 4:18–22. “Against hope (παρ᾽ ἐλπίδα) upon hope (ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι) he trusted
(ἐπίστευσεν; 4:18). “And in the promise of God he did not waver in mistrust (τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ; 4:20).
Thus Paul also links the struggle, or crisis, of trust versus mistrust to the development of hope.
Hope can truly only be hope when there is the appearance, and humanly speaking the real
possibility, that the one in whom one trusts may not fulfill the promise. Hope, however, is the
virtue that allows a person to persevere in trust and to wait out the crisis until the trustworthy
being returns and fulfills the promise. For the Christian, the declaration of a righteous identity
cannot be seen in this life by the human eye or by examining the flawlessness of one’s conduct.
It is received solely by trust in the external word, spoken from the mouth (which is on the face)
of a fellow believer, in the midst of the sanctorum communio, that declares it to be so. This trust
is the ground of Christian identity because the righteous person lives by faith.
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It must be remembered that Erikson’s developmental theory is not a linear progression of
steps through which a person passes, leaving earlier stages behind as irrelevant in the present.
The first stage, of trust versus mistrust, if navigated successfully helps to develop the ego
strength, or virtue, of hope. It also supports identity formation in the fifth stage by providing,
according to Erikson, a sense of temporal perspective and time diffusion.90 For trust to prevail
over mistrust, the insistence that fulfillment must occur in the immediate moment must give way
to hope in God’s timing. Hopeful trust also allows for the apparent absence of God, for the times
when one feels abandoned and alone. The first stage teaches that needs will be met, even if not
on one’s own timetable. Abraham serves well as an example. Indeed, Paul’s example of
Abraham appears to be picture of just such a struggle.91 His hope in the face of hopelessness, his
endurance in faith, are the epitome of the Christian’s faith (fides qua creditur) in the content of
God’s promise (fides quae creditur).
It appears that Erikson’s first stage is valid and useful in regards to active righteousness.
The Christian continues to trust the word that declares the hidden reality. The baptized, looking
within, does not see himself as righteous. He also does not see perfect righteousness in his fellow
Christians. Believers from other ethnic groups do not magically look like his brothers and sisters.
No one looks like a saint, a holy one. A Christian simply receives by faith, by trust in the
external word, that he has died to sin, been buried with Christ, and is raised to newness of life.
By trusting God’s word about him, the Christian accounts it to be true, not because it is seen, but
solely on the basis of the trustworthiness of God and his word. This trust is constantly under
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attack by “what is visible.” Tribulation and persecution challenge this trust. And more than
anything else, death says to him that it is all a lie. The deadness of Sarah’s womb and the
deadness of Abraham’s body said that the promise of a son was null and void. Death also tempts
the Christian to mistrust. The Christian stands by trust in God and God’s word alone. Active
righteousness must grow from this trust, because whatever does not proceed from out of trust is
sin” (Rom. 14:23).
Erikson’s Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) has autonomy as the syntonic element
and shame and doubt comprising the dystonic. It has already been demonstrated above that
autonomy, understood as the attempt to be the source of one’s own existence, is not only selfdepleting but is at the heart of original sin. It necessarily generates shame and doubt because it is
grounded in a lie. Is there, then, any sense in which it can be understood in a way that is
congruent with active righteousness? Richard Eyer treats Erikson’s second stage as “the balance
between being an individual and having a healthy doubt about our self-sufficiency.”92 Erikson
described a child’s attempt at autonomy as “guerilla warfare of unequal wills.”93 This is a very
negative view. Erikson also wrote of the more positive sense of autonomy as the need for the
child to become a unique “I,” separate from the parents.94 Yet, overall, he paints a picture of a
will in rebellion.
As he relates autonomy to the ways in which it supports identity, things get no better. Stage
II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) supports a sense of self-certainty versus self-consciousness

92

Eyer, Pastoral Care, 81. Eyer is considering Erikson’s model in relation to developmental aspects of the

elderly.
93

Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 107. The child’s will is “violent” as he seeks to exercise his will
against the will of the parents.
94

Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 108.

236

and a sense of “will to be oneself” over against self-doubt.95 Yet, as he discusses the concept he
has in mind, it appears that his goal is individuation. A child must learn that he is a separate
unique being. He is, or has, an “I.”96 There is distinction between the child and other people. If
such a distinction is not made, absolute narcissism takes hold. Unable to distinguish between self
and others, such a person thinks of self as the entirety of existence. It is the law and order
element of this stage that creates the shame and doubt Erikson has in mind. One begins to
question the omnipotence of one’s will. Mother no longer appears on demand with a breast full
of milk. Diapers are not changed with a whimper. Crying fits are permitted to continue to teach
the child that his will is not almighty. Therefore, this stage, if taken as a whole, allows for the
necessity of individuation and for the development of a sense of self-control over urges. It is
important for identity development to know that one is a person and yet that one is not the center
of the universe.
If autonomy is to be redeemed for the development of one’s Christian identity, any sense of
rebellion and self-centeredness must be excised from it. Every person is a morally responsible
agent.97 Each person stands before God the Creator and under God’s judgment. Therefore, no
person is truly autonomous, in the sense of being a law unto himself. Capps describes the
challenge of using the term autonomy and a way forward that is faithful to Erikson and makes it
useful for pastoral care.
Some readers of Erikson’s writings have assumed that when he used the word
autonomy, he basically meant independence in the sense of relying only or primarily
on oneself. They associated this with the “individualism” that they considered to be
rampant in American society. . . . Other readers have suggested that by using the
word autonomy Erikson revealed his male bias, because a male child is oriented
toward independence while a female child is oriented toward relationships with
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others (Gilligan 1982, 11–12). . . . I believe, though, that Erikson actually had the
other meaning in mind, that of self-governance, and that his readers fail to recognize
this because the meaning itself is not much in use today.98
If self-governance means the ability to make ethical choices, then such a term may well serve the
purpose. Autonomy certainly has a negative meaning in theology. Perhaps a better word, in
pastoral care, would be the aforementioned term, “individuation.” Of course this term must be
used with a degree of caution. No person is an “individual” in the sense of having responsibility
only for “self.” All Christians belong to one another. Baptism incorporates the Christian into the
church. As a member of the church, each Christian is to act so as to enhance the health of the
body. The social dimensions of Erikson’s psychosocial theory certainly support the view that
Erikson was not thinking of narcissistic autonomy.
In Rom. 12:3–8, Paul warns his readers not to think more highly of themselves than is
proper, but rather to exercise the gifts given to each one for the good of the congregation. Each
one, individually (καθ’ εἷς = each one), is a member of the whole (12:5). Therefore, there is
individuation. Each one, individually has a function within the body. This is not unfettered
autonomy. Rather it is specification of purpose. The significance of this for identity is found in
the function of vocation in providing a person a unique way to express his identity within the
community. Paul makes the same point in 1 Cor. 12:4–11. He then speaks of this as being an
outgrowth of baptism. The various gifts given by the one Spirit (1 Cor. 12:4) are used for the
sake of the one body into which each Christian is baptized (1 Cor. 12:12–13). The Spirit’s work
in baptism is described by Paul as having both a unifying and an individuating effect. Yet the
individuation is for the sake of others and not for the sake of self. This is the hard lesson of
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actualized righteousness. On the other hand, “individuation,” if connected to one’s
responsibilities to the community, whether church, family, or the civic realm, means that one
does not live for oneself, but sacrificially for the sake of others (Eph. 5:15–6:9) using the gifts
given by the Spirit for the common good (1 Cor. 12:7). Two ways in which “individuation”
(autonomy) can become an arena for the struggle for identity is in losing oneself in the collective
and, conversely, in boasting about one’s importance. This might also approach Capp’s
suggestion, in the quote above, that “autonomy” might better be thought of as “self-governance,”
or, even better, as self-control. Such self-control would put restraints on narcissistic autonomy
and the destructive impulses caused by indwelling sin and make autonomy, in terms of
individuation and self-control as truly positive contribution to the social life of the church and
society.
Paul describes the struggle against indwelling sin in Romans 7. Concupiscence, as part of
indwelling, original sin, turns the sinner inward (curvatus in se). All actions become selfcentered. Indwelling sin (the old man) that still adheres to the baptized, does not fear God, does
not trust in God, and is utterly selfish. As long as indwelling sin remains, there will always be the
temptation to pervert a wholesome individuation into sinful autonomy, causing one to consider
others as tools to be used for self-aggrandizement. This narcissism, as Capps describes,
characterizes Western culture, and especially the United States.99 Such a person will also not
have an appropriate ability to feel shame. According to Erikson, such a person can become a
legalist, pointing out the failures and faults of others, while blind to his own. Such a person, as
those Paul describes in Romans 2, will begin to rationalize his own failures while condemning
others for the very same things. Erikson describes this as “the victory of the letter over the spirit
99

Capps, Depleted Self, 11. Capps describes the “self-inflated behavior and inappropriate assertions of
personal grandiosity” which have led therapists to describe ours as a narcissistic age. Capps nots that the narcissist
was the one personality type that Freud refused to treat, “because he considered narcissists to be untreatable.”

239

of the word and the law. It is expressed in the vain display of righteousness or empty
contrition.”100
On the other hand, a person who has not sufficiently individuated from others will fail to be
able to contribute to others, but will remain dependent. Erikson does not describe this failure,
since he assumes autonomy to take place epigenetically. Dependent Personality Disorder is
defined as “A pervasive and excessive need to be taken care of that leads to submissive and
clinging behavior and fears of separation, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety
of contexts.”101 A person’s sense of security, well-being, and the ability to contribute is markedly
reduced. The inability to individuate causes a person to find his identity in the identification
imposed on him by others. This results in a foreclosed identity. For the Christian, utter trust and
reliance upon God in Christ for identity and every good is a virtue. This is in the realm of alien
righteousness and passive faith. In the arena in which actualization of identity includes
individuation, especially in the reception of spiritual gifts to be used in love for the sake of
others, a dependent personality makes true intimacy and generativity an impossibility. One
remains a taker and never becomes a giver. One is unable to look beyond self and initiate action
which puts faith in action for the sake of others (industry). Baptism overcomes narcissistic
autonomy by placing the Christian into a dependent relationship with God, and by incorporating
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the Christian into the sanctorum communio, the body of Christ. It also results is a healthy
individuation, as the Holy Spirit by mans of baptism imparts his gifts for the Christian to use for
the sake of the body.
Erikson’s stages have a logical flow which becomes clear the more one ponders them.
From the ground of trust, which gives the foundation for individuation (autonomy in a good
sense) and self-control, the Christian begins to practice deeds of love. As these deeds become
habituated, the Christian, by daily renouncing the “old man” and his self-centered way and
clinging in trust to the reality of the new identity of being righteous in Christ, becomes a
competent member of the sanctorum communio. He takes his place within the community of
faith and becomes an actor, rather than a spectator. This coincides with Erikson’s assertion that
this stage, in terms of ritualization, includes the dramatic. As the Christian lives out his baptism,
putting to death the deeds of the old man and putting on the new man, he begins to understand
his purpose, his station in life, in the church, in the family, and in society.102 Daniel Levinson
labelled Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt) the “novice phase.” This is the stage when one
experiments with the various roles one could have in life. Levinson states: “During the novice
stage of early adulthood a man is exploring the adult world, developing adult interests and
values, making important choices with regard to work, marriage and family, and forming an
adult identity.”103 This is not a fully-formed identity. Rather it is the beginning of living out
possibilities. As one becomes more competent in various roles, various ways of living out one’s
baptism (what Oswald Bayer calls “ethical progress104), a sense of purpose in one’s life begins to
take shape. Although all Christians have the purpose of trusting God and loving the neighbor,
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each person does so utilizing the unique gifts given by the Spirit (1 Corinthians 12) within one’s
specific vocation.
Paul does not speak directly to what aligns with Erikson’s Stage IV (Industry vs.
Inferiority). He does, however, describe the place of vocation in the life of the baptized.105 He
speaks of the Christian’s responsibility to the Christian congregation in Rom. 12:3–21. Vocation
in terms of life in society is described in Rom. 13:1–7. Although he does not speak directly to it
in Romans, in Eph. 5:22–6:9 and in Col. 3:18–4:1, Paul describes vocation in regards to the
household (and economic) realm. In Colossians, competency and purpose within the family
structure follows directly after, and is built upon, Paul’s description of the life of the baptized,
putting to death the old man and putting on the new (Col. 3:1–17).
Erikson avers that guilt accompanies the initiative of Stage III. Erikson built his theory on a
Freudian foundation. This is concurrent with Freud’s Phallic Stage, in which the most important
aspect is the Oedipus complex.106 It is for this reason that Erikson, building on this foundation,
assigns guilt to this stage. Nevertheless, there is a logic to thinking about guilt in conjunction
with initiative, regardless of Freud. Both a lack of initiative and reckless initiative can cause
guilt.107 Capps writes of people “floundering” as they try to individuate and become contributing
members of their social group.108 A person’s sense of incompetency can bring on a sense of
inferiority and a sense of guilt. This works for the Christian’s advantage. A healthy sense of
guilt, that one has failed to do all things well, and a sense of incompetence work together to
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humble the Christian. Knowing that he is not competent in himself (2 Cor. 3:5), he grows in the
certainty that Christ’s power is made perfect in the Christian’s weakness and failings (2 Cor.
12:9). He relies less on himself and more on God’s work in baptism. Paul emphasizes the
Christian’s inability to be perfect in himself as he describes his own struggle against indwelling
sin in Rom. 7:13–24. He calls himself a “distressed man,” whose ultimate deliverance is in Christ
Jesus his Lord (Rom. 7:25). He is in constant need of assistance. This assistance is his in the
Holy Spirit, whom the Christian receives in baptism, and concerning whose work Paul writes in
Romans 8.
Erikson’s pairing of initiative with guilt and industry with inferiority are congruent with
Paul’s teaching that the Christian is to be active in love toward others and yet is not without the
taint of sin, even in his good works. A healthy sense of what Erikson calls inferiority contributes
to a proper humility that constantly looks to Christ’s atoning work to cover the works with his
righteousness. It also acknowledges the need to be part of the church, that one does not have all
the necessary gifts and skills to be a Christian without the other members of the sanctorum
communio. On the other hand, initiative and industry are ways of describing the movement and
the maturing in one’s vocation which combine to give specific shape to the Christian’s identity in
the time and place wherein he is.
One significant argument of this dissertation is that Erik H. Erikson’s theory can
legitimately utilized in faithful pastoral care in regards to Christian identity actualization, and
that it should be considered in relation to baptismal identity development. Up to this point, his
theory appears to be compatible. The most troubling stage, as has been shown, is Stage II
(Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt), in which autonomy is held up as the syntonic element. By
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redefining109 autonomy in terms of individuation and self-control, it has been possible to maintain
his schema and to recommend its constructive utilization. Each of the dystonic elements have
been shown to be of assistance in impressing upon the Christian the need to rely solely upon God
in Christ for righteousness. This is a paradoxical effect of indwelling sin in the Christian. It
drives the believer to Christ and away from self, so long as trust remains alive. In pastoral care,
these dystonic elements might be highlighted in such a way as to clarify the absolute need to rely
upon the conferred identity as foundational for Christian living. It is the conferred gift of a
righteous standing coram deo that is the source of the Christian’s proper, active righteousness,
which serves the neighbor.
Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) is at the core of Erikson’s theory and of this
dissertation. The syntonic element of Stage V is a sense of identity; the dystonic is identity
diffusion.110 Erikson postulated a corresponding ego strength, or virtue, of fidelity. In terms of
ritualization, this stage brings the previous threads of the numinous, the judicious, the dramatic,
and the formal together to form the ideological. The core of the Christian’s identity is conferred
righteousness, because the Christian is given his identity in Christ, when he, by means of
baptism, died to his old identity in Adam and was raised in Christ to newness of life.
Utilizing the four identity statuses outlined by James Marcia, a person’s sense of identity
can be understood to be foreclosed, diffused, in moratorium, or achieved.111 It has been
acknowledged that the imputed, alien identity of being righteous in Christ is a conferred or
109
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foreclosed identity for the Christian. It also serves a teleological purpose, as the final cause of the
Christian’s life. These four statuses can also serve the purposes of pastoral care by providing a
“way of looking at things” in the actualization of the Christian’s identity coram mundo. Marcia
states that identity is manifested in the two areas of occupation and ideology. These terms can be
thought of theologically as vocation and the faith (fides quae creditor). To return to Joel
Biermann’s statement: “Character describes the matrix of personal traits that define, direct, and
name the individual,”112 in other words, which gives expression to identity. Conversely,
following Biermann as he follows Aristotle, a person’s actualization of identity is shaped,
molded, and changed by one’s habituated actions.113 It would be fair to say that, building on the
conferred identity, that is, of being righteous by faith, the actualization of identity involves a
reciprocal relationship between one’s sense of identity and one’s actions in relation to that
identity. A person’s sense of identity finds its internal expression in his ideology (the content of
his faith) and its external expression in the way he lives out his vocation. Conversely, the way
one lives out one’s vocation and the content of one’s ideology circle back to form a inner sense
of personal identity. All of this happens in the rough and tumble of life and life’s experiences,
including temptations, faith-crises, and tribulation (Rom. 5:1–5), which continue to shape a
person’s sense of identity. In terms of what Paul says in Rom. 7:13–25, the sense of identity
within the “Experiential I” begins to approach the real identity of the Christian (which is that of
the “New I”) as the identity found in the old man/old Adam (“indwelling sin”) is accounted to be
dead, killed in the waters of baptism.
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A Christian with a diffused identity has an uncommitted identity. There is no sense of a
center to his identity which can provide the core of his sense of self. Therefore, there is no
unifying center for faith (fides quae creditor), for ideology, or for ethics. The reality of his
imputed, alien identity has little to no impact on the way he lives in the world. He is more likely
to be conformed to the world than transformed by renewal of the mind (Rom. 12:2). Perhaps the
closest example in Paul’s writings are in 1 Cor. 3:1–2 and Eph. 4:14. He is an infant, living
according “to the flesh,” a childish ego, “tossed here and there by waves and carried along by
every wind of doctrine.” In both cases Paul is concerned about childishness, the foolishness, in
his hearers. The reality of who they are, as those baptized into Christ, is not shaping their
identity.
Identity achievement is the goal.114 A Christian desires to actualize fully his identity in
Christ (Rom. 7:18). The achievement of a sense of one’s identity in Christ comes by trust in
God’s declaration. It is the Christian’s agreement with what God says about the Christian, that he
is righteous. Yet, it nevertheless involves a struggle to the extent that the old man mistrusts that
word. The crisis for the Christian is to trust in hope when his senses tell him that God is
untrustworthy. When trust wins out over the temptation to give in to mistrust, hope is
strengthened.
Paul describes the Christian’s identity, in Eph. 4:15, as growing up into the fullness of
Christ. It is the full actualization of the real identity one has in Christ. It is the goal, it is to be
striven for, but the full actualization of it will not be fully realized until the eschaton. This is true
for multiple reasons, which include the psychological, the social, and the physical dimensions of

114

Alan Waterman has found “five core domains” in identity: vocational choice, religious beliefs, political
ideology, gender-role attitudes, and beliefs about sexual expression. See: Alan Waterman, “Overview of the Identity
Status Scoring Criteria,” in Marcia, Ego Integrity, 157. He also outlines six supplemental domains.

246

life in this world.115 Physically, full identity achievement must await the resurrection of the body.
As embodied beings, human somatic life finds its telos in the glorification of the resurrected
body (Rom. 8:23; Col. 3:4). The body is daily to be offered as a living sacrifice to God (Rom.
12:1), yet while in the body, the Christian struggles with drives that are deeply embedded in the
neurological system of the body.116 Socially, Paul describes the impact of ‘the world” in
conforming people to a mindset that is opposed to God. Every letter Paul wrote to the churches
addresses problems of sociality. Every congregation of Christians, while being in reality a
congregation of saints (sanctorum communio), is in actuality a congregation of sinners
(peccatorum communio). Paul describes the need for striving toward maturity (Eph. 4:11–16),
but even the apostle says that he has not attained perfection (Rom. 7:25).
Erikson wrote of the moratorium that characterizes the period covered by Stage V (Identity
vs. Identity Diffusion). The certainty assumed in the previous two stages is now questioned. The
work of this stage is to integrate all previous identifications, to test them, to refute those that do
not fit or work, and to reshape them so they are relevant for the person in the sociohistorical
moment of his life.117 A moratorium does not translate to a renunciation of one’s sense of
identity; it does not signal a weakness in character. Rather, it is a vital, necessary aspect of
achieving identity. What one has thought of as being right may be incorrect, so alternate
possibilities must be considered. Ways of thinking that are false or ineffective are challenged.
One may have come to the place of thinking identity has been achieved, only to find the
foundation of that identity to be unstable. Stanley Grenz has noted that for Erikson, “the task of a
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mature self involves struggle, crisis, hopelessness, despair, and recovery, all of which participate
in the movement of the person through inner conflict toward integrity.”118 Therefore, as a process
of pressing on toward identity achievement, multiple moratoria would appear to be the rule
rather than the exception.
Theologically, the moratorium status can be thought of as a process of repentance,
especially if it is considered as a cycle from Moratorium to Achievement to Moratorium to
Achievement, what Waterman calls the MAMA Cycle.119 As the Christian hears the word of
God, that word challenges not only his actions within his vocation but his ideology, or faith
(fides quae creditur). Additionally, the struggles and crises challenge his faith (fides qua
creditur) and attack his sense of hope. It may be that what he believes is correct. It may be that
what he believes is not quite correct. The crisis that comes upon him, at the deepest level, is that
of trust versus mistrust. It may be that his trust has been misplaced. It may be that he has been
trusting a false god, as Luther describes in the Large Catechism.120 In that case, a moratorium, a
time of reevaluation and of turning from this false faith in contrition and repentance may be
needed. This contrition and repentance is the way in which Luther describes the significance of
baptism in the Small Catechism.121
Abraham is Paul’s example of a man whose faith (both fides quae and fides qua creditor)
was challenged. He also serves as a biblical example of the MAMA cycle described on page 103.
Abraham was given a righteous identity through his faith in the promise of a son. Paul claims
that “no mistrust made him waver” (Rom. 4:20). Yet a close reading of Genesis suggests
118
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something else. Discounting the conception and birth of Ishmael, after his first son was born, the
Lord appeared to Abram and gave him the name Abraham. The Lord told him that the son of
promise would come from Sarah’s womb. Abraham laughed and questioned how this could be
(Gen. 17:17–18). It appears as though he thought the promise had already been fulfilled through
Ishmael. Abraham had a son, albeit through Hagar as Sarah’s surrogate. The promise that he had
believed had not been fulfilled. Abraham had to change the orientation of his faith from Ishmael
to the as-yet-to-be-born son. Paul will not say that Abraham’s faith (fides qua) wavered. He
continued as a believer. Yet even he had to enter a moratorium of sorts so that his faith (fides
quae) might be closer to the truth.
The idea of a moratorium can also be used to read Romans 6. Paul answers his
interlocutor’s accusation that his gospel of the free grace of God in Christ implies that
continuance in sinning results in increased grace from God. Therefore, it would appear that one
should continue a life of sin in order to experience increased grace. Paul’s abrupt negation of this
line of reasoning is based on the nature and effects of baptism, which have been described
earlier. Paul points his hearers to the new identity they have as those baptized into Christ. Rom.
6:1–10 is concerned with this new reality. His interlocutor, while correct about the abounding
grace of God toward sinners, has not yet grasped the new reality in Christ. Paul first destroys the
grounds of this false identity, that of a forgiven sinner free to live in sin because sins are freely
forgiven, and points to the new, true reality. The Christian has died to sin. While a Christian will
fall into temptation, something Paul acknowledges in chapter 7, “sinner” is not the true identity
of a Christian.122 Christians are “saints” (Rom. 1:7). Therefore, they account this new reality to be
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true in their daily lives. This is actualized by the act of presenting their members daily to God as
those who have been (in reality) brought from death to life (6:13–14). The persistence of sin
tempting the believer may result in the false conclusion that one remains a slave to sin, even
though one is forgiven. This also is the acceptance of a faulty identity. The baptized are no
longer slaves to sin; rather, they are now “slaves to righteousness” (Rom. 6:18). Since
righteousness is a relational word, this means that the Christian is bound to another. The baptized
are now in a relationship which has set them right with their Creator. Therefore, paradoxically,
this slavery is true freedom from sin and death.
Paul uses terms, in Rom. 6:19–23, which are suggestive of ritualistic elements in Torah.
The old status of being a slave was that of slavery to uncleanness, to impurity, and to
“lawlessness,” which could be read as anti-Torah living. Paul has already introduced this kind of
language in Rom. 3:25. He calls the redeeming death of Jesus a ἱλαστήριον . . . ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ
αἵματι (a sacrifice of atonement . . . in his blood).123 Now that the Christian has been reconciled
to God and redeemed by Christ’s atoning sacrifice, ritually he is to present his members, that
means his entire embodied self, to righteousness—to that to which he is “enslaved” in freedom.
The result of this presentation is to be holy. In addition to inferences of atonement, Paul appears
to be pointing to the burnt offering of Leviticus 1. When offering the burnt offering, the Israelite
was to lay his hands on the head of the animal. This action was a ritual act of self-identifying
with the sacrificial animal. Then the sacrificial animal was offered in its entirety to God. The
Holy Spirit and faith are not there.” Martin Luther, “SA 3:43, Kolb-Wengert, 319.
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sacrificial animal was offered to make atonement for the Israelite who offered it (Lev. 1:4). In
Romans 12, Paul picks up on this ritual imagery. The Christian presents his members as
instruments of righteousness to God (Rom. 6:19), as a living sacrifice acceptable to God (Rom.
12:1). This acceptance echoes the pleasing aroma of the burnt sacrifice in Lev. 1:9, 13, 17. The
atonement, on the other hand, has already taken place in Christ’s sacrifice, with whom and in
whom the Christian has died to sin by means of baptism. Since the realm of the unclean and the
unholy is the realm of death, the baptized, being united to Christ in his resurrection, is now, not
merely ritually transferred, but in reality transferred into the realm of purity and holiness, which
leads to life.
Paul does not specifically speak of the face of God in Romans. He does, however, speak of
God’s love. In Rom.1:7, Paul calls his hearers “beloved of God.” In Rom. 5:8, he states that
God’s love is demonstrated in the sacrifice of the Son of God. Furthermore, God’s love is poured
out in the Christians’ hearts by the Holy Spirit (Rom. 5:5). What can be known of God has been
declared in the things that have been made (Rom. 1:19); therefore, a degree of revelation is
available to everyone. But this hardly qualifies as a numinous revelation. God remains hidden
behind his creation and does not speak an audible word. Only his “eternal power and divine
nature” are revealed in the things he made (Rom. 1:20). Admittedly, in Romans, Paul does not
make great use of what Erikson referred to as “the numinous.”
Nonetheless, it must be admitted that Paul does speak of “pleasing God.” This implies that
God looks benevolently,124 favorably and with love into the face of his people. This can be
conceived as a numinous element. Nonetheless, the judicious ritual element is certainly more
pronounced. It is present in Rom. 1:18–3:20, in which section the demands of law and order
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condemn humanity. It establishes the “objective legal guilt”125 of fallen humanity. The dramatic
is found abundantly in both the story of the gospel and in the struggle which Paul outlines in
Romans 6 and brings to a head in the next chapter.
The struggle for actualizing one’s identity as righteous in Christ is dramatically told in
Rom. 7:7–8:39. Paul tells his story in three acts.126 Rom 7:7–12 is Act One, in which Sin seizes
its opportunity through Torah’s commandments and produces all manner of concupiscence (7:8).
Two dramatis personae appear: Paul and Sin. Paul is slain by the commandment which
condemns his action (a judicious element). This brings Paul to recognize a formal element, that
Torah obedience cannot give life. Therefore, the ideological element of Romans, that the
righteous person lives by faith, finds another support in Paul’s experience.
Act Two begins at Rom. 7:13 and goes to the end of the chapter. Three dramatis personae
appear in this section. Paul is now, as it were, a divided person, consisting of “New I” and
“Experiential I.” “Indwelling in,” once again, is the antagonist. In many ways, “Experiential I” is
the battleground between the other two. “Experiential I” (Paul) is in distress over the actuality of
his life. He is on the side of “New I” but finds himself succumbing to “Sin.” This battle, which
he is most definitely waging, is occurring in his members, the very members he is to be
presenting as an offering to God. Erikson describes the dramatic stage as one in which there is a
“killing off of weak and evil ‘others.’”127 While Paul does not portray “sin” as weak, he does say
that it has been killed, put to death in baptism. Therefore, the Christian, in practice, kills “sin” by
accounting it to be dead in the death of Christ. He is now a new man. Torah informs his mind,
and he delights in its teaching.
125

Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 96.

126

At face value, this is Paul’s own story. “The ‘existential’ character of these verses also indicates this.
Middendorf, Romans 1–8, 548.
127

Erikson, Toys and Reasons, 100.

252

The formal element in this act is that the Christian is in a life-long struggle to actualize the
new identity. “New I” has its grip on the mind, but Sin still grasps the members (7:25b).
Deliverance will not come by human effort. Rather, deliverance comes through Jesus Christ the
Lord (7:25a). This also supports the ideological element of the righteousness of faith and not of
works. It also communicates, in a dramatic fashion, the truth that the real identity of the Christian
is the “inner man,” who is free from the dominion of sin, even though, in the actualization of this
identity, “Sin” constantly opposes the renewed will of the Christian.128 Erikson states that the
formal element involves “methodical performance.”129 While Paul does not give detailed
directions, the methodical performance, if it can be called that, is the daily presentation of one’s
members to God as instruments of righteousness (Rom. 6:12–14) and the presenting of oneself as
a “living sacrifice” to God (Rom. 12:1).
That the baptized never shakes off “indwelling sin” in this life may be a source of shame,
doubt, and even great fear. Since unrighteousness leads to death, will not the failure to actualize
a righteous identity lead to condemnation? Act Three, Rom 8:1–39, brings in a new dramatis
persona, namely, the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the “Spirit of Life,” whose Torah teaches
that life is in Christ Jesus (8:1). His Torah is opposed to “the Torah of Sin and of Death.” It is not
that there are two Torahs; rather, the “Torah of Sin and of Death” is a way of speaking of the
negative impact of the commandments when they are used in an attempt at self-justification.130
Paul frames Act Three by stating the formal element in the beginning and at the end.
“There is no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus” (8:1) and, since the only one who
can condemn anyone is Christ Jesus, nothing can separate the baptized from the love of God
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(8:33–39).131 The return to the love of God brings back the numinous element. In Christ Jesus the
Christian experiences the love of God, despite every evil that can be thrown against him. This
solidifies the ideological core of Romans. In the center of this act, the Holy Spirit teaches Christ
(8:2). He gives life, not only spiritually, but will also resurrect the body (8:9–11), and he assures
the Christian that he is a son and child of God, despite experiencing suffering (8:12–25). He also
prays for and in the believer (8:26–30). The affiliative element of Stage VI is found in the new
familial relationship the believer has as a child of God.
Erikson’s concept of the ritualization of experience, especially the judicious, dramatic,
formal, and ideological elements, is a useful way of looking at Paul’s letter. It rescues the
reading from being dry dogma and enlivens it with the dramatic, an element inherent in the letter
itself. Romans 9–11 have an affiliative element, especially as Paul dramatizes his formal point by
speaking of the pruning of the olive tree (11:11–24). Romans 12–15 can be read as expanding
upon the generative element, as each Christian exercises his gifts for the good of the whole body.
However, by this point in the letter, the dramatic element seems to fade, as Paul presses on to the
end.
Once again, the greatest concern with Erikson’s theory is in the definition of autonomy.
Autonomy must be redefined or reframed as individuation and self-control to be positive term in
identity actualization. His emphasis on trust versus mistrust form the foundation of this
developmental theory. It is also the central concern of Paul in Romans. The dystonic elements
correlate with Paul’s description of sinful man. The syntonic elements of initiative and industry,
if coupled with mistrust (lack of trust) and narcissistic autonomy are unacceptable for Christian
practical theology. If autonomy can be salvaged as individuation worked within the Christian by
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the Holy Spirit, especially as a way of reducing any sense of unhealthy “clinginess,” then it can
become a useful term. However, as stated earlier, great caution must be used at this stage.
Initiative and industry, if tied to a motivated desire to serve others, are also of value. When the
baptized person knows that his real identity is that of being righteous in Christ, and that this
righteousness is his only by faith (trust), then being individuated, and being motivated to initiate
and to do good works, help to form the Christian’s unique actualized identity, as he puts his Godgiven gifts to work in service to others within his vocation. This increases his sense of affiliation
with others, in church, in the family, and in society, and gives expression to generativity. At the
end of his life, he can look back and appreciate, even if only partially, a degree of integrity.

Questions for Pastoral Theology from an Eriksonian Perspective
Up to this point, most of the conversation has been a correlative discussion of Erikson’s
theory. While Erikson’s theory has been a lens through which Paul’s theology in his letter to the
Romans has been viewed, Paul’s baptismal theology has been the controlling norm for the
discussion. In this section, while impossible to know exactly what Erikson would ask, an attempt
will be made let Erikson challenge a Pauline theology of identity development. This will follow a
somewhat fanciful format. Erikson and a Practical Theologian will be involved in a fictional
conversation.132
Practical Theologian: Erik, in your discussions with Huey Newton you expressed concern
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that too wide a sense of identity might make people “formless, ineffective, and lost.”133 Despite
your concern for “pseudospeciation,” it appears that you would put a limit on the size of a social
group so that it still maintains its integrity. Paul makes a great distinction between the baptized
and the unbaptized. Yet, he avers that all the baptized, regardless their ethnic group, are one
family. How do you respond to this?
Erikson: Paul, in a sense, does create a situation of pseudospeciation, by dividing people
between the baptized and those outside the Christian faith. I am certain that he would not
consider this division to be a false one, so the” pseudo-” in my term would be objectionable.
What he does, if I understand him correctly, is create the sense of a new family. This family is
joined together by faith in the Father, who gave his Son. Therefore, he calls Christians
“brothers.” My concern is not for the narrowing of the “species” to Christians. Rather, I would
ask the church in America which identity is of greater importance. “What does American identity
stand for? As you know, for the longest time this country has prided itself, beside technical
know-how, on having a ‘way of life.’”134 This identity was more important than the identities
immigrants brought with them to this land.
Practical Theologian: Yes, please stay on this train of thought for a while. Paul understood
baptismal identity to be a higher-level identity than the identities believers brought with them
into the church. In Romans, he drove this identity home to combat, among other things, the
tendency of Judean-leaning Christians (Jews) and Hellenists to exult in their ethnic or cultural
identities to the detriment of Christian unity.
Erikson: Yes, and he had his own motives for doing this, as I understand it. He needed a
united church in Rome in order to have a base of operations and support for his mission to
133
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Spain.135
Practical Theologian: So it would appear. The church desires to reach out to people in
different cultures. This requires us to be sensitive to lower-level identities.
Erikson: This may be so. That is your realm, not mine. But I would ask you to consider
whether, in the church in America, identity as an “American” is, in actuality, a higher-level
identity than that of “Christian.” I was very happy to assume a new identity as an American. In
1929 became a citizen. Nevertheless, as one who came here as an immigrant, I believe I can see
things that the typical American is blind to, such as the desire to throw off all manner of
autocracy.136 Americans want to be masters of everything. To what degree does this desire, which
you might understand to be reflected in my use of the term autonomy, make the American
Christian unwilling to submit to divine authority? If, as you say, God determines a Christian’s
identity, and not the individual, then might clinging to the moniker of “American” as the highest
identity be a way of rebelling against God?
Practical Theologian: And this would be detrimental to attempts to reach out to immigrants
from other cultures. I see where you are going. So, you would have us subsume our national
identity under our baptismal identity so that it becomes primary. This would then elevate the
unifying aspect of the gospel.
Erikson: It very well might. As I wrote in Young Man Luther, “All religions assume that a
Higher Identity inhabits the great unknown.”137 What I said in general about all religions appears
to hold true for Christianity as it joins all peoples, regardless of social status or ethnicity, into one
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family. In fact, Paul states in Galatians that there is no distinction between the sexes either.138
That is a radical thought!
Practical Theologian: Erik, you speak often of “positive and negative” identities. You
appear to believe that they must both exist for a strong, lasting identity to hold together in a
person.139 How do you view Paul’s struggle between the “New I” and “Sin”? Are these parallel in
any way?
Erikson: “It should be clear that these concepts are always both personal and communal.”140
Identity is never individualistic. I appreciate Paul’s sense of communal identity as members of
the church. However, it appears to me that the Lutheran view of righteousness is too often just
that, individualistic, especially in the American context. Perhaps this comes from Martin Luther.
In Young Man Luther, I pointed out Luther’s struggle for an identity. His struggle was as one
who was an individual. Rather than accepting the identifications given him by his father and later
by the church, he stepped out on his own.141
Practical Theologian: Your statement seems to work against you. If Luther’s striving for
independence from father and pope creates rampant individualism, does it not work counter to a
desire for sociality?
Erikson: It certainly could. However, I believe that “the original faith which Luther tried to
restore goes back to the basic trust of early infancy.” He found in the gospel of the grace of God
in Christ, the “smiling face” of God, which he had not found in the Law.142 This certainly seems
to agree with Paul’s words in Romans.
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Practical Theologian: Since this smiling God is the Father, this opened the way for a sense
of true family! Yes, this would make sense. But back to the concept of the positive and negative
identities.
Erikson: “Human nature can best be studied in the state of conflict.”143 An essential conflict
in my theory is the conflict between the parents and the child, which is not merely the
establishment of independence, but “defiance, stubbornness, and self-insistence.”144 Without this
the child cannot develop a trust sense of “I.” Paul appears to be very negative about autonomy.
He labels as “sin” any stubbornness against the commandments of God. I truly question whether
any attempt to moderate my theory to reduce autonomy to individuation is faithful to my intent.
Practical Theologian: You, Erik, point to Luther and appear to see him shift the object of
his defiance from his father to the pope. I wonder whether Paul would not approve the idea of
autonomy as defiance if the object of the Christian’s defiance was not God but “Sin.” Trust is to
be placed in God. The Christian is to mistrust everything that sets itself up, or that is set up, as an
alternative god. Might not the same virtue of will be exercised in defiance against all that is
counter to God and his truth?
Erikson: You might make that change to my theory, but you are modifying what I said.
Then again, mine is but “a way of looking at things.”
Practical Theologian: One of the most intriguing parts of your theory is in ritualization.
Might you expand on that for us?
Erikson: In Young Man Luther, I outlined the ritualization of monastic life which Luther
endured, the aim of which was to indoctrinate him in its ideology. Since Lutheranism, as a
whole, eschews monasticism, I would ask how Lutherans utilize the baptism liturgy to teach a
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Christian ideology. It appears that the ritualization power of the liturgy is attenuated to a large
degree by the manner in which it is conducted.
Practical Theologian: I would agree. In the next chapter this is one of the tasks that will be
attempted, to point to the ritual structure and suggest ways to improve its performance.
Nevertheless, please remember that the true power of baptism is not in the ritual but in the power
of the word attached to the water.
Erikson: Yes, I understand that is your theology. However, you are concerned, if I
understand your purpose, with the actualization of identity. You say that a Christian’s real
identity is given in baptism. It is a foreclosed identity in that it is imputed to the Christian by
God. I would like to see how you use the ritual of baptism to give a Christian a sense of identity.
Practical Theologian: As you may be aware, your theory has been welcomed by many
Christians who practice and teach pastoral care. However, your ideas have not been subjected to
a rigorous theological review. Since baptism is integral to Christian identity, it has been the
purpose of this study to do just that. The main objection, from a theological perspective, is in
applying your stages of development to the Christian’s real, imputed identity.
Erikson: That does not surprise me. As I said earlier, all religions claim that a person’s
higher identity is given by the divine.
Practical Theologian: Yet, interestingly, this study has found that your developmental
model, once “mistrust” (lack of faith) is one’s orientation toward God, aligns fairly well with
Paul’s description of the results of sin.
Erikson: That is something I never explored.
Practical Theologian: Nor did practical theologians such as Donald Capps and James
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Fowler, or Pastoral Counselors, such as Gary Collins145 or Richard Eyer. However, Eyer did
provide a way of understanding Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt) in a way usable for
Christian pastoral care.146 Your developmental theory does provide a way of looking at the
actualization of Christian identity. The task remains, in the next chapter, to consider the theory in
light of experiential identity development and in its implications for ecclesiastical rituals,
especially the baptismal rite.
Erikson: As my son Kai said, after the final session with Huey Newton, “I guess that’s it.
Let’s close by agreeing that we’ve all earned a drink.”147

Summary of the Evaluation
Before exploring some implications of this study for the work of pastoral care, a summary
of the evaluation of Erikson’s theory in light of Pauline baptismal theology in Romans is in
order. This will highlight the major findings in order to solidify the validity of the thesis that the
utilization of Erikson’s developmental theory in pastoral care is theologically defensible, in two
specific, and seemingly contradictory, areas when dealing with Christian identity. First,
Erikson’s theory, when viewed through the lens of Paul’s theology of baptism in Romans, and
especially in the preparatory work Paul does in Romans 1–5, can be used in pastoral care to
describe and illustrate the effects, or fruits, of original sin. Second, it can be utilized faithfully in
assisting in the pastoral care work of identity actualization, if, and only if, the concept of identity
construction or development is excluded from the foundation of Christian identity, which
identity is conferred by means of baptism and based upon the finished work of Christ, in his
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death and resurrection.
The first part of the thesis is concerned with the possibility of legitimately using Erikson’s
theory to assist the task of pastoral care is describing the fruits, or effects, of original sin. Paul
demonstrates, in Rom. 1:18–3:20 that no one is righteous other than God. His gospel is about the
righteousness of God. All of humanity falls short of God’s glory and is designated as ἄδικος
(unrighteous). This is humanity’s identity in Adam (Rom. 5:12–21). At the core of this
unrighteousness is humanity’s mistrust of God. But since creatures cannot exist on their own, but
are dependent beings, this mistrust of God has along with it trust in “that-which-is-not-God.”
Humanity turns to creation and worships and serves it (Rom. 1:22–23). In other words, the
attempt to be truly autonomous is a foolish impossibility. This kind of autonomy produces shame
and doubt and leads to deeds of shameful behavior. Rom. 2:1–3:20 provide a narrative which, in
many ways, parallels Erikson’s model, even if not exactly. Shame leads to the attempt at selfjustification, which ends up with the decree of universal guilt. Any attempt at initiative and
industry to build an autonomous identity results to guilt and inferiority. Humanity is incompetent
in the things related to its relationship to God, and even in the social interactions with one
another. In the end, the only identity which is true is that of ἄδικος. All self-chosen, self-created
identities are false identities. In this way, Erikson’s model can be legitimately used in pastoral
care to guide people away from a false identity and to the acknowledgment of being, apart from
Christ, ἄδικος.
The second important part of the thesis grows from this first part. Any attempt to interject
human effort or works into the Christian concept of identity as one being righteous (δίκαιος) must
be rejected. Paul makes it abundantly clear that righteousness (δικαιοσύνη) is passively received
by faith alone. In no way is any human initiative involved; it is by pure divine monergism. In no
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way is human industry involved; it is Christ’s work of atonement (his propitiatory sacrifice:
Rom. 3:25) which has accomplished it. Human autonomy is excluded because it is the antithesis
of trust, of receiving from one’s Creator the redeeming work of his Son. The Christian’s identity
is certain because it was given to him by God when he was baptized into Christ and received the
Holy Spirit.
The third part of this thesis asks the question, “Can Erikson’s theory help the work of
pastoral care in the realm of identity actualization?” The answer given is in the affirmative, if the
caveat of part two of the thesis is remembered. The thorny issue of Erikson’s term, “autonomy,”
has been addressed by redefining or reframing it in terms of two important concepts. First, the
Holy Spirit not only joins all Christians together as members of the sanctorum communio, he
also gifts every baptized person with individuating gifts to be used in service to the sanctorum
communio. If autonomy is understood in terms of being a contributing member of the church,
serving and not merely being served, then the concept can find a place in pastoral care work.
Second, if Capp’s suggestion that the term be reframed as self-mastery, a term further changed in
this dissertation to self-control, is accepted, then autonomy finds an alternate way of being
expressed. What Capps apparently had in mind was the control that the infant must learn over his
bowels in toilet training. This sense of bodily control leads to the sense of self-control in other
areas of life. Self-control is the final virtue Paul lists in Gal. 5:23, as he describes “the fruit of the
Spirit.” Individuation and self-control, understood in these ways, are effects of the righteousness
of faith and are consistent with a life lived out of trust in God.
Furthermore, having received gifts from the Spirit in baptism, the Christian is now free to
exercise his gifts for the common good. Looking back to the righteousness of faith, this
conferred righteousness frees the Christian from fear of being condemned for incompetence.
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Paul declares, in Rom. 8:1, that “nothing is condemnation” for the one who is in Christ. Will the
Christian fail? Yes, that is certain. However, because there is no condemnation, even if (and
there is truly no “if” about it) the Christian falls short in deeds of service, his identity, his true
identity, is certain because it is not in his works but in Christ, into whom he has been baptized.
As far as identity actualization is concerned, the Christian does not look primarily to his works
for his ultimate identity. That identity is conferred and secure. On the other hand, the vocation to
which the baptized is called by God gives specificity and shape to that identity as he learns to be
Christ to his neighbor.
Aside from the three major parts of the thesis, a few closing remarks are in order before
endeavoring to give some practical shape to the findings of this dissertation in chapter 5.
Erikson’s theory spans the entire life cycle. His unique contribution has been to place ego
development, including the experiential development of a sense of identity within the human life
span and to call it a life cycle. By labeling it a cycle, rather than simply the life span, he
highlights the way each stage relates to the others. Erikson’s theory, as further developed by
Marcia and Waterman, provides the language to discuss statuses of identity and of changes in the
status. This preserves the richness of human experience and allows for a thick description of a
person’s current experience of identity. A major contribution of Erikson’s theory is that it leans
toward identity achievement as being socially influenced. Its chief weakness is that it is without
any objective teleology. A person achieves a sense of ego identity which works for that person in
the social context in which she lives. Stages II (Autonomy vs. Shame and Guilt) and Stage III
(Initiative vs. Guilt) appear to be Erikson’s attempt to remain faithful to Freud’s stages of
psychosexual development. In this dissertation, the distinction between these two stages has been
intentionally blurred. Erikson’s theory on the ritualization of life is extremely useful for
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analyzing the ritual elements of the baptismal rites. It has been shown how this analysis provides
material that can be of help in pastoral care.
As with Erikson, Paul’s theology of baptism, and of baptismal identity, encompasses the
physical, social, and psychological dimensions of life. Additionally, his teaching about Christian
identity leads to a diminishing, albeit not an erasure, of ethnic identity. This correlates well with
Erikson’s concern about pseudospeciation. Both Paul and Erikson understand the divisiveness of
overemphasizing these distinctives between people. Both Paul and Erikson view life as social.
For Erikson, the social dimensions of life are necessary for human affective development. Paul
cannot conceive of the Christian life apart from incorporation into the body of Christ, which is
the family of God.
Although Erikson does not approach identity development from a theological perspective,
it has been shown that using Erikson’s theory when providing pastoral care in terms of Christian
identity and identity actualization is theologically defensible. Although it is of limited value in
discussing the gift of a conferred righteous identity in baptism, it should be considered in relation
to baptismal identity actualization. A unique use of his theory has been found in modifying his
early stages to point out the detrimental effects of mistrust of God, which leads to narcissistic
autonomy. Once this path is chosen, each of the syntonic elements become deadly to faith. By
using his theory in this way, pastoral care can uncover mistrust by its fruits. On the positive side,
if a person is grounded in the righteousness of faith, Erikson’s model can be used to guide the
task of pastoral care so that the person learns to live out, to actualize, the new identity in the
community, the family, and the church by caring for others in love.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF ERIKSON’S THEORY FOR PASTORAL CARE
In the previous chapter, it has been demonstrated that the utilization of Erikson’s
developmental theory in pastoral care is theologically defensible when describing the effects of
original sin and how people attempt to build a self-chosen, autonomous identity. It also can be
used with care when discussing the actualization, or coram mundo, expression of one’s identity,
so long as “autonomy” is reframed to mean individuation and self-control over sinful impulses.
Other than agreeing with Erikson that trust is fundamental to life, Erikson’s theory ought to be
excluded from any discussion of the Christian’s conferred identity, which is grounded in the gift
of the alien righteousness of Christ, received by faith (trust). Essentially, the only contribution
Eriksonian theory has to the Christian’s real identity in Christ is understanding that identity, the
conferred identity, as a “foreclosed” identity. In terms of pastoral care use, “foreclosed” should
be viewed as a positive term. Being foreclosed, the identity is firm and certain, since it is not
based on the imperfection of a person’s work in initiative, industry, or even in vocation.
This is not a “how-to” chapter. Issues of pragmatics in pastoral care work are beyond the
scope of this dissertation. This chapter has as its purpose three modest goals. First, some
implications of Erikson’s theory in light of imputed baptismal identity will be discussed, with the
hope that it will spur research on pragmatic applications in the future. The Christian’s conferred,
imputed identity as being righteous in Christ is foundational to any understanding of Christian
identity. That this imputed identity is a foreclosed identity has been, and will continue to be,
described as a positive concept and not as an essentially negative one, as developmental theory
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tends portrays it. The second task is to point out some implications for research in experiential
identity actualization, drawing on Paul’s baptismal theology and the writings of Erikson, Marcia,
and Waterman. The third task is the exploration of the implications and possibilities of using the
baptismal rites of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, in pastoral care issues involving
Christian identity. This will be done by examining them through the lens of Erikson’s theory of
ritualization. How do the rites function ritualistically? How might they assist the Christian in
actualizing the imputed, real identity?
There are certainly numerous trajectories which could be examined. One important one
which, while tempting to tackle, is too complicated to deal with herein is the issue of sexual
identity. Erikson’s terminology for Stage V, in the second edition of Childhood and Society and
subsequent books, was “Identity vs. Role Confusion.”1 This dissertation follows Erikson’s earlier
term, “Identity Diffusion,” a terminology recommended by Marcia and Waterman. Erikson wrote
of “bisexual confusion” in Identity: Youth and Crisis.2 So there may be much in Erikson which
will assist pastoral care work in this area. That, however, must be set aside for now. Instead, the
implications outlined below parallel the three concerns addressed in the theological evaluation of
chapter 4.

Implications of Imputed Baptismal Identity for Pastoral Care
Erikson’s theory is a theory of affective development over the life cycle. A significant
critique leveled against his theory is that it has no objective teleology. It has been argued above
that this does not make his theory fatally flawed if such a goal is supplied by theology. From a
Lutheran perspective, one way in which a biblically sound teleology can be described is found in
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Erikson, Childhood and Society, 261–63.

2

Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, 27, 186–87, 254.
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Luther’s Small Catechism: “That I may belong to him [Christ], live under him in his kingdom,
and serve him in eternal righteousness, innocence, and blessedness, just as he is risen from the
dead and lives and reigns eternally.”3 This description includes several important aspects of
Christian identity. The words highlight the shift in ownership from being a slave to sin and the
devil to now being under Christ’s lordship. Service to the Lord is done in righteousness, that is,
in a right relationship to God, a restored relationship based on the redemption that is in Christ
Jesus.4 This righteousness, as argued above, is the core of the Christian’s identity. The term,
“innocence,” implies, among other things, the simplicity of child-like faith. The righteousness of
faith is just such a trust. The three terms combine to point to the integrity that will be enjoyed in
the eschatological kingdom. This teleology is grounded in the resurrection of Jesus, who lives
and reigns forever. Furthermore, the concept of the kingdom implies sociality, in that the king
reigns over a multitude of subjects. By incorporating this teleology into a pastoral care usage of
Erikson’s theory, one can help the person seeking help to orient his actualization of identity away
from self-chosen ideals and toward the conferred identity given in Christ.
The baptized person is declared righteous by the joyous exchange, for Jesus took
humanity’s unrighteousness upon himself and gifts his righteousness to humanity by faith.5 This
imputed or conferred identity is foundational to the actualization of identity, which will be
discussed below. Without an identity conferred by God, there is no objective foundation for
Christian identity, let alone for actualizing one. The Christian’s real identity is the imputed
identity of being righteous in Christ. It is the righteousness of faith. This imputation, or conferral,
is not, however, a legal fiction. There “is no conflict between being declared righteous and being
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Rom. 3:24; Eph. 1:7; Col. 1:14.
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made righteous.”6 God’s word accomplishes what he speaks. This is true for the externally
proclaimed word of God, and for the sacraments. As Wolfhart Pannenberg writes, “Baptism and
the Supper are significatory acts, ‘signs of the nearness of God,’ Both, as signs, effect what they
signify.”7 What Christ accomplished on the cross and by his resurrection is given to the Christian
in baptism.8 Thus, whether by preaching or by sacrament, God creates a new reality, a reality he
declares to be true.
Eriksonian theory would describe the baptismal identity of being righteous by faith as a
foreclosed identity. As stated earlier, this is nothing to argue against; these correlate quite well.
In fact, the very foreclosed nature of this identity guarantees its ultimate actualization in the
eschaton. In Eriksonian theory, identity, while strongly socially influenced, is also selfconstructed. Erikson states that it “arises from the selective repudiation and mutual assimilation
of childhood identifications and their absorption in a new configuration, which, in turn is
dependent on the process by which society (often through subsocieties) identifies the young
individual.”9 There is therefore an interplay between the individual and the social matrix in
which he is reared. Yet, the individual’s attainment of a sense of self has “a self-aspect and an
ego aspect”10 which involves him in the process of synthesizing his own self-identity. Stanley
Grenz traces the genesis for the “self-focused self” back to Augustine’s “turn toward the
individual.” While it is not the purpose to argue for or against Grenz’s hypothesis, it is hard to
refute the assertion that modern anthropology “elevates mastery as the key to the construction of
6
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the self.”11 This self-mastery permeates Erikson’s description of affective development. Even in
describing Luther’s identity development in Young Man Luther, Erikson links it to the worldmastery that was occurring at the time when navies were opening water routes to new
continents.12
The imputation of righteousness as the core of the Christian’s new identity in Christ gives a
sure foundation for life and for the actualization of this identity in daily living. Again, this is not
a legal fiction. Kolb and Arand explain the importance of this new identity being a reality.
Thus justification is not a legal fiction. The word does what it says. When God
declares a person to be righteous, that person is actually righteous. The Word has
brought about a new reality. A new relationship has been established. Luther did not
define the status of the believer “as if” one were righteous. The believer was not
fundamentally a sinner for whom God “has purchased a ticket for heaven,” where the
sinner will finally lose that sinful identity while in this life the sinful identity remains
primary.13
This statement agrees with Paul’s assertion in Rom. 6:22 that the baptized person is no longer a
slave to sin. Even though there remains a struggle against indwelling sin (Rom. 7:19), “sinner” is
not the Christian’s true identity. Rather, the Christian delight’s in God’s Torah (Rom. 7:22),
because he is a new creation (2 Cor. 5:17), who has been brought from death to life (Rom. 6:13).
Faithful pastoral care does not point a person to himself so that he builds a self-focused
identity. Rather, by focusing a person’s attention on the identity given in baptism, the pastor
assists the person to actualize the specificity of that identity in the vocation into which God has
called him. Kolb and Arand describe the pastor’s work as urging Christians to help their
neighbor, not in order to earn salvation but “because it is good for your neighbor, and because it
11
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is the way in which God intends humanity to be enjoyed.”14 This points to the actualization of
identity in terms of relationships and work. In Eriksonian terminology, a Christian’s identity is
developed and expressed in the affiliative and generative stages of development. These are the
stages within which are the virtues of love and caring.15 A Christian is given his identity, he
receives it by faith, then he expresses it by loving and caring for others. This is what it means to
live in integrity, that is, in accordance with the identity of being righteous. Righteousness before
God (alien righteousness), understood as identity, as being in a right relationship with God in
Christ, becomes a powerful motivation to live righteously before others, that is, in a right
relationship with the neighbor, because it is reality and not a legal fiction. “You have died and
your life is now hidden with Christ in God” (Col. 3:3), therefore, live as a living sacrifice ((Rom.
12:1) serving as Christ has served you.

Implications of Baptismal Identity Actualization for Pastoral Care
Building on the conferred, objective (real) identity given in baptism, how might Erikson’s
developmental theory be used faithfully in pastoral care? In this section, four implications will be
discussed. First, the importance of attending to the developmental stage of the parishioner will be
considered, including how he or she has negotiated earlier stages which serve as the foundation
for the current stage of development. Second, the utilization of Erikson’s theory for pastoral care
assessment will be examined. Next, the importance of struggle, or crises, for growth in active
righteousness will be revisited. It has been discussed at length in chapter 4. Finally, the
importance of sociality for identity development will close this section. In the section that
follows, the two baptismal rites approved for use in The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod will
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be examined in detail in order to understand how they can provide material for pastoral care of
identity actualization.
Erik Erikson divides the life cycle into eight stages. His developmental stages are linked to
the lifecycle stages of infancy, early childhood, the play age, the school age, adolescence, young
adulthood, adulthood, and the mature age.16 Capps generally followed Erikson, whom he had
met, except that, in The Decades of Life,17 he attempted to arrange the stages according to the
decades from birth to 100 years old. Robert Fuller also followed Erikson as he tried to describe
human fulfillment in terms of religious development.18 Fuller also incorporated Fowler’s stages
of faith, which is admittedly more cognitive than affective.19 Daniel Levinson reduced the stages
of life to four, namely, childhood and adolescence (age 0–22), early adulthood (age 17–45),
middle adulthood (40–65), and late adulthood (60–?).20 He allows for overlap, which reflects the
reality of the arbitrary divisions between the stages. However, his combination of childhood with
adolescence does not do justice to the massive changes that take place in the first two decades of
life. Gail Sheehy concerns herself with aspects of the life cycle after age 18. She writes about
“provisional adulthood,” which is essentially equivalent to early adulthood, “first adulthood,”
ages 30–45, and “second adulthood,” ages 45 and above.21 Each of these writers understand that
people develop over the lifespan and that each stage along the way has its own unique
challenges. Therefore, in pastoral care, one must be cognizant of the crises each stage brings with
16
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it. This would appear to be especially important for one-on-one pastoral care work, couple
counseling, and even youth work and instruction. Knowing the stage of affective development,
as well as cognitive development, can assist in highlighting to what degree identity actualization
can be expressed at that stage in life.
Marcia and Josselson report: “Empirical research aimed at validating Erikson’s theory has
been ongoing for close to ﬁfty years.”22 Using an identity status approach, their research has not
only verified Erikson’s theory;23 they have expanded it to test the areas of intimacy, generativity,
and integrity. These, they have found, are grounded in the work of actualizing one’s identity,
what they call the “identity achievement status.” With solid research to back up Erikson’s theory,
it would appear wise to incorporate it into the practice pastoral care, given the results of this
study showing how it might be used faithfully with certain caveats mentioned above. For
example, it would appear to be helpful for couple counseling to know which “identity status”
each member of the couple is at before dealing with the couple as a unit.
Eyer, who authored Pastoral Care Under the Cross, while director of pastoral care at
Columbia Hospital, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, gives an example of how Erikson’s stages might
apply at each stage of development. Specifically, Eyer is writing about the developmental needs
of the elderly.24 For the goal of each stage to be met, the preceding stages must have been
negotiated adequately. Additionally, each stage cycles back on every other, forming more a web
than a sequence. Although it would not be expected that a play-age child would have a fully
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formed identity in all areas of life, a certain sense of identity is still to be there, even if only
nascently. What is missing in Eyer’s description is the expression of one’s baptismal identity at
each stage. Wise pastoral care can assist an elderly person, who may be troubled by a sense of
worthlessness or even disgust and despair, by reorienting the elder’s mind (renewing of the
mind: Rom. 12:2) from grounding his worth in his works to the conferred status of being
righteous by faith, and, therefore, being a beloved child of God and heir with Christ.
Since a Christian is given his identity at baptism, every Christian has the identity as one
who is righteous by faith. How this identity is actualized at each stage in life will vary.
Nevertheless, to put off identity development until adolescence or later is foolish, and is not even
faithful to Erikson’s theory. Certainly, the expression of a righteous identity will be different in
middle school than it will be in college, or in marriage, or in a retirement home. Righteousness is
to be actualized at each stage. Pastoral care involves guiding people in such a way that they
might find faithful ways of expressing that identity in all stages of development. In early
adulthood, the Christian may be asking whether the roles expected of him are truly valid or
faithful to God’s will for his life.25 Such a question would move a person into an appropriate
moratorium, as he tries to figure out in what way his identity as one righteous by faith is to be
expressed. But to cast off that identity, given in baptism, would be to assume a false identity,
more consistent with the old man than with the new creature he is in Christ. Similarly, to struggle
with vocational choices is part of maturation.26 Taking time to find out how to serve one’s
neighbor is wise. Pastoral care and counseling can guide a person by providing direction. By
keeping baptismal identity in the forefront, the pastor can assist the person in finding a vocation
that is consistent with the core identity given in Christ.
25
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A second implication of Erikson’s theory is in pastoral care assessment. Each stage along
life’s way has its own unique crises. However, a major concern of pastoral care is repentance and
faith, that of putting off the old man and putting on the new man in the concrete setting of that
person’s life.27 Foundational to any concern of pastoral care is trust in Christ. In chapter 4, it was
described how autonomy grows from mistrust in God and from trust in “that-which-is-not-God.”
From this desire for autonomy from God, the desire to be God for oneself, develop the initiative
to attempt self-justification. However, since no one is God except God, the attempt at autonomy
produces a depleted self. The depleted self is a shamed self.28 Since shame drives a person to
cover up, the self that is presented to the world is a false self, even a hypocritical self. In the
work of pastoral care, it is wise to consider the reasons for boasting in his accomplishments.
Such boasting may be an ego defense mechanism, an attempt to hide the failure to truly be
autonomous. Such a disclosure would reveal a lack of trust in God, in that the person’s true
nexus of trust in the narcissistic, yet depleted, self.
On the other hand, as also discussed at length in chapter 4, if a person is attempting to
actualize his righteous identity from the fount of the alien righteousness given in baptism, then
paying attention to the various developmental stages can be of help in guiding the person in
maturity. By emphasizing the identity given in baptism, the pastor can help the person to gain an
understanding about how that identity can be faithfully expressed in love toward those within his
social circle, including family, work, neighborhood, and church. The Christian’s identity is
secure in Christ. The declarative word of God in Christ has created a new reality, not merely a
27
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possibility. Therefore, the pastor first proclaims what God has proclaimed. “You are righteous.”
Then, he can assist the parishioner in exploring what that identity looks like and acts like in that
person’s unique station in life. This also includes speaking with the person about ways to care for
others by understanding his vocation to be a calling in which he becomes Christ to his neighbor.
In both intimacy and in generativity, the sociality of the Christian life is to be expressed.
A third implication of experiential identity development involves the place crisis has in
identity actualization. From a biblical perspective, learning to actualize one’s identity as
righteous in Christ involves struggle against indwelling sin. Indwelling sin is the Christian’s
great existential crisis. Paul expresses this spiritual crisis poignantly in Rom. 7:13–25. Paul’s
description of his struggle against sin is closely connected to his teaching about baptism and its
effects. Middendorf notes that only one imperative occurs in Romans outside of Rom. 6:11–19.
Within that range of verses are five imperatives. “They exhort those who ‘have become new
men’ by virtue of the one-time aorist act of baptism to resist sin and, instead, to walk in the
renewal of life which only now is possible (6:4).”29 Therefore, while baptism bestows a new
identity, making one to be a “new man,” it also calls the baptized to actualize the new reality.30
Indwelling sin, however, remains “in one’s members,” even though it is not one’s true identity.
This compounds the crisis.
In Rom. 8:1, Paul assures the baptized person that even though sinful impulses result in
sinful actions, the person who has been baptized into Christ Jesus will not be condemned. Paul
concludes his description of being a distressed man, because of indwelling sin, by rejoicing in
Christ who will deliver him from “this body of death” (Rom. 7:24–25). This points to one of the
29
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surprisingly felicitous results of sin remaining in the members this side of the grave or the
eschaton. The law points out the sins the Christian unintentionally commits. Lex semper accusat
(the law always accuses).31 Since it always accuses, the Christian is constantly pointed back to
trust in Christ. Any initiative, industry, or generativity on the part of the Christian will only be
partial and therefore incapable of providing the grounds for self-justification.32 Therefore, even
sin, paradoxically, works in the believer’s favor, if he hears the accusation of the law and trusts
in Christ’s atoning work. By so doing, even struggle with and against sin strengthens the
Christian’s identity as one who is righteous by, and only by, faith in Jesus. Then, once a person
knows that the core of Christian identity is the righteousness of faith given in baptism, and that
the power of baptism for actualization of active righteousness is in the death and resurrection of
Christ (which is the Christian’s in baptism), then the initiative to actualize that identity, that is, to
put it into practice, by industrious generativity done in love for neighbor can be pursued.
A fourth implication of experiential identity development involves the concept of sociality.
Love for neighbor, and generative care for him, points to the sociality of baptism and baptismal
identity. In Rom. 12:3–21, Paul intends his hearers to live out their baptism in sacrificial service
to one another. Each person has received a gift with which he is to serve the Christian
community. The social aspect of the baptismal life is highlighted by his description of the church
as a body with various member. Paul makes a similar point in 1 Cor. 12:12–13. Baptism forms
the basis for the corporate life of the church, for the sociality of the Christian community. Paul is
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not arguing in this letter for the practice of baptism; rather he assumes it to be normative.
Richard DeMaris writes about these words to the Corinthian church:
Paul’s claim in these verses that all Christians have undergone baptism and his
introduction of it to argue for unity is instructive. Paul does not argue for baptism but
from it. That is, he depends on it as a premise from which to address a problem
current among the recipients of his letter.33
This sociality expands Christian identity beyond the individual, a concept Paul likely would not
have understood in the way it is today, to the community of faith. The church, as mentioned
repeatedly above, is the sanctorum communio. The corporate nature of the church is greater than
the individuals who comprise its membership.
The implications of sociality extend to the manner in which incorporation into the body of
Christ creates a higher-level identity, which supersedes the socioeconomic and ethnic identities
one has by birth or historical accident. In Gal. 3:14, as in Romans 4, Paul states that all
Christians are now heirs of the promise made to Abraham. J. Daniel Hays writes:
The equation of gospel and Abrahamic promise is significant for our study of race
because we have found the Abrahamic promise running like a scarlet thread
throughout the Scriptures, surfacing especially when the biblical authors are stressing
the universality of God’s plan, his call, or his people.34
Erikson wrote about pseudospeciation. The gospel overcomes this by uniting all Christians
together into the one body of Christ, into which all Christians are baptized. The gospel creates a
unique social identity and cohesion, not simply by membership into an organization, but by a
mystical union, an ontological unity of the Spirit, as Paul describes it in Eph. 4:3. This unity is
reality; it is a true identity. It too, however, must be actualized. This is done as each member,
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intimately connected to every other member, does its part to build up the body in love (Eph.
4:15–16).

The Rites of Holy Baptism and Christian Identity
Since Christian identity is linked to baptism, it would appear valid to explore implications
of the rites of baptism for Christian identity. Christians are given their identity by God when they
are baptized. By means of baptism, they are united with Christ in his death, burial, and
resurrection, declared to be righteous, made to be saints and children of God, and joined to all
other Christians as fellow siblings under one Father. How strange it is, then, that when pastoral
care involves issues of identity, little more is said other than, “Live out your baptism.” William
H. Willimon takes notice of this discrepancy in pastoral care when he states that “an examination
of present baptismal theology and practice indicates that the baptismal font would be the last
place in the church for one to expect help on questions of identity.”35 This is not as it should be.
Therefore, the task of this section is to consider how the baptismal rites used within The
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod might be utilized effectively as material for pastoral care of
identity actualization, using Eriksonian ritualization as one way to view the elements of the rites.
To accomplish this task, the baptismal rites will be view through the stages of ritualization
outlined by Erikson. The two rites which are examined are the rite of “Holy Baptism” and “Holy
Baptism—Alternate Form,” in Lutheran Service Book Pastoral Care Companion,36 since these
are the current rituals used by a great number of LCMS congregations. Before examining them in
terms of ritualization, a description of the elements and the three-act structure of the rites is
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The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod Commission on Worship, Lutheran Service Book Pastoral Care
Companion (St. Louis: Concordia, 2007), 3–20. Lutheran Service Book Pastoral Care Companion will hereafter be
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presented in order to orient the study in the flow of the ritual.
The general notes which precede the rite of “Holy Baptism” state: “The rite of Holy
Baptism is a public rite of the Church that is usually administered in the presence of the
congregation.”37 The rite is usually situated within the wider divine service, replacing the
confession of sins and absolution. The Creed is usually omitted in the divine service because it is
contained within the rite. Several nonobligatory rubrics include: warm water in the font,
baptismal napkins and towels, a baptismal shell, and the use of olive oil during the postbaptismal blessing. The enrollment of sponsors is expected, although several options are given. It
is of special interest that one item mandated by the rubrics is the lighted paschal candle. “The
paschal candle is lighted for all baptisms. It remains lighted for the entire service or office.”38
The rite does allow for pouring, sprinkling, and immersion.
The rite may begin with a baptismal hymn.39 In pastoral care and counseling, these hymns
can provide texts for meditating on aspects of Christian identity. The hymns should be used to
point out both the gift of alien righteousness and the outworking of active righteousness. Familial
terms can also be mined in order to enhance the affiliative aspects of baptism.
The rite assumes the gathering of the candidate for baptism with the sponsors and the
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family. This demonstrates the sociality of the rite. This could be used in pastoral care to highlight
a transference from the biological family of origin into the larger family of the sanctorum
communio. While family membership is important to everyone, people without close family, or
who for various reasons are estranged from family, may find the familial aspects of the
sanctorum communio comforting and reassuring. They have a family. This same emphasis on
community is found in the use of sponsors, who, in this rite, are addressed and make promises to
be examples of faith and holy living. The rubrics appear to prefer the rite to begin at the entrance
to the nave, since this is given as the first option.
Act One of the rite beings with the invocation of the triune name. The candidate for
baptism is then addressed directly. In practice, especially in cases of infant baptism, it might
appear that the adults present are addressed. The term, “Dearly beloved,” could be taken in either
the singular or the plural. However, the rubric that precedes the rite indicates that the addressee is
the one, or ones, to be baptized. The address begins by citing Matt.28:18b–19,40 Mark 16:16a,
and 1 Pet. 3:21 as scriptural texts which command baptism and which give promises of salvation
in baptism. The address continues, teaching about original sin and the deliverance that is for all
in the atoning death of Jesus Christ. The resurrection of Jesus, which is essential to the gospel
and to baptism, is not mentioned in the address.
The first question asked of the candidate is, “How are you named?” The officiant then uses
this name as he marks the candidate’s forehead and heart with the sign of the cross, which
signifies redemption by the crucified Christ. What follows is a prayer, known as “the Flood
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Prayer” (Sintflutgebet).41 This prayer reaches back to the worldwide flood which destroyed the
world in the days of Noah. By being in the ark, he and his family were saved. It brings to
memory the drowning of Pharaoh and his army, when Israel passed safely through the Red Sea.
In each of these accounts, the water slayed the wicked. The righteous were saved by God’s
power. Then the baptism of Jesus is recalled. It is claimed in the rite that Jesus’ baptism in the
water of the Jordan River “sanctified and instituted all waters to be a saving flood and a lavish
washing away of sin.”42 In the prayer, the celebrant then asks God to make the water of the rite to
be a saving flood as well. The request includes asking faith (trust) for the candidate so that all
inherited sin would be “drowned and die”43 The prayer also asks that the candidate be “kept safe
and secure in the holy ark of the Christian Church, being separated from the multitude of
unbelievers.”44 It is also asked that he serve God’s name with fervor and joy and be declared
worthy of eternal life.
The Gospel reading for the rite is always Mark 10:13–16. This emphasizes the infant faith,
or basic passive trust which is saving faith. The reading drives home the theological lesson that
the saving effects of baptism are the work of God in Christ. It is Jesus who blesses. The Lord’s
Prayer (the “Our Father”) follows. This prayer is used in every rite and liturgy in Lutheran
Service Book. It has, therefore, numerous functions. In the rite, it is prayed while the celebrant
lays his hands on the head of the candidate, thereby including tactile elements to the ritual.
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If the foregoing has occurred at the entrance to the nave, then the baptismal party moves to
the font. Upon arrival at the font, the pastor says, as he makes the sign of the cross, “The Lord
preserve your coming in and your going out from this time and forevermore.” This is the third
time the sign of the cross has been made. The first was at the invocation. The pastor may have
made the sign upon himself along with the congregation. The rubrics do not indicate which
action it is to be. The second signing with the cross is at the naming. Now, having come to the
baptismal waters, the cross once more is made upon the candidate. The blessing upon the
candidate concerning his coming in and going out appears to make little sense if the movement
toward the font (coming in) has not occurred. It would appear that the better practice then would
be to begin the baptismal rite at the entrance to the nave.45
The arrival at the font signals the beginning of Act Two. The dramatic element of the rite
intensifies as the pastor asks the candidate to renounce the devil, his works, and his ways. He
then asks the candidate to confess the faith (fides quae creditur) into which the candidate will be
baptized. The baptismal creed is put into an interrogatory form. The final question is, “Do you
desire to be baptized?” The response is, “Yes, I do.” The pastor then pours water three times on
the head of the candidate while saying, “[Name], I baptize you in the name of the Father and of
the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” This creates an inclusio, bracketing everything between the
invocation and the baptism proper. Immediately after the baptism, the pastor again lays his hands
on the person, now no longer a candidate but a baptized Christian, and says, “The almighty God
and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has given you the new birth of water and the Spirit and
has forgiven you all your sins, strengthen you with his grace to life everlasting.” The rubric
indicates a fourth signing with the cross to accompany the blessing. The detailed notes of the rite,
45

“According to the medieval rite, the exorcisms would take place at the door of the church and the rest of
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indicating the option of olive oil with this blessing, refer to Eph. 1:13–14.46 The use of olive oil
carries with it the implication of the giving of the Spirit in baptism. The signing with the cross,
along with the “sealing” indicated in the rubrics points again to the baptized being the possession
of God, who has given the person new birth and the Spirit.47
With the baptizing in water and the marking completed, the formal aspects of the rite are
completed. Nevertheless, a few items remain in the ritual. These can be understood as
comprising Act Three, especially since they are elements that include physical gifts of
remembrance and words spoken by an assistant. Each of these elements of the ritual as optional
according to the rubrics. The first is the gift of a white garment, to picture the gift of Christ’s
righteousness. The words that accompany the gift speak of the imputed, real identity the baptized
Christian has in Christ. No exhortation to actualize this identity is given. This is pure gift. The
second gift is that of a lighted candle. The candle has been lighted from the flame of the paschal
candle, linking it to the resurrection of Christ. This gift does include an exhortation. The
Christian has received Christ, who is the Light of the world. Therefore, the Christian is “always
to live in the light of Christ and be ever watchful for his coming.” This appears to tie back to the
parable of the wise and foolish virgins in Matt. 25:1–13. If so, this could be utilized in pastoral
care and counseling to highlight the goal of wisdom in Stage VIII development.
Next, an assisting minister welcomes the newly baptized into the “one holy Christian and
apostolic Church.” These words echo those of the Third Article of the Nicene Creed. The words
are rich in affiliative language as they declare to the newly baptized that he is now a member of
46
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God’s Son, an heir along with all other Christians of the treasures of heaven, and is received as
“our brother” (or sister) in Christ. This emphasizes the sociality of the gospel and of baptism in
particular. The rite concludes with a prayer of thanksgiving, offered by the pastor, asking for
perseverance and steadfastness on behalf of the newly baptized.
The rite of “Holy Baptism—Alternate Form” in based on, although not exactly the same as,
Martin Luther’s baptism rite. The general notes indicate that the basis for the rite is the
“Baptismal Booklet as appended to Luther’s Small Catechism (The Book of Concord, Kolb
Wengert, pages 371–375).”48 Given the similarities of this rite with the one reviewed above, only
significant divergences will be addressed.
The rite begins at the entrance to the nave or at the font. Unlike the previous rite, this rite
does not begin with the invocation, rather the pastor addresses the candidate, speaking the words
of Matt. 28:18b–19, Mark 16:16a, and 1 Pet. 3:21, as before. Then he says, “The Word of God
also teaches that we are conceived and born sinful and are under the power of the devil until
Christ claims us as His own.” Then the pastor performs the exorcism saying, “Therefore, depart,
you unclean spirit, and make room for the Holy Spirit in the name of the Father and of the Son
and of the Holy Spirit.” Normal Nagel, referring to Luther’s rite, notes that the exorcism was
historically understood by Lutherans as “a touchstone of sound doctrine,” along with the
Sintflutgebet.49 Following, for the most part, Luther’s order, is a prayer imploring God’s gifts
upon the candidate to be baptized. Immediately following this prayer is the Sintflutgebet. Nagel
draws his readers’ attention to the accounts of Noah and the flood and to Moses and the crossing
of the Red Sea. These are two of the readings that appear in the Easter Vigil, the service in which
catechumens historically were baptized. Writing about the Sintflutgebet, he states: “The matrix of
48
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this prayer are the blessing of the water and the readings contained in the Easter Vigil. Cut off
from these, the prayer is difficult to use with understanding as witness the many efforts to rework
it.”50 This remark points to the benefit of baptism during the Easter Vigil, since the ritual
elements of that rite are thick and rich with symbolism, far beyond the stripped-down rite of
either of these services.
The rite of “Holy Baptism—Alternate Form” can be divided into two acts. It does not
provide for the enriched Act Three. The rubric notes the giving of a white garment as an optional
matter. The rite simply ends with the laying on of hands in the giving of the post-baptism
blessing, followed by, “Peace be with you.”
Analyzing the rites from the perspective of Erikson’s scheme for ritualization yields many
things about the rites which can be incorporated into pastoral care of those in need of actualizing
their identity, which has been given to them by means of baptism. While the goal of this study is
the actualization of identity, it has been made clear earlier that identity includes the social matrix
of one’s life setting and the vocation one has been called to in service to others. Therefore, all
eight ritual elements will be discussed in what follows.
The first ritual element to consider is the numinous. The numinous is grounded in the
smiling face of the mother and the naming of the child, which she does as she looks into the
child’s face. Erikson refers to the daily appearance of the mother as the “’greeting ceremonial’
marking the beginning of the infant’s day.”51 In the baptismal rite, “Holy Baptism,” the
invocation, at the beginning, and the “welcome,” at the close of the rite have a similar ritual
function. In the former, the name of God is spoken, setting the rite apart as a sacred ritual in
which God is present with his grace and love. The “welcome” is the congregation’s “greeting
50
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ceremonial,” informing the newly baptized that he is now a member of the group, and a brother
in Christ. The implications of the “greeting ceremonial” provides ritual material from which to
counsel a person concerning his place in the congregation. God has placed his name upon him,
the congregation has acknowledged this fact, he is now a member of a new family. This socially
incorporating aspect of baptism needs greater emphasis in the Lutheran Church—Missouri
Synod than it is often given. Baptism does not merely save an individual; it makes him a member
of the family. The invocation is solely God’s work, claiming the candidate by marking him with
the Triune name. The welcome is the obedient response of the congregation giving their “Amen”
to God’s work in the rite.
The “greeting ceremonial” is intensified in “Holy Baptism–Alternate Form.” Although the
rite does not begin with the invocation, but rather with the scripture verses instituting baptism
and the proclamation of original sin with the result of slavery to Satan, the invocation in this rite
follows the exorcism. This implies a change in status. The candidate has been possessed by an
unclean spirit; he has been a slave of the devil. Now God’s name is pronounced over him, and
the demon is driven away. The sign of the holy cross is made on his forehead and his heart. He
now belongs to Christ the crucified. Solid pastoral care of a Christian, who is deeply troubled by
temptation, should include reference to the exorcistic power of baptism. If the “Alternate Form”
is not practiced in the congregation, or was not used for that person in the congregation in which
he was baptized, the exorcistic elements of the rite, such as the teaching on deliverance from the
power of the devil in the section about original sin, the picture of Pharaoh as a type of Satan, and
entrance into the kingdom of God, as described in the baptism Gospel, should be emphasized.
Before baptism, all people are members of the devil’s realm. By means of baptism, the Christian
is rescued from slavery to the devil and made to be a child of God.
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Another numinous element in the rite is the naming. In “Holy Baptism,” the candidate is
asked how he is named. In “Alternate Form,” the question is not asked. Rather, the pastor first
uses the person’s name in the prayer requesting God’s blessing and power in baptism. The next
time the person’s name is used is when he is asked if he renounces the devil. In both rites, the
most significant use of the name is in the act of baptizing. In this one single act the person’s
name and the Triune name are joined as the water is poured three times, or as the person is triple
immersed in the water. This joining of the person by name with the name of God has great
significance. Nagel states:
Name and identity go together. So we have the designation of a particular person by
name, and upon that particular person the triune name of God is put with the water in
the very act of baptizing. Through all the variations of liturgy this has always been
there. Who and whose we are is given with the name and the water.52
The baptismal Gospel, Mark 10:13–16, includes reference to Jesus taking the little children
up in his arms and putting his hands on them, blessing them. In both rites, this reading is
immediately followed by the pastor placing his hands on the candidate and blessing him by
praying over him and for him the Lord’s Prayer. While this certainly includes a dramatic element
as does the entire ritual, the numinous element is akin to the mother reaching out to lovingly
touch her child, to speak his name, and to assure the child that he is hers. In the baptismal rite,
the pastor personifies Christ, reaching out to bless the candidate for baptism. Nagel remarks:
“The blessing bestowed is that of being drawn by Jesus into the company of those who, with and
because of him, call God Abba, baby talk for Father, which no one ever dared before Jesus.”53
This ties the numinous element to the affiliative, which provides the pastor with a ritual picture
to assist a counselee who feels estranged from God and the church.
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The numinous element includes not only the smiling countenance of the mother, but her
voice speaking to her child, naming him and claiming him as her own. When a mother calls her
child by name she acknowledges him as hers and grants him his place in the family. A father
similarly does this when he claims the child. There is never a doubt about who a child’s mother
is, but, in a sense, every father adopts his child by claiming him as his own, by saying, “You are
mine.” In baptism, “Christ claims us as his own.”54 God’s word is his voice, his numinous voice,
making a person to be his and granting that person his true identity. God’s Word is the recreative agent or tool of his reality-changing action by making a person righteous in Christ.
The numinous element of ritualization is coterminous with Stage I (Trust vs. Mistrust).
Erikson connected this stage with religion. He wrote of the confession of dependence and
“childlike faith” which seeks and finds the security of being in “the very bosom of the divine.”55
The numinous elements of the rite provide the ground for trust in God who loves, who reaches
out to save, and who names the candidate and claims her as his own child. Erikson, however,
also acknowledges that the numinous has a seemingly darker side. Just as the mother withdraws
her smiling face from time to time, and yet reappears to meet real needs, so God often hides his
smiling face. He appears to be an inaccessible “Other.” In Rom. 5:1–5, Paul writes of times of
suffering or trial. Yet he quickly reminds his readers, in 5:6–11, of God’s love in Christ. Erikson
describes the mother’s increasing number of “series of estrangements” which are designed to
exercise and strengthen the child’s trust and to develop the virtue of hope.56 Paul writes about the
teleological purpose of suffering. Suffering is designed to produce hope in the Christian. By
drawing the Christian’s attention to the numinous elements of the rite, pastoral care can provide
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the assurance that God has not maliciously withdrawn his presence from the believer. God
withdraws only in order to, and for as long as it is necessary to, create and strengthen hope.57
Although the numinous might appear to be without a dangerous extreme, Erikson warns of
idolism, “which distorts the reverence for the truly numinous.”58 A magical view of baptism, or
assigning superstitious power to the water itself, are ways the numinous element of baptism can
be perverted. Similarly, the sign of the cross, while a symbol interpreted by the word of the cross
in the gospel, is not a good-luck charm. The power of baptism is in the word of Christ and in the
proclamation of the Triune name. Baptism is a washing of water in the word (Eph. 5:26). Of
concern for many pastors is the parishioner who wants her child or grandchild baptized, but
makes no commitment to regular attendance at the divine service, within which the child will be
catechized in the faith. Nagel notes the catechetical nature of the renunciation and the creed.59
This is, however, but the beginning. An improvement to the rite might include the full citation of
Matt. 28:18–20, rather than the truncated citation currently in use.
The rite of baptism, while predominantly a bestowal of the gift of Christ’s alien
righteousness, has judicious elements as well. In Erikson’s theory, the judicious begins when the
mother sets boundaries on the infant’s behavior, which begin to give the child a sense of
separation or individuation from the mother. This stage intensifies as the principles of law and
order increase and increasing numbers of previously tolerated behaviors are prohibited.60 The
opening words of both rites emphasize the fallen condition of the candidate. He has been
conceived and born sinful, he is under the power of the devil, and he would be lost forever were
57
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it not for Christ. This gives a fatal blow to sinful human autonomy, as well as to human initiative
and industry in terms of works-righteousness. The sinfulness of the unbelieving world and the
obduracy of the human heart are highlighted in the Sintflutgebet. The candidate’s own sinfulness,
inherited from Adam, and his sinful deeds are also a topic of that prayer. The mention of Adam
in the Sintflutgebet reaches back to Genesis 3, but also can be used in pastoral care and
counseling as an entry point for discussing Romans 5, and then the themes of the old man and
new man in Romans 6–8. A final section on the judicious appears in the living of the lighted
candle. As pointed out above, the light comes from the paschal candle, which is a ritual
representative of Christ resurrected from the dead. Now the newly baptized Christ is given light
from that light so that he might walk in that light. The judicious is here a gentle urging to
actualize the light given in baptism.
In “Holy Baptism—Alternate Form,” the judicious, namely the teaching about original sin,
precedes the numinous greeting, the proclamation of the Triune name and the signing of the
candidate with the cross. It should be remembered that the various elements of ritualization, in
Erikson’s theory, though usually highlighted at various stages in the life cycle, are present in one
form or another at each stage. That the judicious precedes the numinous in this rite is of no real
consequence. From the perspective of proclamation, it would appear to follow more closely the
Luther proclivity for preaching law before gospel. The first proclamation of then gospel, in
“Holy Baptism—Alternate Form,” is the exorcism. Nagel remarks:
By Baptism the Lord saves and makes us his own. The only alternative to belonging
to him is to belong to the devil. Hence Satan must be banished and renounced. This is
done with words of God and prayer. This is Jesus’ work (Matt. 8:16; 12:28) and is
done in his name (Mark 9:38). The dominion of Satan is the dominion of sin. Baptism
frees us from this.61
61
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The purpose of baptism is to put to death the old identity of being a slave to sin and Satan
and effecting the rebirth of the candidate, so as to confer upon him the righteousness of Christ,
which is the foundation of his new identity. Erikson warns of the judicious element becoming so
heightened that it transforms into legalism.62 The two baptismal liturgies do not create such a
result. In fact, the only judicious elements are the statement of original sin and, in the giving of
the candle, a gentle urging to live in the light of Christ. It has been shown above, in the
discussion of Romans 6–8, that Paul eschews legalism. The Christian has died to the
commandments of Torah, to the law as a lord. Rather than legalism, the urging to live in the light
of Christ comes from the new reality of being dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus.
The judicious elements of ritual are connected to Stage II (Autonomy vs. Shame and
Doubt). Erikson writes:
The very autonomy gained in the second stage, namely, a sense of being a separate
person with a will born of self-will and tamed by self-control—that autonomy soon
finds its limits in our sensitive awareness of being watched by superior persons and of
being called names, even bestial ones.63
Erikson therefore points to the development of the superego, which stands watch over the person
accusing and excusing. This certainly parallels Paul’s description of the conscience in Rom.
2:15, the very section in which he writes of the judicious. In Rom 8:1–9, Paul writes about the
work of the Holy Spirit, who is given in baptism, and how Christians are to walk in the Spirit. In
Gal. 5:16–26, he uses the same language and states that one aspect of the “fruit of the Spirit” is
self-control. By submitting to the Spirit’s guidance, the Christian begins follow the law’s
guidance without being under its crushing, condemning weight. Erikson states that the egostrength of this stage is “will.” He writes: “To will does not mean to be willful, but rather to gain
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gradually the power of increased judgment and decision in the application of the drive. A man
must learn to will what can be, to renounce as not worth willing what cannot be, and to believe
he willed what is inevitable.”64 Paul, in Rom. 12:1–2, writes of the result of having one’s mind
transformed by the truth. The baptized learns to discern the will of God. Paraphrasing Erikson:
The Christian must learn to will what in conformity with God’s will, to renounce what is not, and
to view all things from the perspective of his reality in Christ. This is the point of the giving of
the candle. The Christian now lives in conformity with the light he has received in Christ.
Stage III (Initiative vs. Guilt) is ritualized in the dramatic. The ego-strength of this stage is
“purpose.”65 Erikson wrote that the dramatic elements include “a coherent plot with dramatic
turns and some form of climatic conclusion.”66 The plot of the baptismal ritual is the movement
from being in sin and under Satan’s power to being a member of God’s family. This is th
purpose of the rite. It includes a change in identity from being a sinner to the identity of being
one of the saints, who “obtain the promised inheritance in heaven.”67 The drama of the ritual is
the strongest in the Sintflutgebet and in the Creed. In the Sintflutgebet the passing through the
waters pictures death and resurrection, which is the motif Paul uses in Romans 6. The prayer
begins with the story of the flood, which annihilated the sinful inhabitants of the world. Noah
and his family were saved by means of the ark. The picture of the ark serves as the inclusio of
the prayer. The pastor asks God to keep the baptized “safe and secure in the holy ark of the
Christian Church.”68 Just as Noah’s family was saved, so the Christian family is saved in the ark
of the church. In the center of the prayer, following the story of the exodus from Egypt, is the
64
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request that the candidate be granted true faith by the Holy Spirit. The foundation of identity is
therefore acknowledged to be in trust in God who has given these promises in baptism. God
speaks these words of promise in the theo-drama of Christ’s work, communicated by means of
baptism.
This theo-drama is recited in the confession of the baptismal creed, which is given as an
interrogation. The creed forms the center of catechesis. It is at the center because in it the drama
of God’s work in creation, redemption, and sanctification is narrated. In terms of pastoral care,
the creed should be taught, not as a dry recitation, but as a dramatic reading of God’s work. In
the rite, following the renunciation, the contrast between the realm of sin and death and the
kingdom of God can be highlighted. That which is renounced is one’s old identity in Adam and
under the devil. That which is confessed is the source of one’s new identity in Christ.
Kevin Vanhoozer describes the roles various players, or actors, have in the drama of
doctrine, which can also be helpful in thinking through the dramatic elements in baptism.69 One
set of actors is Adam and his children. This is reflected in the words of the Sintflutgebet, which
mentions Adam as the one from whom the candidate for baptism has inherited original sin. All
those present also are part of this set of actors, since the congregation and the baptismal party all
participate in parts of the rite. Each has his own script. Another set of actors Vanhoozer refers to
is Christ and his holy angels. While the holy angels are not mentioned in the rite, Christ is the
prominent figure, along with the Father and the Holy Spirit. So instead of Vanhoozer’s cast, it
would be better to consider the three divine Persons as dramatis personae in baptism. The third
set of actors Vanhoozer mentions is comprised of Satan and the demons. The exorcism in “Holy
Baptism—Alternate Form” names the demon as an unclean spirit, commanding it to depart.
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Satan is specifically mentioned, when the candidate is called upon to renounce the devil, his
works, and his ways.
This climatic movement from the kingdom of darkness to God’s kingdom can be
emphasized by the movement recommended in the rubrics from the entrance to the nave to the
font. Additionally, the rubric that directs all to return to their places, which comes at the end of
the rite, can also be used to communicate that the baptized is now a full member of the
sanctorum communio. Having been snatched from the devil’s clutches, having passed safely
through the waters, the newly baptized now takes his seat among the other disciples of Jesus.
Erikson warns of a detrimental tendency to overly dramatize. He warns of impersonation, of
simply playing dramatically, without any conviction. This becomes mere role-playing.70
But this is not mere role-playing. The virtue, or ego-strength, of Stage III (Initiative vs.
Guilt) and the corresponding ritual element of the dramatic is “purpose.” Erikson states that
purpose is “the courage to envisage and pursue valued goals uninhibited by the defeat of infantile
fantasies, by guilt and by the foiling fear of punishment.”71 The dramatic elements of the rite
teach that the Christian has moved into a new realm, that he is no longer under the realm of
Satan. The Christian is in Christ Jesus. “Therefore, there is now no condemnation” for the one
who is baptized into Christ.72 Guilt and “the foiling fear of punishment” are removed. Led by the
Spirit, the Christian is set free to attempt ways of actualizing her baptismal identity, free from the
fear of getting it wrong and being rejected by God because of failure. While Erikson connects
this sage with the play age, it should not be restricted to childhood. The crushing weight of being
judged for every failure to be perfect is entirely removed. This is the liberating joy of being
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righteous in Christ. “Safe and secure in the ark of the Christian church” the Christian is released
from the law so that she can follow the lead of the Spirit in true freedom. The words of the
prayer which accompany the giving of the white garment speak about the judgment seat of
Christ. Rather than being words which create fear, they remind the newly baptize and all in
attendance that the reason for paralyzing fear is removed. “So you shall stand before the
judgment seat of Christ to receive the inheritance prepared for you from the foundation of the
world.”73 In this is true freedom.
This freedom, however, is not merely freedom from, but freedom to. It is freedom to follow
the Spirit’s lead. This freedom is not chaotic, it has form. Erikson links the formal elements of
ritual to Stage IV (Industry vs. Inferiority). The ego-strength of this stage is “competence.”
“Competence, then, is the free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of tasks,
unimpaired by infantile inferiority.”74 It becomes the basis for cooperative work as part of a
group.
The formal aspect of ritual also gives structure to the numinous, the judicious, and the
dramatic elements. It tames the chaotic. Catherine Bell has noted:
Formality is one of the most frequently cited characteristics of ritual, even though it is
certainly not restricted to ritual per se. In fact, as a quality, formality is routinely
understood in terms of contrast and degree. That is, formal activities set up an explicit
contrast with informal or casual ones; and activities can be formalized to different
extents. In general, the more formal a series of movements and activities, the more
ritual-like they are apt to seem to us.75
This is certainly true of the baptismal rites. Vanhoozer refers to pastors as “dramaturges (workers
of drama) charged with preparing the company of the baptized to put feet on their doctrine,
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walking the way of Jesus Christ with not only theoretical but also practical understanding.”76 The
rubrics function as stage directions, guiding the drama, giving it form and structure. However,
the “may” rubrics allow for improvisation, as does the governing principle of the adiaphora.
However, if everything is an adiaphoron, then the entire rite degenerates into chaos. The formal
structure of the rite causes the impression which words of the rite have upon the participants to
be multiplied. Franz Rosenzweig, a German Jewish theologian and philosopher stated:
Liturgy frees gesture from the fetters of helpless servitude to speech, and makes of it
something more than speech. Only the liturgical gesture anticipates that “purified lip”
which is promised for “that day” to the peoples ever divided as to language. In it the
impoverished muteness of the disbelieving members becomes eloquent, the voluble
loquacity of the believing heart becomes silent. Disbelief and belief unite their
prayer.77
Nevertheless, the elements of the rite exist to serve the purpose of the rite, and not the other way
around. Too fastidious concern for perfection in performance can degenerate into mere
showmanship. Erikson reminds us that the numinous, the judicious, the dramatic, and the formal
all combine to teach the ideological. On the other hand, “we also perceive the danger of
overformalization, perfectionism, and empty ceremonialism.”78 This is a helpful warning for
pastors not to become overly fastidious in liturgy. Ritual is not a thing unto itself. It exists in
service to the gospel. In the baptismal rites, ritual serves the sacrament.
As stated above, the ego-strength, or virtue, of this stage is “competence.” While the
baptismal rites do not expressly mention it, within the Sintflutgebet are the words: “serving Your
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name at all times with a fervent spirit and a joyful hope.”79 The renunciation includes the
rejection of the works, or industries, of the devil. The welcome into the congregation, spoken by
the assisting minister or elder, encourage the newly baptized to join in the work the Lord has
given the congregation to do. The free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of
tasks, unimpaired by infantile inferiority”80 is certainly needed for such communal activity.
The foregoing ritual elements combine to teach, what Erikson calls, “the ideological,” and
what the church might call, “the theological,” or the fides quae creditur.81 The biblical references
which are specifically cited in the rite are Matt. 28:18b–19, Mark 16:16a, 1 Pet. 3:21, and Mark
10:13–16. The first three are the references used in the Small Catechism to describe what
baptism is, what benefits it gives, and how water can be salvific. What is missing in the rite is the
reference that supports the significance of baptism for daily life, namely, Rom. 6:4. Rather than
citing this verse, the Sintflutgebet dramatizes it in the stories of the flood and the exodus. The
drowning of sin and dying to sin are specifically mentioned in the prayer in the request for God
to accomplish this in the candidate’s life.
Erikson links Stage V (Identity vs. Identity Diffusion) with the ego-strength of “fidelity.”
Fidelity, or faithfulness, is “the ability to sustain loyalties freely pledged in spite of inevitable
contradiction in value systems.”82 The social milieu certainly presents value systems which
contradict the word of God. Indwelling sin likewise is contrary to the will of God. In baptism, the
Christian is immersed into a new value system and given a counter-cultural ideology.
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Overarching ideological themes in the baptismal rites are being cleansed from the demonic,
being marked with the cross of Christ, with the name of God, and with the seal of the Holy
Spirit. Dying to sin is taught in the Sintflutgebet and renouncing the devil and his works and
ways and being turned to God in Christ are taught in the renunciation and the creed. The gift of
the white garment, with which comes no exhortation, communicates the gift of the righteousness
of Christ, which is the Christian’s new identity. This righteousness covers all sin and removes all
fear of judgment, which is intimately connected to Paul’s statement in Rom. 8:1, that nothing is
condemnation for the Christian. As noted above, an exhortation does accompany the giving of
the lighted candle. Yet it is an urging to live in accordance with reality, to actualize that which is
true by imputation. These aspects of doctrine are taught by act more so than by words.
Vanhoozer states concerning the sacraments: “Baptism, along with the Lord’s Supper, is less a
speech-act and more an act that speaks.”83 The elements of ritual come together to give a rich and
thick experience of the faith (fides quae creditur). This can provide the pastor with a lived text
from which to provide pastoral care as he teaches the meaning of Christian identity and the way
in which it is actualized in daily life.
Erikson’s concern at this stage is that the communication of an ideology not metamorphize
into unhealthy fanaticism. Rather, the purpose of the ritual is to create a solidarity of conviction,
which forms a coherent identity and then leads a person to become a participating, contributing,
loving member of the social group, caring for others, especially for those in other generations.84
This is evident in the affiliative and generative elements in the baptismal rites. The virtues
of Stage VI (Intimacy vs. Isolation) and Stage VII (Generativity vs. Stagnation) are “love” and
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“care” respectively.85 Returning to the Sintflutgebet, the prayer teaches the affiliative effect of
baptism by reminding the congregation of the salvation of Noah’s family and the rescue of the
people of Israel. The prayer also asks that the candidate be separated from the multitude of
unbelievers and joined to the company of those who believe. This includes, to a degree, what
Erikson might call “speciation.” The prayer clearly delineates between those who belong to God
and those who don’t, between the righteous and the unrighteous, between the believers and the
unbelievers. This “speciation” is essential to forming a unique identity as a Christian, so long as
it does not result in a lack of love and care toward others or to a sense of being better than others.
As Paul points out in Romans 2, and in Romans 9–11, that would be antithetical to the gospel,
which is to go out to all.
Another affiliative aspect in “Holy Baptism” is the welcoming spoken by the assisting
minister. If this is spoken by a lay member of the congregation, the impact could be heightened.
The welcome includes reception into the fellowship and the invitation to participate fully in the
life of the congregation.
The baptismal ritual also includes generative elements. Erikson thought of this as the
ritualization work or passing the values of the group on to the next generation.86 In his
developmental scheme, this is the stage in which one works in one’s vocation. Baptism gives the
Christian a new identity, a new family, and a new vocation. The Sintflutgebet points to the
Christian’s vocation by asking that the candidate be blessed in baptism so that he might serve
God’s “name at all times with a fervent spirit and a joyful hope.”87 The welcome also includes
generative elements. The assisting minister invites the newly baptized to join the congregation in
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proclaiming “the praises of Him who called us out of darkness into His marvelous light.”88
The final stage of ritualization is “the integrative.” This stage is connected to Stage VIII
(Integrity vs. Despair and Disgust). The ego-strength of this stage is “wisdom,” which is the
“detached concern with life itself, in the face of death.”89 For Erikson, the person who achieves a
sense of integrity has a hope which outweighs any sense of despair or disgust. The baptismal rite
teaches true wisdom, not by ignoring death, but by embracing it in the death and resurrection of
Christ. The Sintflutgebet reminds those who hear and pray it that baptism unites the Christian
with Christ who has won eternal life for the believer.90 The creed points the hearer to “the
resurrection of the body and the life of the world to come.”91 The words which accompany the
giving of the lighted candle remind the newly baptized of the “marriage feast of the Lamb,”92
which she will attend. This teaches the newly baptized who she is. She is Christ’s. She is
righteous in him. She is a new person with a new identity.
The baptismal rites are a rich source for pastoral care, including the actualization of the
Christian’s real identity. E. Byron Anderson, describes worship as “doing our life together as
Christian people,” and not merely talking about it.93 The rite of baptism moves the participants
beyond a mere lex orandi and lex credenda to lex agenda (the law of action) and to lex vivendi
(law of living).94 It is the ritual elements of the rite, not the mere words, which combine with the
words to impact the participants. Merely studying the words on the page is insufficient. The
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whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The prayers, the words, and the actions combine to
communicate the reality of baptism so that it becomes a means for the actualization of Christian
identity. Erikson’s stages of ritualization provide a framework for examining the baptismal rites,
and for connecting these elements to the work of pastoral care, as the pastor seeks to help people
actualize the identity given to them in baptism.

302

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adam, Adolf. Foundations of Liturgy: An Introduction to Its History and Practice. Translated by
Matthew J. O’Connell. Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1992.
Adams, Jay. Competent to Counsel. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1970.
———. Christian Counselor’s Manual. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1973.
Aden, LeRoy. “Faith and the Development Cycle” Pastoral Psychology 24, no.3 (1976): 215–30.
Adler, Alfred. Understanding Human Nature. Translated by Walter B. Wolfe. Mansfield Centre,
CT: Martino, 2010.
Aland, Barbara, Kurt Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, Carlo M. Martini, and Bruce M.
Metzger, eds. Novum Testamentum Graece, 28th ed. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft,
2012.
Allen, Jon G. Coping with Trauma: A Guide to Self-Understanding. Washington, DC: American
Psychiatric Press, 1995.
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 5th
ed. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2013.
Anderson, E. Byron. Worship and Christian Identity: Practicing Ourselves. Collegeville, MN:
Pueblo, 2003.
Arnett, Jeffrey Jensen. Emerging Adulthood: The Winding Road from the Late Teens through the
Twenties. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Arnold, Magda B., ed. Feelings and Emotions: The Loyola Symposium. New York: Academic
Press, 1977.
Ashbrook, James B. Minding the Soul: Pastoral Counseling as Remembering. Minneapolis:
Fortress, 1996.
Baker, Mark C. and Stewart Goetz, eds. The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of
the Soul. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011.
Balswick, Jack O., Pamela Ebstyne King, and Kevin Reimer. The Reciprocating Self: Human
Development in Theological Perspective. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2005.
Barth, Karl. The Epistle to the Romans. 6th ed. Translated by Edwyn C. Hoskyns. London:
Oxford University Press, 1933.
Bauer, Walter, William F. Arndt, F. Wilbur Gingrich, and Frederick W. Danker, A GreekEnglish Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Christian Literature, 2nd ed. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979.
303

Bayer, Oswald. Living by Faith: Justification and Sanctification. Translated by Geoffrey W.
Bromiley. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003.
Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, 10th ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 1986.
Bell, Catherine. Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions. New York: Oxford University Press,
1997.
Benjamin, Ludy T., Jr. A Brief History of Modern Psychology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell,
2007.
Biermann, Joel D. A Case for Character: Towards a Lutheran Virtue Ethics. Minneapolis:
Fortress, 2014.
Blanchflower, David G. “Is Well-Being U-Shaped over the Life Cycle?” Social Science and
Medicine 66, no. 8 (2008): 1733–49.
Bland, Earl D. “The Divided Self: Courage and Grace as Agents of Change.” Journal of
Psychology and Christianity 28, no. 4 (2009): 326–37.
Bloland, Sue Erikson. In the Shadow of Fame: A Memoir by the Daughter of Erik H. Erikson.
New York: Viking, 2004.
Bollhagen, James. Ecclesiastes. Concordia Commentary. St. Louis: Concordia, 2011.
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Act and Being. Translated by H. Martin Rumscheidt. Vol. 2, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer Works. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996.
———.Sanctorum Communio. Translated by Joachim von Soosten. Vol 1, Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Works. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998.
––––––. Sanctorum Communio: Eine dogmatiche Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche.
München, DE: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 2005.
–––––. Theological Education Underground. Translated by Victoria J. Barnett. Vol. 15, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer Works. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2012.
Borysenko, Joan. A Woman’s Book of Life: The Biology, Psychology, and Spirituality of the
Feminine Life Cycle. New York: Riverhead Books, 1996.
Brittain, Aerika S. “Understanding African American Adolescents’ Identity Development: A
Relational Developmental Systems Perspective.” Journal of Black Psychology 38, no. 2
(2012): 172–200.
Bronfenbrenner, Urie. The Ecology of Human Development: Experiments by Nature and Design.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

304

Brown, Warren S., Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony, eds. Whatever Happened to the
Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998.
Brown, William P. Character in Crisis: A Fresh Approach to the Wisdom Literature of the Old
Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996.
Brunner, Emil. Dogmatics II: The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption Translated by
Olive Wyon. Cambridge: James Clarke, 1952.
Buber, Martin. Ich und Du. Heidelberg: Lambert Schnider, 1983.
Caemmerer, Richard R. Preaching for the Church: Theology and Technique of the Christian
Sermon. St. Louis: Concordia, 1959.
Capps, Donald. Agents of Hope: A Pastoral Psychology. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2001.
———. Biblical Approaches to Pastoral Counseling. Eugene OR: Wipf & Stock, 1981.
———. Deadly Sins and Saving Virtues. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2000.
———. The Decades of Life: A Guide to Human Development. Louisville: Westminster John
Knox, 2008.
———. The Depleted Self: Sin in a Narcissistic Age. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993.
———. “Erikson’s Schedule of Human Strengths and the Childhood Origins of the Resourceful
Self.” Pastoral Psychology 61 (2012): 269–83.
———. “Erikson’s Theory of Religious Ritual: The Case of the Excommunication of Ann
Hibbens.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 18, no. 4 (1979): 337–49.
––––––. “John Nash's Predelusional Phase: A Case of Acute Identity Confusion.” Pastoral
Psychology 51, no. 5 (2003): 361–86.
———. Life Cycle Theory and Pastoral Care. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1983.
———. Men and Their Religion: Honor, Hope, and Humor. Harrisburg: Trinity Press
International, 2002.
———. Men, Religion, and Melancholia: James, Otto, Jung, and Erikson. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1997.
Carpenter, Humphrey, ed. The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien. Boston: Houghton Milton, 1995.
Chang, Hae-Kyung. “The Christian Life in a Dialectical Tension? Romans 7:7–25
Reconsidered.” Novum Testamentum 49, no. 3 (2007): 257–80.
Chrisholm, Roderick M. Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. Chicago: Open Court, 1976.

305

Clebsche, William A. and Charles Jackle. Pastoral Care in Historical Perspective. New York:
Jason Aronson, 1975.
Coe, John H. and Todd W. Hall. Psychology in the Spirit: Contours of a Transformational
Psychology. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2010.
Collins, Gary. Christian Counseling: A Comprehensive Guide. 3rd ed. Nashville: Thomas
Nelson, 2007.
Conzen, Peter. Erik Erikson: Leben und Werk. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1996.
Cook, Kaye V. and Kathleen C. Leonard. “A Relationally Integrated Systems Model for Faith
and Learning in Developmental Psychology.” Journal of Psychology and Theology 42, no.
2 (2014): 150–63.
Coyle, Suzanne M., Uncovering Spiritual Narratives: Using Story in Pastoral Care and
Ministry. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014.
Cozolino, Louis. The Neuroscience of Human Relationships: Attachment and the Developing
Brain. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 2014.
———. The Neuroscience of Psychotherapy: Healing the Social Brain, 2nd ed. New York:
Norton, 2010.
Cranfield, C. E. B., A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. 2 vols.
International Critical Commentary. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975.
Crenshaw, James L. Qoheleth: The Ironic Wink. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina
Press, 2013.
Das, A. Andrew. Galatians. Concordia Commentary. St. Louis: Concordia, 2014.
Davis, John B. Individuals and Identity in Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011.
Dayringer, Richard. Life Cycle: Psychological and Theological Perceptions. New York:
Haworth, 2000.
DeMaris, Richard E. “Backing Away from Baptism: Early Christian Ambivalence about Its
Ritual.” Journal of Ritual Studies 27, no. 1 (2013): 11–19.
Deterding, Paul E. Colossians. Concordia Commentary. St. Louis: Concordia, 2003.
Driedger, Leo. “Individual Freedom vs. Community Control: An Adaptation of Erikson’s
Ontology of Ritualization.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 21, no. 3 (1982):
226–42.

306

Duling, Dennis C. “Social Memory and Commemoration of the Death of ‘the Lord’: Paul’s
Response to the Lord’s Supper Factions at Corinth.” In Memory and Identity in Ancient
Judaism and Christianity: A Conversation with Barry Schwartz, edited by Tom Thatcher,
289–310. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2014.
Eifert, William H. The Pastor at Work. St. Louis: Concordia, 1960.
Ellul, Jacques. La raison d’être: Meditation sur l’Eccléiaste. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1987.
Elms, Alan C. Uncovering Lies: The Uneasy Alliance of Biography and Psychology. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997.
Entwistle, David N. Integrative Approaches to Psychology and Christianity: An Introduction to
Worldview Issues, Philosophical Foundations, and Models of Integration. 2nd ed. Eugene,
OR: Cascade Books, 2010.
Entwistle, David N. and Stephen K. Moroney. “Integrative Perspectives on Human Flourishing:
The Imago Dei and Positive Psychology.” Journal of Psychology and Theology 39, no. 4
(2011): 295–303.
Erikson, Erik H. “Autobiographical Notes on the Identity Crisis.” Daedalus 99, no. 4 (1970),
730–59.
———. Childhood and Society. New York: Norton, 1950.
———. Childhood and Society. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 1963.
———. Dimensions of a New Identity. New York: Norton, 1974.
———. Gandhi’s Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence. New York: Norton, 1969.
———. Identity and the Life Cycle. New York: Norton, 1967.
———. Identity: Youth and Crisis. New York: Norton, 1968.
———. Insight and Responsibility. New York: Norton, 1964.
———. Life History and the Historical Moment: Diverse Perspectives. New York: Norton,
1975.
———. Toys and Reasons: Stages in the Ritualization of Experience. New York: Norton, 1977.
———. A Way of Looking at Things: Selected Papers 1930–80. Edited by Stephen Schlein. New
York: Norton, 1995.
———. Young Man Luther. New York: Norton, 1958.
Erikson, Erik H. and Joan Erikson. The Life Cycle Completed. Ext. ed. New York: Norton, 1998.

307

Erikson, Erik H., Joan M. Erikson, and Helen Q. Kivnick. Vital Involvement in Old Age. New
York: Norton, 1986.
Erikson, Joan. Wisdom and the Senses: The Way of Creativity. New York: Norton, 1988.
Erikson, Kai. In Search of Common Ground: Conversations with Erik H. Erikson and Huey P.
Newton. New York: Norton, 1973.
Esler, Philip F. Conflict and Identity in Romans: The Social Setting of Paul’s Letter.
Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003.
Eyer, Richard C. Pastoral Care under the Cross: God in the Midst of Suffering. St. Louis:
Concordia, 1994.
Faber, Heije, Striking Sails. Translated by Kenneth R. Mitchell. Nashville: Abingdon, 1984.
Fee, Gordon D. The First Epistle to the Corinthians. New International Commentary on the New
Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987.
Figley, Charles R. and William P. Nash, eds. Combat Stress Injury: Theory, Research, and
Management. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 2007.
Forde, Gerhard O. On Being a Theologian of the Cross: Reflections on Luther’s Heidelberg
Disputation. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997.
Fowler, James W. Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for
Meaning. New York: HarperCollins, 1978.
Franzmann, Martin H. Romans: A Commentary. St. Louis: Concordia, 1968.
Freud, Anna. Das Ich und die Abwehrmechanismen: Geist und Psyche. Frankfurt am Main:
Fischer, 2012.
Freud, Sigmund. “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning.” In The Freud
Reader. Edited by Peter Gray, 301–6. New York: Norton, 1989.
———. The Future of an Illusion. Translated by James B. Strachey. New York: Norton, 1961.
———. The Interpretation of Dreams. Translated by James B. Strachey. New York: Basic
Books, 1955.
––––––. New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis. Translated by James Strachey. New
York: Norton, 1964.
––––––. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. Translated by James Strachey. New York:
Basic Books, 2000.
———. Totem and Taboo. Translated by James B. Strachey. New York: Norton, 1950.

308

———. Die Traumdeutung. Leipzig: Franz Deuticke, 1900.
Frey, Jörg, Daniel R. Schwartz, and Stephanie Gripentrog, eds. Jewish Identity in the GrecoRoman World. Boston: Brill, 2007.
Friedman, Edwin H. Generation to Generation: Family Process in Church and Synagogue. New
York: Guilford, 1985.
Friedman, Lawrence J. Identity’s Architect: A Biography of Erik H. Erikson. New York:
Scribner, 1999.
Fritz, John H. C. Pastoral Theology. Concordia Classic. St. Louis: Concordia, 2000.
Fuller, Robert C. Religion and the Life Cycle. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988.
Gabbard, Glen O., Bonnie E. Litowitz, and Paul Williams, eds. Textbook of Psychoanalysis. 2nd
ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric, 2012.
Gaffin, Richard B. The Centrality of the Resurrection: A Study of Paul’s Soteriology. Grand
Rapids: Baker, 1978.
Gibbs, Jeffrey A. “Christ is Risen, Indeed: Good News for Him, and For Us.” Concordia Journal
40, no. 2 (2014): 113–31.
Giguère, Paul-André. “L'expérience des passages: regard d'un anthropologue et exégète.”
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